LECTURE 10 (197 a 36-198 a 21)

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHANCE AND FORTUNE. THE CAUSES ARE NEITHER MORE NOR LESS THAN FOUR

             226. Having treated fortune and chance with reference to those aspects in which they are alike, the Philosopher here explains the difference between them.

             This section is divided into two parts. First he explains the difference between fortune and chance. Secondly, where he says, 'The difference between . . .' (197 b 32), he explains that in which this difference primarily consists.

             The first part is divided into two parts. First he explains the difference between chance and fortune. Secondly, where he says, 'Hence it is clear . . .' (197 b 18), he summarizes what he has said about each of them.

             227. Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he explains the difference between chance and fortune. He says that they differ by reason of the fact that chance pertains to more things than fortune, because everything which is by fortune is by chance, but not conversely.

             228. Secondly, where he says, 'Chance and what results . . .' (197 b 1), he clarifies the difference mentioned above.

             First he designates the things in which fortune is found. Secondly, where he says, 'The spontaneous . . .' (197 b 14), he shows that chance is found in more things.

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he designates the things in which fortune is found. Secondly, where he says, 'Thus an inanimate thing . . .' (197 b 6), he draws a conclusion about those things in which fortune is not found.

             229. He says, therefore, first that fortune and that which is by fortune are found in those things in which something is said to happen well. For fortune is found in those things in which there can be good fortune and misfortune.

             Now a thing is said to happen well for him to whom action belongs. However, action belongs properly to him who has dominion over his action. For what does not have dominion over its action is that which is acted upon rather than that which acts. And thus action is not in the power of that which is acted upon, but rather in the power of that which acts.

             Now since the active or practical life pertains to those who have dominion over their acts (for here is where operation according to virtue or vice is found), it is necessary that fortune pertains to the practical.

             A sign of this is the fact that fortune seems to be the same as happiness, or very nearly so. Hence the happy are commonly called the fortunate. For according to those who think that happiness consists in external goods, happiness is the same as fortune; according to those, however, who say that external goods, in which fortune plays a great part, help as instruments in the attainment of happiness, good fortune is close to happiness because it helps one attain it.

             Hence, since happiness is a certain operation (for it is good operation, i.e., that of perfected virtue, as is said in Ethics, I , it follows that fortune pertains to the actions in which one happens to act well or is impeded from acting well. And this means that things turn out either well or badly. Hence, since one has dominion over his actions insofar as he acts voluntarily, it follows that in those actions alone where one acts voluntarily should something happen by fortune, but not in others.

             230. Next where he says, 'Thus an inanimate thing . . .' (197 b 6), he draws from the above a conclusion about the things in which fortune is not found.

             He says that since fortune is found only in those who act voluntarily, it follows that neither an inanimate thing, nor a child, nor a beast act by fortune, since they do not act voluntarily as having free choice (which is here called 'that which is proposed'). Hence, neither good fortune nor misfortune can happen to them except metaphorically. Thus, someone said that the stones from which altars are built are fortunate because honour and reverence are shown them, but the stones next to the altar stones are walked upon. This is said because of a certain likeness to men among whom the honoured seemed to be fortunate, whereas those stones which are walked upon are called unfortunate.

             But although it follows from the foregoing that such things do not act by fortune, there is nothing to prevent them from being acted upon by fortune. For some voluntary agent may act upon them. Thus, we say that it is good fortune when a man finds a treasure, or it is a misfortune when he is struck by a falling stone.

             231. Next where he says, 'The spontaneous . . .' (197 b 14), he points out that chance is found also in other things.

             Concerning this he makes three points. First, he shows that chance is found in other things. Secondly, where he says, 'Hence it is clear . . .' (197 b 18), he draws a certain conclusion from what was said above. Thirdly, where he says, 'This is indicated . . .' (197 b 23), he uses an example to clarify the point.

             232. He says, therefore, first that chance is found not only in men, who act voluntarily, but also in other animals and even in inanimate things. He gives an example dealing with other animals. It is said that a horse comes by chance when his coming is conducive to his safety, although he did not come for the sake of safety. He gives another example taken from inanimate things. We say that a tripod falls by chance because, as it stands, it is suitable for sitting, although it did not fall for the sake of this, i.e., so that someone might sit on it.

             233. Next where he says, 'Hence it is clear . . .' (197 b 18), he draws the following conclusion from the above. When things which come to be simply for the sake of something do not come to be for the sake of that which happens, but for the sake of something extrinsic, then we say that these things come to be by chance. But we say that among the things which come to be by chance, only those things which happen in those who have free choice come to be by fortune.

             234. Next where he says, 'This is indicated . . .' (197 b 23), he clarifies what he has stated in this conclusion, i.e., that chance occurs in those things which happen for the sake of something.

             A sign of this is the fact that the word 'vain' is used, which in the Greek is close to chance. For we use the term 'vain' when that which is for the sake of something does not come to be because of that something, i.e., when that for the sake of which something is done does not occur. Thus if one should walk in order to evacuate the bowels, and if this should not occur to the walker, then he is said to have walked in vain, and his walking would be vain. Thus that which is suitable for the coming to be of something is vain and frustrated when it does not accomplish that for whose coming to be it is suitable.

             He explains why he says 'that for whose coming to be it is suitable'. If someone were to say that he bathed in vain because the sun was not eclipsed while he bathed, he would speak ridiculously, because bathing oneself is not apt for producing an eclipse of the sun.

