Whence most beautifully the Egyptian priest in Plato said, “O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, not having in your souls a single ancient opinion received through tradition from antiquity. And not one of the Greeks is an old man;”340 [Timæus, p. 22, B.—S.] meaning by old, I suppose, those who know what belongs to the more remote antiquity, that is, our literature; and by young, those who treat of what is more recent and made the subject of study by the Greeks,—things of yesterday and of recent date as if they were old and ancient. Wherefore he added, “and no study hoary with time;” for we, in a kind of barbarous way, deal in homely and rugged metaphor. Those, therefore, whose minds are rightly constituted approach the interpretation utterly destitute of artifice. And of the Greeks, he says that their opinions ”differ but little from myths.” For neither puerile fables nor stories current among children are fit for listening to. And he called the myths themselves “children,” as if the progeny of those, wise in their own conceits among the Greeks, who had but little insight; meaning by the “hoary studies” the truth which was possessed by the barbarians, dating from the highest antiquity. To which expression he opposed the phrase “child fable,” censuring the mythical character of the attempts of the moderns, as, like children, having nothing of age in them, and affirming both in common—their fables and their speeches—to be puerile.
Divinely, therefore, the power which spoke to Hermas by revelation said, “The visions and revelations are for those who are of double mind, who doubt in their hearts if these things are or are not.”341 [See Shepherd of Hermas, i. p. 14, ante. S.]
Similarly, also, demonstrations from the resources of erudition, strengthen, confirm, and establish demonstrative reasonings, in so far as men’s minds are in a wavering state like young people’s. “The good commandment,” then, according to the Scripture, “is a lamp, and the law is a light to the path; for instruction corrects the ways of life.”342 Prov. vi. 23. “Law is monarch of all, both of mortals and of immortals,” says Pindar. I understand, however, by these words, Him who enacted law. And I regard, as spoken of the God of all, the following utterance of Hesiod, though spoken by the poet at random and not with comprehension:—
“For the Saturnian framed for men this law: Fishes, and beasts, and winged birds may eat Each other, since no rule of right is theirs; But Right (by far the best) to men he gave.” |
Whether, then, it be the law which is connate and natural, or that given afterwards, which is meant, it is certainly of God; and both the law of nature and that of instruction are one. Thus also Plato, in The Statesman, says that the lawgiver is one; and in The Laws, that he who shall understand music is one; teaching by these words that the Word is one, and God is one. And Moses manifestly calls the Lord a covenant: “Behold I am my Covenant with thee,”343 Gen. xvii. 4. “As for me, behold, My convenant is with thee.”—A.V. having previously told him not to seek the covenant in writing.344 The allusion here is obscure. The suggestion has been made that it is to ver. 2 of the same chapter, which is thus taken to intimate that the covenant would be verbal, not written. For it is a covenant which God, the Author of all, makes. For God is called Θεός, from θέσις (placing), and order or arrangement. And in the Preaching345 Referring to an apocryphal book so called. [This book is not cited as Scripture, but (valeat quantum) as containing a saying attributed to St. Peter. Clement quotes it not infrequently. A very full and valuable account of it may be found in Lardner, vol. ii. p. 252, et seqq. Not less valuable is the account given by Jones, On the Canon, vol. i. p. 355. See all Clement’s citations, same volume, p. 345, et seqq.] of Peter you will find the Lord called Law and Word. But at this point, let our first Miscellany346 Στρωματεύς of gnostic notes, according to the true philosophy, come to a close.
