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32

has a certain signification, for example, "man." For the one who said this, having shown the common nature through the name, did not describe by the word a particular man, the one known particularly by the name. For Peter is not more a man than Andrew and John and James. The commonality of what is signified, therefore, applying equally to all those ranged under the same name, has need of the sub-distinction by which we will recognize not man in general, but Peter or John. But proper names have a more particular indication by which the commonality of the nature is not contemplated in what is signified, but a description of some thing having no community with its own kind, according to its particularity, for example, Paul or Timothy. For such a word no longer refers to the commonality of the nature, but, separating it from the comprehensive meaning, presents through the names an emphasis on certain circumscribed things. Therefore, when an account of the essence of two or even more individuals, such as Paul and Silvanus and Timothy, is sought, one will not give one account of the essence for Paul, and another for Silvanus and another for Timothy, but by whatever accounts the essence of Paul might be shown, these will also apply to the others, and those who are described by the same account of essence are consubstantial with each other. But whenever someone, having learned the commonality, turns his consideration to the particular properties by which one is separated from the other, the identifying account of each one will no longer correspond in all respects to that of the other, even if in some things it is found to have what is common. 38.3 This, therefore, we say: that what is spoken of particularly is signified by the term hypostasis. For one who says "man" has produced in the hearing a certain scattered thought by the indefiniteness of the meaning, so that the nature is indicated by the name, but the subsisting thing that is particularly indicated by the name is not signified. But one who says "Paul" has shown the nature subsisting in the thing indicated by the name. This, then, is the hypostasis, not the indefinite conception of the essence, which finds no stability from the commonality of what is signified, but that which presents and circumscribes the common and the uncircumscribed in a certain thing through the appearing properties, as it is also customary for Scripture to do such a thing both in many other places and in the story of Job. For since it was about to narrate the things concerning him, having first mentioned the common term and said "man," it immediately restricts it with the particular in the addition of "a certain one." But the description of the essence, as bringing no profit to the proposed aim of the account, it passed over in silence, but it characterizes the "certain one" by his own distinguishing marks, both saying his place and the marks of his character and whatever external things, being taken along with, were about to separate and distinguish him from the common signification, so that through all these things the description of the one whose story is told became clear: from his name, from his place, from the properties of his soul, from the external things contemplated about him. But if it had given the account of the essence, there would have been no mention of the things said in the interpretation of the nature. For the account would have been the same as that for Bildad the Shuhite and Zophar the Naamathite and for each of the men mentioned there. This account of the difference, therefore, which you have learned in our own case between essence and hypostasis, if you transfer this also to the divine doctrines, you will not err. Whatever your conception supposes the being of the Father to be (for it is not possible to rest the soul on any definite thought, because of being persuaded that it is beyond all thought), this you will also conceive for the Son, and this likewise also for the Holy Spirit. For the account of the uncreated and the incomprehensible is one and the same for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. For one is not more incomprehensible and uncreated, and another less so. But since it is necessary through particular marks the unconfused in the Trinity the

