Chapter XXXII.—Empedocles Increased the Absurdity of Pythagoras by Developing the Posthumous Change of Men into Various Animals.

But the fact is, Empedocles, who used to dream that he was a god, and on that account, I suppose, disdained to have it thought that he had ever before been merely some hero, declares in so many words: “I once was Thamnus, and a fish.” Why not rather a melon, seeing that he was such a fool; or a cameleon, for his inflated brag? It was, no doubt, as a fish (and a queer one too!) that he escaped the corruption of some obscure grave, when he preferred being roasted by a plunge into Ætna; after which accomplishment there was an end for ever to his μετενσωμάτωσις or putting himself into another body—(fit only now for) a light dish after the roast-meat. At this point, therefore, we must likewise contend against that still more monstrous presumption, that in the course of the transmigration beasts pass from human beings, and human beings from beasts. Let (Empedocles’) Thamnuses alone. Our slight notice of them in passing will be quite enough: (to dwell on them longer will inconvenience us,) lest we should be obliged to have recourse to raillery and laughter instead of serious instruction. Now our position is this: that the human soul cannot by any means at all be transferred to beasts, even when they are supposed to originate, according to the philosophers, out of the substances of the elements. Now let us suppose that the soul is either fire, or water, or blood, or spirit, or air, or light; we must not forget that all the animals in their several kinds have properties which are opposed to the respective elements. There are the cold animals which are opposed to fire—water-snakes, lizards, salamanders, and what things soever are produced out of the rival element of water. In like manner, those creatures are opposite to water which are in their nature dry and sapless; indeed, locusts, butterflies, and chameleons rejoice in droughts. So, again, such creatures are opposed to blood which have none of its purple hue, such as snails, worms, and most of the fishy tribes. Then opposed to spirit are those creatures which seem to have no respiration, being unfurnished with lungs and windpipes, such as gnats, ants, moths, and minute things of this sort. Opposed, moreover, to air are those creatures which always live under ground and under water, and never imbibe air—things of which you are more acquainted with the existence than with the names. Then opposed to light are those things which are either wholly blind, or possess eyes for the darkness only, such as moles, bats, and owls. These examples (have I adduced), that I might illustrate my subject from clear and palpable natures. But even if I could take in my hand the “atoms” of Epicurus, or if my eye could see the “numbers” of Pythagoras, or if my foot could stumble against the “ideas” of Plato, or if I could lay hold of the “entelechies” of Aristotle, the chances would be, that even in these (impalpable) classes I should find such animals as I must oppose to one another on the ground of their contrariety. For I maintain that, of whichsoever of the before-mentioned natures the human soul is composed, it would not have been possible for it to pass for new forms into animals so contrary to each of the separate natures, and to bestow an origin by its passage on those beings, from which it would have to be excluded and rejected rather than to be admitted and received, by reason of that original contrariety which we have supposed it to possess,230    Hujus. and which commits the bodily substance receiving it to an interminable strife; and then again by reason of the subsequent contrariety, which results from the development inseparable from each several nature. Now it is on quite different conditions231    Alias. that the soul of man has had assigned to it (in individual bodies232    This is the force of the objective nouns, which are all put in the plural form.) its abode, and aliment, and order, and sensation, and affection, and sexual intercourse, and procreation of children; also (on different conditions has it, in individual bodies, received especial) dispositions, as well as duties to fulfil, likings, dislikes, vices, desires, pleasures, maladies, remedies—in short, its own modes of living, its own outlets of death. How, then, shall that (human) soul which cleaves to the earth, and is unable without alarm to survey any great height, or any considerable depth, and which is also fatigued if it mounts many steps, and is suffocated if it is submerged in a fish-pond,—(how, I say, shall a soul which is beset with such weaknesses) mount up at some future stage into the air in an eagle, or plunge into the sea in an eel?  