Book I Chapter I.—Preface—The Author’s Object—The Utility of Written Compositions.
Chapter III.—Against the Sophists.
Chapter IV.—Human Arts as Well as Divine Knowledge Proceed from God.
Chapter V.—Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology.
Chapter VI.—The Benefit of Culture.
Chapter VII.—The Eclectic Philosophy Paves the Way for Divine Virtue.
Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.
Chapter IX.—Human Knowledge Necessary for the Understanding of the Scriptures.
Chapter X.—To Act Well of Greater Consequence Than to Speak Well.
Chapter XI.—What is the Philosophy Which the Apostle Bids Us Shun?
Chapter XII.—The Mysteries of the Faith Not to Be Divulged to All.
Chapter XIII.—All Sects of Philosophy Contain a Germ of Truth.
Chapter XIV.—Succession of Philosophers in Greece.
Chapter XV.—The Greek Philosophy in Great Part Derived from the Barbarians.
Chapter XVI.—That the Inventors of Other Arts Were Mostly Barbarians.
Chapter XVII.—On the Saying of the Saviour, “All that Came Before Me Were Thieves and Robbers.”
Chapter XVIII.—He Illustrates the Apostle’s Saying, “I Will Destroy the Wisdom of the Wise.”
Chapter XIX.—That the Philosophers Have Attained to Some Portion of Truth.
Chapter XX.—In What Respect Philosophy Contributes to the Comprehension of Divine Truth.
Chapter XXII.—On the Greek Translation of the Old Testament.
Chapter XXIII.—The Age, Birth, and Life of Moses.
Chapter XXIV.—How Moses Discharged the Part of a Military Leader.
Chapter XXV.—Plato an Imitator of Moses in Framing Laws.
Chapter XXVII.—The Law, Even in Correcting and Punishing, Aims at the Good of Men.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Fourfold Division of the Mosaic Law.
Chapter XXIX.—The Greeks But Children Compared with the Hebrews.
Book II. Chapter I.—Introductory.
Chapter II.—The Knowledge of God Can Be Attained Only Through Faith.
Chapter III.—Faith Not a Product of Nature.
Chapter IV.—Faith the Foundation of All Knowledge.
Chapter V.—He Proves by Several Examples that the Greeks Drew from the Sacred Writers.
Chapter VI.—The Excellence and Utility of Faith.
Chapter VII.—The Utility of Fear. Objections Answered.
Chapter VIII.—The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things.
Chapter IX.—The Connection of the Christian Virtues.
Chapter X.—To What the Philosopher Applies Himself.
Chapter XI.—The Knowledge Which Comes Through Faith the Surest of All.
Chapter XIII.—On First and Second Repentance.
Chapter XIV.—How a Thing May Be Involuntary.
Chapter XV.—On the Different Kinds of Voluntary Actions, and the Sins Thence Proceeding.
Chapter XVI.—How We are to Explain the Passages of Scripture Which Ascribe to God Human Affections.
Chapter XVII.—On the Various Kinds of Knowledge.
Chapter XIX.—The True Gnostic is an Imitator of God, Especially in Beneficence.
Chapter XX.—The True Gnostic Exercises Patience and Self-Restraint.
Chapter XXI.—Opinions of Various Philosophers on the Chief Good.
Book III. Caput I.—Basilidis Sententiam de Continentia Et Nuptiis Refutat.
Caput II.—Carpocratis Et Epiphanis Sententiam de Feminarum Communitate Refutat.
Caput IV.—Quibus Prætextibus Utantur Hæretici ad Omnis Genetis Licentiam Et Libidinem Exercendam.
Caput VII.—Qua in Re Christianorum Continentia Eam Quam Sibi Vindicant Philosophi Antecellat.
Caput X.—Verba Christi Matt. xviii. 20, Mystice Exponit.
Caput XI.—Legis Et Christi Mandatum de Non Concupiscendo Exponit.
Caput XIV.—2 Cor. xi. 3, Et Eph. iv. 24, Exponit.
Caput XV.—1 Cor. vii. 1 Luc. xiv. 26 Isa. lvi. 2, 3, Explicat.
Caput XVI.—Jer. xx. 14 Job xiv. 3 Ps. l. 5 1 Cor. ix. 27, Exponit.
Book IV. Chapter I.—Order of Contents.
Chapter II.—The Meaning of the Name Stromata or Miscellanies.
