Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica

 After the judgment of the thoughts, an exact discernment of how the thoughts happen to be, whether they are good or otherwise but imagination is the

 to divide for us, by the established terms, the sesquitertian ratios into both the sesquioctave ratios and the leimmata, we would have stopped at thes

 having split it, he bent each one into a circle, bringing them together middle to middle with each other like a chi, having joined 7 them both to them

 left, or rather the one is an image of mind, the other of soul. And in the soul itself, the right is that which is turned toward the intelligible thin

 regarding the explanation of the Platonic psychogony, this we now discharge for you as a kind of debt. For Plato's statement that the division of thes

 and of exegesis. And there is a letter of mine placed among my books that has traced out and carefully examined the meaning in the sayings. But it is

 a ruler drives a team of two then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is oppo

 a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the extern

 through which it is not swept into material disorder, but is joined to the divine light, holds it in its own place and makes it unmixed with matter, l

 of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofo

 agrees, but among them the salty is more than the drinkable. They say, for example, that every soul is either divine or changing from intellect to min

 to be deemed worthy of pardon in repenting. If the soul is a body according to some of the ancients, what is it that contains it? every body is three-

 distinction. Two kinds of air according to Aristotle, the vaporous from the exhalation of water and the smoky from the extinguishing of fire. The latt

 Plato. Pleasure is not a coming-to-be for coming-to-be is of things that are not, while pleasure is of things that are. And coming-to-be is swift and

 is natural, while habit is acquired and taught. Providence is the care for existing things that comes from God. Epicurus says: the blessed and incorr

 but such powers are simply and imperceptibly desired. What then? Do we have three souls? Solution: just as the soul, when united to the body, seems to

 When this is dimmed they also are dimmed the soul flourishes when this 34 withers. Further, everything desires to preserve its own substrate. If the

 actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in th

 concerning form, matter and cause, for example the matter of the celestial bodies is not the four elements, but a certain fifth, spherical one, as be

 as knowledge (for knowledge is a transition from defined things to defined things for this reason it is also knowledge, as leading the mind to a stat

 this, for indeed the flesh also moves downwards and is none of the elements. Aporia: but matter, that is the element, is not soul, but the form that c

 definitions have as their beginning the most general things, as their end the most specific things. If, then, these are finite, so are the definitions

 and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be e

 the rest, but this is about hot and soft, heavy and light, rare and dense, and many opposites. In humans, the cause of local motion is intellect, in i

 is nourished {which} is twofold: either as Matter or as an instrument. And the instrument is twofold: either moving and being moved, like the innate h

 is equal in distance to the zodiac signs. Light is not a body. for if it were a body, how would it be possible for it to have instantaneous movement,

 we see the introduction of the forms of things seen entering the sight, but how do we see the interval of the air in between? Solution: It is not that

 with a violent collision. In soft things no sound is produced, because the air is broken up in their pores and dispersed as in sponges. In things that

 a buzzing which is conveyed back to the sense of hearing. Others say that the sound occurring in the ears after the blockage is of the external air th

 For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart.

 the sense organs of touch, it is clear for every sense organ is both separated and known. Aristotle speaks of the senses both as one each and as many

 Aristotle in On the Soul : if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-

 Some add also a sixth, the attentive [faculty], as when a man says, I perceived, I thought, I opined. To this part they also add the activities of t

 We can say ten, but not indeed opine it, so that opinion is not up to us. But neither do we imagine what we wish for we see at night what we do not w

 in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says

 theoretical versus the practical. The theoretical corresponds to a vision discerning of forms, while the practical corresponds to a vision not only kn

 organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produc

 simpler, or rather the things inherent in the matter, into which the matter is also divided, which are also prop[erly] called its elements. I say then

 he hints that it is not completed from both of the things mixed, but is produced in the union of the soul and the body, not by the soul itself giving

 closing the senses, so as to know unknowingly the transcendent substance of that which is. For according to their own opinions, the philosopher who ha

 he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philoso

 it grows and is naturally constituted to decay, must in every way grow along with and decay along with the other in a connate manner for that by whic

 a demonstration, so also the soul in an infant's body and a more imperfect one, if it were in another, perfect body, would immediately have shown its

