§1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.
§4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.
§7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.
§10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.
§13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.
§19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.
§21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.
§23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .
§34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.
§35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.
§36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.
§38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .
§39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”
§40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.
§41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.
§42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.
§17. Discussion as to the exact nature of the ‘energies’ which, this man declares, ‘follow’ the being of the Father and of the Son.
Then he says “there must of course be included in this account the energies that accompany each Being, and the names appropriate to these energies.” Shrouded in such a mist of vagueness, the meaning of this is far from clear: but one might conjecture it is as follows. By the energies of the Beings, he means those powers which have produced the Son and the Holy Spirit, and by which the First Being made the Second, and the Second the Third: and he means that the names of the results produced have been provided in a manner appropriate to those results. We have already exposed the mischief of these names, and will again, when we return to that part of the question, should additional discussion of it be required.
But it is worth a moment’s while now to consider how energies ‘follow’ beings: what these energies are essentially: whether different to the beings which they ‘follow,’ or part of them, and of their inmost nature: and then, if different, how and whence they arise: if the same, how they have got cut off from them, and instead of co-existing ‘follow’ them externally only. This is necessary, for we cannot learn all at once from his words whether some natural necessity compels the ‘energy,’ whatever that may be, to ‘follow’ the being, the way heat and vapour follow fire, and the various exhalations the bodies which produce them. Still I do not think that he would affirm that we should consider the being of God to be something heterogeneous and composite, having the energy inalienably contained in the idea of itself, like an ‘accident’ in some subject-matter: he must mean that the beings, deliberately and voluntarily moved, produce by themselves the desired result. But, if this be so, who would style this free result of intention as one of its external consequences? We have never heard of such an expression used in common parlance in such cases; the energy of the worker of anything is not said to ‘follow’ that worker. We cannot separate one from the other and leave one behind by itself: but, when one mentions the energy, one comprehends in the idea that which is moved with the energy, and when one mentions the worker one implies at once the unmentioned energy.
An illustration will make our meaning clearer. We say a man works in iron, or in wood, or in anything else. This single expression conveys at once the idea of the working and of the artificer, so that if we withdraw the one, the other has no existence. If then they are thus thought of together, i.e. the energy and he who exercises it, how in this case can there be said to “follow” upon the first being the energy which produces the second being, like a sort of go-between to both, and neither coalescing with the nature of the first, nor combining with the second: separated from the first because it is not its very nature, but only the exercise of its nature, and from that which results afterwards because it does not therein reproduce a mere energy, but an active being.
Εἶτά φησι: « συμπεριλαμβανομένων δηλαδὴ καὶ τῶν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἑπομένων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις προσφυῶν ὀνομάτων ». τούτων δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶ μὲν οὐ λίαν εὐσύνοπτος, πολλῷ τῷ γνόφῳ τῆς ἀσαφείας κεκαλυμμένος, ὡς δ' ἄν τις εἰκάσας ὑπονοήσειε, τοιοῦτός ἐστιν: « ἐνεργείας οὐσιῶν » ὀνομάζει τὰς ἀποτελεστικάς, ὡς οἶμαι, τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος δυνάμεις, δι' ὧν ἡ πρώτη οὐσία τὴν δευτέραν εἰργάσατο καὶ ἡ δευτέρα τὴν τρίτην, καὶ « τὰ ὀνόματα » τῶν ἀποτελεσθέντων ἔργων « προσφυῶς » συγκατεσκευάσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις φησίν. ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν περὶ τὰ ὀνόματα κακουργίαν ἤδη τε κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐξητάσαμεν, καὶ ὅταν εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος τῆς ἐξετάσεως ἔλθωμεν, ἐὰν ὁ λόγος ἐπιζητῇ, πάλιν προθήσομεν.
Τέως δὲ νῦν ἄξιόν ἐστι λογίσασθαι, πῶς « ἕπονται » ταῖς οὐσίαις αἱ ἐνέργειαι, τί οὖσαι κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν, ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας αἷς παρέπονται ἢ μέρος ἐκείνων καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως: καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄλλο, πῶς ἢ παρὰ τίνος γενόμεναι, εἰ δὲ τὸ αὐτό, πῶς ἀποτεμνόμεναι καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ „συνυπάρχειν” αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν « παρεπόμεναι ». οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁπλῶς οὕτως ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἔστι μαθεῖν, πότερον ἀνάγκης τινὸς φυσικῆς ἀπροαιρέτως τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἥτις ποτὲ αὕτη ἐστίν, ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ οὐσίᾳ βιαζομένης, ὡς ἕπεται τῷ πυρὶ ἡ καῦσις καὶ οἱ ἀτμοὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναθυμιάσεις τοῖς ἀφ' ὧν ταῦτα γίνονται σώμασιν_ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν οἶμαι τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὥστε ποικίλον τι χρῆμα καὶ σύνθετον νομίζειν τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀχώριστον ἔχουσαν καὶ συνεπιθεωρουμένην ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ὥς τι συμβεβηκὸς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δεικνύμενον_ἀλλὰ προαιρετικῶς καὶ αὐτεξουσίως κινουμένας τὰς οὐσίας τὸ δοκοῦν φησι καθ' ἑαυτὰς ἀπεργάζεσθαι. καὶ τίς τὸ ἐκ προνοίας ἑκουσίως γινόμενον ὥς τι τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπακολουθούντων « ἕπεσθαι » λέγει; οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἔγνωμεν τετριμμένην τὴν λέξιν, ὥστε τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ περί τι πονοῦντος ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ πονοῦντι λέγειν: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι δυνατὸν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου διαζεύξαντα καταλαβεῖν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ λειπόμενον, ἀλλ' ὁ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἰπὼν τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν κινούμενον τῷ λόγῳ συμπεριέλαβε, καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος μνησθεὶς καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν πάντως κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον αὐτῷ συνεσήμηνε.
Σαφέστερον δὲ διὰ τῶν ὑποδειγμάτων τὸ λεγόμενον ἔσται. χαλκεύειν τινὰ λέγομεν ἢ τεκταίνεσθαι ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐνεργεῖν τῶν τοιούτων. οὐκοῦν τῇ μιᾷ φωνῇ τήν τε ἐργασίαν καὶ τὸν μετιόντα τὴν τέχνην κατὰ ταὐτὸν ὁ λόγος παρέστησεν, ὥστε εἰ χωρισθείη τὸ ἕτερον, μὴ ἂν ὑποστῆναι τὸ λειπόμενον. εἰ οὖν τὰ δύο μετ' ἀλλήλων νοεῖται, αὐτή τε ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν κινούμενος, πῶς ἐνταῦθα « ἕπεσθαι » λέγεται τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ πρώτῃ ἡ τὴν δευτέραν οὐσίαν ἀπεργαζομένη ἐνέργεια, μεσιτεύουσά πως δι' ἑαυτῆς ἀμφοτέραις καὶ οὔτε τῇ πρώτῃ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν συμβαίνουσα οὔτε πρὸς τὴν δευτέραν συναπτομένη; τῆς μὲν γὰρ κεχώρισται τῷ μὴ φύσις εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φύσεως κίνησις, τῇ δὲ μεθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐ συμβαίνει, ὅτι οὐ ψιλὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλ' ἐνεργὸν οὐσίαν δι' ἑαυτῆς ὑπεστήσατο.