ARTICLE 1

(1) In St. Thomas' moral synthesis, the consideration of virtue precedes that of vice: "Although in the order of execution vices should be uprooted before virtues may be sown, according to Ps. 33/15: 'Turn away from evil and do good,' and Is. 1/16-17: 'Cease to do perversely; learn to do well;' nevertheless, in the order of knowledge virtue precedes vice." (I-II, 100, 6 ad 2) Virtue as such bespeaks good, which is something positive and formed in its own right; whereas vice is intrinsically a lack of goodness, something privative and hence intelligible only in relation to the good of which it deprives its subject.

             Note also that in the way of invention, things are known first, as real beings, before their real definition, precisely as such, is grasped by the mind. Thus in this Article St. Thomas seeks to place virtue in a real genus, that of habit; while in Article 2 he is concerned with the process of formulating the definition of virtue.

             The word virtue is used variously for a habit, an act, and an object. In the present context it is taken exclusively as a habit. Cf. I-II, 55 1 obj.  and ad 1.

             (2) The title of this Article: In I-II, 55, the title of Art. 1 reads: "Whether human virtue is a habit." St. Thomas uses the word "human," not as restrictive to those virtues only which can be acquired by human powers in any way; but as pertaining to man precisely as such, i.e., insofar as he is rational. What proceeds in man from reason is to be distinguished from what is natural in him. Reason integrates, while dominating, the whole of human personality and capacity. Hence man's powers are brought to dynamic perfection by habits formed under the direction of reason. It remains true, nevertheless, that our reason is a thing measured rather than measuring: we possess the truth of things only by submitting our intellects to the demands of reality. Moreover, when it is a question of supernatural virtue, human reason plays a role which is no way decisive or arbitrative. Cf. Art. 3, obj. 4, note 9, et al. in the text above.

             (3) "Since an effect must be proportionate to its cause, the act of a rational power must be proportionate to the power itself. Now in a virtuous act we consider not only the substance of the act itself, but also the manner of acting; for not anyone who performs chaste acts in some way or other is chaste, but one who does so easily and with delight, as we are told in I Ethics, c. 13. Delight, however, is the result of agreeableness, as is evident in sensible matters, where the conjunction of agreeable elements causes delectation. A virtuous act, therefore, must proceed from a power adapted and assimilated to this act. But a rational power does not have this (adaptation) of itself, since it is objectively indifferent. Consequently, something must be added to the power so that, by this perfection, it might readily elicit such an act: and this perfection we call a virtuous habit . . . Hence also a power perfected by a virtuous habit tends to similar acts, as it were, by nature. For this reason, in the prologue to De Invent. Rhet., Bk. II, Tully says that virtue is a habit in agreement with reason, after the manner of nature; for just as heavy bodies tend downward, so chastity performs chaste acts. This is also the reason why, in a completed nature, whose power cannot be deflected to evil, no habit is required with which to act, because the power is of itself proportioned to a perfect act, as is clearly the case with God."--In II Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 1.

             (4) "Some say that virtues have certain acts which are continuous, suffering no interruption, although they are not perceived by us; for these people do not allow that virtues can be inactive. But act is two-fold: first act, as existence, is the act of form: and by this act virtue is continuous, for as long as chastity remains firm, its subject remains chaste; and second act, which is operation, and this act is not continuous, for it is the act not merely of a virtue but also of the power which the latter perfects. Just as no form which is not per se subsistent has an operation in which its subject does not communicate, neither is there any act or operation of free choice, and especially one with election--without which there can be no virtuous act--without our perceiving it. It must be said therefore, in opposition to the above opinion, that the nature of a power is not destroyed by a habit; and since it is the nature of a rational power that it cannot be coerced to one object of choice, it will retain the liberty, even when perfected by virtue, of acting or not acting, and of choosing this or that. It need not continuously follow the inclination of virtue: for from the power a virtuous act derives that it be unnecessitated, and from the habit that it be performed with ease."--Ibid, ad 3.

             (5) Aristotle arrived at habit as the genus of virtue by considering those accidents of the soul which are principles of acts. By a process of elimination, powers and passions are excluded and virtue is shown to be a habit. "In investigating the nature of virtue, we must agree that in the soul there are three things, namely: passions, powers, and habits. One of these must be virtue, for (the Philosopher) said above that virtue is the principle of certain operations of the soul. Now nothing in the soul, besides these three things, is a principle of operation. A man is seen to act, at one time from passion, as from anger; at another time, from sheer power (potentia nuda), as when an action is first begun; and yet again from habit, as the man who exercises an art. Whence it is clear that under this division not everything which is in the soul is contained: for the essence of the soul is none of these things, nor is intellectual operation. Here are mentioned only those things which are principles of operation."--In II Ethics, lect. 5.

             (6) Father Brennan summarizes, from this Article, the properties of an act which springs from habit: "Once habit has been made part of man's permanent equipment, it displays other definite characteristics which Aquinas has summarized under three headings:

             "First, every established habit manifests a typical uniformity in the way that it functions and in the acts that it produces. So smooth and regular are its operations, in fact, as to suggest the automatism of a machine. This trait appears all the more striking when we contrast the initial stumbling performance of a habit in formation with the stabilized products of a habit that is fixed.

             "Second, every established habit exhibits a propensity to act at the slightest provocation. As soon as an object is presented, it, at once, and without effort, and often without consciousness of what is involved, begins to operate. So emphatic is this habitual impulse that it may require a special act of will to prevent our doing what we are accustomed to doing. For this reason habit has rightly been called second nature. Like nature at work, it is full of grace and ease and masterful action. There is artistry in the craftsman's skilled labor, in the painter's manipulation of colors, in the sculptor's handling of chisel and hammer, in the singer's exercise of vocal chords, in the thinker's clean-cut incision through the body of error to the soul of truth, in the saint's splendid mortification of sense and appetite. The task of habit, accordingly, is analagous to the task of the perfect servant: to make the work of the power wherein it dwells more lightsome and unobtrusive, more readily undertaken, more effectively accomplished.

             "Third, every mature habit is a pleasure to its possessor since its operations are so assured and well rounded and satisfying to the power thus accustomed to act. Without such pleasure as a reward for our efforts, the work of forming habits would be grievous and burdensome."--R. E. Brennan, O.P. Thomistic Psychology, Macmillan, N. Y. 1941, pp. 264-65.