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of substance, he confidently dogmatizes that this is the case, I know not from 1.1.221 what learning or wisdom he has taken this confidence. For if every construction and proof must be preceded by some irrefutable and indubitable admission, so that what is unknown may be appropriately demonstrated by being brought to what is preconceived through intermediate constructions, he who still proposes what is sought for the construction of other things constructs nothing other than ignorance through ignorance and deception through deception. This is to make a blind man a guide for the blind, as the Gospel somewhere says. 1.1.222 For truly, to the blind and empty argument that calls the Creator and Maker of all things a “creature and a work,” they yoke another blind argument, that the Son is alien in nature, unlike in substance, and in every way without share in the natural affinity of the Father. But not yet about these things; for where he more nakedly reveals [in his argument] the impiety of his mindset, there it is opportune for us also to postpone the refutation of the impiety; but for now we must return to the sequence of what was said by him. 1.1.223 “Again, since each of these substances is purely simple and in every way one, both being and being conceived according to its own worth, and since the energies are circumscribed by the works, and the works are measured by the energies of those who performed them, it is of course entirely necessary that the energies following each of the substances be lesser and greater, and that some hold the first rank, and others the second.” 1.1.224 The thought through all that has been said, even if [the argument] is concluded by him in a multitude of words, is one: to construct that there is no connection of the Father to the Son or, again, of the Son to the Spirit, but that the substances are torn apart from each other, being divided into some estranged nature and uncongenial otherness, and not only this, but also differing in magnitude and diminution of dignities, so that, as he himself says, “some are conceived as greater,” “and others as smaller,” and in all other respects they have variation. 1.1.225 But we, even if it seems superfluous to many to dwell on the obvious and to try to refute each point—as many things are immediately considered false and abominable and to have no force among the majority—nevertheless, so as not to seem to overlook unexamined anything said by him for lack of refutations, we will address these points as well, according to our ability. He says, “each of these substances is purely simple and in every way one, both being and being conceived according to its own worth.” Here again, proposing disputed things as if they were agreed upon, he thinks he is saying something, believing it sufficient, instead of any proof, for him to make the declaration himself. He speaks of three substances; for this he indicates by saying, “of each of these substances.” For he would not have spoken thus, if he believed in one. 1.1.226 If, then, he speaks of the difference of the substances from one another in such a way as not to seem to agree with the impiety of Sabellius, who applies three appellations to one subject, we too agree, and none of the pious objects to the doctrine, except insofar as he seems to err in the names alone and the utterance of the statement, naming “substances” instead of “hypostases.” 1.1.227 For not all things that have the same definition of substance will likewise concur in the rendering of the definition with respect to hypostasis. For Peter and James and John were the same as one another in the definition of substance (for each of them was a man), but in the particular properties of the hypostasis of each of them, they did not concur with one another. 1.1.228 Therefore, if he was constructing this, that one must not confuse the hypostases and apply the three appellations to one person, his argument would have been faithful, according to the testimony of the apostle, and worthy of all acceptance. But since he is not looking to this, nor does he say these things distinguishing the hypostases from one another by their observed particular properties, but he constructs that the underlying substance itself is alien to the other—or rather, to itself—and for this reason he names many substances, as if each
