Chapter 53 [XXXI.]—Volition and Ability.

Some one will ask whether the faith itself, in which seems to be the beginning either of salvation, or of that series leading to salvation which I have just mentioned, is placed in our power. We shall see more easily, if we first examine with some care what “our power” means. Since, then, there are two things,—will and ability; it follows that not every one that has the will has therefore the ability also, nor has every one that possesses the ability the will also; for as we sometimes will what we cannot do, so also we sometimes can do what we do not will. From the words themselves when sufficiently considered, we shall detect, in the very ring of the terms, the derivation of volition from willingness, and of ability from ableness.294    [That is, in the Latin, “voluntas” (choice, will, volition) comes from velle (to wish, desire, determine), and “potestas” (power, ability) from “posse” (to be able).—W.] Therefore, even as the man who wishes has volition, so also the man who can has ability. But in order that a thing may be done by ability, the volition must be present. For no man is usually said to do a thing with ability if he did it unwillingly. Although, at the same time, if we observe more precisely, even what a man is compelled to do unwillingly, he does, if he does it, by his volition; only he is said to be an unwilling agent, or to act against his will, because he would prefer some other thing. He is compelled, indeed, by some unfortunate influence, to do what he does under compulsion, wishing to escape it or to remove it out of his way. For if his volition be so strong that he prefers not doing this to not suffering that, then beyond doubt he resists the compelling influence, and does it not. And accordingly, if he does it, it is not with a full and free will, but yet it is not without will that he does it; and inasmuch as the volition is followed by its effect, we cannot say that he lacked the ability to do it. If, indeed, he willed to do it, yielding to compulsion, but could not, although we should allow that a coerced will was present, we should yet say that ability was absent. But when he did not do the thing because he was unwilling, then of course the ability was present, but the volition was absent, since he did it not, by his resistance to the compelling influence. Hence it is that even they who compel, or who persuade, are accustomed to say, Why don’t you do what you have in your ability, in order to avoid this evil? While they who are utterly unable to do what they are compelled to do, because they are supposed to be able usually answer by excusing themselves, and say, I would do it if it were in my ability. What then do we ask more, since we call that ability when to the volition is added the faculty of doing? Accordingly, every one is said to have that in his ability which he does if he likes, and does not if he dislikes.

Chapter 54.—Whether Faith Be in a Man’s Own Power.

Attend now to the point which we have laid down for discussion: whether faith is in our own power? We now speak of that faith which we employ when we believe anything, not that which we give when we make a promise; for this too is called faith.295    [That is, in Latin, faith (“fides”) is both active and passive, and means both trust and trustworthiness, both faith and faithfulness. This is also true in English, as Augustin’s own examples illustrate—W.] We use the word in one sense when we say, “He had no faith in me,” and in another sense when we say, “He did not keep faith with me.” The one phrase means, “He did not believe what I said;” the other, “He did not do what he promised.” According to the faith by which we believe, we are faithful to God; but according to that whereby a thing is brought to pass which is promised, God Himself even is faithful to us; for the apostle declares, “God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able.”296    1 Cor. x. 13. Well, now, the former is the faith about which we inquire, Whether it be in our power? even the faith by which we believe God, or believe on God. For of this it is written, “Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness.”297    Rom. iv. 3; comp. Gen. xv. 6. And again, “To him that believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.”298    Rom. iv. 5. Consider now whether anybody believes, if he be unwilling; or whether he believes not, if he shall have willed it. Such a position, indeed, is absurd (for what is believing but consenting to the truth of what is said? and this consent is certainly voluntary): faith, therefore, is in our own power. But, as the apostle says: “There is no power but comes from God,”299    Rom. xiii. 1. what reason then is there why it may not be said to us even of this: “What hast thou which thou hast not received?”300    1 Cor. iv. 7.—for it is God who gave us even to believe. Nowhere, however, in Holy Scripture do we find such an assertion as, There is no volition but comes from God. And rightly is it not so written, because it is not true: otherwise God would be the author even of sins (which Heaven forbid!), if there were no volition except what comes from Him; inasmuch as an evil volition alone is already a sin, even if the effect be wanting,—in other words, if it has not ability. But when the evil volition receives ability to accomplish its intention, this proceeds from the judgment of God, with whom there is no unrighteousness.301    Rom. ix. 14. He indeed punishes after this manner; nor is His chastisement unjust because it is secret. The ungodly man, however, is not aware that he is being punished, except when he unwillingly discovers by an open penalty how much evil he has willingly committed. This is just what the apostle says of certain men: “God hath given them up to the evil desires of their own hearts, . . .to do those things that are not convenient.”302    Rom. i. 24, 28. Accordingly, the Lord also said to Pilate: “Thou couldest have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above.”303    John xix. 11. But still, when the ability is given, surely no necessity is imposed. Therefore, although David had received ability to kill Saul, he preferred sparing to striking him.304    1 Sam. xxiv. 7, and xxvi. 9. Whence we understand that bad men receive ability for the condemnation of their depraved will, while good men receive ability for trying of their good will.

Chapter 55 [XXXII.]—What Faith is Laudable.

Since faith, then, is in our power, inasmuch as every one believes when he likes, and, when he believes, believes voluntarily; our next inquiry, which we must conduct with care, is, What faith it is which the apostle commends with so much earnestness? For indiscriminate faith is not good. Accordingly we find this caution: “Brethren, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God.”305    1 John iv. 1. Nor must the clause in commendation of love, that it “believeth all things,”306    1 Cor. xiii. 7. be so understood as if we should detract from the love of any one, if he refuses to believe at once what he hears. For the same love admonishes us that we ought not readily to believe anything evil about a brother; and when anything of the kind is said of him, does it not judge it to be more suitable to its character not to believe? Lastly, the same love, “which believeth all things,” does not believe every spirit. Accordingly, charity believes all things no doubt, but it believes in God. Observe, it is not said, Believes in all things. It cannot therefore be doubted that the faith which is commended by the apostle is the faith whereby we believe in God.307    Rom. iv. 3.

