§15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is improperly spoken of, and is inferior.

But at all events he will allow that this supremacy of being betokens no excess of power, or of goodness, or of anything of that kind. Every one knows that, not to mention those whose knowledge is supposed to be very profound; viz., that the personality of the Only-begotten and of the Holy Ghost has nothing lacking in the way of perfect goodness, perfect power, and of every quality like that. Good, as long as it is incapable of its opposite, has no bounds to its goodness: its opposite alone can circumscribe it, as we may see by particular examples. Strength is stopped only when weakness seizes it; life is limited by death alone; darkness is the ending of light: in a word, every good is checked by its opposite, and by that alone. If then he supposes that the nature of the Only-begotten and of the Spirit can change for the worse, then he plainly diminishes the conception of their goodness, making them capable of being associated with their opposites. But if the Divine and unalterable nature is incapable of degeneracy, as even our foes allow, we must regard it as absolutely unlimited in its goodness: and the unlimited is the same as the infinite. But to suppose excess and defect in the infinite and unlimited is to the last degree unreasonable: for how can the idea of infinitude remain, if we posited increase and loss in it? We get the idea of excess only by a comparison of limits: where there is no limit, we cannot think of any excess. Perhaps, however, this was not what he was driving at, but he assigns this superiority only by the prerogative of priority in time, and, with this idea only, declares the Father’s being to be alone the supreme one. Then he must tell us on what grounds he has measured out more length of life to the Father, while no distinctions of time whatever have been previously conceived of in the personality of the Son.

And yet supposing for a moment, for the sake of argument, that this was so, what superiority does the being which is prior in time have over that which follows, on the score of pure being, that he can say that the one is supreme and proper, and the other is not? For while the lifetime of the elder as compared with the younger is longer, yet his being has neither increase nor decrease on that account. This will be clear by an illustration. What disadvantage, on the score of being, as compared with Abraham, had David who lived fourteen generations after? Was any change, so far as humanity goes, effected in the latter? Was he less a human being, because he was later in time? Who would be so foolish as to assert this? The definition of their being is the same for both: the lapse of time does not change it. No one would assert that the one was more a man for being first in time, and the other less because he sojourned in life later; as if humanity had been exhausted on the first, or as if time had spent its chief power upon the deceased. For it is not in the power of time to define for each one the measures of nature, but nature abides self-contained, preserving herself through succeeding generations: and time has a course of its own, whether surrounding, or flowing by, this nature, which remains firm and motionless within her own limits. Therefore, not even supposing, as our argument did for a moment, that an advantage were allowed on the score of time, can they properly ascribe to the Father alone the highest supremacy of being: but as there is really no difference whatever in the prerogative of time, how could any one possibly entertain such an idea about these existencies which are pre-temporal? Every measure of distance that we could discover is beneath the divine nature: so no ground is left for those who attempt to divide this pre-temporal and incomprehensible being by distinctions of superior and inferior.

We have no hesitation either in asserting that what is dogmatically taught by them is an advocacy of the Jewish doctrine, setting forth, as they do, that the being of the Father alone has subsistence, and insisting that this only has proper existence, and reckoning that of the Son and the Spirit among non-existencies, seeing that what does not properly exist can be said nominally only, and by an abuse of terms, to exist at all. The name of man, for instance, is not given to a portrait representing one, but to so and so who is absolutely such, the original of the picture, and not the picture itself; whereas the picture is in word only a man, and does not possess absolutely the quality ascribed to it, because it is not in its nature that which it is called. In the case before us, too, if being is properly ascribed to the Father, but ceases when we come to the Son and the Spirit, it is nothing short of a plain denial of the message of salvation. Let them leave the church and fall back upon the synagogues of the Jews, proving, as they do, the Son’s non-existence in denying to Him proper being. What does not properly exist is the same thing as the non-existent.

Again, he means in all this to be very clever, and has a poor opinion of those who essay to write without logical force. Then let him tell us, contemptible though we are, by what sort of skill he has detected a greater and a less in pure being. What is his method for establishing that one being is more of a being than another being,—taking being in its plainest meaning, for he must not bring forward those various qualities and properties, which are comprehended in the conception of the being, and gather round it, but are not the subject itself? Shade, colour, weight, force or reputation, distinctive manner, disposition, any quality thought of in connection with body or mind, are not to be considered here: we have to inquire only whether the actual subject of all these, which is termed absolutely the being, differs in degree of being from another. We have yet to learn that of two known existencies, which still exist, the one is more, the other less, an existence. Both are equally such, as long as they are in the category of existence, and when all notions of more or less value, more or less force, have been excluded.