Chapter III.—The True Excellence of Man.
Chapter IV.—The Praises of Martyrdom.
Chapter V.—On Contempt for Pain, Poverty, and Other External Things.
Chapter VI.—Some Points in the Beatitudes.
Chapter VII.—The Blessedness of the Martyr.
Chapter VIII.—Women as Well as Men, Slaves as Well as Freemen, Candidates for the Martyr’s Crown.
Chapter IX.—Christ’s Sayings Respecting Martyrdom.
Chapter X.—Those Who Offered Themselves for Martyrdom Reproved.
Chapter XI.—The Objection, Why Do You Suffer If God Cares for You, Answered.
Chapter XII.—Basilides’ Idea of Martyrdom Refuted.
Chapter XIII.—Valentinian’s Vagaries About the Abolition of Death Refuted.
Chapter XIV.—The Love of All, Even of Our Enemies.
Chapter XV.—On Avoiding Offence.
Chapter XVI.—Passages of Scripture Respecting the Constancy, Patience, and Love of the Martyrs.
Chapter XVII.—Passages from Clement’s Epistle to the Corinthians on Martyrdom.
Chapter XVIII.—On Love, and the Repressing of Our Desires.
Chap. XIX.—Women as well as Men Capable of Perfection.
Chapter XXI.—Description of the Perfect Man, or Gnostic.
Chapter XXIII.—The Same Subject Continued.
Chapter XXIV.—The Reason and End of Divine Punishments.
Chapter XXV.—True Perfection Consists in the Knowledge and Love of God.
Chapter XXVI.—How the Perfect Man Treats the Body and the Things of the World.
Chapter III.—The Objects of Faith and Hope Perceived by the Mind Alone.
Chapter IV.—Divine Things Wrapped Up in Figures Both in the Sacred and in Heathen Writers.
Chapter V.—On the Symbols of Pythagoras.
Chapter VI.—The Mystic Meaning of the Tabernacle and Its Furniture.
Chapter VII.—The Egyptian Symbols and Enigmas of Sacred Things.
Chapter VIII.—The Use of the Symbolic Style by Poets and Philosophers.
Chapter IX.—Reasons for Veiling the Truth in Symbols.
Chapter X.—The Opinion of the Apostles on Veiling the Mysteries of the Faith.
Chapter XII.—God Cannot Be Embraced in Words or by the Mind.
Chapter XIII.—The Knowledge of God a Divine Gift, According to the Philosophers.
Chapter XIV.—Greek Plagiarism from the Hebrews.
Chapter II.—The Subject of Plagiarisms Resumed. The Greeks Plagiarized from One Another.
Chapter III.—Plagiarism by the Greeks of the Miracles Related in the Sacred Books of the Hebrews.
Chapter V.—The Greeks Had Some Knowledge of the True God.
Chapter VI.—The Gospel Was Preached to Jews and Gentiles in Hades.
Chapter VII.—What True Philosophy Is, and Whence So Called.
Chapter VIII.—Philosophy is Knowledge Given by God.
Chapter IX.—The Gnostic Free of All Perturbations of the Soul.
Chapter X.—The Gnostic Avails Himself of the Help of All Human Knowledge.
Chapter XI.—The Mystical Meanings in the Proportions of Numbers, Geometrical Ratios, and Music.
Chapter XII.—Human Nature Possesses an Adaptation for Perfection The Gnostic Alone Attains It.
Chapter XIII.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven Corresponding with the Dignities of the Church Below.
Chapter XIV.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven.
Chapter XV.—Different Degrees of Knowledge.
Chapter XVI.—Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue.
Chapter XVII.—Philosophy Conveys Only an Imperfect Knowledge of God.
Chapter XVIII.—The Use of Philosophy to the Gnostic.
Chapter II.—The Son the Ruler and Saviour of All.
Chapter III.—The Gnostic Aims at the Nearest Likeness Possible to God and His Son.
Chapter IV.—The Heathens Made Gods Like Themselves, Whence Springs All Superstition.
Chapter V.—The Holy Soul a More Excellent Temple Than Any Edifice Built by Man.
Chapter VI.—Prayers and Praise from a Pure Mind, Ceaselessly Offered, Far Better Than Sacrifices.
Chapter VII.—What Sort of Prayer the Gnostic Employs, and How It is Heard by God.