Ὅθεν παγκάλως ὁ παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι Αἰγύπτιος ἱερεύς· ὦ Σόλων, Σόλων, εἶπεν, Ἕλληνες ὑμεῖς αἰεὶ παῖδές ἐστε, οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἔχοντες δι' ἀρχαίαν ἀκοὴν παλαιὰν δόξαν, γέρων δὲ Ἑλλήνων οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδείς· γέροντας, οἶμαι, εἰπὼν τοὺς τὰ πρεσβύτερα, τουτέστι τὰ ἡμέτερα, εἰδότας, ὡς ἔμπαλιν νέους τοὺς τὰ νεώτερα καὶ ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ἐπιτετηδευμένα, τὰ χθὲς καὶ πρῴην γενόμενα, ὡς παλαιὰ καὶ ἀρχαῖα ἱστοροῦντας. ἐπήγαγεν οὖν μάθημα χρόνῳ πολιόν, κατὰ βαρβαρικόν τινα τρόπον ἀπλάστῳ καὶ οὐκ εὐκρινεῖ χρωμένων ἡμῶν τῇ μεταφορᾷ. ἀτεχνῶς γοῦν οἱ εὐγνώμονες ὅλῳ τῷ πλάσματι τῷ τῆς ἑρμηνείας προσίασιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων φησὶ τὴν οἴησιν αὐτῶν [παίδων] βραχύ τι διαφέρειν μύθων· οὐ γὰρ μύθων παιδικῶν ἐξακουστέον οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν τοῖς παισὶ γενομένων μύθων· παῖδας δὲ εἴρηκεν αὐτούς γε τοὺς μύθους, ὡς ἂν μικρὸν διορώντων τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησιν οἰησισόφων, αἰνιττόμενος τὸ μάθημα τὸ πολιόν, τὴν παρὰ βαρβάροις προγενεστάτην· ἀλήθειαν, ᾧ ῥήματι ἀντέθηκε τὸ παῖς μῦθος, τὸ μυθικὸν τῆς τῶν νεωτέρων ἐπιβολῆς διελέγχων ὡς δίκην παίδων μηδὲν πρεσβύτερον ἐχούσης, ἄμφω κοινῶς τοὺς μύθους αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς λόγους παιδικοὺς εἶναι παριστάς. θείως τοίνυν ἡ δύναμις ἡ τῷ Ἑρμᾷ κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν λαλοῦσα τὰ ὁράματα φησὶ καὶ τὰ ἀποκαλύμματα διὰ τοὺς διψύχους, τοὺς διαλογιζομένους ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, εἰ ἄρα ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πολυμαθοῦς περιουσίας ἀποδείξεις ἰσχυροποιοῦσι καὶ βεβαιοῦσι καὶ θεμελιοῦσι τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀποδεικτικούς, ὅσον ἔτι αἱ αὐτῶν ὡς νέων φρένες ἠερέθονται. λαμπτὴρ ἄρα ἐντολὴ ἀγαθή, κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, νόμος δὲ φῶς ὁδοῦ· ὁδοὺς γὰρ βιότητος ἐλέγχει παιδεία. νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων, λέγει Πίνδαρος. ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν θέμενον τὸν νόμον διὰ τούτων ἐξακούω καὶ τό γε Ἡσιόδειον ἐπὶ τοῦ πάντων λελέχθαι θεοῦ λαμβάνω, εἰ καὶ στοχαστικῶς εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ, ἀλλ' οὐ καταληπτικῶς· τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων, ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς, ἐσθέμεν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτῶν· ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη. εἴτ' οὖν τὸν ἅμα τῇ γενέσει φησὶ νόμον εἴτε καὶ τὸν αὖθις δοθέντα, πλὴν ἐκ θεοῦ ὅ τε τῆς φύσεως ὅ τε τῆς μαθήσεως νόμος, εἷς [ὤν], ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Πολιτικῷ ἕνα τὸν νομοθέτην φησίν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις ἕνα τὸν συνήσοντα τῶν μουσικῶν, διὰ τούτων διδάσκων τὸν λόγον εἶναι ἕνα καὶ τὸν θεὸν ἕνα. Μωυσῆς δὲ φαίνεται τὸν κύριον διαθήκην καλῶν, ἰδοὺ ἐγώ, λέγων, ἡ διαθήκη μου μετὰ σοῦ· ἐπεὶ καὶ πρότερον εἶπεν διαθήκην, [παραινεῖ] μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν γραφῇ. ἔστι γὰρ διαθήκη ἣν ὁ αἴτιος τοῦ παντὸς θεὸς τίθεται (θεὸς δὲ παρὰ τὴν θέσιν εἴρηται), [αὐτὸς ὁ ποιήσας] κατὰ τάξιν τὴν διακόσμησιν. ἐν δὲ τῷ Πέτρου Κηρύγματι εὕροις ἂν νόμον καὶ λόγον τὸν κύριον προσαγορευόμενον. Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικῶν ὑπομνημάτων πρῶτος ἡμῖν Στρωματεὺς ἐνταυθοῖ περιγεγράφθω.