LECTURE 7 (195 b 31-196 b 9)

DIFFERENT OPINIONS ABOUT FORTUNE AND CHANCE, THE HIDDEN CAUSES

             198. Having treated the obvious species and modes of cause, the Philosopher here takes up certain hidden modes, namely, fortune and chance.

             Concerning this he makes two points. First he states his intention. Secondly, he pursues his intention, where he says, 'Some people even question . . .' (195 b 36).

             He says, therefore, first that fortune and chance are also reckoned among the causes, since many things are said to come to be or to exist because of fortune and chance.

             And so with respect to fortune and chance three things must be considered; namely, how they are reduced to the causes mentioned above, then whether fortune and chance are the same or different, and finally what chance and fortune are.

             Next where he says, 'Some people even question . . .' (195 b 36), he begins his treatment of fortune and chance.

             First he sets forth the opinions of others. Secondly, where he says, 'First then we observe . . .' (196 b 10), he establishes the truth.

             Concerning the first part he sets forth three opinions. The second begins where he says, 'There are some . . .' (196 a 25), and the third, where he says, 'Others there are . . .' (196 b 5).

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he sets forth the opinions and arguments of those who deny fortune and chance. Secondly, where he says, 'But there is a further circumstance . . .' (196 a 11), he argues about some of these reasons.

             199. He says, therefore, first that some have questioned whether fortune and chance exist. They deny that they exist for two reasons.

             The first argument is that all of those things which are said to come to be by chance or fortune are found to have some determinate cause other than fortune. He gives an example of this sort of thing. If someone coming to the market place should find some man whom he wished to find, but who he did not previously believe would be found, we say that his finding of this man was due to fortune. But the cause of this finding is his will to buy, for the sake of which he went to the market where the man whom he sought was. And the same is true of all other things which are said to be by fortune, for they have some cause other than fortune. And so fortune does not seem to be a cause of anything, and consequently is nothing. For we do not posit fortune except insofar as we hold that some things exist by fortune.

             200. He gives the second argument where he says, '. . . for if chance were real . . .' (196 a 6).

             He says that if fortune were something, it seems to be inconsistent (and that it is truly inconsistent is shown below and puzzling why none of the ancient wise men who treated the causes of generation and corruption treated fortune. But, as it seems, those ancients thought that nothing exists by fortune. This second argument is taken from the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers.

             201. Next where he says, 'But there is a further circumstance . . .' (196 a 11), he argues about this second proof, showing what he had assumed above, namely, that it is inconsistent that the ancient natural philosophers did not treat chance and fortune. He proves this with two arguments.

             His first argument is as follows. It seems remarkable, and indeed it is, that the ancient natural philosophers did not treat chance and fortune. For they assumed that they treated the causes of those things which come to be, yet there are many things which come to be by fortune and chance. Hence they should have treated fortune and chance. Nor are they to be excused by the argument given above which denies fortune and chance. For although men know that every effect is reduced to some cause, as the above opinion which denies fortune and chance stated, nevertheless, regardless of this argument, these philosophers held that some things come to be by fortune, and other things do not. Hence these natural philosophers must make mention of fortune and chance at least in order to show that it is false that some things come to be by fortune and chance, and in order to point out the reason why some things are said to be by fortune and some not. Nor can they be excused by reason of the fact that chance and fortune would be reduced to one of the causes which they posited. For they did not think that fortune is one of the things which they thought to be causes, such as friendship or strife or some other such thing.

             202. He gives his second argument where he says, 'This is strange . . .' (196 a 19).

             He says that whether they thought that fortune existed or not, it is inconsistent that the ancient natural philosophers neglected to treat fortune. For if they thought that there was fortune, it is inconsistent that they did not treat it; if, however, they thought that there was no fortune, it is inconsistent that they sometimes used it. For example, Empedocles said that air is not always united on high above the earth, as if this were natural to it, but rather this happens by chance. For he says that when the earth was made by strife distinguishing the elements, it happened that air gathered together in this place, and as it came together then, it will hold this course so long as the world remains. But in other worlds, which he held come to be and are corrupted to infinity, as was said above, air would be differently related in many ways to the parts of the universe. And likewise he said that the many parts of animals come to be by fortune, so that in the first production of the world, heads came to be without necks.

             203. Next where he says, 'These are some . . .' (196 a 25), he gives the second opinion.

             Concerning this he makes two points. First he sets forth the opinion. Secondly, he disproves it where he says, 'This statement might . . .' (196 a 28).

             He says, therefore first, that some have said that chance is the cause of the heavens and all the parts of the world. And they said that the revolution of the world, and the movement of the stars distinguishing and constituting the whole universe below according to this order, is by chance. This seems to be the opinion of Democritus, who says that the heavens and the whole world are constituted by chance through the movement of atoms which are per se mobile.

             204. Next where he says, 'This statement might . . .' (196 a 28), he disproves this position with two arguments.

             The first argument is that it would seem to be worthy of great wonder that animals and plants are not from fortune but from intellect or nature or some other determinate cause. For it is clear that a thing is not generated from any seed whatsoever, but man from a determinate seed, and the olive from a determinate seed. And since these inferior things do not come to be by fortune, it is worthy of wonder that the heavens and those things which are more divine among the sensible things obvious to us, e.g. the sempiternal parts of the world, are by chance, and should not have any determinate cause, as do animals and plants. And if this is true, it would have been worthwhile to insist and to give a reason why this is so. But the ancients failed to do this.

             205. He gives the second argument where he says, 'For besides the other . . .' (196 b 1). How can it be true that the celestial bodies are by chance, while inferior bodies are not? This seems to be inconsistent first from the fact that they are the nobler, and secondly it is even more inconsistent in the light of what is seen. For we see that in the heavens nothing comes to be by chance, whereas in inferior bodies, which are not said to be by chance, many things seem to happen by fortune. According to their position it would be more reasonable if the converse were true, so that in those things whose cause is chance or fortune, some things would be found to come to be by chance or by fortune, whereas in those things whose cause is not chance or fortune, these latter would not be found.

             206. Next where he says, 'Others there are . . .' (196 b 5), he sets forth the third opinion about fortune.

             He says that it seems to some that fortune is a cause, but it is hidden to the human intellect, as if it were something divine and above men. For they wanted to hold the position that all fortuitous events are reduced to some divine ordaining cause, as we hold that all things are ordered by divine providence.

             But although this opinion has a radical truth, they did not use the name 'fortune' well. For that divine thing which orders cannot be called or named fortune, because to the extent that a thing participates in reason or order, it recedes from the nature [ratio] of fortune. Hence, the inferior cause, which of itself does not have an ordination to the fortuitous event, should much more be called fortune than the superior cause, if such a cause is the one which orders.

             He omits an inquiry about this opinion, both because it exceeds the bounds of natural science, and because he shows below that fortune is not a per se cause, but a per accidens cause. Hence how he evaluates these opinions will be made more clear in what follows. And so he concludes that for the clarification of these opinions, we must consider what fortune and chance are, and whether they are the same or different, and how they are reduced to the causes mentioned above.