Nemesius Emesenus, On Human Nature

is; but none of the things that come to be, comes to be and has come to be at the same time; but it is clear that it is by parts; but that which is pleased is pleased all at once; therefore pleasure is not a coming-to-be. Furthermore, every coming-to-be is from what is not; but pleasure is of things that already are; therefore pleasure is not a coming-to-be. Furthermore, a coming-to-be is said to be fast and slow; but pleasure is not. Furthermore, of good things, some are states, some are activities, and some are instruments. A state, for example, is virtue; an activity is the action in accordance with it. And again, a state is the capacity for sight; an activity is seeing; and instruments are the things through which we act, such as the eye and wealth and things of that sort. All the psychical faculties concerned with good and bad things are faculties of certain states; if, therefore, pleasure is good or bad, it will be only in these; but it is not a state. For it is not like virtue; for it would not so easily change into its opposite, pain; nor is it like that which is opposed to privation. For it is impossible for a state and a privation to exist at the same time; but some people are pleased and pained at the same time, like those who scratch an itch; therefore pleasure is not a state. But neither is it an instrument. For instruments are for the sake of other things, and not for their own sake; but pleasure is not for the sake of something else but for its own sake; therefore it is not an instrument either. It remains, then, for it to be an activity. Whence Aristotle defines it as the unimpeded activity of the natural state. For impediments to the natural activity are pain; but happiness, too, is an unimpeded activity of the natural state; it follows then from this definition that happiness is pleasure, and that the definition is mistaken; correcting it, therefore, he defined pleasure to be the end of the unimpeded natural activities of the animal, so that pleasure is intertwined and co-exists with happiness, but happiness is not pleasure. Not every activity is a motion, but there is also a certain activity through immobility, according to which the first God acts; for the first mover is unmoved. Such also is the activity of contemplation in human beings. For it is through immobility; for that which is contemplated is one and always the same, and the thought of the one contemplating is at rest; for it is always occupied with one and the same thing. But if the pleasure of contemplation, being the greatest and most proper and true, comes about through immobility, it is clear that those that come about through fewer motions, by however much they are through fewer, by that much are they better and greater. Pleasures are divided in kind along with activities; for as many as are the kinds of activities, so many are there of pleasures; and those of noble activities are noble, and of base ones, base; and it is clear that corresponding to each sense there are also different kinds of pleasures. For those of touch and taste are different, and different are those of sight and of hearing and of smell; purer are those senses that please without coming close to the objects of sense, such as sight and hearing and smell. And of the intellectual faculties, there are two kinds: for one is practical, the other theoretical. It is clear, therefore, that there are also two kinds of pleasures that accompany these activities. And of these, the theoretical is purer than the practical. The intellectual pleasures are proper to man, insofar as he is man. For the sensible pleasures are common, insofar as he is an animal, also with the other animals. Since with respect to the sensible pleasures some are pleased by some, others by others, not those that appear noble to the base but those that appear noble to the virtuous are also noble in themselves. For a correct judge on every matter is not just anyone, but the one who has knowledge and is disposed according to nature. 18 Concerning pain. Of pain there are four kinds, distress, burden, envy, pity. Distress is a pain that produces speechlessness; burden is a pain that weighs down; envy is a pain at the good fortune of others; pity is a pain at the misfortunes of others. Every pain is an evil in its own nature. For even if the virtuous man will sometimes be pained, at good men being destroyed, or his children, or a city being sacked; but not primarily, nor by design, but according to circumstance. And in these things, the contemplative man will be altogether impassive, having alienated himself from the things here and joined himself to God; but the virtuous man will be moderate in his passions in these matters and not excessive nor taken captive by them but rather mastering them. Pain is opposed as an evil to a good to moderate pleasure, and as an evil to an evil to excessive pleasure. but excesses exist only in bodily pleasures

