Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on Jn. 1:18, "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: "Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him."

Objection 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (Question 7, Article 1). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.

Objection 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect.

Objection 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God.

On the contrary, It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 2:2).

I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light.

Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.

Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.

Reply to Objection 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son."

Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears from what was said above (Question 7, Article 1).

Reply to Objection 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means that He is not comprehended.

Reply to Objection 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.

Articulus 1

Argumentum 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus intellectus creatus possit deum per essentiam videre.

Chrysostomus enim, super ioannem, exponens illud quod dicitur Ioan. I, deum nemo vidit unquam, sic dicit, ipsum quod est deus, non solum prophetae, sed nec Angeli viderunt nec Archangeli, quod enim creabilis est naturae, qualiter videre poterit quod increabile est? dionysius etiam, I cap. De div. Nom., loquens de deo, dicit, neque sensus est eius, neque phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia.

Argumentum 2

Praeterea, omne infinitum, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum. Sed deus est infinitus, ut supra ostensum est.

Ergo secundum se est ignotus.

Argumentum 3

Praeterea, intellectus creatus non est cognoscitivus nisi existentium, primum enim quod cadit in apprehensione intellectus, est ens.

Sed deus non est existens, sed supra existentia.

Ut dicit dionysius.

Ergo non est intelligibilis; sed est supra omnem intellectum.

Argumentum 4

Praeterea, cognoscentis ad cognitum oportet esse aliquam proportionem, cum cognitum sit perfectio cognoscentis. Sed nulla est proportio intellectus creati ad deum, quia in infinitum distant. Ergo intellectus creatus non potest videre essentiam dei.

Sed Contra

Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, videbimus eum sicuti est.

Corpus

Respondeo dicendum quod, cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu, deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum, sicut sol, qui est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione, propter excessum luminis.

Hoc igitur attendentes, quidam posuerunt quod nullus intellectus creatus essentiam dei videre potest.

Sed hoc inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, si nunquam essentiam dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in alio eius beatitudo consistet quam in deo. Quod est alienum a fide. In ipso enim est ultima perfectio rationalis creaturae, quia est ei principium essendi, intantum enim unumquodque perfectum est, inquantum ad suum principium attingit. Similiter etiam est praeter rationem. Inest enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur effectum; et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. Si igitur intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae. Unde simpliciter concedendum est quod beati dei essentiam videant.

Ad 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod utraque auctoritas loquitur de visione comprehensionis. Unde praemittit dionysius immediate ante verba proposita, dicens, omnibus ipse est universaliter incomprehensibilis, et nec sensus est, etc.. Et chrysostomus parum post verba praedicta subdit, visionem hic dicit certissimam patris considerationem et comprehensionem, tantam quantam pater habet de filio.

Ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non perfectae per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio est per formam. Sed infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formae non limitatae per materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem deus est infinitus, et non primo modo, ut ex superioribus patet.

Ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod deus non sic dicitur non existens, quasi nullo modo sit existens, sed quia est supra omne existens, inquantum est suum esse. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod nullo modo possit cognosci, sed quod omnem cognitionem excedat, quod est ipsum non comprehendi.

Ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum quod duplum, triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc, intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum deum.