 I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature,

 Porphyry has philosophized in harmony with this. For in discussing the soul, he says: “Just as insomniacs, by the very act of wanting to sleep and wat

 have they cast off? Perhaps those who hold the contrary opinion will vex us with these things. But their objection is like a spider's web, which will

 to have received watchwords from the first father, nor that they possess the fullness of many bosoms, nor would I accept that they stand before the bo

 both the Sibylline and the Orphic ones, and those according to which the Berytian Bulls came to be and Amous the Egyptian, and Socrates and Plato (for

 of the bonds by which they were bound, and after this, turning their minds upward, they will approach God. And if the account told about the Sibyl wer

 has the front part? What then do you think? a mind scattered in so great a size is from this cause for him both slack and weak, and the soul is simply

 would remember any of the things here. But as many of the souls as were allotted to more humble portions and their whole mind has not been snatched aw

 Let us not altogether reject the analogy of the eye in the case of the soul, let it be and be called a more precise substance of the soul but if some

 The manner of the entry of souls, and likewise of their release or separation from hence, both are most difficult or hard to explain for of the first

 but by such powers the soul is led like some kind of thing moved by another, being drawn towards whatever the leaders happen to lead it, but then rath

 For that which is according to reason, knowledge is readily at hand, but that which is contrary to reason, is so because it has received such a nature

 of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent

 fitting and gluing it to that by means of a suitable analogy, not placing the rational and intellectual substance into any of the animals for this is

 are generated from these powers alone, for this reason, having abandoned the others, they divided the substance of the soul into these alone. But if y

 it is in fourths, when one might contemplate these both in the third order of the intellectual virtues and in the fourth of the paradigmatic virtues,

 and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for y

 and with nothing separating them, it is necessary for the one to be ordered, and the other to order and the one which is ordered has its form divided

 what is hard and resistant in them has been smoothed out by me. But what follows from this must be attributed to them alone for, proposing to speak a

 proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause

 in our sacred writings, neither a whole soul nor any whole nature, apart from the partial ones, has been dogmatically established1. I for my part reje

 by the energy, then also the substance is perfected according to it, and these things stand in each other according to one energy. For he who does not

 having a life activated according to intellect and reason the psychic is defined according to reason 124 and takes care of divisible souls the physi

 tormenting them. But there are, they say, both on earth divine daimons and in the air, guardians of the animals there, and <in> the water, extending t

 make it superior to the confusion of life, but, if possible, may you not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the very body which you have put o

 cast under your mind: for there is no plant of truth on earth» that is: do not busy your mind with the great measures of the earth, as the geographer

 Gregory by reason and contemplation leads the soul up to the more divine things by reason that is according to us, the more intellectual and better,

 such a lion-bearing fount of heaven and the stars, but the ruling part of its own existence conceals the vision of them. Chaldaean Oracle. From all si

 often appearing, they feign the semblance of some goodness towards the one being initiated. Chaldean Oracle. The soul of mortals will draw God into it

 they can. Whence everything they say and show is false and insubstantial for they know existing things through forms but that which knows future thi

 and fear is the holding back of his goodness towards us for the sake of the economy. Chaldean Oracle. The Father snatched himself away, not even enclo

 they are possessed by passions. Therefore, it is necessary for these also to receive their part of the whole judgment and, having been filled up with

 for it is higher than being venerated, than being uttered, and than being conceived. A Chaldean Oracle. The Iynges, being conceived by the Father, the

 an unknown password, spoken and unspoken. And they often bring the soul down 148 into the world for many reasons, either through the shedding of its w

 of truth and of love. After which are the demiurgic fountains, such as that of the ideas, according to which the cosmos and the things in it have shap