ἐστιν· οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν γινομένων ἅμα γίνεται καὶ γέγονεν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ μέρος· τὸ δὲ ἡδόμενον ἀθρόως ἥσθη· οὐκ ἄρα γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή. ἔτι πᾶσα γένεσις οὐκ ὄντος ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ τῶν ἤδη ὄντων· οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή. ἔτι γένεσις μὲν ταχεῖα καὶ βραδεῖα λέγεται· ἡδονὴ δὲ οὔ. ἔτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἕξις ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ ἐνέργεια, τὰ δὲ ὄργανα. ἕξις μὲν ὡς ἀρετή· ἐνέργεια δὲ ὡς ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν πρᾶξις. καὶ πάλιν ἕξις μὲν ἡ ὁρατική· ἐνέργεια δὲ τὸ ὁρᾶν· ὄργανα δὲ δι' ὧν ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὡς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ φαῦλα ψυχικαὶ δυνάμεις ἕξεών τινῶν εἰσι δυνάμεις· εἴπερ οὖν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ ἢ φαῦλον, ἐν τούτοις ἔσται μόνοις· ἀλλ' ἕξις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἀρετή· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω ῥᾳδίως μετέπιπτεν εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἑαυτῇ λύπην· οὔτε ὡς ἡ ἀντικειμένη τῇ στερήσει· κατὰ ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἕξιν καὶ στέρησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι· ἅμα δέ τινες ἥδονται καὶ λυποῦνται, ὡς οἱ κνώμενοι· οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα ἕξις ἡ ἡδονή. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὄργανον. τὰ γὰρ ὄργανα καὶ δι' ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ δι' ἑαυτά· ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐ δι' ἄλλο ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτήν· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ὄργανον. λείπεται δὴ ἐνέργειαν αὐτὴν εἶναι. ὅθεν Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτὴν ὁρίζεται ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως ἀνεμπόδιστον. τὰ γὰρ ἐμπόδια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργείας, λύπη· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἀνεμπόδιστος τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως· συμβαίνει δὴ κατὰ τὸν ὅρον τοῦτον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἡδονὴν εἶναι, καὶ διεσφάλθαι τὸν ὅρον· διορθούμενος οὖν ὡρίσατο τὴν ἡδονὴν τέλος εἶναι τῶν τοῦ ζῴου κατὰ φύσιν ἀνεμποδίστων ἐνεργειῶν, ὡς συμπεπλέχθαι καὶ συνυπάρχειν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἐνέργεια κίνησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τις καὶ δι' ἀκινησίας ἐνέργεια, καθ' ἣν ὁ πρῶτος ἐνεργεῖ Θεός· τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐνέργεια. διὰ γὰρ ἀκινησίας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ θεωρούμενον ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ καὶ ἡ διάνοια τοῦ θεωροῦντος ἕστηκεν· περὶ ἓν γὰρ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ κατα γίνεται. εἰ δὲ τῆς θεωρίας ἡ ἡδονή, μεγίστη τε οὖσα καὶ κυριωτάτη καὶ ἀληθής, δι' ἀκινησίας γίνεται, δῆλον ὡς αἱ δι' ἐλαττόνων κινήσεων γινόμεναι, ὅσῳ δι' ἐλαττόνων, τοσούτῳ καὶ κρείσσους καὶ μείζους εἰσίν. συνδιαιροῦνται δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἡδοναὶ κατ' εἶδος ὅσα γὰρ ἐνεργειῶν εἴδη, τοσαῦτα καὶ ἡδονῶν· καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν καλαί, τῶν δὲ φαύλων φαῦλαι· καὶ δῆλον ὡς καθ' ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἡδοναί. ἕτεραι γὰρ ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως καὶ ἕτεραι τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως· καθαρώτεραι δέ εἰσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὅσαι μὴ προσπελάζουσαι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἥδουσιν, ὡς ὄψις καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄσφρησις. καὶ τῶν διανοητικῶν δὲ εἴδη δύο· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστι πρακτικόν, τὸ δὲ θεωρητικόν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν παρεπομένων ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ταύταις εἴδη δύο. καὶ τούτων δὲ καθαρώτερον τὸ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ πρακτικοῦ. τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιαι, καθ' ὃ ἄνθρωπος, αἱ διανοητικαί. κοιναὶ γὰρ καθ' ὃ ζῷον αἱ αἰσθητικαὶ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν ἡδονῶν οἱ μὲν ἄλλαις, οἱ δὲ ἄλλαις ἥδονται, οὐχ αἱ τοῖς φαύλοις ἀλλ' αἱ τοῖς σπουδαίοις καλαὶ φαινόμεναι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτάς εἰσι καλαί. κριτὴς γὰρ ὀρθὸς ἐπὶ παντὸς πράγματος οὐχ ὁ τυχών. ἀλλ' ὁ ἐπιστήμων καὶ κατὰ φύσιν διακείμενος. 18 περὶ λύπης. Τῆς δὲ λύπης εἴδη τέσσαρα, ἄχος, ἄχθος, φθόνος, ἔλεος. ἔστι δὲ ἄχος λύπη ἀφωνίαν ἐμποιοῦσα· ἄχθος δὲ λύπη βαρύνουσα· φθόνος δὲ λύπη ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς· ἔλεος δὲ λύπη ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς. πᾶσα δὲ λύπη κακὸν τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος λυπηθήσεταί ποτε, χρηστῶν ἀνδρῶν διαφθειρομένων, ἢ τέκνων, ἢ πόλεως πορθουμένης· ἀλλ' οὐ προηγουμένως, οὐδὲ κατὰ πρόθεσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ περίστασιν. καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὲ ὁ μὲν θεωρητικὸς ἀπαθὴς ἔσται παντάπασιν, ἀλλοτρίωσας ἑαυτὸν τῶν τῇδε καὶ συνάψας θεῷ· ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος μετριοπαθὴς ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων οὐδὲ αἰχμαλωτιζόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κρατῶν αὐτῶν. ἀντίκειται δὲ ἡ λύπη ὡς μὲν κακὸν καλῷ τῇ μετρίᾳ ἡδονῇ, ὡς δὲ κακὸν κακῷ τῇ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ἡδονῇ. ἐν ταῖς σωματικαῖς δὲ μόναις ὑπερβολαὶ