Chapter VIII.—The Gnostic So Addicted to Truth as Not to Need to Use an Oath.
Chapter IX.—Those Who Teach Others, Ought to Excel in Virtues.
Chapter X.—Steps to Perfection.
Chapter XI.—Description of the Gnostic’s Life.
Chapter XII.—The True Gnostic is Beneficent, Continent, and Despises Worldly Things.
Chapter XIII.—Description of the Gnostic Continued.
Chapter XIV.—Description of the Gnostic Furnished by an Exposition of 1 Cor. vi. 1, Etc.
Chapter XV.—The Objection to Join the Church on Account of the Diversity of Heresies Answered.
Chapter XVI.—Scripture the Criterion by Which Truth and Heresy are Distinguished.
Chapter XVII.—The Tradition of the Church Prior to that of the Heresies.
Book VIII. Chapter I.—The Object of Philosophical and Theological Inquiry—The Discovery of Truth.
Chapter II.—The Necessity of Perspicuous Definition.
Chapter III.—Demonstration Defined.
Chapter IV.—To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition.
Chapter V.—Application of Demonstration to Sceptical Suspense of Judgment.
Chapter VI.—Definitions, Genera, and Species.
Chapter VII.—On the Causes of Doubt or Assent.
But we, who have heard by the Scriptures that self-determining choice and refusal have been given by the Lord to men, rest in the infallible criterion of faith, manifesting a willing spirit, since we have chosen life and believe God through His voice. And he who has believed the Word knows the matter to be true; for the Word is truth. But he who has disbelieved Him that speaks, has disbelieved God.
“By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that what is seen was not made of things which appear,” says the apostle. “By faith Abel offered to God a fuller sacrifice than Cain, by which he received testimony that he was righteous, God giving testimony to him respecting his gifts; and by it he, being dead, yet speaketh,” and so forth, down to “than enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season.”373 Heb. xi. 3, 4, 25. Faith having, therefore, justified these before the law, made them heirs of the divine promise. Why then should I review and adduce any further testimonies of faith from the history in our hands? “For the time would fail me were I to tell of Gideon, Barak, Samson, Jephtha, David, and Samuel, and the prophets,” and what follows.374 Heb. xi. 32. Now, inasmuch as there are four things in which the truth resides—Sensation, Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion,—intellectual apprehension is first in the order of nature; but in our case, and in relation to ourselves, Sensation is first, and of Sensation and Understanding the essence of Knowledge is formed; and evidence is common to Understanding and Sensation. Well, Sensation is the ladder to Knowledge; while Faith, advancing over the pathway of the objects of sense, leaves Opinion behind, and speeds to things free of deception, and reposes in the truth.
Should one say that Knowledge is founded on demonstration by a process of reasoning, let him hear that first principles are incapable of demonstration; for they are known neither by art nor sagacity. For the latter is conversant about objects that are susceptible of change, while the former is practical solely, and not theoretical.375 Instead of μονονουχί, Petavius and Lowth read μόνον οὐχί, as above. Hence it is thought that the first cause of the universe can be apprehended by faith alone. For all knowledge is capable of being taught; and what is capable of being taught is founded on what is known before. But the first cause of the universe was not previously known to the Greeks; neither, accordingly, to Thales, who came to the conclusion that water was the first cause; nor to the other natural philosophers who succeeded him, since it was Anaxagoras who was the first who assigned to Mind the supremacy over material things. But not even he preserved the dignity suited to the efficient cause, describing as he did certain silly vortices, together with the inertia and even foolishness of Mind. Wherefore also the Word says, “Call no man master on earth.”376 Matt. xxiii. 9. For knowledge is a state of mind that results from demonstration; but faith is a grace which from what is indemonstrable conducts to what is universal and simple, what is neither with matter, nor matter, nor under matter. But those who believe not, as to be expected, drag all down from heaven, and the region of the invisible, to earth, “absolutely grasping with their hands rocks and oaks,” according to Plato. For, clinging to all such things, they asseverate that that alone exists which can be touched and handled, defining body and essence to be identical: disputing against themselves, they very piously defend the existence of certain intellectual and bodiless forms descending somewhere from above from the invisible world, vehemently maintaining that there is a true essence. “Lo, I make new things,” saith the Word, “which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man.”377 Isa. lxiv. 4; 1 Cor. ii. 9. With a new eye, a new ear, a new heart, whatever can be seen and heard is to be apprehended, by the faith and understanding of the disciples of the Lord, who speak, hear, and act spiritually. For there is genuine coin, and other that is spurious; which no less deceives unprofessionals, that it does not the money-changers; who know through having learned how to separate and distinguish what has a false stamp from what is genuine. So the money-changer only says to the unprofessional man that the coin is counterfeit. But the reason why, only the banker’s apprentice, and he that is trained to this department, learns.
