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they have sought out many devices. The sum of the speculation is this: God made man upright, that is, beautiful and good, having nothing crooked or distorted. But they have invented many devices. According to those devices, these are the differences: "for one to be a prey," "one by one to find a device," "for one to be foolish." I was saying that the enemy is complex, when I mentioned Proteus. Yet he certainly has a face that is like himself, in which he is Satan, in which he is the devil. This face of his only those can see who say, "for we are not ignorant of his designs." They know what sort of artificial and externally imposed face he has, and what is, as it were, his natural face. And his natural face is to be steeped in wickedness. And you often find even sophists, men who put on a thousand faces, and they have some one hidden purpose. That, then, is their face. Therefore, as in these cases he passes over to the praiseworthy, there is a certain face of man, in which he is man, not in which he is a wicked or crafty man. This is the one who was in honor: "Man, being in honor, did not understand," as the man who was also made "in the image and likeness" of God. And this indeed is his principal face, which if someone observes, he has found the man. But they did not practice one device, but many. For wickedness is many-chambered. And I remember once having spoken an image concerning calculation, that all who get it right find the same number, but those who err do not find the same one. Man, therefore, has a face, in which he is rational, in which he does all things with reason, and just as I was saying about the judge: the true judge is justice incarnate; he considers nothing other than the facts of the judged, not whether they are friends or enemies or relatives. For the uprightness of the judgment is stained. And observe that it did not say "he was compared to a beast," but "to the beasts." And there is one form of man that makes him like God, but many into which he falls. When he becomes crafty, he bears the face of a fox. When venomous and harmful, of a snake; when savage, of a lion; when licentious and pleasure-loving and a flatterer, of a dog. And in general, from the one man and the one form, manifoldness and multiformity arise. And again the goal will be, even if it does not seem so to some, according to which the rejection of all forms occurs, to bear that which God has made, so that it may be revealed. When, therefore, he remained in sameness, he had one device. And just as it is said in one of the psalms: "God makes the single-minded dwell in a house," those who are settled piously and virtuously and ecclesiastically are single-minded, "being perfected in the same mind and in the same judgment," so that each one is single-minded.

But according to a second account you will say that all have one way. Concerning those who have such a judgment it is said, that of the "believers there was one soul and one heart," not in number, but in sameness. And this sameness is the first state. And we at least are sometimes in disagreement with ourselves, saying: Is it not this, not that? But this belongs to one who has not understood. For this reason it is said: "He who has heard has rested." When he is no longer carried away to many things, but knows that which the one who reports declares, he is at rest, he is no longer disturbed. At any rate, that philosopher calls foolishness a disturbance: "For let not the parts of substances disturb us." Who knows the wise? And who knows the interpretation of a saying? A man's wisdom will illuminate his face. 233 Rare is the one who knows the wise. For it is possible to know scientifically who is wise. But the one who thus beholds the wise man, who he is, also knows wisdom. One cannot know a shipwright without understanding the craft by which he builds the ships. And no one can understand who a painter is unless he knows the art of painting. And just as it is impossible to know a white body without knowing what white color is, and it is impossible to know a certain science without knowing what science is, so also