 enclosing the triad towards itself and they call these also intelligible. After these, another order of the intelligible and at the same time intelle

 to the setting [sun], and the pit to the one just at mid-heaven. And thus, gently separating the membrane of the liver, [which is placed] upon the org

 parts of philosophy is necessary. For according to moral philosophy it is necessary to assume that not all things are and come to be by necessity, but

 knowledge and sees not only the essences themselves, but also their powers and their activities, both those according to nature and those contrary to

 he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad and this knowledge is an unchan

 from the one who knows, and it revolves around the thing known and is made like the one who knows. I mean something like this: the knowledge of the so

 they fabricate. For I too had a certain little man, ignoble in soul, but by no means the least of storytellers to him, at any rate, such phantoms pre

For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart. The tasteless is fourfold: either that which can be flavored, as water, being without quality, or that which is subject to the other senses, like a sound, or that which has little taste, like watery broths, or things of bad taste, like poisons. And in the case of the other senses, these four meanings are distinguished. 58 The principles of the tastable are the drinkable as perfecting and the undrinkable as destructive of taste through a bad flavor. The moist, as moist, is tangible, but as of a certain kind, is tastable. The tongue is moistened by other humors, but is dried by salted things and the like, as such things draw out its moisture. Those who have a smooth or dry or wet tongue do not perceive tastable things, because the moisture in it, being flavorful, this becomes the first touch of the tongue, not allowing the perception of things from without. Likewise, he who has an excessively dry tongue perceives less; for the sense-organ must be affected somewhat by the tastable thing, which is moist, but the excessively dry is less affected by the moist, just as dried hides are less affected by moisture. Just as with colors, some are simple, like white and black, and others are composite, and nearer to white is yellow, and to black is dark blue, and those in between, gray, red, so also with flavors, the simple are sweet and bitter, and the others are mixed, nearer to sweetening is the rich, the salty to the bitter, and the others in between. It should be known that they are not intermediate and mixed, but the reverse. They are called intermediate as partaking of neither of the extremes. Salts are from bitter and sweet, the pungent is harsh and sharp. Aristotle says there are eight kinds of flavors: sweet and bitter are the extremes, near to sweet is the rich and to bitter is the salty, in the middle are astringent, harsh, pungent, sharp. Galen says the extremes are pungent and sharp, having regard to the tangible qualities; for pungent is extreme in heat, sharp is extreme in cold. But he, as a philosopher, regarded the tastable things. Plato says there are seven flavors, because something with sweetness makes it sweet, but without this, it is rich, and he calls sharp and pungent extremes, near-extremes to sharp is astringent, to pungent is bitter, near-intermediate to bitter is salty, to astringent is harsh, and in the middle is sweet. He assigns, therefore, sharp to Hermes, pungent to Ares, bitter to the Moon, sweet to the Sun, salty to Aphrodite, harsh to Zeus, astringent to Kronos. Every sense is concerned with one opposition, but touch is concerned with several which are not subordinate to one another: hot, cold, dry, moist, heavy, light, 59 and so on; it is not [therefore] one sense. Further, every single sense is concerned with one genus, but touch is not concerned with one named or unnamed genus that is comprehensive of its proper sensibles. If we speak of a white and black voice, we speak by analogy; for white and black belong to sight. And if large and small are spoken of in other cases, they belong principally to hearing, and <similarly> in the other cases. Further, in the case of tangible things the oppositions are entirely separate, but in the other senses they perhaps have some community. Someone refutes such an opinion, saying, "If there is one sense-organ of touch, the flesh, then the sense is also one." It is not so; for the tongue is also one, but has different senses. The flesh is a sense-organ, since without delay, upon the touching of tangible things by the flesh, we perceive them. For if it were not so, some time would be needed for perception, just as hearing, having air as its medium, needs time for it to be affected, and in the other senses. Further, we have no other tangible sense-organ besides the flesh. Further, in the others there is some medium, but this is not the case unless the flesh itself is tangible. Oppositions: the flesh is not a sense-organ because it is without delay (for it has this by nature), because even when a foreign membrane is placed upon the flesh, we touch and perceive no less. that there are not more