If, then, he denies that we can regard the Only-begotten as completely existing,—for to this depth his statement seems to lead,—in withholding from Him a proper existence, let him deny it even in a less degree. If, however, he does grant that the Son subsists in some substantial way—we will not quarrel now about the particular way—why does he take away again that which he has conceded Him to be, and prove Him to exist not properly, which is tantamount, as we have said, to not at all? For as humanity is not possible to that which does not possess the complete connotation of the term ‘man,’ and the whole conception of it is cancelled in the case of one who lacks any of the properties, so in every thing whose complete and proper existence is denied, the partial affirmation of its existence is no proof of its subsisting at all; the demonstration, in fact, of its incomplete being is a demonstration of its effacement in all points. So that if he is well-advised, he will come over to the orthodox belief, and remove from his teaching the idea of less and of incompleteness in the nature of the Son and the Spirit: but if he is determined to blaspheme, and wishes for some inscrutable reason thus to requite his Maker and God and Benefactor, let him at all events part with his conceit of possessing some amount of showy learning, unphilosophically piling, as he does, being over being, one above the other, one proper, one not such, for no discoverable reason. We have never heard that any of the infidel philosophers have committed this folly, any more than we have met with it in the inspired writings, or in the common apprehension of mankind.

I think that from what has been said it will be clear what is the aim of these newly-devised names. He drops them as the base of operations or foundation-stone of all this work of mischief to the Faith: once he can get the idea into currency that the one Being alone is supreme and proper in the highest degree, he can then assail the other two, as belonging to the inferior and not regarded as properly Being. He shows this especially in what follows, where he is discussing the belief in the Son and the Holy Spirit, and does not proceed with these names, so as to avoid bringing before us the proper characteristic of their nature by means of those appellations: they are passed over unnoticed by this man who is always telling us that minds of the hearers are to be directed by the use of appropriate names and phrases. Yet what name could be more appropriate than that which has been given by the Very Truth? He sets his views against the Gospel, and names not the Son, but ‘a Being existing through the First, but after It though before all others.’ That this is said to destroy the right faith in the Only-begotten will be made plainer still by his subsequent arguments. Still there is only a moderate amount of mischief in these words: one intending no impiety at all towards Christ might sometimes use them: we will therefore omit at present all discussion about our Lord, and reserve our reply to the more open blasphemies against Him. But on the subject of the Holy Spirit the blasphemy is plain and unconcealed: he says that He is not to be ranked with the Father or the Son, but is subject to both. I will therefore examine as closely as possible this statement.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ δυνάμεως οὐδὲ ἀγαθότητος οὐδὲ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων ὑπεροχὴν τὸ ἄνω φήσει τῆς οὐσίας ἐνδείκνυσθαι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο παντὶ γνώριμον, μὴ ὅτι τοῖς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ πλεονεκτεῖν ὑπειλημμένοις, ὅτι ἀνενδεὴς πρὸς τελείαν ἀγαθότητά τε καὶ δύναμιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἥ τε τοῦ μονογενοῦς καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματός ἐστιν ὑπόστασις. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντα, ἕως ἂν ἀπαράδεκτα τοῦ ἐναντίου μένῃ, ὅρον οὐκ ἔχει τῆς ἀγαθότητος, ἐπειδὴ μόνοις τοῖς ἐναντίοις πέφυκε περιγράφεσθαι, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ὑποδειγμάτων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν. ἡ δύναμις ἀσθενείας περιλαβούσης ἵσταται, ἡ ζωὴ θανάτῳ περιορίζεται, φωτὸς πέρας τὸ σκότος γίνεται, καὶ πάντα συνελόντι φάναι, τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐναπολήγει. εἰ μὲν οὖν τρεπτὴν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον τὴν φύσιν τοῦ μονογενοῦς καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑποτίθεται, εἰκότως ἐπ' αὐτῶν κατασμικρύνει τὴν τῆς ἀγαθότητος ἔννοιαν, ὡς δυναμένων καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις συνενεχθῆναι. εἰ δὲ ἀνεπίδεκτός ἐστι τοῦ χείρονος ἡ θεία τε καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος φύσις, καὶ τοῦτο παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὡμολόγηται, ἀόριστος πάντως ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ θεωρεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἀόριστον τῷ ἀπείρῳ ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἀπείρου δὲ καὶ ἀορίστου πλεονασμὸν καὶ ἐλάττωσιν ἐννοεῖν τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀλογίας ἐστί. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὁ τῆς ἀπειρίας διασωθείη λόγος, εἰ τὸ πλέον τε καὶ ἔλαττον ἐν αὐτῷ δογματίζοιτο; ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τῶν περάτων πρὸς ἄλληλα παραθέσεως τὸ πλέον διαγινώσκομεν: ἐφ' ὧν δὲ πέρας οὐκ ἔστι, πῶς ἄν τις δυνηθείη τὸ περισσὸν ἐννοῆσαι; ἢ οὐχὶ τοῦτο, χρονικὴν δέ τινα τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐννοῶν κατὰ τὰ πρεσβεῖα τῆς ἀρχαιότητος τὸ πλέον νέμει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίαν μόνην ἀνωτάτω φησίν; οὐκοῦν εἰπάτω, τίνι τὸ πλέον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ζωῆς διεμέτρησε, μηδενὸς διαστήματος χρονικοῦ προεπινοουμένου τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑποστάσεως.
