Chap. iii.—that cicero and other men of learning erred in not turning away the people from error.

But what does it avail thus to address the vulgar and ignorant, when we see that learned and prudent men, though they understand the vanity of these ceremonies, nevertheless through some perverseness persist in the worship of those very objects which they condemn? Cicero was well aware that the deities which men worshipped were false. For when he had spoken many things which tended to the overthrow of religious ceremonies, he said nevertheless that these matters ought not to be discussed by the vulgar, lest such discussion should extinguish the system of religion which was publicly received. What can you do respecting him, who, when he perceives himself to be in error, of his own accord dashes himself against the stones, that all the people may stumble? or tears out his own eyes, that all may be blind? who neither deserves well of others, whom he suffers to be in error, nor of himself, since he inclines to the errors of others, and makes no use of the benefit of his own wisdom, so as to carry out109    Fill up and complete the outline which he has conceived.      [Religionum falsitas. He does not here employ superstitio By the way, Lactantius derives this word from those “qui superstitem memoriam hominum, tanquam deorum, colerent.” Cicero, however, derives it from those who bother the gods with petitions,—”pro superstite prole.” See note of the annotator of the Delphin Cicero, on the Natura Deor., i. 17.]   in action the conception of his own mind, but knowingly and consciously thrusts his foot into the snare, that he also may be taken with the rest, whom he ought, as the more prudent, to have extricated? Nay rather, if you have any virtue, Cicero, endeavour to make the people wise: that is a befitting subject, on which you may expend all the powers of your eloquence. For there is no fear lest speech should fail you in so good a cause, when you have often defended even bad ones with copiousness and spirit. But truly you fear the prison of Socrates,110    Lactantius charges Cicero with want of courage, in being unwilling to declare the truth to the Romans, lest he should incur the peril of death. The fortitude with which Socrates underwent death, when condemned by the Athenians, is related by Xenophon and Plato.      A joint or fastening.   and on that account you do not venture to undertake the advocacy of truth. But, as a wise man, you ought to have despised death. And, indeed, it would have been much more glorious to die on account of good words than on account of revilings. Nor would the renown of your Philippics have been more advantageous to you than the dispersion of the errors of mankind, and the recalling of the minds of men to a healthy state by your disputation.  

But let us make allowance for timidity, which ought not to exist in a wise man. Why, then, are you yourself engaged in the same error? I see that you worship things of earth made by the hand: you understand that they are vain, and yet you do the same things which they do, whom you confess to be most foolish. What, therefore, did it profit you, that you saw the truth, which you were neither about to defend nor to follow? If even they who perceive themselves to be in error err willingly, how much more so do the unlearned vulgar, who delight in empty processions, and gaze at all things with boyish minds! They are delighted with trifling things, and are captivated with the form of images; and they are unable to weigh every object in their own minds, so as to understand that nothing which is beheld by the eyes of mortals ought to be worshipped, because it must necessarily be mortal. Nor is it matter of surprise if they do not see God, when they themselves do not even see man, whom they believe that they see. For this, which falls under the notice of the eyes,111    Lactantius here follows Plato, who placed the essence of man in the intellectual soul. The body, however, as well as the soul, is of the essence of man; but Lactantius seems to limit the name of man to the higher and more worthy part. [Rhetorically, not dogmatically.]      What he professed—gave himself out to be.   is not man, but the receptacle of man, the quality and figure of which are not seen from the lineaments of the vessel which contains them, but from the actions and character. They, therefore, who worship images are mere bodies without men, because they have given themselves to corporeal things, and do not see anything with the mind more than with the body; whereas it is the office of the soul to perceive those things more clearly which the eye of the body cannot behold. And that philosopher and poet severely accuses those men as humble and abject, who, in opposition to the design of their nature, prostrate themselves to the worship of earthly things; for he says:112    Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, vi. 5. [“Premunt ad terram.”]      Subjaceret.  —  

When he said these things, indeed, his meaning was different—that nothing was to be worshipped, because the gods do not regard the affairs of men.  

In another place, at length, he acknowledges that the ceremonies and worship of the gods is an unavailing office:113    Lucretius, v. 1197.  —  

And assuredly if these things are useless, it is not right that sublime and lofty souls should be called away and depressed to the earth, but that they should think only of heavenly things.  