Now Aristotle says that the judgment which follows knowledge is in truth faith. Accordingly, faith is something superior to knowledge, and is its criterion. Conjecture, which is only a feeble supposition, counterfeits faith; as the flatterer counterfeits a friend, and the wolf the dog. And as the workman sees that by learning certain things he becomes an artificer, and the helmsman by being instructed in the art will be able to steer; he does not regard the mere wishing to become excellent and good enough, but he must learn it by the exercise of obedience. But to obey the Word, whom we call Instructor, is to believe Him, going against Him in nothing. For how can we take up a position of hostility to God? Knowledge, accordingly, is characterized by faith; and faith, by a kind of divine mutual and reciprocal correspondence, becomes characterized by knowledge.
Epicurus, too, who very greatly preferred pleasure to truth, supposes faith to be a preconception of the mind; and defines preconception to be a grasping at something evident, and at the clear understanding of the thing; and asserts that, without preconception, no one can either inquire, or doubt, or judge, or even argue. How can one, without a preconceived idea of what he is aiming after, learn about that which is the subject of his investigation? He, again, who has learned has already turned his preconception378 κατάληψιν ποιεῖ τῆν πρόληψιν. into comprehension. And if he who learns, learns not without a preconceived idea which takes in what is expressed, that man has ears to hear the truth. And happy is the man that speaks to the ears of those who hear; as happy certainly also is he who is a child of obedience. Now to hear is to understand. If, then, faith is nothing else than a preconception of the mind in regard to what is the subject of discourse, and obedience is so called, and understanding and persuasion; no one shall learn aught without faith, since no one [learns aught] without preconception. Consequently there is a more ample demonstration of the complete truth of what was spoken by the prophet, “Unless ye believe, neither will ye understand.” Paraphrasing this oracle, Heraclitus of Ephesus says, “If a man hope not, he will not find that which is not hoped for, seeing it is inscrutable and inaccessible.” Plato the philosopher, also, in The Laws, says, “that he who would be blessed and happy, must be straight from the beginning a partaker of the truth, so as to live true for as long a period as possible; for he is a man of faith. But the unbeliever is one to whom voluntary falsehood is agreeable; and the man to whom involuntary falsehood is agreeable is senseless;379 οὐ ζῶον is here interpolated into the text, not being found in Plato. neither of which is desirable. For he who is devoid of friendliness, is faithless and ignorant.” And does he not enigmatically say in Euthydemus, that this is “the regal wisdom”? In The Statesman he says expressly, “So that the knowledge of the true king is kingly; and he who possesses it, whether a prince or private person, shall by all means, in consequence of this act, be rightly styled royal.” Now those who have believed in Christ both are and are called Chrestoi (good),380 Χριστός and χρηστός are very frequently compared in the patristic authors. as those who are cared for by the true king are kingly. For as the wise are wise by their wisdom, and those observant of law are so by the law; so also those who belong to Christ the King are kings, and those that are Christ’s Christians. Then, in continuation, he adds clearly, “What is right will turn out to be lawful, law being in its nature right reason, and not found in writings or elsewhere.” And the stranger of Elea pronounces the kingly and statesmanlike man “a living law.” Such is he who fulfils the law, “doing the will of the Father,”381 Matt. xxi. 31. inscribed on a lofty pillar, and set as an example of divine virtue to all who possess the power of seeing. The Greeks are acquainted with the staves of the Ephori at Lacedæmon, inscribed with the law on wood. But my law, as was said above, is both royal and living; and it is right reason. “Law, which is king of all—of mortals and immortals,” as the Bœotian Pindar sings. For Speusippus,382 Plato’s sister’s son and successor. in the first book against Cleophon, seems to write like Plato on this wise: “For if royalty be a good thing, and the wise man the only king and ruler, the law, which is right reason, is good;”383 σπουδαῖος. which is the case. The Stoics teach what is in conformity with this, assigning kinghood, priesthood, prophecy, legislation, riches, true beauty, noble birth, freedom, to the wise man alone. But that he is exceedingly difficult to find, is confessed even by them.
Ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν δεδόσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αὐτοκρατορικὴν παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου διὰ τῶν γραφῶν παρειληφότες ἀμεταπτώτῳ κριτηρίῳ τῇ πίστει ἐπαναπαυώμεθα, τὸ πνεύμα πρόθυμον ἐνδειξάμενοι, ὅτι εἱλόμεθα τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τῷ θεῷ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνου φωνῆς πεπιστεύκαμεν· καὶ ὁ τῷ λόγῳ πιστεύσας οἶδεν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀληθές· ἀλήθεια γὰρ ὁ λόγος· ὁ δὲ ἀπιστήσας τῷ λέγοντι ἠπίστησε τῷ θεῷ. πίστει νοοῦμεν κατηρτίσθαι τοὺς αἰῶνας ῥήματι θεοῦ εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὸ βλεπόμενον γεγονέναι, φησὶν ὁ ἀπόστολος πίστει πλείονα θυσίαν Ἄβελ παρὰ Κάιν προσήνεγκε, δι' ἧς ἐμαρτυρήθη εἶναι δίκαιος, μαρτυροῦντος ἐπὶ τοῖς δώροις αὐτῷ τοῦ θεοῦ· καὶ δι' αὐτῆς ἀποθανὼν ἔτι λαλεῖ καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ἕως ἢ πρόσκαιρον ἔχειν ἁμαρτίας ἀπόλαυσιν. τούτους μὲν οὖν καὶ πρὸ νόμου ἡ πίστις δικαιώσασα κληρονόμους κατέστησε τῆς θείας ἐπαγγελίας. τί οὖν ἔτι τὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐκ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἱστορίας ἀναλεγόμενος παρατίθεμαι μαρτύρια; ἐπιλείψει γάρ με διηγούμενον ὁ χρόνος περὶ Γεδεών, Βαράκ, Σαμψών, Ἰεφθάε ∆αβίδ τε καὶ Σαμουὴλ καὶ τῶν προφητῶν καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑπόμενα. τεσσάρων δὲ ὄντων ἐν οἷς τὸ ἀληθές, αἰσθήσεως, νοῦ, ἐπιστήμης, ὑπολήψεως, φύσει μὲν πρῶτος ὁ νοῦς, ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἡ αἴσθησις, ἐκ δὲ αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ νοῦ ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης συνίσταται οὐσία, κοινὸν δὲ νοῦ τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως τὸ ἐναργές. ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἐπιβάθρα τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἡ πίστις δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁδεύσασα ἀπολείπει τὴν ὑπόληψιν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἀψευδῆ σπεύδει καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν καταμένει. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου, ἀκουσάτω ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι· οὔτε γὰρ τέχνῃ οὔτε μὴν φρονήσει γνωσταί. ἣ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενά ἐστιν ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἣ δὲ ποιητικὴ μόνον, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ θεωρητική. πίστει οὖν ἐφικέσθαι μόνῃ οἷόν τε τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς. πᾶσα γὰρ ἐπιστήμη διδακτή ἐστι· τὸ δὲ διδακτὸν ἐκ προγινωσκομένου. οὐ προεγινώσκετο δὲ ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, οὔτ' οὖν Θαλῇ ὕδωρ ἐπισταμένῳ τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς φυσικοῖς τοῖς ἑξῆς· ἐπεὶ [εἰ] καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας πρῶτος ἐπέστησε τὸν νοῦν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οὗτος ἐτήρησε τὴν αἰτίαν τὴν ποιητικήν, δίνους τινὰς ἀνοήτους ἀναζωγραφῶν σὺν τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ἀπραξίᾳ τε καὶ ἀνοίᾳ. διὸ καί φησιν ὁ λόγος· μὴ εἴπητε ἑαυτοῖς διδάσκαλον ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, ἡ πίστις δὲ χάρις ἐξ ἀναποδείκτων εἰς τὸ καθόλου ἀναβιβάζουσα τὸ ἁπλοῦν, ὃ οὔτε σὺν ὕλῃ ἐστὶν οὔτε ὕλη οὔτε ὑπὸ ὕλης. οἱ δὲ ἄπιστοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσιν εἰς γῆν, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα· τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διισχυρίζονται τοῦτ' εἶναι μόνον, ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι. [οἱ δὲ] πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι. ἰδοὺ δή, ποιῶ καινά, ὁ λόγος φησίν, ἃ ὀφθαλμὸς οὐκ εἶδεν οὐδὲ οὖς ἤκουσεν οὐδὲ ἐπὶ καρδίαν ἀνθρώπου ἀνέβη· καινῷ ὀφθαλμῷ, καινῇ ἀκοῇ, καινῇ καρδίᾳ ὅσα ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀκουστὰ [καὶ] καταληπτὰ διὰ τῆς πίστεως καὶ συνέσεως, πνευματικῶς λεγόντων, ἀκουόντων, πραττόντων τῶν τοῦ κυρίου μαθητῶν. ἔστι γὰρ δόκιμον νόμισμα καὶ ἄλλο κίβδηλον, ὅπερ οὐδὲν ἔλαττον ἀπατᾷ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, οὐ μὴν τοὺς ἀργυραμοιβούς, οἳ ἴσασι μαθόντες τό τε παρακεχαραγμένον καὶ τὸ δόκιμον χωρίζειν καὶ διακρίνειν. οὕτως ὁ ἀργυραμοιβὸς τῷ ἰδιώτῃ τὸ νόμισμα τοῦτο μόνον, ὅτι κίβδηλόν ἐστι, φησί· τὸ δὲ πῶς, μόνος ὁ τοῦ τραπεζίτου γνώριμος καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀλειφόμενος μανθάνει. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὸ ἑπόμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ κρῖμα, ὡς ἀληθὲς τόδε τι, πίστιν εἶναί φησι. κυριώτερον οὖν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἡ πίστις καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῆς κριτήριον. Ὑποκρίνεται δὲ τὴν πίστιν ἡ εἰκασία, ἀσθενὴς οὖσα ὑπόληψις, καθάπερ ὁ κόλαξ τὸν φίλον καὶ ὁ λύκος τὸν κύνα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁρῶμεν [ὅτι] ὁ τέκτων ὅτι μαθών τινα τεχνίτης γίνεται καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης παιδευθεὶς τὴν τέχνην κυβερνᾶν δυνήσεται, οὐκ ἀπαρκεῖν λογιζόμενος τὸ βούλεσθαι καλὸν γενέσθαι κἀγαθόν, ἀνάγκη δὲ ἄρα πειθόμενον μαθεῖν· τὸ δὲ πείθεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ὃν διδάσκαλον ἀνηγορεύσαμεν, αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ πιστεῦσαί ἐστι κατ' οὐδὲν ἀντιβαίνοντα. πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε ἀντεφίστασθαι τῷ θεῷ; πιστὴ τοίνυν ἡ γνῶσις, γνωστὴ δὲ ἡ πίστις θείᾳ τινὶ ἀκολουθίᾳ τε καὶ ἀντακολουθίᾳ γίνεται. ναὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ὁ μάλιστα τῆς ἀληθείας προτιμήσας τὴν ἡδονήν, πρόληψιν εἶναι διανοίας τὴν πίστιν ὑπολαμβάνει· πρόληψιν δὲ ἀποδίδωσιν ἐπιβολὴν ἐπί τι ἐναργὲς καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναργῆ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπίνοιαν· μὴ δύνασθαι δὲ μηδένα μήτε ζητῆσαι μήτε ἀπορῆσαι μηδὲ μὴν δοξάσαι, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐλέγξαι χωρὶς προλήψεως. πῶς δ' ἂν μὴ ἔχων τις πρόληψιν οὗ ἐφίεται μάθοι περὶ οὗ ζητεῖ; ὁ μαθὼν δὲ ἤδη κατάληψιν ποιεῖ τὴν πρόληψιν. εἰ δὲ ὁ μανθάνων οὐκ ἄνευ προλήψεως μανθάνει τῆς τῶν λεγομένων παραδεκτικῆς, αὐτὸς μὲν ὦτα ἔχει τὰ ἀκουστικὰ τῆς ἀληθείας· μακάριος δὲ ὁ λέγων εἰς ὦτα ἀκουόντων, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει μακάριος καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ τῆς ὑπακοῆς. τὸ δὲ κατακοῦσαι συνεῖναί ἐστιν. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ πίστις οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πρόληψίς ἐστι διανοίας περὶ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ τοῦτο ὑπακοή τε εἴρηται σύνεσίς τε καὶ πειθώ, οὐ μὴ μαθήσεταί τις ἄνευ πίστεως, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἄνευ προλήψεως. ἀληθὲς δ' οὖν ὂν παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀποδείκνυται τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου εἰρημένον· ἐὰν μὴ πιστεύσητε, οὐδὲ μὴ συνῆτε. τοῦτο καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος τὸ λόγιον παραφράσας εἴρηκεν· ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται ἀνέλπιστον, οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερεύνητον ἐὸν καὶ ἄπορον. ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις τὸν μέλλοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα γενέσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς εἶναι μέτοχον χρῆναι φησίν, ἵν' ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ἀληθὴς ὢν διαβιῴη· πιστὸς γάρ. ὃ δὲ ἄπιστος, ᾧ φίλον ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον· ὅτῳ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους· ὧν οὐ ζῷον οὐδέτερον οὖν ζηλωτόν· ἄφιλος γὰρ πᾶς ὅ γε ἄπιστος καὶ ἀμαθής. καὶ μή τι ταύτην σοφίαν βασιλικὴν ἐν Εὐθυδήμῳ ἐπικεκρυμμένως λέγει. ἐν γοῦν τῷ Πολιτικῷ πρὸς λέξιν φησίν· ὥστε ἡ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιστήμη βασιλική, καὶ ὁ ταύτην κεκτημένος, ἐάν τε ἄρχων ἐάν τε ἰδιώτης ὢν τυγχάνῃ, πάντως κατά γε τὴν τέχνην αὐτὴν βασιλικὸς ὀρθῶς προσαγορευθήσεται. αὐτίκα οἱ εἰς τὸν Χριστὸν πεπιστευκότες χρηστοί τε εἰσὶ καὶ λέγονται, ὡς τῷ ὄντι βασιλικοὶ οἱ βασιλεῖ μεμελημένοι. ὡς γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ σοφίᾳ εἰσὶ σοφοὶ καὶ οἱ νόμιμοι νόμῳ νόμιμοι, οὕτως οἱ Χριστῷ βασιλεῖ βασιλεῖς καὶ οἱ Χριστοῦ Χριστιανοί. εἶθ' ὑποβὰς ἐπιφέρει σαφῶς· τὸ μὲν ὀρθὸν ἂν εἴη νόμιμον καὶ νόμος φύσει ὢν ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐν γράμμασιν οὐδὲ ἑτέροις. ὅ τε Ἐλεάτης ξένος τὸν βασιλικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα νόμον ἔμψυχον ἀποφαίνεται. τοιοῦτος δὲ ὁ πληρῶν μὲν τὸν νόμον, ποιῶν δὲ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός, ἀναγεγραμμένος δὲ ἄντικρυς ἐπὶ ξύλου τινὸς ὑψηλοῦ παράδειγμα θείας ἀρετῆς τοῖς διορᾶν δυναμένοις ἐκκείμενος. ἴσασι δὲ Ἕλληνες τὰς τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἐφόρων σκυτάλας νόμῳ ἐπὶ ξύλων ἀναγεγραμμένας· ὁ δὲ ἐμὸς νόμος, ὡς προείρηται, βασιλικός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἔμψυχος καὶ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός· νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων, ὡς ὁ Βοιώτιος ᾄδει Πίνδαρος. Σπεύσιππος γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς Κλεοφῶντα πρώτῳ τὰ ὅμοια τῷ Πλάτωνι ἔοικε διὰ τούτου γράφειν· εἰ γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία σπουδαῖον ὅ τε σοφὸς μόνος βασιλεὺς καὶ ἄρχων, ὁ νόμος λόγος ὢν ὀρθὸς σπουδαῖος· ἃ καὶ ἔστιν. τούτοις ἀκόλουθα οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φιλόσοφοι δογματίζουσιν, βασιλείαν, ἱερωσύνην, προφητείαν, νομοθετικήν, πλοῦτον, κάλλος ἀληθινόν, εὐγένειαν, ἐλευθερίαν μόνῳ προσάπτοντες τῷ σοφῷ· ὃ δὲ δυσεύρετος πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ πρὸς αὐτῶν ὁμολογεῖται.