How, again, shall it, after being nourished with generous and delicate as well as exquisite viands, feed deliberately on, I will not say husks, but even on thorns, and the wild fare of bitter leaves, and beasts of the dung-hill, and poisonous worms, if it has to migrate into a goat or into a quail?—nay, it may be, feed on carrion, even on human corpses in some bear or lion? But how indeed (shall it stoop to this), when it remembers its own (nature and dignity)? In the same way, you may submit all other instances to this criterion of incongruity, and so save us from lingering over the distinct consideration of each of them in turn. Now, whatever may be the measure and whatever the mode of the human soul, (the question is forced upon us,) what it will do in far larger animals, or in very diminutive ones? It must needs be, that every individual body of whatever size is filled up by the soul, and that the soul is entirely covered by the body. How, therefore, shall a man’s soul fill an elephant?  How, likewise, shall it be contracted within a gnat? If it be so enormously extended or contracted, it will no doubt be exposed to peril. And this induces me to ask another question: If the soul is by no means capable of this kind of migration into animals, which are not fitted for its reception, either by the habits of their bodies or the other laws of their being, will it then undergo a change according to the properties of various animals, and be adapted to their life, notwithstanding its contrariety to human life—having, in fact, become contrary to its human self by reason of its utter change? Now the truth is, if it undergoes such a transformation, and loses what it once was, the human soul will not be what it was; and if it ceases to be its former self, the metensomatosis, or adaptation of some other body, comes to nought, and is not of course to be ascribed to the soul which will cease to exist, on the supposition of its complete change. For only then can a soul be said to experience this process of the metensomatosis, when it undergoes it by remaining unchanged in its own (primitive) condition. Since, therefore, the soul does not admit of change, lest it should cease to retain its identity; and yet is unable to remain unchanged in its original state, because it fails then to receive contrary (bodies),—I still want to know some credible reason to justify such a transformation as we are discussing. For although some men are compared to the beasts because of their character, disposition, and pursuits (since even God says, “Man is like the beasts that perish”233    Ps. xlix. 20.), it does not on this account follow that rapacious persons become kites, lewd persons dogs, ill-tempered ones panthers, good men sheep, talkative ones swallows, and chaste men doves, as if the selfsame substance of the soul everywhere repeated its own nature in the properties of the animals (into which it passed). Besides, a substance is one thing, and the nature of that substance is another thing; inasmuch as the substance is the special property of one given thing, whereas the nature thereof may possibly belong to many things.  Take an example or two. A stone or a piece of iron is the substance: the hardness of the stone and the iron is the nature of the substance. Their hardness combines objects by a common quality; their substances keep them separate.  Then, again, there is softness in wool, and softness in a feather: their natural qualities are alike, (and put them on a par;) their substantial qualities are not alike, (and keep them distinct.) Thus, if a man likewise be designated a wild beast or a harmless one, there is not for all that an identity of soul. Now the similarity of nature is even then observed, when dissimilarity of substance is most conspicuous: for, by the very fact of your judging that a man resembles a beast, you confess that their soul is not identical; for you say that they resemble each other, not that they are the same. This is also the meaning of the word of God (which we have just quoted): it likens man to the beasts in nature, but not in substance. Besides, God would not have actually made such a comment as this concerning man, if He had known him to be in substance only bestial.

CAPUT XXXII.