False religious systems, therefore, have been attacked by more sagacious men, because they perceived their falsehood; but the true religion was not introduced, because they knew not what and where it was. They therefore so regarded it as though it had no existence, because they were unable to find it in its truth. And in this manner they fell into a much greater error than they who held a religion which was false. For those worshippers of fragile images, however foolish they may be, inasmuch as they place heavenly things in things which are earthly and corruptible, yet retain something of wisdom, and may be pardoned, because they hold the chief duty of man, if not in reality, yet still in their purpose; since, if not the only, yet certainly the greatest difference between men and the beasts consists in religion. But this latter class, in proportion to their superior wisdom, in that they understood the error of false religion, rendered themselves so much the more foolish, because they did not imagine that some religion was true. And thus, because it is easier to judge of the affairs of others than of their own, while they see the downfall of others, they have not observed what was before their own feet. On either side is found the greatest folly, and a certain trace114    Odor quidam sapientiæ.   of wisdom; so that you may doubt which are rather to be called more foolish—those who embrace a false religion, or those who embrace none. But (as I have said) pardon may be granted to those who are ignorant and do not own themselves to be wise; but it cannot be extended to those who, while they profess115    Rom. i. 22: “Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools.”   wisdom, rather exhibit folly. I am not, indeed, so unjust as to imagine that they could divine, so that they might find out the truth by themselves; for I acknowledge that this is impossible. But I require from them that which they were able to perform by reason116    The apostle teaches the same, Rom. i. 19–21.   itself. For they would act more prudently, if they both understood that some form of religion is true, and if, while they attacked false religions, they openly proclaimed that men were not in possession of that which is true.  

But this consideration may perhaps have influenced them, that if there were any true religion, it would exert itself and assert its authority, and not permit the existence of anything opposed to it. For they were unable to see at all, on what account, or by whom, and in what manner true religion was depressed, which partakes of a divine mystery117    Divini sacramenti. 1 Cor. ii. 7: “We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery.”   and a heavenly secret. And no man can know118    1 Cor ii. 14: “The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.”   this by any means, unless he is taught. The sum of the matter is this: The unlearned and the foolish esteem false religions as true, because they neither know the true nor understand the false.119    [2 Pet. iii. 16. Even among believers such perils exist.]   But the more sagacious, because they are ignorant of the true, either persist in those religions which they know to be false, that they may appear to possess something; or worship nothing at all, that they may not fall into error, whereas this very thing partakes largely of error, under the figure of a man to imitate the life of cattle. To understand that which is false is truly the part of wisdom, but of human wisdom. Beyond this step man cannot proceed, and thus many of the philosophers have taken away religious institutions, as I have pointed out; but to know the truth is the part of divine wisdom. But man by himself cannot attain to this knowledge, unless he is taught by God. Thus philosophers have reached the height of human wisdom, so as to understand that which is not; but they have failed in attaining the power of saying that which really is. It is a well-known saying of Cicero:120    De Natura Deorum, lib. i. [cap. 32. Quam falsa convincere].   “I wish that I could as easily find out the truth as I can refute false things.” And because this is beyond the power of man’s condition, the capability of this office is assigned to us, to whom God has delivered the knowledge of the truth; to the explaining of which the four last books shall be devoted. Now, in the meantime, let us bring to light false things, as we have begun to do.  

0263A CAPUT III. Quod Cicero 0263A aliique doctiores peccaverunt, non avertendo populos ab errore.

Sed quid prodest ad vulgus et ad homines imperitos hoc modo concionari? cum videamus etiam doctos et prudentes viros, cum religionum intelligant vanitatem, nihilominus tamen in iis ipsis, quae damnant, colendis nescio qua pravitate perstare. Intelligebat Cicero falsa esse, quae homines adorarent. Nam cum multa dixisset quae ad eversionem religionum valerent, ait tamen non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis extinguat. Quid de eo facias, qui, cum errare se sentiat, ultro ipse in lapides impingat, ut populus omnis offendat? ipse sibi oculos eruat, ut omnes 0263B caeci sint? qui nec de aliis bene mereatur, quos patitur errare; nec de se ipso, qui alienis accedit erroribus, nec utitur tandem sapientiae suae bono, ut factis impleat, quod mente percepit, sed prudens et sciens pedem laqueo inserit, ut simul cum caeteris, quos liberare ut prudentior debuit, et ipse capiatur? Quin potius, si quid tibi, Cicero, virtutis est, experire populum facere sapientem: digna res est, ubi omnes eloquentiae tuae vires exerceas. Non enim verendum est ne te in tam bona causa deficiat oratio, 0264A qui saepe etiam malas copiose ac fortiter defendisti. Sed nimirum Socratis carcerem times, ideoque patrocinium veritatis suscipere non audes. At mortem ut sapiens contemnere debuisti. Et erat quidem multo pulchrius, ut ob bene dicta potius, quam ob maledicta morereris. Nec plus tibi laudes Philippicae afferre potuerunt, quam discussus error humani generis, et mentes hominum ad sanitatem tua disputatione revocatae.

