ARTICLE 5

(23) The will is more than the seat of certain virtues; being inclined to the universal good, it commands all the other powers, whose objects are several particular goods. Whereas the other faculties are each inclined to its own proper good, the will seeks the good of the entire man. This is the reason why, if a man has a good will, he is absolutely good: for he stands in due order to the Ultimate End or Supreme Good.

             "Here we reach the most fundamental and essential point in the analysis of virtue under its psychological aspect, and discover the binding link or principle of unification between the psychology and ethics of virtue, namely, the controlling force of the will in relation to habit.

             "This relation of the will to habits, and more particularly of operative habits, is one of causality. But since causality is fourfold, namely, efficient, material, formal and final, it is necessary to be more precise. Firstly, then, the will is the efficient cause of a habit insofar as it is the cause of the repeated action from which the habit results. Secondly, the will is obviously not the material cause of habit; this comprises the potency of the faculty in which the habit inheres, the bodily modification it connotes and the diverse external objects with which the faculty is concerned. Thirdly, the will is the formal cause of the habit to the extent that it is the desire of the will that moves a faculty to the repetition of this kind of act rather than that. Thus it is the desire to be abstemious that influences a man's actions and so produces a habit of temperance. Finally, the will is the final cause of habit in the sense that it belongs to the will to decide upon the end to be aimed at and to choose the means best calculated to obtain that end. It should perhaps be noted here that if a habit is not acquired by repeated acts, but infused immediately by God, the will would not be the efficient cause of the habit. But it would still play the part of formal and final cause, and moreover would be the efficient cause of the use of that infused habit."

             "Further, moral virtues are concerned with means to the end and not directly with the end itself. The particular action of the will in relation to these virtues is, therefore, that of choice. Hence we find St. Thomas saying that the principal act of any virtue is choice ., . and St. Augustine defines virtue as 'the good use of free choice' . . . Right reason gives the norm of morality but of itself, as Aristotle says (VI Ethics, c. 2), reason moves nothing, and consequently reason cannot be the constituent of virtue. That which constitutes virtue, and is itself essentially virtuous, is moral choice proceeding from a will rightly orientated in respect of the true ultimate end. This rectitude of the will alone gives the virtuous character to human habits.

             "Finally, the pre-eminence of the will is seen in the inter-connection of the virtues. St. Gregory says: 'That is not true prudence which is not also just and temperate and strong; nor perfect temperance that is not strong and prudent and just; nor complete fortitude that is not prudent, temperate and just; nor true justice that is not prudent, strong and temperate.' (Moral. XXII, 1). This inter-relation follows precisely from the fact that virtue connotes the moral good of the man as a whole which is rooted in the rectitude of the will. If a man has this fundamental moral perfection, it follows necessarily that he must have not just this virtue or that, but all the virtues, because in desiring the true ultimate end he must direct by his will all his faculties to the use of means calculated to bring him to that end. Though there may be, of course, degrees of moral excellence or moral deficiency, nevertheless, just as a man is either moral or not moral, so he has either all the virtues or none. The deciding factor is the rectitude or otherwise of his will."

             St. Thomas treats the connection of the virtues in I-II, q. 65. He insists also that the will's very strength, in orientating both its own acts as well as those of all the other powers, derives from its docility to God, from the conformity to the Divine will. For this, of course, Divine aid is necessary.

             (24) "As we said above, virtues are necessary for us in order that our natural powers may be determined to good. Hence in those natural powers which are by their very nature determined to good, no virtues are required.

             "Now the will has for its object the good as end. Therefore, it is by its own nature intrinsically determined to the good which is an end proportionate to human nature. For this same reason, the Philosophers assigned no virtue to the will with respect to the ultimate end.

             "However, some acquired virtue must be placed in the will as regards the means to the end, and this is justice, as will be shown later (d. 33, q. 2, a. 4 Sol. 3), which regards the goods which sustain human life and is counted among the moral virtues. The reason is that the will, although by its very nature essentially in the rational part, nevertheless, from a likeness of operation agrees with the irascible and concupiscible powers, which are called rational by participation. For the will itself participates to some extent in reason, inasmuch as it is directed by reason apprehending (good).

             "Moreover, the doctrine of faith reveals an Ultimate End which exceeds natural inclination. Hence, according to the Theologians, a virtue must be assigned to the will, to elevate it to this (supernatural) end; and this virtue we call charity."--In III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 3 ad 5.

             (25) "Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the very nature of this power is sufficient for the purpose, as has been said. A need exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good."--I-II, 56, 6 ad 3.