CAPUT XXXI.

53. Fides an sit in nostra potestate. Quaeret aliquis, utrum fides ipsa, in qua salutis vel ad salutem connexionis hujus, quam commemoravi, esse videtur exordium, in nostra constituta sit potestate: quod facilius videbimus, si prius quid sit potestas aliquanto diligentius perspexerimus. Cum enim duo quaedam sint, velle et posse, unde nec qui vult continuo potest, nec qui potest continuo vult; quia sicut volumus aliquando quod non possumus, sic etiam possumus aliquando quod nolumus: satis evolutis ipsis etiam vocabulis resonat, quod ab eo quod est velle, voluntas; ab eo autem quod est posse potestas nomen accepit. Quapropter, sicut qui vult habet voluntatem, ita potestatem qui potest. Sed ut potestate aliquid fiat, voluntas aderit. Neque enim dici solet quispiam potestate fecisse , si quid fecit invitus. Quanquam, si subtilius advertamus, etiam quod quisque invitus facere cogitur, si facit, voluntate facit: sed quia mallet aliud, ideo invitus, hoc est, nolens facere dicitur. Malo quippe aliquo facere compellitur, quod volens evitare vel a se removere, facit quod cogitur. Nam si tanta voluntas sit, ut malit hoc non facere quam illud non pati; cogenti procul dubio resistit, nec facit. Ac per hoc, si facit; non quidem plena et libera voluntate, sed tamen non facit nisi voluntate: quam voluntatem quia effectus consequitur, non possumus dicere potestatem defuisse facienti. Si enim cogenti cedens vellet facere, nec posset; ei voluntatem adfuisse licet extortam, sed potestatem defuisse diceremus. Cum vero ideo non faciebat, quia nolebat; erat utique potestas, sed voluntas deerat quamdiu cogenti reluctando non fecit. Hinc est quod etiam illi qui cogunt, vel qui suadent, solent dicere: Quod habes in potestate, quare non facis, ut hoc malo careas? Et qui omnino facere non possunt, quod ideo coguntur ut faciant, quia posse creduntur, solent excusando respondere et dicere: Facerem, si esset in potestate. Quid igitur ultra quaerimus; quandoquidem 0235 hanc dicimus potestatem, ubi voluntati adjacet facultas faciendi ? Unde hoc quisque in potestate habere dicitur, quod si vult, facit; si non vult, non facit.

54. Attende jam illud quod excutiendum posuimus, utrum fides in potestate sit? De hac enim fide nunc loquimur, quam adhibemus cum aliquid credimus, non quam damus cum aliquid pollicemur; nam et ipsa dicitur fides. Sed aliter dicimus. Non mihi habuit fidem: aliter, Non mihi servavit fidem. Nam illud est, Non credidit quod dixi: illud, Non fecit quod dixit. Secundum hanc fidem qua credimus, fideles sumus Deo: secundum illam vero qua fit quod promittitur , etiam Deus ipse fidelis est nobis. Hoc enim dicit Apostolus: Fidelis Deus, qui non vos permittat tentari super id quod potestis (I Cor. X, 13). De illa itaque fide quaerimus, utrum in potestate sit, qua credimus Deo, vel credimus in Deum. Hinc enim scriptum est, Credidit Abraham Deo, et deputatum est illi ad justitiam; et, Credenti in eum qui justificat impium, deputatur fides ejus ad justitiam (Gen. XV, 6, et Rom. IV, 3, 5). Vide nunc utrum quisque credat, si noluerit; aut non credat, si voluerit. Quod si absurdum est (quid est enim credere, nisi consentire verum esse quod dicitur? consensio autem utique volentis est); profecto fides in potestate est. Sed, sicut Apostolus dicit, Non est potestas nisi a Deo (Rom. XIII, 1). Quid igitur causae est cur non et de ista nobis dicatur, Quid enim habes quod non accepisti (I Cor. IV, 7)? Nam et ut credamus , Deus dedit. Nusquam autem legimus in Scripturis sanctis, Non est voluntas nisi a Deo. Et recte non scriptum est, quia verum non est: alioquin etiam peccatorum, quod absit, auctor est Deus, si non est voluntas nisi ab illo: quoniam mala voluntas jam sola peccatum est, etiam si desit effectus, id est, si non habeat potestatem. Porro cum voluntas mala potestatem accipit implere quod intendit , ex judicio Dei venit, apud quem non est iniquitas (Rom. IX, 14). Punit enim etiam isto modo; nec ideo injuste, quia occulte. Caeterum iniquus puniri se ignorat, nisi cum manifesto supplicio senserit nolens, quantum mali sit quod perpetravit volens. Hoc est quod de quibusdam Apostolus ait: Tradidit illos Deus in concupiscentias cordis illorum, ut faciant quae non conveniunt (Id. I, 24). Hinc et Dominus Pilato: Non haberes in me, inquit, potestatem, nisi data esset tibi desuper (Joan. XIX, 11). Sed cum potestas datur, non necessitas utique imponitur. Unde cum David Saülis occidendi potestatem accepisset, maluit parcere, quam ferire (I Reg. XXIV et XXVI). Unde intelligimus malos accipere potestatem ad damnationem malae voluntatis suae, bonos autem ad probationem bonae voluntatis suae.