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indeed,” he said, “I see you not deliberating, but ratifying a decision. For if you were deliberating, I myself might have said something advantageous. Nevertheless, since you have asked, I will say what I think is advantageous. And first, it occurs to me to wonder whence you have so persuaded yourselves that you will capture Constantinople with no effort, merely by being seen. For if you know or have heard anything more than what I myself know, I would wish to learn whatever it might be; but if not, you think entirely the opposite to me. For I think that to seize a city so great and populous, and most powerful in money and arms and soldiers, and having 1.103 an established emperor, so wise, who has ruled for so many years and has many well-disposed people around him, and is strong in money, with which he will persuade the army to be loyal to him, is not among the easiest, but among the most difficult things. And apart from these things, a certain wise man of the ancient Greeks persuades us not to hope for such things readily, saying that there are many things between the lip and the cup. And there is a certain law for generals, to measure misfortunes equally with successes, and he is the best of generals, who either succeeding conquers, or failing does not lose what he has. Consider then, if, having now marched against Constantinople, we are not able to take it, how many difficulties will occur. For immediately, with us having returned unsuccessful, it is necessary for those attached to the elder emperor both to take courage and, having come to the hope of conquering, they would more eagerly attack us, for which we ourselves would appear most to blame to ourselves for having deliberated badly. And having enemies on both sides—for both from the cities in the east subject to the Romans and from Byzantium itself a formidable army can be gathered against us, and another similar one from the west—we ourselves, being caught in the middle, will either be destroyed, being unable to withstand a war on two fronts, or we will come off badly, with the enemies pressing on both sides and those who came over to us defecting, because we are expected to be destroyed. And in addition to this, we will need arms and money, warring against those who have 1.104 already defected, and establishing garrisons for those who still remain, so that they do not defect; one must perceive into how many necessities this will place us. And further I have considered this, that both the leader of the Triballi and the king of the Mysians, Svyatoslav, being kinsmen by marriage of the emperor, are now at variance with him for some private reasons; but if because of the war against us he reconciles with them and orders them to help, we will face them as most fearsome enemies. Such evils and other more difficult ones will spring up for us, if we do not take the city at the first shout, as you yourselves say; but if we turn towards the west, first, there is nothing to prevent us from bringing it all under our control in a short time; For the westerners, spontaneous towards revolts, will also readily come over to the new emperor, delighting in revolutions, and the governors set over the cities, each being forced by his own citizens and fearing the uncertainty of fortune, not knowing to which of the emperors power will go, will hand over the cities to the one who seems for the present to be more powerful and who is pressing upon them. But indeed the emperor also, rewarding those who come over to him with money and honors and other gifts, would draw over even those who were not previously willing; then also the leaders of the neighboring nations whom we mentioned will hesitate to oppose us in war as we are powerful, or they will ally with us. For the ability 1.105 to reciprocate makes the barbarians turn more towards friendship. And having brought the west, which is a counterbalance to us, under our control, and having doubled our power, we shall then safely march against Byzantium. And if it should come over, it would be well; but if not, having besieged it, we will take it by siege in time, with there being no one to force us to withdraw. For these reasons, then, the emperor's opinion is advantageous

