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PYR. If you say the will is natural, and the natural is in every way also compelled, how is it not necessary, when we say the wills in Christ are natural, to abolish all voluntary motion in him.

MAX. Not only does the divine and uncreated nature have nothing natural that is compelled, but neither does the intellectual and created nature. For that which is by nature rational has a natural power, the rational appetite, which is also called the will 15Γ_122 of the intellectual soul; by which, in willing, we reason; and in reasoning, in willing, we resolve. And in willing, we seek, we consider and deliberate, and we judge, and we are disposed, and we choose, and we are impelled, and we make use of. Since, as has been said, the power to desire rationally—that is, to will, and to reason; and to deliberate and to seek, and to consider, and to resolve, and to judge, and to be disposed, and to choose, and to be impelled, and to make use of—belongs to us by nature, then the natural properties of intellectual beings are not compelled. And even if this were granted, how would such a proposition not be shown to be more absurd than any absurdity? For if, according to it, the natural is in every way also compelled, and God is God by nature, good by nature, creator by nature, then God will be God by necessity, and good and creator by necessity; to even think this, let alone say it, is the utmost blasphemy. For who is it that imposes the necessity? But consider, if you please, my friend, the blasphemy of such a proposition in this way also. For if he who says the wills in Christ are natural, according to you, abolishes all voluntary motion in him, it is necessary that those things which will naturally have involuntary motion, while those which do not will naturally have voluntary motion. Therefore not only God, who is beyond beings, but also all intellectual and rational beings, being volitional by nature, will have involuntary motion; while inanimate things, not being volitional, will have voluntary motion. Except that the blessed Cyril, in the third chapter against the criticisms of Theodoret, has freed us from superfluous matters, by declaring explicitly, that nothing natural 0296 in an intellectual nature is involuntary. And it is possible for anyone who wishes to learn this, by taking up that chapter.

PYR. Since it is right to accept with good judgment the truths that appear from the investigation, and the argument has shown with great clarity that the wills in Christ are natural, is it possible 15Γ_124 that just as we speak of one composite reality from the two natures, so also to speak of one composite reality from the two natural wills; so that both those who speak of two wills, on account of the natural difference of the natures in Christ, and those who speak of one, on account of the perfect union, may no longer disagree with one another for the sake of mere words; since, as Gregory the great Theologian says, for us truth is not in names, but in realities.

MAX. Do you see that you are led astray by this, by being completely ignorant that compositions are of things that are in the hypostasis, and not of things contemplated in another and not in their own principle. And this is the common opinion of all, both of the philosophers outside and of the God-wise mystagogues of the Church. But if you speak of a composition of the wills, you will be forced to speak of the composition of the other natural properties as well, if you wish to show the argument of your own dogma to be coherent; that is, of the created and uncreated, of the infinite and the finite, of the uncircumscribed and the circumscribed, of the mortal and the immortal, of the corruptible and the incorruptible, and you will be carried away into absurd suppositions. And how will that which is from the wills be called a will? For it is not possible for the composite to be called by the name of the things from which it is composed. Or else, in this way, that which is from the natures will also be called a nature, according to the ancient heretics. And in addition to this, you again separate him from the wills of the Father, having characterized a composite nature, and only it, with a composite will.

PYR. Therefore, just as the natures, did their natural properties have nothing in common?

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ΠΥΡ. Εἰ φυσικόν λέγεις τό θέλημα, τό δέ φυσικόν πάντως καί ἠναγκασμένον, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη, φυσικά λέγοντας ἐπί Χριστοῦ τά θελήματα, πᾶσαν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ ἑκούσιον ἀναιρεῖν κίνησιν.