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οὐσίας τὴν ἐφεξῆς θαρσῶν δογματίζει τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, οὐκ οἶδα ἐκ 1.1.221 ποίας παιδεύσεως ἢ σοφίας τοῦτο θαρσήσας. εἰ γὰρ πάσης κατασκευῆς καὶ ἀποδείξεως ἄμαχόν τινα καὶ ἀναμφίβολον προηγεῖσθαι χρὴ τὴν ὁμολογίαν, ὥστε τῷ προκατειλημμένῳ τὸ ἀγνοούμενον ταῖς διὰ μέσου κατασκευαῖς οἰκείως προσ αγόμενον ἀποδείκνυσθαι, ὁ τὸ ζητούμενον ἔτι εἰς κατα σκευὴν ἑτέρων προτείνων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ δι' ἀγνοίας ἄγνοιαν καὶ δι' ἀπάτης ἀπάτην κατασκευάζει. τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ τυφλοῦ τυφλὸν ὁδηγὸν ποιεῖσθαι, καθώς φησί που τὸ εὐαγγέλιον. 1.1.222 ὄντως γὰρ τυφλῷ καὶ κενεμβατοῦντι τῷ λόγῳ τῷ 20κτίσμα καὶ ποίημα20 τὸν πάντων κτίστην καὶ δημιουργὸν εἶναι λέγοντι ἕτερον τυφλὸν λόγον παραζευγνύουσι, τὸ ἀλλότριον τῇ φύσει καὶ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀνόμοιον καὶ πάντη τῆς φυ σικῆς οἰκειότητος ἀμέτοχον εἶναι τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱόν. ἀλλ' οὔπω μὲν περὶ τούτων· ἐν οἷς γὰρ γυμνότερον ἐκκα λύπτει [τῷ λόγῳ] τὸ ἀσεβὲς τοῦ φρονήματος, ἐν τούτοις εὔκαιρόν ἐστι καὶ ἡμᾶς ὑπερθέσθαι τῆς ἀσεβείας τὸν ἔλεγ χον· νυνὶ δὲ ἡμῖν πρὸς τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν παρ' ἐκείνου ῥηθέντων ἐπανιτέον. 1.1.223 20Πάλιν δ' αὖ ἑκάστης τούτων οὐσίας εἰλικρινῶς ἁπλῆς καὶ πάντη μιᾶς οὔσης τε καὶ νοουμένης κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀξίαν, συμπεριγραφομένων δὲ τοῖς ἔργοις τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, καὶ τῶν ἔργων ταῖς τῶν ἐργασαμένων ἐνεργείαις παραμετρουμένων, ἀνάγ κη δήπου πᾶσα καὶ τὰς ἑκάστῃ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἑπο μένας ἐνεργείας ἐλάττους τε καὶ μείζους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς μὲν πρώτην, τὰς δὲ δευτέραν τάξιν ἐπέχειν20. 1.1.224 ἡ μὲν διάνοια διὰ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων, κἂν ἐν πλήθει ῥημάτων [ὁ λόγος] αὐτῷ συμπεραίνηται, μία ἐστί, τὸ κατα σκευάσαι μηδεμίαν συνάφειαν εἶναι τῷ πατρὶ πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν πάλιν τῷ πνεύματι, ἀλλ' ἀπεσχίσθαι τὰς οὐσίας ἀπ' ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀπεξενωμένην τινὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀσύμ φυλον ἀλλοτριότητα διασπωμένας, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πηλικότητι καὶ ἀξιωμάτων ὑφέσει διαφερούσας, ὥστε 20τὰς μὲν μείζους20, καθὼς αὐτός φησι, 20τὰς δὲ μικρο τέρας νοεῖσθαι20 καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα τὴν παρ αλλαγὴν ἔχειν. 1.1.225 Ἡμεῖς δὲ κἂν περιττὸν τοῖς πολλοῖς εἶναι δοκῇ τὸ τοῖς προδήλοις ἐνδιατρίβειν καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον διελέγχειν πειρᾶσθαι, ὅσα παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτόθεν ψευδῆ καὶ βδε λυκτὰ καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν νομίζεται, ὅμως ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν δι' ἀπορίαν ἐλέγχων ἀνεξέταστόν τι παρορᾶν τῶν παρ' ἐκείνου ῥηθέντων, κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τούτοις ἐπελευ σόμεθα. 20ἑκάστην φησὶ τούτων οὐσίαν εἰλικρινῶς ἁπλῆν καὶ πάντη μίαν εἶναί τε καὶ νοεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀξίαν20. πάλιν ἐνταῦθα ὡς ὁμολογούμενα τὰ ἀμφι βαλλόμενα προτεινόμενος οἴεταί τι λέγειν, ἀντὶ πάσης ἀποδείξεως ἐξαρκεῖν νομίζων τὸ αὐτὸς ἀποφήνασθαι. τρεῖς οὐσίας φησί· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐνδείκνυται τῷ εἰπεῖν 20ἑκάστης τούτων οὐσίας20. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἶπεν, εἰ μίαν ᾤετο. 1.1.226 Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγει τὴν τῶν οὐσιῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας διαφοράν, ὡς μὴ δοκεῖν τῇ ἀσεβείᾳ τοῦ Σαβελλίου συμφέ ρεσθαι ἑνὶ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τρεῖς ἐφαρμόζοντος προσηγορίας, καὶ ἡμεῖς συντιθέμεθα καὶ οὐδεὶς τῶν εὐσεβούντων ἀντι λέγει τῷ δόγματι, πλὴν ὅσον μόνοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τῇ προφορᾷ τοῦ λόγου πλημμελεῖν δοκεῖ, "1οὐσίας"2 ἀντὶ "1ὑπο 1.1.227 στάσεων"2 ὀνομάζων. οὐ γὰρ ὅσα τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει τῇ ἀποδόσει τοῦ λόγου συνενεχθήσεται. Πέτρος γὰρ καὶ Ἰάκωβος καὶ Ἰωάννης ἐν μὲν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας οἱ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν ἀλλή λοις (ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστος), ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδιώμασι τῆς ἑκάστου αὐτῶν ὑποστάσεως ἀλλήλοις οὐ συνεφέροντο. 1.1.228 οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν τοῦτο κατεσκεύαζε, τὸ μὴ δεῖν φύρειν τὰς ὑποστάσεις καὶ ἑνὶ προσώπῳ τὰς τρεῖς ἐφαρμόζειν προση γορίας, πιστὸς ἂν ἦν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀποστόλου μαρτυρίαν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ καὶ πάσης ἀποδοχῆς ἄξιος. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπει οὐδὲ τὰς ὑποστάσεις ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἐπιθεωρουμένοις ἰδιώμασι διακρίνων ταῦτά φησιν, ἀλλ' αὐ τὴν τὴν ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν ἀλλοτρίως πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἔχειν κατασκευάζει καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλὰς οὐσίας ὀνομάζει, ὡς ἑκάστης