Sed enim Empedocles, quia se deum delirarat, idcirco, opinor, dedignatus aliquem se heroum recordari: Thamnus et piscis fui, inquit, cur non magis et pepo, tam insulsus, et chamaeleon, tam inflatus? Plane ut piscis, ne aliqua sepultura conditiore putesceret , assum se maluit, in Aethnam praecipitando. Atque exinde in illo finita sit metensomatosis, ut aestiva coena post assum. Perinde igitur et hic dimicemus necesse est adversus portentosiorem praesumptionem, bestias ex hominibus, et homines ex bestiis revolventem. Viderint thamni. Licebit et raptim , 0702C ne plus ridere quam docere cogamur. Dicimus animam 0703A humanam nullo modo in bestias posse transferri, etiamsi secundum philosophos ex clementitiis substantiis censeretur. Sive enim ignis anima, sive aqua, sive sanguis, sive spiritus, sive aer, sive lumen, recogitare debemus contraria quaeque singulis speciebus animalia: igni quidem ea quae rigent, colubros, stelliones, salamandras; et jam quaecumque de aemulo producentur elemento, de aqua scilicet, perinde contraria, utique illa, quae arida et exsuccida: denique siccitatibus gaudent locustae, papiunculi, chamaeleontes. Item contraria sanguini, quae carent purpura ejus, cochleas, vermiculos et majorem piscium censum. Spiritui vero contraria, quae spirare non videntur, carentia pulmonibus et arteriis, culices, formicas, tineas, et hoc genus minutalia. Item aeri 0703B contraria, quae semper subterraneum et subaquaneum viventia, carent haustu ejus. Res magis, quam nomina noveris . Item contraria lumini, quae caeca in totum, vel solis tenebris habent oculos, talpas, vesperugines, noctuas. Haec, ut ex apparentibus et manifestis substantiis doceam. Caeterum, si et atomos Epicuri tenerem, et numeros Pythagorae viderem, et ideas Platonis offenderem, et entelechias Aristotelis occuparem, invenirem fors his quoque speciebus animalia, quae nomine contrarietatis opponerem. Contendo enim, ex quacumque substantia supradicta constitisset humana anima, non potuisse eam in tam contraria unicuique substantiae animalia reformari, et censum eis de sua translatione conferre, a quibus excludi ac respui magis haberet, quam admitti 0703C et capi; nomine hujus primae contrarietatis, quae substantivi status diversitatem committit, tunc et reliquae per consequentem ordinem cujusque naturae. Nam et sedes alias humana anima sortita est, et victus, et instructus, et sensus, et affectus, et concubitus, et foetus; item ingenia; tum opera, gaudia, taedia, vitia, cupidines, voluptates, valetudines, medicinas; suos postremo, et vitae modos, et exitus mortis. Quomodo igitur illa anima quae terris inhaerebat, nullius sublimitatis, nullius profunditatis intrepida, ascensu etiam scalarum fatigabilis, submersu etiam piscinarum strangulabilis, aeri postea 0704A insultabit in aquila, aut mari postea desultabit in anguilla? Quomodo item pabulis liberalibus et delicatis atque curatis educata, non dico paleas, sed spinas, et agrestes amaritudines frondium, et bestias sterquiliniorum, vermium etiam venena ruminabit, si in capram transierit, vel in coturnicem: imo et cadaverinam, imo et humanam, sui utique memor in urso et leone? Sic et caetera ad incongruentiam rediges , ne singulis perorandis immoremur. Ipsius animae humanae quisquis modus, quaecumque mensura, quid faciet in amplioribus longe vel minutioribus animalibus? Necesse est enim et corpus omne anima compleri, et animam omnem corpore obduci. Quomodo ergo anima hominis complebit elephantum? quomodo item obducetur in 0704B culice? Si tantum extendetur aut contrahetur , profecto periclitabitur. Et ideo adjicio, si nulla ratione capax est hujusmodi translationis in animalia, nec modulis corporum, nec caeteris naturae suae legibus adaequantia, numquid ergo demutabitur secundum quatitales generum, et vitam eorum contrariam humanae vitae, facta et ipsa contraria humanae per demutationem? Enimvero si demutationem capit amittens quod fuit, non erit quae fuit; et si quae fuit, non erit, soluta est metensomatosis, non adscribenda scilicet ei animae, quae si demutabitur, non erit. Illius enim metensomatosis dicetur, quaecumque eam in suo statu permanendo pateretur. Igitur si nec mutari potest, ne non sit ipsa, nec permanere in statu, quia contraria non capit, quaero adhuc caussam aliquam 0704C fide dignam hujusmodi translationis. Nam etsi quidam homines bestiis adaequantur, pro qualitatibus morum, et ingeniorum, et adfectuum, quia et Deus: Assimilatus est, inquit, homo irrationabilibus jumentis ; non ideo milvi ex rapacibus fient, et canes ex spurcis, et pantherae ex acerbis, aut oves ex probis, et hirundines ex garrulis, et columbae ex pudicis; quasi eadem substantia animae ubique naturam suam in animalium proprietatibus repetat. Aliud est autem substantia, aliud natura substantiae. Siquidem substantia propria est rei cujusque, natura vero potest esse communis. Suscipe exemplum. Substantia est 0705A lapis, ferrum; duritia lapidis et ferri, natura substantiae est. Duritia communicat, substantia discordat. Mollitia lanae, mollitia plumae, pariant naturalia earum; substantiva non pariant. Sic et si saeva bestia vel proba vocetur homo, sed non eadem anima. Nam et tunc naturae similitudo notatur, cum substantiae dissimilitudo conspicitur. Ipsum enim, quod hominem similem bestiae judicas, confiteris animam non eamdem ; similem dicendo, non ipsam. Sic et divina pronuntiatio sapit, pecudibus adaequans hominem natura, non substantia. Caeterum, nec Deus hominem hoc modo notasset, si pecudem de substantia nosset.