ΜΑΞ.. Οὐ μόνον ἡ θεία καί ἄκτιστος φύσις οὐδέν ἠναγκασμένον ἔχει φυσικόν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ ἡ νοερά καί κτιστή. Τό γάρ φύσει λογικόν, δύναμιν ἔχει φυσικήν τήν λογικήν ὄρεξιν, ἥτις καί θέλησις 15Γ_122 καλεῖται τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς· καθ᾿ ἥν θέλοντες λογιζόμεθα· καί λογιζόμενοι, θέλοντες βουλόμεθα. Καί θέλοντες ζητοῦμεν, σκεπτόμεθά τε καί βουλευόμεθα, καί κρίνομεν, καί διατιθέμεθα, καί προαιρούμεθα, καί ὁρῶμεν, καί κεχρήμεθα. Κατά φύσιν δέ ἡμῖν, ὡς εἴρηται, προσόντος τοῦ λογικῶς ὀρέγεσθαι, ἤγουν θέλειν, καί λογίζεσθαι· βουλεύεσθαί τε καί ζητεῖν, καί σκέπτεσθαι, καί βούλεσθαι, καί κρίνειν, καί διατίθεσθαι, καί αἱρεῖσθαι, καί ὁρμᾷν, καί κεχρῆσθαι· οὐκ ἄρα ἠναγκασμένα τά τῶν νοερῶν φυσικά. Πῶς δέ καί τούτου δοθέντος, οὐ πάσης ἀτοπίας ἀτοπωτέρα ἡ τοιαύτη δειχθήσεται πρότασις; Εἰ γάρ κατ᾿ αὐτήν τό φυσικόν πάντως καί ἠναγκασμένον· φύσει δέ ὁ Θεός Θεός, φύσει ἀγαθός, φύσει δημιουργός· ἀνάγκῃ ἔσται ὁ Θεός Θεός, καί ἀγαθός καί δημιουργός· ὅπερ καί ἐννοεῖν, μήτι γε λέγειν, ἐσχάτης ἐστί βλασφημίας. Τίς γάρ ὁ τήν ἀνάγκην ἐπάγων; Σκόπει δέ, εἰ δοκεῖ, ὦ φιλότης, καί οὕτω τῆς τοιαύτης προτάσεως τό βλάσφημον. Εἰ γάρ ὁ φυσικά ἐπί Χριστοῦ λέγων τά θελήματα, πᾶσαν, κατά σέ, ἑκούσιον ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ ἀναιρεῖ κίνησιν, ἀνάγκη τά μέν φυσικῶς θέλοντα, ἀκούσιον ἔχειν κίνησιν· τά δέ φυσικῶς μή θέλοντα, ἑκούσιον. Οὐκοῦν οὐ μόνον Θεός, ὁ ὑπέρ τά ὄντα· ἀλλά καί νοερά πάντα καί λογικά, φύσει ὄντα θελητικά, ἀκούσιον ἕξει κίνησιν· ἄψυχα δέ οὐ θελητικά, ἑκούσιον ἕξει κίνησιν. Πλήν ὅτι ὁ μακάριος Κύριλλος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ κεφαλαίῳ πρός τάς τοῦ Θεοδωρήτου μέμψεις, ἀπήλλαξεν ἡμᾶς περιττῶν πραγμάτων, διαῤῥήδην ἀποφηνάμενος, Μηδέν φυσικόν 0296 εἶναι ἐν τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει ἀκούσιον. Καί τοῦτο ἔξεστι τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν, μετά χεῖρας λαβόντι τό τοιοῦτο κεφάλαιον.

ΠΥΡ. Ἐπειδή χρή τά ἐκ τῆς ἐξετάσεως ἀναφαινόμενα ἀληθῆ, εὐγνωμόνως ἀποδέχεσθαι· μετά δέ πολλῆς εὐκρινείας ἔδειξεν ὁ λόγος, φυσικά εἶναι τά ἐπί Χριστοῦ θελήματα· δυνατόν δέ 15Γ_124 ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν δύο φύσεων ἕν τι σύνθετον λέγομεν, οὕτω καί ἐκ τῶν δύο φυσικῶν θελημάτων ἕν τι σύνθετον λέγειν· ἵνα καί οἱ δύο λέγοντες θελήματα, διά τήν φυσικήν τῶν ἐν Χριστῷ φύσεων διαφοράν, καί οἱ ἕν λέγοντες, διά τήν ἄκραν ἕνωσιν, μηκέτι ψιλῶν λέξεων ἕνεκεν πρός ἀλλήλους διαφέρωνται· εἴπερ οὐκ ἐν ὀνόμασιν ἡμῖν, φησίν ὁ μέγας ἐν θεολογίᾳ Γρηγόριος, ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν πράγμασιν.

ΜΑΞ. Ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐκ τούτου πλανᾶσθε, ἐκ τοῦ πάντη ἀγνοῆσαι ὅτι αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει ὄντων, καί οὐ τῶν ἐν ἑτέρῳ, καί οὐκ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ θεωρουμένων, εἰσί. Καί τοῦτο κοινόν φρόνημα πάντων, καί τῶν ἔξω φιλοσόφων, καί τῶν τῆς Ἐκκλησίας θεοσόφων μυσταγωγῶν. Εἰ δέ τῶν θελημάτων σύνθεσιν λέγετε, καί τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν τήν σύνθεσιν λέγειν ἐκβιασθήσεσθε· εἴπερ εὐσυνάρτητον τόν τοῦ οἰκείου δόγματος λόγον δεῖξαι βούλεσθε, τουτέστι, τοῦ κτιστοῦ καί ἀκτίστου, τοῦ ἀπείρου καί τοῦ πεπερασμένου, τοῦ ἀορίστου καί τοῦ ὡρισμένου, τοῦ θνητοῦ καί τοῦ ἀθανάτου, τοῦ φθαρτοῦ καί τοῦ ἀφθάρτου, καί εἰς ἀτόπους ἐξενεχθήσεσθε ὑπολήψεις. Πῶς δέ τό ἐκ τῶν θελημάτων, θέλημα προσαγορευθήσεται; Οὐ γάρ δυνατόν τό σύνθετον τῇ τῶν συντεθειμένων ὀνομάζεσθαι προσηγορίᾳ. Ἤ οὕτω γε καί τό ἐκ τῶν φύσεων, φύσις, κατά τούς πάλαι αἱρετικούς προσαγορευθήσεται. Προσεπιτούτοις δέ καί πάλιν αὐτόν θελήμασι τοῦ Πατρός χωρίζετε, συνθέτῳ θελήματι σύνθετον καί μόνην χαρακτηρίσαντες φύσιν.

ΠΥΡ. Οὐδέν οὖν, καθάπερ αἱ φύσεις, καί τά αὐτῶν φυσικά εἶχε κοινόν;