and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move by themselves but by means of others, since nature is able to make them move by themselves with the motion with which they now move by means of others, having made them immovable in themselves in their most mobile substance? If in eternal things nothing is contrary to nature, but it is contrary to nature to have a substance and a shape that is always mobile, but a state of rest that is immobile, then are the things in which there is something contrary to nature not eternal, or is it false that in eternal things nothing is contrary to nature. If none of the ungenerated things either has or does not have what it has or does not have by the providence of anyone, how, if the heaven and the stars are ungenerated, by the providence of nature does it not have an instrument of motion, but has a spherical shape instead of an instrument, being more suitable for continuous motion than instruments of locomotion? 61. From the same discourse. The first, being one, moves many of the divine bodies, but the many, being many, each move only one; for any one of the wandering stars is borne along by several motions. In this way, therefore, nature equalizes and makes a certain order, assigning many bodies to the one, and many motions to the one body. For the one sphere is carried along bound within many spheres, and each sphere happens to be a body. If of ungenerated and eternal substances there is no maker, how are these things eternal and ungenerated, of whose order nature is the maker, assigning many bodies to the one, and to the one body many motions, equalizing the multitude of motions of the one body with the multitude of the bodies. If these things are ungenerated and unmade, how is it possible for there to be a natural order that has been made in ungenerated things? A sphere bound within a sphere, having the same substance which the sphere in which it is bound has, how does it not appear to have both absurdities which do not exist in eternal things, that is, to possess in vain the mobile substance by which it is not moved, and to be moved contrary to nature by accident? 62. From the third discourse of On the Heavens. Of the things said to be by nature, some are substances, others are their works and affections; I mean by substances the simple bodies, such as fire and earth and those of the same class, and whatever is made from these, both the whole heaven and its parts, and again animals and plants and their parts. He who said that the heaven is from some simple element other than the elements here, and that it is not possible for another heaven to come into being because this one has encompassed all matter, how does he now say that the heaven is from the same elements from which animals and plants also are? But if he says another heaven came to be from other elements, how is he not lying when he says: It is not possible for there to be another heaven besides one? But if he says the same heaven is sometimes from another, more divine elem

καὶ ἔχουσιν ἃ ἔχουσιν; Eἰ οὐκ ἐχρῆν κινεῖσθαι τὰ ἄστρα, διὰ τί ὅλως κινοῦνται δι' ἑτέρων; Eἰ δὲ ἐχρῆν κινεῖσθαι, διὰ τί μὴ δι' ἑαυτῶν κινοῦνται ἀλλὰ δι' ἑτέρων, δυναμένης τῆς φύ σεως ποιεῖν αὐτὰ κινεῖσθαι δι' ἑαυτῶν τὴν κίνησιν ἣν νῦν κι νοῦνται δι' ἑτέρων, τῆς ἐν εὐκινητοτάτῃ αὐτῶν οὐσίᾳ πεποιη κυίας αὐτὰ ἀκίνητα καθ' αὑτά; Eἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐδὲν παρὰ φύσιν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὸ οὐσίαν μὲν καὶ σχῆμα ἔχειν ἀεὶ κινητόν, στάσιν δὲ ἀκίνητον, ἄρα οὐκ ἀΐδια τὰ ἐν οἷς τι παρὰ φύσιν, ἢ ψευδὲς τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐδὲν παρὰ φύσιν. Eἰ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀγενήτων οὔτε ὃ ἔχει οὔτε ὃ μὴ ἔχει κατὰ πρόνοιάν τινος ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, πῶς, εἰ ἀγένητος ὁ οὐ ρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἄστρα, κατὰ πρόνοιαν τῆς φύσεως ὄργανον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει κινήσεως, σχῆμα δὲ ἔχει σφαιρικὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀργάνου, πρὸς τὴν συνεχῆ κίνησιν ἐπιτηδειότερον ὂν τῶν πορευτικῶν ὀργάνων; ξα. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἡ μὲν πρώτη μία οὖσα πολλὰ κινεῖ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν θείων, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ οὖσαι ἓν μόνον ἑκάστη· τῶν γὰρ πλα νωμένων ἓν ὁτιοῦν πλείους φέρεται φοράς. Ταύτῃ οὖν ἀνι σάζει ἡ φύσις καὶ ποιεῖ τινα τάξιν, τῇ μὲν μιᾷ πολλὰ ἀποδιδοῦσα σώματα, τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ σώματι πολλὰς φοράς. Ἐν πολλαῖς γὰρ σφαίραις ἡ μία σφαῖρα ἐνδεδεμένη φέρεται, ἑκάστη δὲ σφαῖρα σῶμα τυγχάνει ὄν. Eἰ τῶν ἀγενήτων τε καὶ ἀϊδίων οὐσιῶν ποιητὴς οὐδείς, πῶς ἀΐδιά τε καὶ ἀγένητα ταῦτα, ὧν ἡ φύσις τῆς τάξεώς ἐστι ποιητής, τῇ μὲν μιᾷ ἀποδιδοῦσα πολλὰ σώματα, τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ σώματι πολλὰς φοράς, τὰ πλήθη τῶν τοῦ ἑνὸς σώ ματος φορῶν ἰσάζουσα τῷ πλήθει τῶν σωμάτων. Eἰ τὰ ἀγένητα ταῦτα καὶ ἀποίητα, πῶς ἐνδέχεται ἐν τοῖς ἀγενήτοις πεποιημένην εἶναι τάξιν φυσικήν; Σφαῖρα σφαίρᾳ ἐνδεδε μένη, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσα οὐσίαν ἣν ἔχει ἡ σφαῖρα ᾗ ἐνδέδεται, πῶς οὐ φαίνεται ἀμφοτέρας ἔχουσα τὰς ἀτοπίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις μὴ ὑπαρχούσας, τὸ μάτην ἔχειν τὴν κινητὴν οὐ σίαν καθ' ἣν οὐ κινεῖται, καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν κινεῖσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός; ξβ. Ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου λόγου Περὶ οὐρανοῦ. Τῶν φύσει λεγομένων τὰ μέν εἰσιν οὐσίαι, τὰ δὲ ἔργα καὶ πάθη τούτων· λέγω δὲ οὐσίας μὲν τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτοις, καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τού των, τόν τε σύνολον οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ μόρια τούτου, πάλιν τά τε ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια τούτων. Ὁ εἰρηκὼς τὸν οὐρανὸν εἶναι ἐξ ἁπλοῦ τινος στοιχείου ἑτέρου ὄντος παρὰ τὰ ἐνταῦθα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὐρανὸν ἄλλον γενέσθαι διὰ τὸ τοῦτον πᾶσαν περιειληφέναι τὴν ὕλην, πῶς νῦν λέγει ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι στοιχείων τὸν οὐρανόν, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτά; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἄλλον οὐρανὸν λέγει ἐξ ἄλλων στοιχείων γενέσθαι, πῶς οὐ ψεύδεται λέγων· Oὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλον οὐρανὸν εἶναι πλὴν ἑνός; Eἰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λέγει οὐρανὸν ποτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἄλλου θειοτέρου στοι