Καίτοι εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἦν (εἰρήσθω γὰρ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τέως), ἡ τῷ χρόνῳ προήκουσα τῆς μεταγενεστέρας οὐσίας τί μᾶλλον ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, κατ' αὐτὸν λέγω τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον, ὥστε τὴν μὲν « ἀνωτάτω καὶ κυρίαν » λέγειν, τὴν δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν; τοῦ γὰρ προγενεστέρου πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον ὁ μὲν χρόνος τῆς ζωῆς πλείων ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ οὐσία παρὰ τοῦτο οὔτε πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἔχει. σαφέστερον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ δι' ὑποδειγμάτων γενήσεται. τί ἔλαττον εἶχε τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον ὁ μετὰ δεκατέσσαρας γενεὰς ἀναδειχθεὶς Δαβίδ; ἆρά τι μετεποιήθη τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἐπὶ τούτου καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος ἦν, ὅτι τῷ χρόνῳ μεταγενέστερος; καὶ τίς οὕτως ἠλίθιος ὥστε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν; εἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἑκατέρων τῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲν τῇ παρόδῳ τοῦ χρόνου συναλλοιούμενος. οὐδ' ἄν τις εἴποι τὸν μὲν μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι διὰ τὸ προήκειν τῷ χρόνῳ, τὸν δὲ ἔλαττον μετέχειν τῆς φύσεως, ὅτι μεθ' ἑτέρους τῇ ζωῇ ἐπεδήμησεν, ὥσπερ ἢ προαναλωθείσης ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν τῆς φύσεως, ἢ τοῦ χρόνου τὴν δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς παρῳχηκόσι προδαπανήσαντος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἔστιν ἀφορίζειν ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέτρα τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μένει διὰ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων ἑαυτὴν συντηροῦσα: ὁ δὲ χρόνος φέρεται κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον τρόπον εἴτε περιέχων εἴτε καὶ παραρρέων τὴν φύσιν παγίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις μένουσαν ὅροις. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ εἰ τῷ χρόνῳ δοθείη τὸ πλέον ἔχειν, καθὼς ὁ λόγος ὑπέθετο, κυρίως τῷ πατρὶ μόνῳ τὸ ἀνώτατον τῆς οὐσίας προσμαρτυρήσουσι: μηδεμιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς κατὰ τὰ πρεσβεῖα τοῦ χρόνου διαφορᾶς (πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῆς προαιωνίου φύσεως τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπινοήσειε, παντὸς διαστήματος μετρητικοῦ κάτω τῆς θείας φύσεως εὑρισκομένου) τίς καταλείπεται λόγος τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσι τὴν πρόχρονόν τε καὶ ἀκατάληπτον οὐσίαν τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω διαφορᾷ διασχίζειν;
Ἀλλ' οὐδεμίαν ἀμφιβολίαν ὁ λόγος ἔχει, ὅτι συνηγορία τοῦ Ἰουδαϊκοῦ δόγματός ἐστι τὸ παρὰ τούτων δογματιζόμενον, μόνην ὑφεστάναι τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν ἐνδεικνυμένων, ἣν μόνην κυρίως εἶναι διισχυρίζονται, τὴν δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσι λογιζομένων. