OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to nature, but another besides this, either in quantity or in quality, how is it not now moved contrary to nature? 50. From the same argument. That the circles are moved, but the stars are at rest and, being bound to the circles, are carried along. If the stars are at rest in the circles according to nature, they are bound to the circles in vain; but if they are at rest contrary to nature, it is clear that they are at rest by force; but among eternal things, nothing is either in vain or contrary to nature. Therefore Aristotle did not discover the principle concerning the motion of the stars; for he says the stars are eternal, and in what he said concerning their motion, both appear: that which is in vain and that which is contrary to nature. If the stars are eternal, and the heaven in which the stars are bound is also eternal, and each of them has been called a god, how are they not gods being dragged by gods? For things bound to what is moved are moved by being dragged. If the composition of substance (for it is from matter and form) is one thing, and the composition from the parts having substance is another, how are these things, which have both compositions, said to be eternal? For the heaven, having the sun and the stars as bound parts, is composed of them; for the heaven is what has these within itself. 57. From the same argument. Besides these things, it is irrational that nature assigned them no instrument for motion; for nature does nothing at random, nor does it care for living things while neglecting things so precious, but it seems as if it has purposely taken away all means by which it is possible for them to proceed by themselves. If for eternal and ungenerated things there is no maker, nor is it by anyone's care that they are what they are or have what they have according to nature, how, if the heaven is ungenerated and the phenomena in the heaven are co-ungenerated with it, does it have nature as the maker and caretaker of the things accomplished for their constitution? If it was fitting for one making the argument concerning the motion of eternal things to say that nature does nothing at random, how is it not clear that both the heaven and the phenomena in the heaven are works of the nature which took away their instruments of motion? 58. From the same argument. Since, therefore, it is necessary for the heaven to be moved with its own motion, but for the other stars not to proceed by themselves, it would be reasonable for each to be spherical; for in this way the one would best be moved, and the other would be at rest. If that which is at rest is said to be that which is able to be moved with that motion from which it is at rest, how are the stars at rest, having no proper motion according to which they ought to be moved? But if it has the power to be moved, but is prevented on account of being bound to the sphere, how is its motion not contrary to nature

φύσιν ἐκινεῖτο κίνησιν ἣν νῦν κινεῖται, πῶς οὐ μάτην ἐνεδέθη τῇ σφαίρᾳ; Eἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτην ἐκινεῖτο κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἑτέ ραν παρὰ ταύτην εἴτε τῷ ποσῷ εἴτε τῷ ποιῷ, πῶς οὐ παρὰ φύσιν κινεῖται νῦν; ν. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Τοὺς μὲν κύκλους κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἄστρα ἠρεμεῖν καὶ ἐνδεδεμένα τοῖς κύκλοις φέρεσθαι. Eἰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τοῖς κύκλοις τὰ ἄστρα, μάτην ἐνδέδεται τοῖς κύκλοις, εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἠρεμεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι βίᾳ ἠρεμεῖ· ἀλλὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐθὲν οὔτε μάτην οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν. Oὐκ ἄρα εὗρεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων κινήσεως λόγον· ἀΐδια γὰρ λέγει τὰ ἄστρα, καὶ ἐν οἷς εἶπε περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κινήσεως ἀμφότερα φαίνεται, τὸ μάτην καὶ παρὰ φύσιν. Eἰ ἀΐδια μὲν τὰ ἄστρα, ἀΐδιος δὲ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὰ ἄστρα δεδεμένα, καὶ θεὸς ἕκα στον αὐτῶν προσηγόρευται, πῶς οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν συ ρόμενοι; Τὰ γὰρ τῷ κινουμένῳ ἐνδεδεμένα συρομένως κινεῖ ται. Eἰ ἄλλη ἡ σύνθεσις οὐσίας (ἐξ ὕλης γὰρ καὶ εἴδους) καὶ ἄλλη ἡ σύνθεσις ἡ ἐκ τῶν οὐσίαν ἐχόντων μερῶν, πῶς ἀΐδια ταῦτα λέγεται τὰ ἀμφοτέρας ἔχοντα τὰς συνθέσεις; Ὁ γὰρ οὐρανός, ἔχων τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ἐνδεδεμένα μέρη, σύνθετος ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐστιν· ἔχων γὰρ ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστιν ὁ οὐρανός. νζ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄλογον τὸ μηθὲν ὄργανον αὐτοῖς ἀπο δοῦναι τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις, οὐδὲ τῶν μὲν ζώων φροντίσαι, τῶν δὲ οὕτω τιμίων ὑπεριδεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἀφελεῖν πάντα δι' ὧν ἐνδέχεται προϊέναι καθ' αὑτά. Eἰ τῶν ἀϊδίων τε καὶ ἀγενήτων οὐδείς ἐστι ποιητής, οὐδὲ φροντίδι τινός εἰσιν ἅ εἰσιν ἢ ἔχουσιν ἃ ἔχουσι κατὰ φύσιν, πῶς, εἰ ἀγένητός ἐστιν ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐ ρανῷ φαινόμενα συναγένητα ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ, τὴν φύσιν ἔχει ποιητήν τε καὶ φροντιστὴν τῶν πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῶν τελουμένων; Eἰ ἥρμοττε τῷ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν ἀϊδίων τὸν λόγον ποιουμένῳ τὸ λέγειν τὴν φύσιν μηδὲν ὡς ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ὅτι ἔργα εἰσὶ τῆς φύσεως ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ φαινόμενα, τῆς ἀφελούσης αὐτῶν τὰ ὄργανα τῆς κινήσεως; νη. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἐπεὶ οὖν δεῖ τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν κινεῖσθαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κίνησιν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἄστρα μὴ προϊέναι δι' αὑτῶν, εὐλόγως ἂν ἑκάτερον εἴη σφαιροειδές· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα τὸ μὲν κινηθήσεται, τὸ δὲ ἠρεμήσει. Eἰ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ἐκεῖνο λέγεται τὸ δυνάμενον κινηθῆναι τὴν κίνησιν ἐκείνην ἀφ' ἧς ἠρεμεῖ, πῶς ἠρεμεῖ τὰ ἄστρα ἰδίαν οὐκ ἔχοντα κίνησιν, καθ' ἣν κινεῖσθαι ἐχρῆν; Eἰ δὲ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει τοῦ κινεῖσθαι, κωλύεται δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐνδε δέσθαι τῇ σφαίρᾳ, πῶς οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχει τὸ κινεῖσθαι