Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica
After the judgment of the thoughts, an exact discernment of how the thoughts happen to be, whether they are good or otherwise but imagination is the
to divide for us, by the established terms, the sesquitertian ratios into both the sesquioctave ratios and the leimmata, we would have stopped at thes
having split it, he bent each one into a circle, bringing them together middle to middle with each other like a chi, having joined 7 them both to them
left, or rather the one is an image of mind, the other of soul. And in the soul itself, the right is that which is turned toward the intelligible thin
regarding the explanation of the Platonic psychogony, this we now discharge for you as a kind of debt. For Plato's statement that the division of thes
and of exegesis. And there is a letter of mine placed among my books that has traced out and carefully examined the meaning in the sayings. But it is
a ruler drives a team of two then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is oppo
a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the extern
through which it is not swept into material disorder, but is joined to the divine light, holds it in its own place and makes it unmixed with matter, l
of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofo
agrees, but among them the salty is more than the drinkable. They say, for example, that every soul is either divine or changing from intellect to min
to be deemed worthy of pardon in repenting. If the soul is a body according to some of the ancients, what is it that contains it? every body is three-
distinction. Two kinds of air according to Aristotle, the vaporous from the exhalation of water and the smoky from the extinguishing of fire. The latt
Plato. Pleasure is not a coming-to-be for coming-to-be is of things that are not, while pleasure is of things that are. And coming-to-be is swift and
is natural, while habit is acquired and taught. Providence is the care for existing things that comes from God. Epicurus says: the blessed and incorr
but such powers are simply and imperceptibly desired. What then? Do we have three souls? Solution: just as the soul, when united to the body, seems to
When this is dimmed they also are dimmed the soul flourishes when this 34 withers. Further, everything desires to preserve its own substrate. If the
actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in th
concerning form, matter and cause, for example the matter of the celestial bodies is not the four elements, but a certain fifth, spherical one, as be
as knowledge (for knowledge is a transition from defined things to defined things for this reason it is also knowledge, as leading the mind to a stat
this, for indeed the flesh also moves downwards and is none of the elements. Aporia: but matter, that is the element, is not soul, but the form that c
definitions have as their beginning the most general things, as their end the most specific things. If, then, these are finite, so are the definitions
and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be e
the rest, but this is about hot and soft, heavy and light, rare and dense, and many opposites. In humans, the cause of local motion is intellect, in i
is nourished {which} is twofold: either as Matter or as an instrument. And the instrument is twofold: either moving and being moved, like the innate h
is equal in distance to the zodiac signs. Light is not a body. for if it were a body, how would it be possible for it to have instantaneous movement,
we see the introduction of the forms of things seen entering the sight, but how do we see the interval of the air in between? Solution: It is not that
with a violent collision. In soft things no sound is produced, because the air is broken up in their pores and dispersed as in sponges. In things that
a buzzing which is conveyed back to the sense of hearing. Others say that the sound occurring in the ears after the blockage is of the external air th
For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart.
the sense organs of touch, it is clear for every sense organ is both separated and known. Aristotle speaks of the senses both as one each and as many
Aristotle in On the Soul : if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-
Some add also a sixth, the attentive [faculty], as when a man says, I perceived, I thought, I opined. To this part they also add the activities of t
We can say ten, but not indeed opine it, so that opinion is not up to us. But neither do we imagine what we wish for we see at night what we do not w
in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says
theoretical versus the practical. The theoretical corresponds to a vision discerning of forms, while the practical corresponds to a vision not only kn
organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produc
simpler, or rather the things inherent in the matter, into which the matter is also divided, which are also prop[erly] called its elements. I say then
he hints that it is not completed from both of the things mixed, but is produced in the union of the soul and the body, not by the soul itself giving