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ἐζήτησαν λογισμοὺς πολλούς. τὸ κεφάλαιον τοῦ θεωρήματος τοῦτό ἐστιν· ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον εὐθὴν πεποίηκεν, τουτέστιν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, μηδὲν ἔχοντα σκολιὸν ἢ λελοξωμέ νον. αὐτοὶ δὲ πολλοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐφεῦρον. κατὰ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐκείνους αἱ διαφοραί εἰσιν αὗται· τὸ "θήρευμά τινα εἶναι", τὸ "μία τῇ μιᾷ τοῦ ε̣υ῾̣ρεῖν λογισμόν", τὸ "ἄφρονα εἶναί" τινα. ἔλεγον ὅτι πολύπλοκός ἐσ τιν ὁ ἐχθρός, ὅτε τοῦ Πρωτέως ἐμνημόνευσα. πάντως δὲ ἔχει τι πρόσωπον ἐοικὸς αὑτῷ καθ' ὃ σατανᾶς ἐστιν, καθ' ὃ διάβολός ἐστιν. τοῦτο τὸ πρόσ ωπον αὐτοῦ μόνοι ἐκεῖνοι δύνανται ἰδεῖν οἱ λέγοντες "οὐ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὰ νοήματα ἀγνοοῦμεν." ἴσασιν, ποῖον ἐπίπλαςτον ἔχει πρόσωπον καὶ ἔξωθεν ἐπιβαλλόμενον καὶ ποῖόν ἐστιν τὸ ὡσανεὶ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ πρόσωπον. κατὰ φύσιν δὲ αὐτοῦ πρόσωπόν ἐστιν τὸ ἐνβαθῦναι τῇ κακίᾳ. καὶ εὑρίσκεις πολλάκις καὶ σοφιστὰς ἀνθρώπους μυρία πρόσωπα περι βαλλομένους, καὶ ἕνα τινὰ ἔχουσιν λανθάνοντα σκοπόν. ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν οὖν αὐτῶν τὸ πρόσωπον. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τούτων μεταβαίνει ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐπαινετούς, ἔστιν τι πρόσωπον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καθ' ὃ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὐ κ̣αθ̣' ὃ πονηρὸς ἄν θρωπος ἢ πανοῦργος. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν τιμῇ γενόμενος· "ἄνθρωπος ἐν τι μῇ ὢν οὐ συνῆκεν" ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ "κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν" θεοῦ γεγο νώς. καὶ τοῦτό γέ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τὸ προηγούμενον πρόσωπον, ὅπερ ἐάν τις 232 καὶ θεωρη´̣σῃ̣ εὕρηκεν τὸν̣ ἄνθρωπον. αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐχ ἕνα λογισμὸν ἐπετήδευσαν, ἀλλὰ πολλούς. πολυχοῦς γάρ ἐστ̣ι̣ν ἡ κακία. καὶ μέμνημαι εἰρηκώς ποτε εἰκόνα περὶ τοῦ διαψηφισμοῦ, ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐπιτυγχάνοντες τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν εὑρίσκουσιν, οἱ σφαλ λόμενοι δ̣ὲ οὐ τὸν αὐτόν. ἔχει οὖν πρόσωπον ἄνθρωπος, καθ' ὃ λογικός ἐστιν, καθ' ὃ σὺν λόγῳ πράττει πάντα καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλεγον ὅτι ὁ δικαστής· ὁ ἀληθῶς κριτὴς ἔνψυχόν ἐστιν δίκαιον· οὐδὲν ἕτερον σκοπεῖ ἢ τὰ πράγματα τῶν κρινομένων, οὐκ εἰ φίλοι ἢ δυσμενεῖς ἢ συγγενεῖς. χραίνεται γὰρ τὸ εὐ θὲς τοῦ κ̣ρίματος. καὶ θεώρει, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν "παρασυνεβλήθη κτήνει", ἀλλὰ "τοῖς κτή νεσιν". καὶ μία μὲν ἔστιν μορφὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἡ ὁμοιοῦσα αὐτὸν τῷ θεῷ, πολλαὶ δέ, εἰς ἃς πίπτει. ὅταν πανοῦργος γίνηται, ἀλώπεκος φέρει πρόσωπον. ὅταν ἰῶδες καὶ βλαπτικόν, ὄφεως· ὅταν ἄγριον, λεόν τος· ὅταν ἀκόλαστον καὶ φιλήδονον καὶ κόλαξ, κυνός. καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῆς μιᾶς μορφῆς πολυτροπία καὶ πολυμορφία γίνεται. καὶ πάλιν σκοπὸς ἔσται, κἄν τισιν μὴ δοκῇ, καθ' ὃν ἀποβολ̣ὴ πασῶν τῶν μορφῶν γίνεται, φέρειν ἵν' ἐκεῖνο, ὅπερ πεποίηκεν ὁ θε ός, α᾿̣ναδειχθῇ. ὅτε οὖν ἔμενεν ἐν τῇ ταυτότητι, ἕνα λογισμὸν εἶχεν. καὶ ὥσπερ λέγεται ἐν ἑνὶ τῶν ψαλμῶν· "ὁ θεὸς κατοικίζει μονοτρόπους ἐν οἴκῳ", οἱ εὐσεβῶς καὶ ἐναρέτως καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικῶς κατοικιζομένοι μο νότροποί εἰσιν, "κατηρτισμένοι τῷ αὐτῷ νοῒ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ", ὡς ἕκαστον μονότροπον εἶναι.

κατὰ δεύτερον δὲ λόγον ἐρεῖς, ὅτι πάντες ἕνα τρόπον ἔχουσιν. περὶ τῆς οὕτω οὖν γνώμης ἐχόντων λέγεται, ὅτι τῶν "πιστευόντων ψυχὴ μία καὶ καρδία μία", οὐ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ταυτότη τι. ἡ ταυτότης δὲ αὕτη ἡ πρώτη κατάστασίς ἐστιν. καὶ ἡμεῖς γοῦν ἐνίοτε εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἀσύμφωνοί ἐσμεν λέγοντες· ἆρα μὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν, μὴ ἐκεῖνο; τοῦτο δὲ μὴ νενοηκότος ἐστίν. διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται· "ὁ ἀκούσας η᾿̣ρέμη σεν." ὅταν μηκέτι εἰς πολλὰ φέρηται, ἀλλὰ γνῷ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ δηλοῖ ὁ ἀπαγ γέλλων, ἠρεμεῖ, οὐκέτι ταράττεται. ἀμέλει γοῦν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐκεῖνος τὴν ἀνοησίαν ταραχὴν λέγει· "μὴ ταραττέτω γὰρ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν." τίς οἶδεν σοφούς; καὶ τίς οἶδεν ἐπίλυσιν ῥήματος; σοφία ἀνθρώπου φωτιεῖ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ. 233 σπάνιός ἐστιν ὁ ἐπιστάμενος τοὺς σοφούς. ἔστιν γὰρ ἐπιστημονικῶς εἰδέναι, τίς σοφός. ὁ δὲ οὕτω θεωρῶν τὸν σοφόν, τίς ἐστιν, καὶ τὴν σο φίαν οἶδεν. οὐ δύναταί τις εἰδέναι ναυπηγὸν μὴ τὴν τέχνην περινοῶν, καθ' ἣν κατασκευάζει τὰς ναῦς. καὶ ζωγράφον οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐπιστῆσαι, τίς ἐστιν, ἐὰν μὴ τὴν ζωγραφικὴν τέχνην εἰδῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν εἰ δέναι εἰδέναι λευκὸν σῶμα μὴ εἰδότα, τί ἐστιν λευκὸν χρῶμα, καὶ ἀδύνα τόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι τινὰ ἐπι̣στήμην οὐκ ἐπιστάμενον, τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, οὕτως