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μὴ κυρίως ὂν ἐν ῥήματι μόνῳ καὶ καταχρήσει συνηθείας εἶναι λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὀνομάζεται οὐχ ὁ διὰ μιμήσεως ἐπὶ τῆς εἰκόνος δεικνύμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ κυρίως λεγόμενος. οὗτος οὐχ ὁμοίωμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπόν ἐστι τοῦ ὁμοιώματος: ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν μέχρις ὀνόματος ἄνθρωπος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχει τὸ κυρίως λέγεσθαι ὅπερ λέγεται, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῇ φύσει ὃ ὀνομάζεται. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν εἰ μόνου τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ οὐσία κυρίως λέγεται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος οὐκέτι, τί ἄλλο ἢ οὐχὶ ἄρνησίς ἐστι περιφανὴς τοῦ σωτηρίου κηρύγματος; οὐκοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐπὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς τῶν Ἰουδαίων παλινδρομείτωσαν, ἐν τῷ μὴ διδόναι τὸν υἱὸν κυρίως εἶναι τὸ μηδὲ ὅλως εἶναι κατασκευάζοντες: τὸ γὰρ ἄκυρον τῷ ἀνυπάρκτῳ ταὐτόν ἐστιν.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σοφὸς εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα βούλεται καὶ διαπτύει τοὺς ἄνευ λογικῆς ἐντρεχείας ἐπιχειροῦντας τῷ γράφειν, εἰπάτω τοῖς καταφρονουμένοις ἡμῖν, ἐκ ποίας σοφίας τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον τῆς οὐσίας ἐγνώρισε. τις « ὁ » λόγος ὁ τὴν τοιαύτην διαφορὰν παραστήσας, ὅτι οὐσία τις ἑτέρας οὐσίας μᾶλλον ἔστι; κατ' αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ σημαινόμενον τῆς οὐσίας: μὴ γὰρ δὴ προφερέτω τὰς τῶν ποιοτήτων ἢ τὰς τῶν ἰδιωμάτων διαφοράς, ὅσαι περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἐπινοίας καταλαμβάνονται, ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὖσαι. οὐ γὰρ ἀτμῶν ἢ χρωμάτων ἢ βάρους ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ ἀξιώματος ἢ τρόπων καὶ ἤθους διαφορὰς ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο περί τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν θεωρεῖται, ταῦτα πρόκειται νῦν ἐξετάζειν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ᾧ κυρίως τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἐπικέκληται ὄνομα, εἴ τινα πρὸς ἄλλην οὐσίαν ἐν τῷ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει. ἀλλ' οὔπω μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀκηκόαμεν δύο τινῶν ὁμολογουμένων εἶναι, ἕως ἂν ἀμφότερα ᾖ, τὸ μέν τι μᾶλλον, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον εἶναι: ἔστι γὰρ ὁμοίως ἑκάτερον, ἕως ἂν ᾖ, καθὸ ἔστιν, ὑπεξῃρημένου, καθὼς προείρηται, τοῦ κατὰ τὸ προτιμότερον ἢ διαρκέστερον λόγου.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐ δίδωσιν ὅλως ἐν οὐσίᾳ τὸν μονογενῆ θεωρεῖσθαι (πρὸς τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικε λεληθότως αὐτῷ κατολισθαίνειν ὁ λόγος), ὁ μὴ διδοὺς αὐτῷ τὸ κυρίως εἶναι μηδὲ τὸ ἧττον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ συγχωρείτω. εἰ δὲ ἐνούσιον δύναμιν ὁμολογεῖ τὸν υἱὸν ὁπωσοῦν ὑποστάντα (οὔπω γὰρ περὶ τούτου διαμαχόμεθα), τί πάλιν ἀφαιρεῖται ὃ δίδωσι τὸν ὁμολογηθέντα εἶναι, τὸ μὴ κυρίως εἶναι κατασκευάζων, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστί, καθὼς εἴρηται, τῷ μηδὲ ὅλως εἶναι; ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ᾧ μὴ τελείως ὁ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα λόγος ἐφήρμοσται, τῷ δὲ ἐλλείποντι τῶν ἰδιωμάτων ὅλος ὁ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῷ συνδιαγράφεται λόγος, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς πράγματος, ᾧ μὴ τελείως μήτε κυρίως τὸ εἶναι