closing the senses, so as to know unknowingly the transcendent substance of that which is. For according to their own opinions, the philosopher who ha
he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philoso
it grows and is naturally constituted to decay, must in every way grow along with and decay along with the other in a connate manner for that by whic
a demonstration, so also the soul in an infant's body and a more imperfect one, if it were in another, perfect body, would immediately have shown its
I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature,
Porphyry has philosophized in harmony with this. For in discussing the soul, he says: “Just as insomniacs, by the very act of wanting to sleep and wat
have they cast off? Perhaps those who hold the contrary opinion will vex us with these things. But their objection is like a spider's web, which will
to have received watchwords from the first father, nor that they possess the fullness of many bosoms, nor would I accept that they stand before the bo
both the Sibylline and the Orphic ones, and those according to which the Berytian Bulls came to be and Amous the Egyptian, and Socrates and Plato (for
of the bonds by which they were bound, and after this, turning their minds upward, they will approach God. And if the account told about the Sibyl wer
has the front part? What then do you think? a mind scattered in so great a size is from this cause for him both slack and weak, and the soul is simply
would remember any of the things here. But as many of the souls as were allotted to more humble portions and their whole mind has not been snatched aw
Let us not altogether reject the analogy of the eye in the case of the soul, let it be and be called a more precise substance of the soul but if some
The manner of the entry of souls, and likewise of their release or separation from hence, both are most difficult or hard to explain for of the first
but by such powers the soul is led like some kind of thing moved by another, being drawn towards whatever the leaders happen to lead it, but then rath
For that which is according to reason, knowledge is readily at hand, but that which is contrary to reason, is so because it has received such a nature
of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent
fitting and gluing it to that by means of a suitable analogy, not placing the rational and intellectual substance into any of the animals for this is
are generated from these powers alone, for this reason, having abandoned the others, they divided the substance of the soul into these alone. But if y
it is in fourths, when one might contemplate these both in the third order of the intellectual virtues and in the fourth of the paradigmatic virtues,
and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for y
and with nothing separating them, it is necessary for the one to be ordered, and the other to order and the one which is ordered has its form divided
what is hard and resistant in them has been smoothed out by me. But what follows from this must be attributed to them alone for, proposing to speak a
proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause
in our sacred writings, neither a whole soul nor any whole nature, apart from the partial ones, has been dogmatically established1. I for my part reje
by the energy, then also the substance is perfected according to it, and these things stand in each other according to one energy. For he who does not
having a life activated according to intellect and reason the psychic is defined according to reason 124 and takes care of divisible souls the physi
tormenting them. But there are, they say, both on earth divine daimons and in the air, guardians of the animals there, and <in> the water, extending t
make it superior to the confusion of life, but, if possible, may you not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the very body which you have put o
cast under your mind: for there is no plant of truth on earth» that is: do not busy your mind with the great measures of the earth, as the geographer
Gregory by reason and contemplation leads the soul up to the more divine things by reason that is according to us, the more intellectual and better,
such a lion-bearing fount of heaven and the stars, but the ruling part of its own existence conceals the vision of them. Chaldaean Oracle. From all si
often appearing, they feign the semblance of some goodness towards the one being initiated. Chaldean Oracle. The soul of mortals will draw God into it
they can. Whence everything they say and show is false and insubstantial for they know existing things through forms but that which knows future thi
and fear is the holding back of his goodness towards us for the sake of the economy. Chaldean Oracle. The Father snatched himself away, not even enclo
they are possessed by passions. Therefore, it is necessary for these also to receive their part of the whole judgment and, having been filled up with
for it is higher than being venerated, than being uttered, and than being conceived. A Chaldean Oracle. The Iynges, being conceived by the Father, the
an unknown password, spoken and unspoken. And they often bring the soul down 148 into the world for many reasons, either through the shedding of its w
