and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art are unable to make anything from non-substance? . If, as Aristotle says, there is a body neither heavy nor light, neither one of the four elements nor from the four elements, it is clear that, if this is true, there will be a body neither hot nor cold, neither by nature nor by affection; for that which is by nature or by affection hot or cold is either one of the four elements or is from the four elements. But if there is not a body that is hot or cold either by nature or by affection, then neither is there a body that is neither heavy nor light, nor one of the four elements, nor from the four elements. How then does he say that the aether is hot through the motion of the heavenly body and of the bodies moving in it? For bodies that heat by their motions are heated before the things heated by them; but if it is heated, it is clear that it is heated by affection; and if by affection, it is clear that it is by alteration; and if by alteration, it is clear that it is by change; and if by change, it is clear that it changes from an opposite to an opposite. And the opposite of cold is hot; therefore, it changes from cold to hot. But since there is no body that changes from cold to hot by affection, being neither one of the four elements nor from the four elements, for this reason the heavenly body is not a different element besides the four elements; for it is heated by affection, changing from cold to hot. 7. If bodies heated by motion are heated more with more motion, how is it that, if according to Aristotle the sun is a body not hot by nature but by motion, with more motion it neither is heated more nor does it heat more, but always with unequal motion it has an equal amount of heat? 8. If according to Aristotle the definition of substance is that which is receptive of contraries in turn, how does the same Aristotle say again that matter is not substance, although it is receptive of contraries in turn, namely of privation and possession? 9. If that which is deprived of being a "this" is also deprived of being, how does Aristotle say that it is impossible for something to come to be from that which in every way is not, when matter, according to him, is deprived of both, both of being and of being a "this"? 10. If nothing comes to be from that which in every way is not, it is clear that something comes to be from that which is. But if matter is this, how does Aristotle speak truly when he says that matter is not? 11. If matter does not alter, it is not possible for anything to come to be from it. But if everything that alters alters from a "this" into a "this," and matter is not a "this," then it does not alter; wherefore neither does anything come to be from it. 12. If a change does not happen from any chance thing to any chance thing

καὶ αἱ πλίνθοι. Τοίνυν τῆς ὕλης οὐκ οὔσης οὐσίας, τίς ἐστιν ὁ ποιήσας ἐξ αὐτῆς τὰ γεγονότα ἐξ αὐτῆς, τῆς φύσεώς τε καὶ τέχνης ἀδυνατούσης ποιεῖν τι ἐκ μὴ οὐσίας; . Eἰ, καθώς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης, ἔστι σῶμα μήτε βαρὺ μήτε κοῦφον μήτε ἓν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων μήτε ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, δῆλον ὅτι, εἰ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο, ἔσται σῶμα μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρὸν μήτε κατὰ φύσιν μήτε κατὰ πάθος· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ πάθος θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων ἐστὶ στοιχείων. Eἰ δὲ σῶμα οὐκ ἔστι μήτε κατὰ φύσιν θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν μήτε κατὰ πάθος, οὐδ' ἄρα ἐστὶ σῶμα μήτε βαρὺ μήτε κοῦφον μήτε ὂν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων μήτε ὂν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων. Πῶς οὖν λέγει θερμὸν εἶναι τὸν αἰθέρα διὰ τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ οὐρανίου σώματος καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κινουμένων σωμάτων; Τὰ γὰρ ταῖς κινήσεσι θερμαί νοντα σώματα πρὸ τῶν θερμαινομένων ὑπ' αὐτῶν θερ μαίνεται· ἀλλ' εἰ θερμαίνεται, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ πάθος θερμαί νεται· εἰ δὲ κατὰ πάθος, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ ἀλλοίωσιν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλλοίωσιν, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ μεταβολήν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μετα βολήν, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον μεταβάλ λεται. Ἐναντίον δὲ τῷ ψυχρῷ τὸ θερμόν· ἐκ τοῦ ψυχροῦ ἄρα εἰς τὸ θερμὸν μεταβάλλεται. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα ἐκ τοῦ ψυχροῦ εἰς τὸ θερμὸν κατὰ πάθος μεταβαλλόμε νον, μὴ ὂν μήτε τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων μήτε ἐκ τῶν τεσ σάρων στοιχείων, διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι τὸ οὐράνιον σῶμα ἕτερον στοιχεῖον παρὰ τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα· θερμαίνεται γὰρ κατὰ πάθος ἐκ τοῦ ψυχροῦ εἰς τὸ θερμὸν μεταβαλλόμενον. ζ. Eἰ τὰ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως θερμαινόμενα σώματα τῷ πλείονι τῆς κινήσεως πλειόνως θερμαίνεται, πῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ ἥλιος οὐ κατὰ φύσιν θερμὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ κίνησιν, τῷ πλείονι τῆς κινήσεως πλειόνως οὔτε θερμαίνεται οὔτε θερμαίνει, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ τῷ ἀνίσῳ τῆς κινήσεως τὸ ἴσον ἔχει τῆς θερμότητος; η. Eἰ κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην ὅρος τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀνὰ μέρος δεκτικόν, πῶς λέγει πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ὕλην μὴ εἶναι οὐσίαν, οὖσαν τῶν ἐναντίων ἀνὰ μέρος δεκτικήν, τῆς στερήσεως γὰρ καὶ ἕξεως; θ. Eἰ ὁ στερούμενος τοῦ εἶναι τόδε οὗτος καὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἐστέρηται, πῶς λέγει ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀδύνατον ἐκ τοῦ πάντη μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι τι, τῆς ὕλης κατ' αὐτὸν ἀμφο τέρων στερουμένης, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ τόδε εἶναι; ι. Eἰ ἐκ τοῦ πάντη μὴ ὄντος οὐ γίνεταί τι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος γίνεταί τι. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ ὕλη τοῦτο, πῶς ἀλη θεύει Ἀριστοτέλης λέγων τὴν ὕλην οὐκ ὄν; ια. Eἰ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται ἡ ὕλη, οὐ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τι ἐξ αὐτῆς. Ἀλλ' εἰ πᾶν τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἡ ὕλη τόδε, οὐκ ἄρα ἀλλοιοῦται· διὸ οὐδὲ γίνεταί τι ἐξ αὐτῆς. ιβ. Eἰ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος εἰς τὸ τυχὸν οὐ γίνεται μετα