γοῦν ἰχθύες ταύτην μὴ ἔχοντες διὰ τῶν βραγχίων καταψύχονται. τὰ ἔχοντα ἀρτηρίαν ἔχουσι καὶ πνεύμονα. οἱ ἰχθύες οὔτε ταῦτα ἔχει οὔτε καρδίαν. Τετραχῶς τὸ ἄγευστον· ἢ τὸ δυνάμενον χυμωθῆναι, ὡς τὸ ὕδωρ ἄποιον ὄν, ἢ τὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν ὑποκείμενον, ὡς ψόφος, ἢ τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον γεῦσιν, ὡς τὰ ὑδαρὰ τῶν ῥοφημάτων, ἢ τὰ κακόγευστα, ὡς τὰ δηλητήρια. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ αἰσθήσεων τὰ τέτταρα ταῦτα διαγινώσκεται σημαινόμενα. 58 Ἀρχαὶ τοῦ γευστοῦ τὸ ποτὸν ὡς τελειωτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄποτον ὡς φθαρτικὸν τῆς γεύσεως διὰ μοχθηρὸν χυμόν. Τὸ ὑγρὸν ὡς μὲν ὑγρὸν ἁπτόν, ὡς δὲ τοιόνδε γευστόν. Ἡ γλῶττα ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων χυμῶν ὑγραίνεται, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεταριχευμένων καὶ λοιπῶν ξηραίνεται, ἐξικμαζόντων τῶν τοιούτων τὴν ὑγρότητα αὐτῆς. Οἱ τὴν γλῶτταν λείαν ἢ ξηρὰν ἢ ὑγρὰν ἔχοντες οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνονται τῶν γευστῶν, διότι ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ ὑγρότης ἔγχυμος οὖσα αὕτη γίνεται πρώτη γλώττης ἁφή, οὐκ ἐῶσα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν ἔξωθεν. ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ ἔχων τὴν γλῶτταν ἄγαν ξηρὰν ἧττον αἰσθάνεται· δεῖ γὰρ παθεῖν τι τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὑπὸ τοῦ γευστοῦ ὑγροῦ ὄντος, τὸ δὲ ἄγαν ξηρὸν ἧττον πάσχει ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ὡς αἱ ἐξηραμέναι τῶν βυρσῶν ἧττον πάσχουσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ. Ὥσπερ τῶν χρωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἁπλᾶ, ὡς λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα, καὶ ἐγγυτέρω μὲν τοῦ λευκοῦ τὸ ξανθόν, τοῦ δὲ μέλανος τὸ κυανοῦν, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, φαιόν, ἐρυθρόν, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χυμῶν ἁπλᾶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα μικτά, ἐγγύτερον τοῦ γλυκαίνειν τὸ λιπαρόν, τὸ ἁλμυρὸν τοῦ πικροῦ, τὰ δ' ἄλλα μεταξύ. ἰστέον δὲ ὡς οὐ τὰ μεταξὺ καὶ μικτά, ἀλλὰ ἀνάπαλιν. μεταξὺ δὲ λέγεται ὡς μηδετέρου τῶν ἄκρων μετέχοντα. οἱ ἅλες ἐκ πικροῦ καὶ γλυκέος, τὸ δριμὺ αὐστηρὸν καὶ ὀξύ. Ἀριστοτέλης ὀκτὼ εἴδη χυμῶν λέγει, γλυκὺ πικρὸν τὰ ἄκρα, ἐγγὺς τοῦ γλυκέος τὸ λιπαρὸν καὶ τοῦ πικροῦ τὸ ἁλμυρόν, ἐν μέσῳ στρυφνόν, αὐστηρόν, δριμύ, ὀξύ. ὁ Γαληνὸς ἄκρους λέγει δριμὺν καὶ ὀξύν, ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἁπτὰς ἰδὼν ποιότητας· ἄκρον γὰρ κατὰ θερμότητα τὸ δριμύ, κατὰ ψῦξιν τὸ ὀξύ. ὁ δ' ὡς φιλόσοφος πρὸς τὰ γευστὰ ἑώρακε. Πλάτων ἑπτὰ λέγει χυμούς, ὅτι τό γέ τι μετὰ ἡδύτητος γλυκὺ αὐτὸ [ποιεῖ, εἰ] δὲ χωρὶς τούτου, λιπαρόν, καὶ ἄκρα λέγει ὀξύ, δριμύ, πάρακρα πρὸς τὸ ὀξὺ τὸ στρυφνόν, πρὸς τὸ δριμὺ τὸ πικρόν, παράμ[εσα] πρὸς τὸ πικρὸν τὸ ἁλμυρόν, πρὸς τὸ στρυφνὸν τὸ αὐστηρόν, μέσον τὸ γλυκύ. ἀνατίθησιν οὖν τὸ ὀξὺ τῷ Ἑρμῇ, τὸ δριμὺ τῷ Ἄρει, πικρὸν Σελήνῃ, γλυκὺ Ἡλίῳ, ἁλμυρὸν Ἀφροδίτῃ, αὐστηρὸν ∆ιί,στρυφνὸν Κρόνῳ. Ἅπασα αἴσθησις περὶ μίαν ἐναντίωσιν καταγίνεται, ἡ δὲ ἁφὴ περὶ πλείους οὐχ ὑπαλλήλους, θερμόν, ψυχρόν, ξηρόν, ὑγρόν, βαρύ, κοῦφον 59 καὶ λοιπόν· οὐκ [ἄρα] αἴσθησις μία. ἔτι πᾶσα ἡ αἴσθησις μία περὶ ἓν γένος καταγίνεται, ἡ δὲ ἁφὴ οὐ περὶ ἓν ὠνομασμένον ἢ ἀνώνυμον τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῆς αἰσθητῶν περιεκτικόν. εἰ δὲ λέγομεν λευκὴν καὶ μέλαιναν φωνήν, κατὰ ἀναλογίαν λέγομεν· τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν τῆς ὄψεως. καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν εἰ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις λέγεται, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τῆς ἀκουστικῆς, καὶ <ὁμοίως> ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. ἔτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἁπτῶν αἱ ἀντιθέσεις πάντῃ εἰσὶ κεχωρισμέναι, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν ἴσως ἔχουσί τινα κοινωνίαν. Ἀναιρεῖ τις τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν λέγων «εἰ ἓν αἰσθητήριον τῆς ἁφῆς, ἡ σάρξ, μία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις». οὐκ ἔστιν· γλῶττα καὶ γὰρ μία, διαφόρους δὲ ἔχει αἰσθήσεις. ἡ σὰρξ αἰσθητήριόν ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ ἀχρόνως ἅμα τῷ θιγεῖν τῇ σαρκὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα αὐτῶν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν, ἔδει χρόνου τινὸς εἰς ἀντίληψιν, ὡς ἡ ἀκοὴ μέσον ἔχουσα τὸν ἀέρα δεῖ χρόνου, ὥστε παθεῖν αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς λοιπαῖς. ἔτι ἄλλο αἰσθητήριον ἁπτικὸν παρὰ τὴν σάρκα οὐκ ἔχομεν. ἔτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστί τι μεταξύ, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰ μὴ ἡ σάρξ ἐστιν ἁπτική. ἀντιθέσεις· οὐ διὰ τὸ ἄχρονον αἰσθητήριόν ἐστιν ἡ σάρξ (φύσει γὰρ ἔχει τοῦτο), ὅτι καὶ ὑμένος ἐπιτεθέντος ἀλλοτρίου τῇ σαρκὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἁπτόμεθα καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα. ὅτι δὲ οὐ πλείονά εἰσι τὰ