of truth and of love. After which are the demiurgic fountains, such as that of the ideas, according to which the cosmos and the things in it have shap
enclosing the triad towards itself and they call these also intelligible. After these, another order of the intelligible and at the same time intelle
to the setting [sun], and the pit to the one just at mid-heaven. And thus, gently separating the membrane of the liver, [which is placed] upon the org
parts of philosophy is necessary. For according to moral philosophy it is necessary to assume that not all things are and come to be by necessity, but
knowledge and sees not only the essences themselves, but also their powers and their activities, both those according to nature and those contrary to
he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad and this knowledge is an unchan
from the one who knows, and it revolves around the thing known and is made like the one who knows. I mean something like this: the knowledge of the so
they fabricate. For I too had a certain little man, ignoble in soul, but by no means the least of storytellers to him, at any rate, such phantoms pre
Aristotle in On the Soul: if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-organ are among relative things. If, then, sensation is lacking, the sense-organ is also lacking. Sensation is that which uses, the sense-organ is that which it uses. Therefore, when that which uses is absent, that which it uses also departs, unless it is to be in vain. There are four elements and one celestial body. From this, then, since it is eternal, sensation does not arise; for the senses are perishable. From fire, nothing; for this too is destructive. From earth by itself, nothing (for it is hard to shape), but with the others it creates; for touch and taste partake of more earth as being more fleshy. Water made the crystalline part of sight, air, hearing and smell; for the air built into the nose and ears is itself the sense-organ of hearing and smell. If there are five senses, how are there three sense-organs? Three in name, but five in reality, for to earth belong both touch and taste, and to air hearing and smell, and to water sight. How can one sense have two sense-organs, as for smell in land animals and birds air is the medium, but in aquatic animals water? This does not happen in the same animal, but in different ones. 62 Themistius says, "It was not possible for the rational soul to come upon it, unless the animal had first been adorned with all the faculties of the irrational part." And the mole has the five sense-organs. For even if its sight is covered by a membrane, so that it is not harmed by the earth, it nonetheless has the sense-organ intact. As there are five solid mathematical bodies, so too are there senses. Of which senses are magnitude, shape, number, motion, rest the objects? Magnitude and shape of sight and touch, but the remaining three of all five. The accidental sensibles do not produce an affection. Sight judges the sweet from its color. If, then, we see a yellow liquid, we say that this is honey, and this is called an accidental sensible. Why is it that the senses do not have their own proper quality, but one touches upon another, for instance, sight knows the honey and knew it as yellow, taste as sweet, yet on the morrow sight knew the honey as both yellow and sweet? The imagination of the sweetness is the cause, which seeks out yesterday's taste. And besides, sight knows the sweet, which is proper to taste, accidentally. Hence it is also often deceived, as in the case of Colophonian resin, which upon seeing it as yellow, it supposes to be sweet. Several senses perceive one thing, as sight and touch perceive magnitude and shape, and all five perceive number, and Aristotle says this is so that there might be common sensibles, shapes, motions, magnitudes. But the senses know their proper sensibles differently from the common ones. Perceiving accidentally is twofold: both to perceive through another sense that which is subject to a different sense, as the sweet from the yellow, and that which is not subject to sense at all. For the son of Cleon when seen is not seen as a substance, but as white. How is it that, having several senses, we do not perceive the common sensibles with one sense? Solution: so that we do not perceive fewer of the sensibles. And besides, how could one sense perceive both the common and the proper? And if it did perceive them, it would not be distinguished. Aporia: Are the five senses perhaps ten? For we hear and we perceive, and we see and we perceive, and we taste and we perceive, and likewise for the rest. Solution: It is not possible for the sense that sees to be one, and the sense that perceives the act of seeing to be another, but they are the same. For if the perceiving sense were different, that one would also have another sense perceiving it, and that one another, and so on to infinity. 63 Alexander says that the five senses are perceptive of sensibles, but the common sense is perceptive of both their substrates and their activities. Plutarch says that opinion, the less honored part of the rational soul, connects the rational and the irrational. To the five faculties of the rational soul
Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς· εἰ ἔλιπεν αἴσθησις, ἔλιπεν ἂν καὶ αἰσθητήριον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ δεύτερον οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ τὸ πρῶτον.
ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ αἰσθητήριον τῶν πρός τι. ἐὰν οὖν λείπῃ αἴσθησις, λείπει καὶ αἰσθητήριον. ἡ αἴσθησις χρώμενον, τὸ αἰσθητήριον
ᾧ χρῆται. ἀπόντος οὖν τοῦ χρωμένου ἀπέστη καὶ ᾧ χρᾶται εἰ μὴ μάτην μέλλει εἶναι. Τέτταρά εἰσι τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ἓν τὸ οὐράνιον
σῶμα. ἐκ τούτου οὖν ἀιδίου ὄντος οὐ γίνεται αἴσθησις· φθαρταὶ γὰρ αἱ αἰσθήσεις. ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς οὐδέν· φθαρτικὸν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο.
ἐκ τῆς γῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐδέν (δυστύπωτος γάρ ἐστι), μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖ· ἡ ἁφὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις πλείονος γῆς μετέχει ὡς
σαρκωδέστερον. τὸ ὕδωρ ἐποίησε τὸ κρυσταλλοειδὲς τῆς ὄψεως, ὁ ἀὴρ ἀκοὴν καὶ ὄσφρησιν· ὁ γὰρ ἐγκατῳκοδομημένος τῇ ῥινὶ καὶ
τοῖς ὠσὶν ἀὴρ αὐτός ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἀκοῆς καὶ ὀσφρήσεως. εἰ πέντε αἰσθήσεις, πῶς τρία τὰ αἰσθητήρια; τῷ ὀνόματι τρία,
τῷ δὲ πράγματι πέντε, καὶ γὰρ τῇ γῇ καὶ ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις, καὶ τῷ ἀέρι ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄσφρησις, καὶ τῷ ὕδατι ὅρασις. Πῶς μιᾷ αἰσθήσει
δύο αἰσθητήρια, ὡς ὀσφρήσεως ἐπὶ πεζῶν καὶ πτηνῶν ὁ ἀήρ, ἐπὶ δὲ ἐνύδρων τὸ ὕδωρ; οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ζῴου συμβαίνει τοῦτο, ἀλλ'
ἐπ' ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου. 62 Θεμίστιός φησιν «οὐκ ἦν δυνατὸν ψυχὴν ἐπιφοιτῆσαι τὴν λογικήν, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐκοσμήθη τὸ ζῷον πάσαις
ταῖς τοῦ ἀλόγου δυνάμεσι». Καὶ ὁ ἀσπάλαξ τὰ πέντε αἰσθητήρια ἔχει. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὑμένι καλύπτεται ἡ ὄψις, ὥστε μὴ βλάπτεσθαι
αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς, ἀλλ' οὖν τὸ αἰσθητήριον σῷον ἔχει. ὡς πέντε τὰ στερεὰ μαθηματικὰ σώματα, οὕτω καὶ αἰσθήσεις. Τίνων αἰσθητὰ
μέγεθος, σχῆμα, ἀριθμός, κίνησις, ἠρεμία; μέγεθος καὶ σχῆμα ὄψεως καὶ ἁφῆς, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τρία τῶν πέντε. Τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
αἰσθητὰ οὐ ποιοῦσι πάθος. ἡ ὄψις κρίνει τὸ γλυκὺ ἀπὸ τῆς χροιᾶς. ἐὰν οὖν ἴδωμεν ὑγρόν τι ξανθόν, λέγομεν ὅτι τοῦτο μέλι ἐστί,
καὶ λέγεται τοῦτο κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητόν. Τί δήποτε οὐκ ἔχουσι τὴν οἰκείαν ἰδιότητα αἱ αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλ' ἅπτεται μία ἑτέρας,
οἷον οἶδεν ὄψις τὸ μέλι καὶ ἔγνω ξανθόν, ἡ γεῦσις γλυκύ, κατὰ τὴν αὔριον ἔγνω ἡ ὄψις τὸ μέλι καὶ ξανθὸν καὶ γλυκύ; ἡ φαντασία
τοῦ γλυκέος αἰτία, ἥτις τὴν χθὲς γεῦσιν ἀναζητεῖ. ἄλλως τε ἡ ὄψις τὸ γλυκὺ τὸ τῆς γεύσεως ἴδιον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οἶδεν. ὅθεν
καὶ πολλάκις ἀπατᾶται, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς Κολοφωνίας ἣν ἰδοῦσα ξανθὴν καὶ γλυκεῖαν εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνει. Πλείους αἰσθήσεις ἀντιλαμβάνονται
ἑνός, ὡς ὄψις καὶ ἁφὴ μεγέθους, σχήματος, καὶ αἱ πέντε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καί φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης διὰ τοῦτο, ἵνα ὦσι κοινὰ αἰσθητά,
σχήματα, κινήσεις, μεγέθη. ἄλλως δὲ οἴδασιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τὰ ἴδια αἰσθητὰ ἢ τὰ κοινά. Τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθάνεσθαι διττόν·
τό τε τῇ ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει ὑποκείμενον ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δι' ἑτέρου, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ξανθοῦ τὸ γλυκύ, καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰσθήσει ὑποκείμενον.
ὁ γὰρ Κλέωνος υἱὸς ὁρώμενος οὐχ ὡς οὐσία ὁρᾶται, ἀλλ' ὡς λευκός. Πῶς πλείους ἔχοντες αἰσθήσεις μὴ μιᾷ τῶν κοινῶν αἰσθητῶν
ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα; λύσις· ἵνα μὴ ἥττω τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβανώμεθα. ἄλλως τε μία αἴσθησις πῶς εἶχεν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ τὸν
κοινὸν καὶ τὸν ἴδιον; καὶ εἰ ἀντελαμβάνετο, οὐκ ἂν διεκρίνετο. Ἀπορία· μήποτε αἱ πέντε αἰσθήσεις δέκα; ἀκούομεν γὰρ καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα,
καὶ βλέπομεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ γευόμεθα καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως. λύσις· οὐ δυνατὸν ἄλλην μὲν εἶναι αἴσθησιν
τὴν ὁρῶσαν καὶ ἄλλην τὴν αἰσθανομένην τῆς ὁρατῆς ἐνεργείας, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ αἰσθανομένη ἑτέρα, ἔχει καὶ ἐκείνη ἄλλην
αἴσθησιν αἰσθανομένην, κἀκείνη ἑτέραν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ' ἄπειρον. 63 Ἀλέξανδρος λέγει τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις αἰσθητῶν εἶναι ἀντιληπτικάς,
τὴν δὲ κοινὴν καὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν αὐτῶν. Πλούταρχος τὴν δόξαν τὸ ἄτιμον μέρος τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς συναπτικὸν
λέγει τῆς λογικῆς καὶ ἀλόγου. Ταῖς πέντε δυνάμεσι τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς
