OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the same argument. Therefore, concerning the first of the elements it has been said, both what it is in nature, and that it is incorruptible and ungenerated. If an element is that from which what comes to be comes to be, being inherent in it, how is it possible for the same thing to be both an element and ungenerated? If the element is first and what comes from the element is later, how is the element, from which heaven is, ungenerated, and heaven co-ungenerated with it? If the element is ungenerated for this reason, that it is not from an element, how is heaven, which is from an element, ungenerated? 64. From the same argument. Therefore, for them to be eternal is impossible; for we see fire and water and each of the simple bodies being dissolved. So it is necessary that the elements of the bodies be generated and corruptible. If the earth is also an element of the bodies, how have you said that the earth is both co-eternal and co-ungenerated with heaven, but the other elements generated and corruptible? 65. From the same argument. The generation of the elements is from one another. How do the elements come to be from one another if they do not first come to be according to the generation from one another? For it is necessary for this generation to precede that generation; for when they exist, they are changed into one another and come to be from one another. AGAINST THE GREEKS. a. The nature that makes natural things, unless it is first made to be by that which does not act according to nature, neither exists nor acts. b. That not simply every generated and corruptible thing has in its generation the fourfold time, beginning and increase, acme and decline, but that which comes to be by nature or by art. c. If God is called by our names whatever He is called, it is not necessary that whatever follows our name should follow God because of the name. But God is also called truth and good; and to truth falsehood is opposed, and to the good, evil, but to God nothing is opposed. Plato, not understanding this, posited something opposite to God, an evil that is both necessary and eternal. d. Being is not a being that is not a 'this something', just as a body is not a body that is not 'this body'. But if matter does not have being as 'this', then it does not have being at all; for being is inseparable from being 'this'. e. Nature and art make what they make out of substances, for example, nature makes man from seed and seed from man; and both the seed and the man are substances. Likewise also the arts make a statue from bronze and a house from bricks; and substances are both the bronze

χείου παρὰ τὰ ἐνταῦθα ποτὲ δὲ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι θατέρως ψευδόμενος; ξγ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτου τῶν στοιχείων εἴρηται, καὶ ποῖόν τι τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον. Eἰ στοιχεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐνυ πάρχον αὐτῷ, πῶς ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ στοιχεῖον εἶναι καὶ ἀγένητον; Eἰ πρῶτον τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ ὕστερον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ στοιχείου, πῶς ἀγένητον τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ συναγένητος αὐτῷ ὁ οὐρανός; Eἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἀγένητον τὸ στοι χεῖον ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ στοιχείου, πῶς ἀγένητος ὁ οὐρανὸς ὁ ὢν ἐκ στοιχείου; ξδ. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Ἀΐδια μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἀδύνατον· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων διαλυόμενον. Ὥστ' ἀνάγκη γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων. Eἰ στοιχεῖον τῶν σωμάτων ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ γῆ, πῶς τὴν μὲν γῆν συναΐδιόν τε καὶ συναγένητον εἴρηκας τῷ οὐρανῷ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα στοιχεῖα γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτά; ξε. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. Τῶν στοιχείων ἡ γένεσις ἐξ ἀλλήλων. Πῶς γίνεται ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὰ στοιχεῖα πρῶτον μὴ γινομέ νων κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων; Ταύτην γὰρ τὴν γέ νεσιν ἀνάγκη προηγεῖσθαι ἐκείνης τῆς γενέσεως· ὄντων γὰρ αὐτῶν μεταβάλλεται εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ γίνονται ἐξ ἀλλήλων. ΠΡOΣ ΤOΥΣ EΛΛHΝAΣ. α. Ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα τὰ φυσικά, ἐὰν μὴ προηγουμέ νως γίνηται ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ποιοῦντος, οὔτε ὑπάρχει οὔτε ποιεῖ. β. Ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς πᾶν πρᾶγμα γενητόν τε καὶ φθαρτὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἔχει τὸν τετραμερῆ χρόνον, ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐπίδοσιν, ἀκμὴν καὶ παρακμήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ γινόμενον. γ. Eἰ τοῖς ἡμετέροις ὀνόμασι καλεῖται ὁ θεὸς πᾶν εἴ τι καλεῖται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνάγκη ἕπεσθαι τῷ θεῷ διὰ τὸ ὄνομα ὅσα ἕπεται τῷ ἡμετέρῳ ὀνόματι. Καλεῖται δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἀγαθός· καὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἀντίκειται τὸ ψεῦ δος, τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν, τῷ δὲ θεῷ οὐδὲν ἀντίκειται. Τοῦτο μὴ νοήσας ὁ Πλάτων ὑπεναντίον τι ἐδογμάτισε τῷ θεῷ, κακὸν ἀναγκαῖόν τε καὶ ἀΐδιον. δ. Oὐκ ἔστι τὸ ὂν μὴ τόδε τι ὄν, οἷον οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα μὴ τόδε σῶμα ὄν. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ ὕλη τὸ εἶναι τόδε οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδ' ἄρα τὸ εἶναι ἔχει· ἀχώριστον γὰρ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ τόδε εἶναι. ε. Ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐκ τῶν οὐσιῶν ποιοῦσιν ἅπερ ποιοῦσιν, οἷον ἐκ σπέρματος ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου τὸ σπέρμα· οὐσίαι δέ εἰσι τό τε σπέρμα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ὡσαύτως καὶ αἱ τέχναι ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἀνδριάντα καὶ ἐκ πλίνθων οἰκίαν· οὐσίαι δ' εἰσὶν ὅ τε χαλκὸς