OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire; but each of the things above is carried in its sphere, so that they themselves are not set on fire, but it is necessary for the air which is under the sphere of the cyclical body to be heated as that sphere moves, and this especially where the sun happens to be fixed. For which reason indeed, as it approaches and rises and is above us, heat is produced. That therefore they are neither fiery nor are carried in fire, let these things have been said by us concerning them. If the stars are from the same matter from which the heaven is, how is it not false that “The heaven was made from all matter,” and that “It has encompassed all matter”? If that which is moved and becomes heating of another by its motion, unless it is first heated itself by its own motion, cannot become heating of another, how do the sphere and the stars in it heat the air by their own motion, while they themselves are not heated? If it is necessary for that which performs heating activities by its own motion to have either weight or lightness, how do the heaven and the stars in it, having neither weight nor lightness, perform the heating activities? If it is necessary for things that have the same movable substance to be moved with the same motion in themselves and not by accident, how is the sun not moved by accident, if it is bound to the sphere? And the same argument applies to the other stars, if they are not moved by themselves according to their own natural motions, but through the spheres to which they are bound. If the sun is from the same matter from which the heaven is, that has neither weight nor lightness, and it has a spherical shape, just as the heaven has, why are not both moved in the same way, or according to the interchange of parts as the sun is moved? If nothing is contrary to nature in eternal things, how is it not contrary to nature that the motion which something has by nature, it is not moved with this motion by itself but by another? For both the sun and the stars are moved not by themselves, but by the spheres in which they are bound. If, just as generated things are according to reason what they have become, so also ungenerated things are according to reason what they are, then the ungenerated things are subsequent to reason. But if this is impossible, then the ungenerated things are not according to reason. But if they are not according to reason, how is each of them usefully what it is and has what it has and does what it does? For things that exist usefully are the works of reason and providence. If it follows for generated things to be from reason and matter, then the ungenerated things are not from reason and matter. How then are both the heaven and all the things in it ungenerated and are from reason and matter? If, as Aristotle said, in eternal things there is nothing in vain or contrary to nature, how from what he said about the motion of the sun does it happen that for the sun both are the case, both that which is in vain and that which is contrary to nature? For if the sun, not being bound to the sphere that moves it, the same according to

αὐτὸ πάσχειν. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν αὐτὰ ἐκθερμαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐν ἀέρι φέρεσθαι, ὃς διὰ τὴν πληγὴν τῇ κινήσει γίνεται πῦρ· τῶν δὲ ἄνω ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ σφαίρᾳ φέρεται, ὥστε αὐτὰ μὲν μὴ ἐκπυροῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ κυκλι κοῦ σώματος σφαῖραν ὄντος ἀνάγκη φερομένης ἐκείνης θερ μαίνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτην μάλιστα ᾗ ὁ ἥλιος τυγχάνει ἐνδεδε μένος. ∆ιὸ δὴ πλησιάζοντός τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνίσχοντος καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ὄντος γίνεται θερμότης. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε πύρινά ἐστιν οὔτε ἐν τῷ πυρὶ φέρεται, ταῦθ' ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ αὐτῶν. Eἰ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης, ἐξ ἧς ἐστιν ὁ οὐρανός, ἐκ ταύ της ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἄστρα, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ Ἐκ πάσης γέγονε τῆς ὕλης ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ τὸ Πᾶσαν τὴν ὕλην περιεί ληφεν; Eἰ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ τῇ κινήσει θερμαντικὸν ἑτέρου γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν μὴ προηγουμένως αὐτὸ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κινήσει θερμανθῇ, θερμαντικὸν ἑτέρου γενέσθαι οὐ δύναται, πῶς ἡ σφαῖρα καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ ἄστρα θερμαίνουσι τῇ ἑαυτῶν κινήσει τὸν ἀέρα, αὐτὰ μὴ θερμαινόμενα; Eἰ τὸ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κινήσει θερμαντικὰς ἐνεργείας ἐκτελοῦν ἀνάγκη τοῦτο ἢ βαρύτητα ἔχειν ἢ κουφότητα, πῶς ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἄστρα μήτε βαρύτητα ἔχοντα μήτε κουφότητα τὰς θερμαντικὰς ἐκ τελεῖ ἐνεργείας; Eἰ τὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα κινητὴν οὐσίαν, τούτοις ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὸ κινεῖσθαι κίνησιν καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἥλιος κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινούμενος, εἰ τῇ σφαίρᾳ ἐνδέδεται; Καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, εἰ μὴ δι' ἑαυτῶν κινοῦνται τὰς κατὰ φύσιν αὑτῶν κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν σφαιρῶν αἷς εἰσιν ἐνδε δεμένα. Eἰ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης ἐστὶν ὁ ἥλιος ἧς ἐστιν ὁ οὐρα νός, τῆς μήτε βαρύτητα μήτε κουφότητα ἐχούσης, καὶ σφαιρι κὸν ἔχει τὸ σχῆμα, ὥσπερ ἔχει καὶ ὁ οὐρανός, διὰ τί μὴ ὡσαύ τως κινοῦνται ἀμφότεροι ἢ κατὰ ἀντιμετάστασιν τῶν μερῶν ὥσπερ κινεῖται ὁ ἥλιος; Eἰ οὐδὲν παρὰ φύσιν ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ φύσιν τὸ τὴν κίνησιν, ἣν ἔχει τις κατὰ φύσιν, ταύτην μὴ δι' ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ δι' ἑτέρου; Κι νοῦνται γὰρ ὅ τε ἥλιος καὶ τὰ ἄστρα οὐ δι' ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν σφαιρῶν ἐν αἷς εἰσιν ἐνδεδεμένοι. Eἰ, ὥσπερ τὰ γενητὰ κατὰ λόγον ἐστὶν ὃ γέγονεν, οὕτως καὶ τὰ ἀγένητα κατὰ λόγον ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστιν, ὕστερα ἄρα τοῦ λόγου τὰ ἀγένητα. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ λόγον ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγένητα. Μὴ ὄντων δὲ αὐτῶν κατὰ λόγον, πῶς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν χρειωδῶς ἐστιν ὅ ἐστι καὶ ἔχει ὃ ἔχει καὶ ποιεῖ ὃ ποιεῖ; Τὰ γὰρ χρειω δῶς ὄντα λόγου τε καὶ προνοίας ἐστὶν ἔργα. Eἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς γενητοῖς τὸ ἐκ λόγου εἶναι καὶ ὕλης, οὐκ ἄρα ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὕλης τὰ ἀγένητα. Πῶς οὖν ἀγένητα ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα καὶ ἔστιν ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὕλης; Eἰ, καθὰ εἶπεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐδὲν μάτην οὐδὲ παρὰ φύσιν, πῶς ἀφ' ὧν εἶπε περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου κινήσεως συμβαίνει τῷ ἡλίῳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ τὸ μάτην καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν; Eἰ γὰρ τοῦ ἡλίου τῇ κινούσῃ αὐτὸν σφαίρᾳ μὴ ἐνδεδεμένου τὴν αὐτὴν κατὰ