OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one is always in motion like the heaven, while the other is always at rest like the stars? 59. From the same argument. So that, since this is not seen to happen always, none of them would be carried along by an ensouled or a violent motion, as if nature provided for what was to be, because if motion were not of this kind, nothing in the region here below would be in a similar state. How then are things that have received their being as such and their motion as such according to the providence of nature eternal and ungenerated? For things that are according to providence are secondary to providence, and eternal things are secondary to nothing. If what is to be did not exist before it came to be, how is it possible for both things to be true concerning the heaven and the stars and their motion, that they are what is to be and that they are eternal and ungenerated? For what is to be does not yet exist, and what is eternal and ungenerated always exists. If nature provided for the aforesaid manner of motion of the heaven to exist for the sake of things in the region here below being in a similar state as they were, how are these things eternal and ungenerated, which exist as they exist and move as they move for the sake of generated things? 60. From the same argument. For since it has been shown that they are not by nature moved by themselves, and nature does nothing irrationally or in vain, it is clear that it has also assigned to motionless things a shape of such a kind that is least suited for motion. And the sphere is least suited for motion because it has no instrument for motion. So it is clear that their bulk would be spherical. If nature has given to things always in motion the spherical shape, which is suitable for ease of motion, how is it that the stars have not received such a shape in vain, being bound in their circles and not able to complete their motion according to their own nature? If the stars are not by nature moved by themselves, then they do not have eternal motion according to nature. How then are they from the same element as the heaven, which has neither weight nor lightness? If the heaven, because it is from such an element and because it has a spherical shape, is by nature moved always about the center by itself, but the stars, being from the same element and having the same shape, are not by nature moved by themselves, nature has, it seems, given them in vain a substance and shape suitable for eternal motion, if they have a motionless state. How is it that the stars having a substance and shape that is always movable, and a motionless state, is not a sign of an irrational and vain making, which has made the stars rest contrary to nature? If the substances of ungenerated and eternal things are superior to all making, both that which is according to reason and that which is contrary to reason, how, if the heaven and the stars are ungenerated, are they what they are according to the providence of nature, which does nothing irrationally or in vain

ἀεί; Eἰ τοῖς ἀεὶ κινουμένοις ὡς ἁρμόδιον ἐδόθη τὸ σφαιρι κὸν σχῆμα, πῶς τῶν ἐχόντων τὸ σφαιρικὸν σχῆμα τὸ μὲν κινεῖται ἀεὶ ὡς ὁ οὐρανός, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖ ὡς τὰ ἄστρα; νθ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ὥστε, ἐπείπερ οὐ φαίνεται τοῦτο ἀεὶ συμβαῖνον, οὔτε ἂν ἔμψυχον οὔτε βίαιον φέροιτο φορὰν οὐθὲν αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι προνοούσης τῆς φύσεως, ὅτι μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐχούσης τῆς κινήσεως οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν τῶν περὶ τὸν δεῦρο τόπον ὁμοίως ἔχον. Πῶς οὖν ἀΐδια καὶ ἀγένητα τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν τῆς φύσεως τὸ εἶναι τοιάδε καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τοιῶσδε εἰληφότα; Τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πρόνοιαν δεύτερα τῆς προνοίας, καὶ τὰ ἀΐδια οὐδενός ἐστι δεύτερα. Eἰ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι πρὸ τοῦ εἶναι οὐκ ἦν, πῶς ἐνδέχεται περὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄστρων καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κινήσεως ἀμφότερα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀγένητα αὐτὰ εἶναι; Τὸ γὰρ μέλλον οὔπω ἐστί, καὶ τὸ ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἀγένητον πάντοτε ἔνεστιν. Eἰ ἕνεκα τοῦ τὰ περὶ τὸν δεῦρο τόπον ὡς ἔσχεν ὁμοίως ἔχειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡ φύσις προενόη σεν εἶναι, πῶς ἀΐδιά τε καὶ ἀγένητα ταῦτα, ἃ ἕνεκεν τῶν γε νητῶν ἐστιν ὡς ἔστι καὶ κινεῖται ὡς κινεῖται; ξ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δέδεικται ὅτι οὐ πεφύκασι κινεῖσθαι δι' αὑτῶν, ἡ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν ἀλόγως οὐδὲ μάτην ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ σχῆμα τοιοῦτον ἀποδέδωκε τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ὃ ἥκιστά ἐστι κινητικόν. Ἥκιστα δὲ κινητικὸν ἡ σφαῖρα διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὄργανον πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν. Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι σφαιροειδῆ ἂν εἴη τὸν ὄγκον. Eἰ ἡ φύσις δέδωκε τοῖς ἀεὶ κινητοῖς τὸ σφαιρικὸν σχῆμα ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὴν εὐκινησίαν, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ἄστρα μάτην εἰληφότα σχῆμα τοιοῦτον, ἐνδεδεμένα τοῖς κύκλοις καὶ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν αὑτῶν μὴ δυνάμενα ἐκτελεῖν κίνησιν; Eἰ οὐ πεφύκασι τὰ ἄστρα δι' αὑτῶν κινεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἄρα ἔχουσι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν ἀΐδιον κίνησιν. Πῶς οὖν εἰσιν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ στοιχείου ἐξ οὗ καὶ ὁ οὐρανός, τοῦ μήτε βαρύτητα ἔχοντος μήτε κουφότητα; Eἰ ὁ μὲν οὐρανὸς διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἐκ τοιούτου στοιχείου καὶ διὰ τὸ σφαιρικὸν ἔχειν τὸ σχῆμα πέφυκε περὶ τὸ μέσον κινεῖσθαι ἀεὶ δι' ἑαυτοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄστρα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντα στοιχείου καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχοντα σχῆμα οὐ πεφύκασι κινεῖσθαι δι' ἑαυτῶν, μάτην ὡς ἔοικε δέδωκεν αὐ τοῖς ἡ φύσις οὐσίαν τε καὶ σχῆμα πρὸς τὴν ἀεὶ κίνησιν ἐπιτήδειον, εἰ στάσιν ἔχουσιν ἀκίνητον. Τὸ οὐσίαν ἔχειν καὶ σχῆμα ἀεὶ κινητὸν τὰ ἄστρα καὶ στάσιν ἀκίνητον πῶς οὐκ ἔστι δεῖγμα τῆς ἀλόγου τε καὶ ματαίας ποιήσεως τῆς παρὰ τὴν φύσιν πεποιηκυίας ἠρεμεῖν τὰ ἄστρα; Eἰ τῶν ἀγενήτων τε καὶ ἀϊδίων αἱ οὐσίαι πάσης ποιήσεως τῆς τε κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἀνώτεραί εἰσι, πῶς, εἰ ἀγένητος ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἄστρα, κατὰ πρόνοιαν τῆς φύ σεως τῆς μηθὲν ἀλόγως μήτε ματαίως ποιούσης εἰσὶν ὅ εἰσι