Sed concedamus timiditati, quae in sapiente esse non debet. Quid ergo ipse in eodem versaris errore? Video te terrena et manufacta venerari: vana esse intelligis, et tamen eadem facis quae faciunt ipsi, quos ipse stultissimos confiteris. Quid igitur profuit 0264B vidisse te veritatem, quam nec defensurus esses, nec secuturus? Si libenter errant etiam ii qui errare se sentiunt, quanto magis vulgus indoctum, quod pompis inanibus gaudet, animisque puerilibus spectat omnia? oblectatur frivolis, et specie simulacrorum capitur, nec ponderare secum unamquamque rem potest, ut intelligat nihil colendum esse quod oculis mortalibus cernitur, quia mortale sit necesse est. Nec mirandum est, si Deum non videant, cum ipsi ne hominem quidem videant, quem videre se credunt. Hoc enim quod oculis subjectum est, non 0265A homo, 0265A sed hominis receptaculum est; cujus qualitas et figura, non ex lineamentis vasculi quo continetur, sed ex factis et moribus pervidetur. Qui ergo colunt simulacra, corpora sunt hominibus carentia, quia se corporalibus dediderunt, nec vident plus aliquid mente quam corpore; cum sit animi officium ea subtilius cernere, quae acies corporalis non potest intueri. Quos homines idem ille philosophus ac poeta graviter accusat, tamquam humiles et abjectos, qui contra naturae suae rationem ad veneranda terrena se prosternant: ait enim (Lucret., lib. VI de Natura rerum, v. 51): Et faciunt animos humiles formidine divum, Depressosque premunt ad terram.

Aliud quidem ille, cum haec diceret, sentiebat; nihil 0265B utique esse colendum, quia dii humana non curent.

Denique alio loco religiones deorum et cultus inane esse officium confitetur (Idem, lib. V, ad finem): Nec pietas ulla est, velatum saepe videri Vertere se ad lapidem, atque omnes accedere ad aras, Et procumbere humi prostratum, et pandere palmas Ante deum delubra, nec aras sanguine multo Spargere quadrupedum, nec votis nectere vota.Quae profecto si cassa sunt, non oportet sublimes et 0266A excelsos animos avocari, atque in terram premi, sed nihil aliud quam coelestia cogitare.

Impugnatae sunt ergo a prudentioribus falsae religiones, quia sentiebant esse falsas: sed non est inducta vera, quia qualis, aut ubi esset, ignorabant. Itaque sic habuerunt, tanquam nulla esset omnino, quia veram non poterant invenire. Et eo modo inciderunt in errorem multo majorem quam illi qui falsam tenebant. Nam isti fragilium cultores, quamvis sint inepti, quia coelestia constituunt in rebus corruptibilibus atque terrenis, aliquid tamen sapientiae retinent, et habere veniam possunt, quia summum hominis officium, etsi non reipsa, tamen proposito tenent: siquidem hominum atque mutorum, vel solum, vel certe maximum in religione discrimen est. Hi 0266B vero quanto fuerunt sapientiores, quod intellexerunt falsae religionis errorem, tanto facti sunt stultiores, quod esse aliquam veram non putaverunt. Itaque quoniam facilius est de alienis judicare, quam de suis; dum aliorum praecipitium vident, non prospexerunt quid ante suos pedes esset. In utraque igitur parte, et summa stultitia invenitur, et odor quidam sapientiae: ut possis dubitare, quos dicas potissimum stultiores, illosne qui falsam religionem suscipiunt, 0267A an eos qui nullam. Sed (ut dixi) venia concedi potest 0267A imperitis, et qui se sapientes non esse fateantur: his vero non potest qui, sapientiam professi, stultitiam potius exhibent. Non sum equidem tam iniquus, ut eos putem divinare potuisse, ut veritatem per seipsos invenirent; quod fieri ego non posse confiteor. Sed hoc ab his exigo, quod ratione ipsa praestare potuerunt. Facerent enim prudentius, si et intelligerent esse aliquam veram religionem, et falsis impugnatis, aperte pronuntiarent, eam, quae vera esset, ab hominibus non teneri.

Sed moverit eos fortasse illud, quod si qua vera esset religio, exereret se ac vindicaret, nec pateretur esse aliud quidquam. Videre enim nullo modo poterant, quare, aut a quo, et quemadmodum Religio 0267B vera opprimeretur; quod est divini sacramenti, et coelestis arcani. Id vero, nisi doceatur, aliquis scire nullo pacto potest. Summa rei haec est: imperiti et insipientes falsas religiones pro veris habent, quia neque veram sciunt, neque falsam intelligunt. Prudentiores vero, quia veram nesciunt, aut in iis, quas falsas esse intelligunt, perseverant, ut aliquid tenere videantur, aut omnino nihil colunt, ne incidant in errorem, cum id ipsum maximi sit erroris vitam pecudum sub figura hominis imitari. Falsum vero intelligere, est quidem sapientiae, sed humanae. Ultra hunc gradum procedi ab homine non potest; itaque multi philosophorum religiones (ut docui) sustulerunt: verum autem scire divinae est sapientiae. Homo autem per seipsum pervenire ad hanc scientiam 0267C non potest, nisi doceatur a Deo. Ita philosophi quod 0268A summum fuit humanae sapientiae assecuti sunt, ut intelligerent quid non sit: illud assequi nequiverunt, ut dicerent quid sit. Nota Ciceronis vox est (Lib. I de Natura deorum): «Utinam tam facile vera invenire possem, quam falsa convincere.» Quod quia vires humanae conditionis excedit, ejus officii facultas nobis est attributa, quibus tradidit Deus scientiam veritatis; cui explicandae quatuor posteriores libri servient. Nunc interim falsa, ut coepimus, detegamus.