             Hence chance, which in the Greek is called 'automatum', i.e., per se vain, occurs in those things which are for the sake of something. This is also true of that which is frustrated or vain. For the name per se vain signifies the very thing which is frustrated, just as per se man signifies man himself and per se good signifies good itself.

             He gives an example of things which happen by chance. Thus [it is chance] when it is said that a stone, which strikes someone when falling, did not fall for the purpose of striking him. Therefore it fell because of that which is per se vain or per se frustrated, for the stone does not naturally fall for this purpose. However at times a stone does fall as thrown by someone for the purpose of hitting another.

             However, although chance and the vain are alike insofar as each is among the things which are for the sake of something, nevertheless they also differ. For a thing is called vain because of the fact that that which was intended does not follow, whereas a thing is called chance because of the fact that something else which was not intended does follow.

             Hence sometimes a thing is vain and chance at the same time, for example, when that which was intended does not occur but something else does occur. However, sometimes there is chance but not the vain, as when both that which was intended and something else occur. And there is the vain and no chance when neither that which was intended nor anything else occurs.

             235. Next where he says, 'The difference . . .' (197 b 32), he explains that in which chance most of all differs from fortune.

             He says that they differ most of all in the things which happen by nature, because chance has a place here but fortune does not. For when in the operations of nature something happens outside of nature, for example, when a six fingered person is born, we do not say that this happens by fortune, but rather because of that which is per se vain, i.e., by chance.

             And so we can take as another difference between chance and fortune the fact that the cause of those things which are by chance is intrinsic, just as the cause of those things which are by nature is intrinsic.

             But the cause of those things which are by fortune is extrinsic, just as the cause of those things which are from free choice is extrinsic.

             And he finally concludes that he has now explained what the per se vain or chance is, what fortune is, and how they differ from each other.

             236. Next where he says, 'Both belong . . .' (198 a 2), he points out the genus of cause to which chance and fortune are reduced.

             First he states his position. Secondly, where he says, 'Spontaneity and chance . . .' (198 a 5), he disproves from this a certain opinion mentioned above.

             He says, therefore, first that both chance and fortune are reduced to the genus of the moving cause. For chance and fortune are causes either of those things which proceed from nature or of those things which proceed from intelligence, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, since nature and intelligence are causes as things from which motion begins, so fortune and chance also are reduced to the same genus. But since chance and fortune are per accidens causes, their number is indeterminate, as was said above.

             237. Next where he says, 'Spontaneity and chance . . .' (198 a 5), he refutes the opinion of those who maintain that fortune and chance are the causes of the heavens and of all worldly things.

             He says that since chance and fortune are per accidens causes of those things of which intellect and nature are the per se causes, and since a per accidens cause is not prior to a per se cause, as nothing per accidens is prior to that which is per se, it follows that chance and fortune are causes which are posterior to intellect and nature. Hence if it should be held that chance is the cause of the heavens, as some maintained, as was said above, it would follow that intellect and nature are first of all causes of some other things and afterwards causes of the whole universe.

             Moreover, the cause of the whole universe seems to be prior to the cause of some part of the universe, since any part of the universe is ordered to the perfection of the universe. But it seems to be inconsistent that some other cause is prior to that which is the cause of the heavens. Hence it is inconsistent that chance is the cause of the heavens.

             238. Furthermore we must consider that if those things which happen fortuitously or by chance, i.e., outside the intention of inferior causes, are reduced to some superior cause which orders them, then in relation to this latter cause they cannot be said to be fortuitous or by chance. Hence that superior cause cannot be called fortune.

             239. Next where he says, 'It is clear then . . .' (198 a 14), he shows that the causes are not more than those mentioned.

             This is clarified as follows. The question 'why' asks for the cause. But only the above mentioned causes answer the question 'why'. Therefore, the causes are not more than those which were mentioned. He says that the answers to the question 'why' are the same in number as the above mentioned causes.

             For sometimes the 'why' is reduced finally to what the thing is, i.e., to the definition, as is clear in all immobile things. The mathematicals are of this sort, in which the 'why' is reduced to the definition of the straight or of the commensurate, or of some other thing which is demonstrated in mathematics. Since a right angle is defined as that angle which is formed by the falling of one line upon another which makes of both parts two equal angles, then if it should be asked why an angle is a right angle, the reply would be because it is formed by a line making two equal angles from each part. And it is the same in the other instances.

             Sometimes the 'why' is reduced to the first moving cause. Thus, why does someone fight? Because he has stolen. For this is what brought on the fight.

             Sometimes it is reduced to the final cause, as if we should ask for the sake of what does someone fight, and the answer is that he might rule.

             Sometimes it is reduced to the material cause, as when it is asked why this body is corruptible, and the answer is because it is composed of contraries.

             Thus it is clear that these are the causes and they are just so many.

             240. Furthermore there must be four causes.

             A cause is that upon which the existence of another follows. Now the existence of that which has a cause can be considered in two ways. First it is considered absolutely, and thus the cause of the existing is the form by which something is in act. Secondly it is considered insofar as a being comes to be in act from being in potency. And since everything which is in potency is reduced to act by that which is a being in act, it is necessary that there be two other causes, namely the matter and the agent which reduces the matter from potency to act. However, the action of the agent tends toward something determinate, and thus it proceeds from some determinate principle. For every agent does that which is suitable to it. But that toward which the action of the agent tends is called the final cause. Therefore, there must be four causes.

             But since the form is the cause of existing absolutely, the other three are causes of existence insofar as something receives existence. Hence in immobile things the other three causes are not considered, but only the formal cause is considered.