OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because that particular thing is, for instance, because the heaven exists it is necessary for the earth also to exist, and if the earth and heaven exist? This is the work of providence, which made this universe out of parts different in essence and in use. Or then are they not eternal, both the heaven and the earth and all the things in them, which contribute to one another for being and for acting and for being acted upon, or if they are eternal, it is not necessary for this to be this, because that is that. Aristotle, by positing one eternal necessity, made many other eternal necessities dependent upon the one posited. It is necessary, he says, for there to be an eternal motion. And if there is motion, it is necessary for there to be eternal time as well; for time is the number of motion. And if the motion is eternal, it is necessary for it to be continuous. And if the motion is continuous, it is necessary for there to be a simple body besides the bodies here, having neither heaviness nor lightness; for heavy and light bodies, since they move in a straight line, cannot move continuously. And if it moves continuously, it is necessary for it to have a spherical shape; for only with this shape is it possible for continuous motion to occur. And if it moves spherically, it is necessary for the earth to be always at rest in the middle, so that the motion of the sphere might occur around it. And if the earth, it is necessary also for the bodies between earth and fire. And if these, it is necessary for there to be generation, since these cannot be eternal. And if generation, it is necessary for there to be other circular bodies as well. But if the principle, 'if this is this, it is necessary for that to be that', has no place in ungenerated and eternal things, then the things mentioned are not eternal and ungenerated. And if these things are eternal and ungenerated, then this is not because of that, nor that because of this. Since if the earth exists, it is necessary for fire also to exist and the bodies between them, how, if the earth is ungenerated and eternal, is fire not eternal, being light and upward-moving? For if, as he says, of contraries if one exists by nature it is necessary for the other also to exist by nature, how is it not absurd for the earth to be eternal and ungenerated, but for fire not to be eternal, or for fire to be eternal, but the earth not to be eternal, things that exist on account of each other? If on account of generation it is necessary for there to be other circular bodies, how is generation not the cause of eternal things? For the circular bodies are eternal, and generation occurs according to their motion. And if this is absurd, then the circular bodies are not ungenerated; for those things whose being exists on account of other things coming to be, these are generated and not eternal. If it is possible for that which will exist in generated things to exist in eternal things—that this must be, since that is that—then ungenerated things do not differ at all from generated things; for, he says, in eternal things the possible differs in no way from the actual. 54. From the same discourse. Since it is possible to be moved on a circle in two ways, and these are not contrary. But if nothing happens by chance nor from

καὶ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν γινομένοις δεύ τερόν ἐστι τῆς προαιρέσεως), πῶς ὑπάρχει ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τὸ εἶναι τόδε τι διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο τόδε τι, οἷον ἐπειδὴ ὁ οὐρανός ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὴν γῆν, εἰ δὲ γῆ καὶ οὐ ρανός ἐστι; Τοῦτο δὲ προνοίας ἐστὶν ἔργον, τῆς τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἐκ διαφόρων κατ' οὐσίαν τε καὶ χρείαν μερῶν ποιησά σης. Ἢ ἄρα οὐκ ἀΐδια ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς πάντα, τὰ πρὸς τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἀλλήλοις συντελοῦντα, ἢ εἰ ἀΐδια, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τόδε τόδε εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ τόδε τόδε ἐστίν. Μίαν ἀΐδιον ἀνάγκην ὑποθέμενος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης πολλὰς ἄλλας ἀϊδίους ἀνάγκας ἐκ τῆς ὑπο τεθείσης ἐξήρτησεν. Ἀνάγκη, φησίν, εἶναι κίνησιν ἀΐδιον. Eἰ δὲ κίνησις, ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ χρόνον ἀΐδιον· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος. Eἰ δὲ ἀΐδιος ἡ κίνησις, ἀνάγκη ταύτῃ εἶναι συνεχῆ. Eἰ δὲ συνεχὴς ἡ κίνησις, ἀνάγκη εἶναι σῶμα ἁπλοῦν παρὰ τὰ ἐνταῦθα σώματα, μήτε βαρύτητα μήτε κου φότητα ἔχον· τὰ γὰρ βαρέα καὶ κοῦφα σώματα, ἐπειδὴ κατ' εὐθεῖαν κινεῖται, συνεχῶς κινεῖσθαι οὐ δύναται. Eἰ δὲ συνε χῶς κινεῖται, ἀνάγκη σφαιρικὸν ἔχειν σχῆμα· τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ σχήματι ἐνδέχεται μόνῳ τὴν συνεχῆ γενέσθαι κίνησιν. Eἰ δὲ σφαιρικῶς κινεῖται, ἀνάγκη τὴν γῆν εἶναι ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἀεὶ ἠρεμοῦσαν, ἵνα περὶ αὐτὴν γίνηται τῆς σφαίρας ἡ κίνησις. Eἰ δὲ ἡ γῆ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ γῆς τε καὶ πυρὸς σώματα. Eἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα ἀΐδια εἶναι οὐ δύναται. Eἰ δὲ ἡ γένεσις, ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα ἐγκύκλια σώματα. Ἀλλ' εἰ, εἰ τόδε τόδε ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τόδε τόδε εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀγενήτοις τε καὶ ἀϊδίοις χώραν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐκ ἄρα ἀΐδιά τε καὶ ἀγένητα τὰ ·ηθέντα. Eἰ δὲ ἀΐδια ταῦτα καὶ ἀγένητα, οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο δι' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἐκεῖνο διὰ τοῦτο. Ἐπειδὴ εἰ ἡ γῆ ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ πῦρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν σώματα, πῶς, εἰ ἡ μὲν γῆ ἀγένητός τε καὶ ἀΐδιος, τὸ πῦρ οὐκ ἀΐδιον, τὸ ὑπάρχον κοῦφόν τε καὶ ἀνωφερές; Eἰ γάρ, ὥς φησιν, ὧν ἐναντίων τὸ θάτερον φύσει καὶ τὸ θάτερον ἀνάγκη φύσει εἶναι, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον τὸ τὴν γῆν εἶναι ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἀγένητον, τὸ δὲ πῦρ μὴ εἶναι ἀΐδιον, ἢ τὸ πῦρ εἶναι ἀΐδιον, τὴν δὲ γῆν μὴ εἶναι ἀΐδιον, τὰ δι' ἄλληλα ὄντα; Eἰ διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἄλλα ἐγκύκλια σώματα, πῶς οὐχ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστιν αἰτία τῶν ἀϊδίων; Ἀΐδια γὰρ τὰ ἐγκύκλια σώματα, καὶ ἡ γένεσις κατὰ τὴν τούτων κίνησιν. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἐγκύκλια σώματα ἀγένητα· ὧν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἄλλα γενέσθαι ἐστί, γενητὰ ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἀΐδια. Eἰ ἐνδέχεται ἐν τοῖς ἀϊ δίοις ὑπάρξειν τὸ ὑπάρξον ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς, τόδε ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τόδε ἐστὶ τόδε, οὐδὲν ἄρα διαφέρει τὰ ἀγένητα τῶν γενητῶν· ἐν γάρ, φησί, τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ εἶναι. νδ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἐπειδὴ ἔστι διχῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου κινηθῆναι, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐναντίαι αὗται. Ἀλλὰ εἰ μηθὲν ὡς ἔτυχε μηδ' ἀπὸ