32

τινὰ τὴν σημασίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἄνθρωπος. Ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο εἰπών, τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος δείξας, οὐ περιέγραψε τῇ φωνῇ τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον, τὸν ἰδίως ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος γνωριζόμενον. Οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον Πέτρος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ καὶ Ἀνδρέας καὶ Ἰωάννης καὶ Ἰάκωβος.Ἡ οὖν κοινότης τοῦ σημαινομένου, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα τεταγμένους χωροῦσα, χρείαν ἔχει τῆς ὑποδιαστολῆς δι' ἧς οὐ τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν Πέτρον ἢ τὸν Ἰωάννην ἐπιγνωσόμεθα. Τὰ δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἰδικωτέραν ἔχει τὴν ἔνδειξιν δι' ἧς οὐχ ἡ κοινότης τῆς φύσεως ἐνθεωρεῖται τῷ σημαινομένῳ, ἀλλὰ πράγματός τινος περιγραφὴ μηδεμίαν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές, κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον, τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἷον ὁ Παῦλος ἢ ὁ Τιμόθεος. Οὐκέτι γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη φωνὴ ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως φέρεται, ἀλλὰ χωρίσασα τῆς περιληπτικῆς σημασίας περιγεγραμμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων ἔμφασιν διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων παρίστησιν. Ὅταν οὖν δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντων, οἷον Παύλου καὶ Σιλουανοῦ καὶ Τιμο θέου, περὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζητεῖται λόγος, οὐκ ἄλλον τις ἀποδώσει τῆς οὐσίας ἐπὶ τοῦ Παύλου λόγον, ἕτερον δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Σιλουανοῦ καὶ ἄλλον ἐπὶ τοῦ Τιμοθέου, ἀλλὰ δι' ὧν ἂν λόγων ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Παύλου δειχθῇ οὗτοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐφαρμόσουσι, καί εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις ὁμοούσιοι οἱ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας ὑπογραφόμενοι. Ἐπειδὰν δέ τις τὸ κοινὸν μαθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ ἰδιάζοντα τρέψῃ τὴν θεωρίαν δι' ὧν χωρίζεται τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον, οὐκέτι ὁ ἑκάστου γνωριστικὸς λόγος τῷ περὶ τοῦ ἄλλου διὰ πάντων συνε νεχθήσεται, κἂν ἔν τισιν εὑρεθῇ τὸ κοινὸν ἔχων. 38.3 Τοῦτο τοίνυν φαμέν· τὸ ἰδίως λεγόμενον τῷ τῆς ὑπο στάσεως δηλοῦσθαι ῥήματι. Ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον εἰπὼν ἐσκεδασμένην τινὰ διάνοιαν τῷ ἀορίστῳ τῆς σημασίας τῇ ἀκοῇ ἐνεποίησεν, ὥστε τὴν μὲν φύσιν ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος δηλωθῆναι, τὸ δὲ ὑφεστὸς καὶ δηλούμενον ἰδίως ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος πρᾶγμα μὴ σημανθῆναι. Ὁ δὲ Παῦλον εἰπὼν ἔδειξεν ἐν τῷ δηλουμένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος πράγματι ὑφεστῶσαν τὴν φύσιν. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὑπόστασις, οὐχ ἡ ἀόριστος τῆς οὐσίας ἔννοια μηδεμίαν ἐκ τῆς κοινότη τος τοῦ σημαινομένου στάσιν εὑρίσκουσα, ἀλλ' ἡ τὸ κοινόν τε καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον ἐν τῷ τινὶ πράγματι διὰ τῶν ἐπιφαι νομένων ἰδιωμάτων παριστῶσα καὶ περιγράφουσα, ὡς καὶ τῇ Γραφῇ σύνηθες τὸ τοιοῦτο ποιεῖν ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸν Ἰὼβ ἱστορίᾳ. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔμελλε τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ διηγεῖσθαι, πρότερον τοῦ κοινοῦ μνημονεύσασα καὶ εἰποῦσα ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς ἀποτέμνει τῷ ἰδιάζοντι ἐν τῇ προσθήκῃ τοῦ τίς. Ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν οὐσίας τὴν ὑπογραφὴν ὡς οὐδὲν φέρουσαν κέρδος πρὸς τὸν προκείμενον τοῦ λόγου σκοπὸν ἐσιώπησε, τὸν δὲ τινὰ διὰ τῶν οἰκείων γνω ρισμάτων χαρακτηρίζει καὶ τόπον λέγουσα καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἤθους γνωρίσματα καὶ ὅσα τῶν ἔξωθεν συμπαραληφθέντα χωρίζειν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀφιστᾶν ἤμελλε τῆς κοινῆς σημασίας, ὥστε διὰ πάντων ἐναργῆ τοῦ ἱστορουμένου γενέσθαι τὴν ὑπογραφὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος, ἐκ τοῦ τόπου, ἐκ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἰδιωμάτων, ἐκ τῶν ἔξωθεν περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρουμένων. Εἰ δὲ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐδίδου λόγον, οὐδεμία ἂν ἐγένετο τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν τῇ τῆς φύσεως ἑρμηνείᾳ μνήμη. Ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἂν ἦν λόγος ὃς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Βαλδὰδ τοῦ Σαυχίτου καὶ Σοφὰρ τοῦ Μιναίου καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ἐκεῖ μνημο νευθέντων ἀνθρώπων. Ὃν τοίνυν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔγνως διαφορᾶς λόγον ἐπί τε τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ὑποσ τάσεως τοῦτον μετατιθεὶς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θείων δογμάτων οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει. Πῶς τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Πατρός, ὅ τι ποτὲ ὑποτίθεταί σου ἡ ἔννοια (πρὸς οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπο τεταγμένον νόημα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπερείδειν, διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν εἶναι νόημα) τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ νοήσεις, τοῦτο ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ Ἁγίου. Ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀκτίστου καὶ τοῦ ἀκαταλήπτου λόγος εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπί τε τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματός ἐστιν. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον ἀκατάλη πτόν τε καὶ ἄκτιστον, τὸ δὲ ἧττον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ χρὴ διὰ τῶν ἰδιαζόντων σημείων ἀσύγχυτον ἐπὶ τῆς Τριάδος τὴν