προσμαρτυρεῖται, οὐδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἡ μερικὴ τοῦ εἶναι συγκατάθεσις, ἀλλὰ τὴν καθόλου τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀναίρεσιν κατασκευάζει ἡ περὶ τοῦ μὴ τελείως εἶναι κατασκευή. ὥστε εἰ μὲν εὖ φρονεῖ, πρὸς τὴν εὐσεβῆ διάνοιαν μεταθέσθω, τὸ ἧττον καὶ τὸ ἄκυρον ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ μονογενοῦς τε καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ὑφελὼν ἐκ τοῦ δόγματος. εἰ δὲ ἀσεβεῖν ἔγνωκε πάντως, [ὡς] ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα ἀνθ' ὅτου καὶ βούλεται τὸν κτίστην ἑαυτοῦ καὶ θεὸν καὶ εὐεργέτην διὰ βλασφημίας ἀμείβεσθαι. τὴν γοῦν τοῦ δοκεῖν τις εἶναι κατὰ τὴν παίδευσιν ὑπόνοιαν ζημιούσθω, ἀμαθῶς οὐσίαν ὑπερτιθεὶς οὐσίας καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄνω τὴν δὲ κάτω κατὰ τὸν μὴ εὑρισκόμενον λόγον ἀποφαινόμενος καὶ τῇ μὲν τὸ κύριον τῇ δὲ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον προσμαρτυρῶν. οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἔξω τῆς πίστεως πεφιλοσοφηκότων ἔγνωμέν τινα τοῦτο ληρήσαντα, οὔτε ταῖς θεοπνεύστοις φωναῖς οὔτε ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις τὸ τοιοῦτο συμβαίνει.
Τὸν μὲν οὖν σκοπὸν τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπινοίας ἱκανῶς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων οἴομαι πεφανερῶσθαι, ὅτι καθάπερ ὁρμητήριον ἢ θεμέλιον τῆς πάσης ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ δόγμα κακουργίας τὰ ῥήματα ταῦτα προϋποβάλλεται, ἵνα κατασκευάσας τὸ μόνην τὴν μίαν οὐσίαν « ἀνωτάτω τε καὶ κυριωτάτην » νομίζειν ῥᾳδίως κατατρέχῃ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἐν τοῖς κάτω καὶ μὴ κυρίως θεωρουμένων. δείκνυσι δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς, ἐν οἷς τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος διαλεγόμενος οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἔρχεται τούτων, ἵνα μή, καθὼς προεῖπον, τὸ οἰκεῖον τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν ταῖς προσηγορίαις καὶ μὴ βουλόμενος παραστήσῃ, ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμον αὐτῶν ποιεῖται τὴν μνήμην ὁ δογματίζων ἀπὸ τῶν « προσφυῶν ὀνομάτων » καὶ ῥημάτων δεῖν τὰς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας προσάγεσθαι. καίτοι τί προσφυέστερον ὄνομα τοῦ παρ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ὠνομασμένου; ἀλλ' ἀντιδογματίζει τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις οὐχ υἱὸν ὀνομάζων, ἀλλὰ « τὴν δι' ἐκείνην μὲν οὖσαν, μετ' ἐκείνην δὲ πάντων τῶν ὄντων πρωτεύουσαν. » τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι μὲν ἐπὶ καθαιρέσει τῆς εὐσεβοῦς περὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὑπολήψεως λέγεται, ἐκ τῆς λοιπῆς αὐτοῦ κατασκευῆς μᾶλλον φανερωθήσεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ μέσως ἔχειν δοκεῖ τὰ εἰρημένα, ὡς καὶ τὸν μηδὲν ἀσεβὲς περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ λέγοντα χρήσασθαι ἄν ποτε τοῖς ῥήμασι τούτοις, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς τὸν περὶ τοῦ κυρίου λόγον νῦν ὑπερβήσομαι, ταῖς φανερωτέραις κατ' αὐτοῦ βλασφημίαις ταμιευσάμενος τὴν ἀντίρρησιν: περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐπειδὴ φανερᾷ καὶ ἀπαρακαλύπτῳ χρῆται τῇ βλασφημίᾳ, λέγων ἀσύντακτον εἶναι πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ « ὑποτεταγμένον », ἤδη καθόσον ἂν οἷός τε ὦ, ἐξετάσω τὸν λόγον.