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γε» εἶπεν «οὐ βουλευομένους, ἀλλὰ τὴν βουλὴν ἐπικυροῦντας ὁρῶ. εἰ γὰρ ἐβουλεύεσθε, τάχ' ἄν τι καὶ αὐτὸς εἶπον τῶν συμφερόντων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ ἐπύθεσθε, ἃ νομίζω συμφέροντα ἐρῶ. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἔπεισί μοι θαυμάζειν, ὅθεν οὕτω πεπείκατε ἑαυτοὺς, σὺν οὐδενὶ πόνῳ καταλήψεσθαι τὴν Κωνσταντίνου μόνον ὀφθέντες. εἰ μὲν γάρ τι πλέον ἴστε ἢ ἐπύθεσθε ὧν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπίσταμαι, ὅ, τι ποτ' ἂν εἴη μαθεῖν ἐβουλόμην· εἰ δ' οὐδὲν, τἀναντία παντάπασιν ἐμοὶ φρονεῖτε. ἐγὼ γὰρ πόλιν οὕτω μεγάλην καὶ πολυάνθρωπον, καὶ χρήμασι καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ στρατιώταις δυνατωτάτην, καὶ βασιλέα ἔχου 1.103 σαν ἐγκαθεστῶτα, οὕτω μὲν συνετὸν, ἐπὶ τοσούτοις δ' ἄρξαντα χρόνοις καὶ πολλὸν ἔχοντα περὶ αὐτὸν εὐνοϊκῶς διακειμένων, καὶ χρήμασιν ἐῤῥωμένον, οἷς αὐτῷ πείσει προσέχειν τὴν στρατιὰν, οὐ τῶν ῥᾴστων, ἀλλὰ τῶν δυσκολωτάτων εἶναι νομίζω κατασχεῖν. καὶ χωρὶς δὲ τούτων τῶν παλαιῶν τις Ἑλλήνων σοφὸς μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ῥᾳδίως ἐλπίζειν πείθει, πολλὰ τὰ μεταξὺ χειλέων καὶ κύλικος εἶναι εἰπών. ἔστι δέ τις καὶ στρατηγοῖς νόμος, ἐπίσης ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ τὰς δυσπραγίας μετρεῖν, καὶ οὗτος ἄριστος στρατηγῶν, ὅστις ἢ ἐπιτυγχάνων νικᾷ, ἢ ἀποτυγχάνων οὐκ ἀποβάλλει τὰ ὄντα. σκέψασθε δὴ, εἴγε νῦν ἐπιστρατεύσαντες τῇ Κωνσταντίνου, οὐχ οἷοί τε γενώμεθα ἑλεῖν, ὁπόσα συμβήσεται τὰ δυσχερῆ. εὐθὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη τοὺς τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ βασιλεῖ προσκειμένους, ἡμῶν ἀπράκτων ἐπανελθόντων, ἀναθαρσῆσαί τε καὶ εἰς ἐλπίδα τοῦ νικήσειν γενομένους προθυμότερον ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπελθεῖν, οὗπερ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἡμεῖς ἂν φανείημεν αἰτιώτατοι βουλευσάμενοι κακῶς. ἔχοντες δὲ ἑκατέρωθεν τοὺς πολεμίους, ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἕω τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὑπηκόων πόλεων καὶ αὐτοῦ Βυζαντίου δυνατὸν ἀξιόμαχον ἡμῖν ἀθροισθῆναι στρατιὰν, καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἑσπέρας ἑτέραν ὁμοίαν, αὐτοὶ ἐναπειλημμένοι μέσοι, ἢ διαφθαρησόμεθα, μὴ δυνάμενοι ἀντέχειν πρὸς ἀμφίβολον τὸν πόλεμον, ἢ κακῶς ἀπαλλάξομεν, τῶν μὲν πολεμίων ἑκατέρωθεν ἐπικειμένων, τῶν προσχωρησάντων δὲ ἀφισταμένων, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐλπίσιν ἡμᾶς εἶναι διαφθαρήσεσθαι. καὶ πρὸς ἔτι τούτοις ὅπλων δεησόμεθα καὶ χρημάτων, τοῖς μὲν ἤδη 1.104 ἀφεστῶσι πολεμοῦντες, τοῖς δ' ἔτι μένουσι φρουρὰς ἐγκαθιστάντες, ὅπως μὴ ἀποστῶσιν· ἃ ἐς ὅσας ἀνάγκας ἡμᾶς καταστήσει, συνορᾷν χρή. ἔτι δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἐνεθυμήθην, ὡς ὅ τε τῶν Τριβαλῶν ἡγεμὼν καὶ ὁ τῶν Μυσῶν βασιλεὺς Σφεντισθλάβος, κηδεσταὶ βασιλέως ὄντες, νῦν μὲν διαφέρονται πρὸς αὐτὸν ἰδίων τινῶν ἕνεκα αἰτιῶν· ἂν δὲ διὰ τὸν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πόλεμον διαλύσηται πρὸς αὐτοὺς, καὶ κελεύσῃ βοηθεῖν, πολεμίοις αὐτοῖς χρησόμεθα φοβερωτάτοις. τοιαῦτα μὲν καὶ ἕτερα δυσχερέστερα ἀναφυήσεται ἡμῖν κακὰ, ἂν μὴ αὐτοβοεὶ τὴν πόλιν ἕλωμεν, καθάπερ αὐτοί φατε· ἂν δὲ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὴν ἑσπέραν, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ κωλῦσον οὐδὲν, ἅπασαν ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιήσασθαι ἐν βραχεῖ· οἵ τε γὰρ ἑσπέριοι, αὐθόρμητοι πρὸς τὰς ἀποστασίας, καὶ προσχωρήσουσι ῥᾳδίως τῷ νέῳ βασιλεῖ, χαίροντες πρὸς τοὺς νεωτερισμοὺς, οἵ τ' ἐφεστηκότες ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡγεμόνες, ὑπό τε τῶν ἰδίων ἕκαστος πολιτῶν ἐκβιαζόμενος καὶ τὴν ἀδηλίαν δεδοικότες τῆς τύχης, οὐκ εἰδότες πρὸς ὁπότερον τῶν βασιλέων τὸ κράτος χωρήσει, τῷ δυνατωτέρῳ τὸ νῦν ἔχον φαινομένῳ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐπικειμένῳ παραδώσουσι τὰς πόλεις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ δωρεαῖς ἄλλαις ἀμειβόμενος τοὺς προσιόντας πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, καὶ τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πρότερον ἂν ἐφελκύσηται· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ οὓς εἴπομεν ἡγεμόνας τῶν ὁμόρων ἡμῖν ἐθνῶν ἀποκνήσουσιν ἡμῖν ὡς δυνατοῖς ἀντικαθίστασθαι πρὸς πόλεμον, ἢ συμμαχήσουσι. τὸ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἰς ἀντίδοσιν ποιεῖ 1.105 τοὺς βαρβάρους μᾶλλον πρὸς φιλίαν τρέπεσθαι. ποιησάμενοι δὲ ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς τὴν ἑσπέραν ἀντίῤῥοπον οὖσαν ἡμῖν, καὶ διπλασιάσαντες τὴν δύναμιν, ἀσφαλῶς ἤδη πρὸς Βυζάντιον βαδιούμεθα. κἂν μὲν προσχωροίη, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, περικαθεσθέντες ἐκπολιορκήσομεν τῷ χρόνῳ, οὐδενὸς ὄντος τοῦ ἀπανίστασθαι καταναγκάσοντος. τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα τὴν βασιλέως γνώμην λυσιτελεῖν