On Lying.

 1. There is a great question about Lying, which often arises in the midst of our every day business, and gives us much trouble, that we may not either

 2. Setting aside, therefore, jokes, which have never been accounted lies, seeing they bear with them in the tone of voice, and in the very mood of the

 3. For which purpose we must see what a lie is. For not every one who says a false thing lies, if he believes or opines that to be true which he says.

 4. But it may be a very nice question whether in the absence of all will to deceive, lying is altogether absent. Thus, put the case that a person shal

 5. But whether a lie be at some times useful, is a much greater and more concerning question. Whether, as above, it be a lie, when a person has no wil

 6. On the other hand, those who say that we must never lie, plead much more strongly, using first the Divine authority, because in the very Decalogue

 7. Neither do they confess that they are awed by those citations from the Old Testament which are alleged as examples of lies: for there, every incide

 8. For this reason, from the books of the New Testament, except the figurative pre-significations used by our Lord, if thou consider the life and mann

 9. But if no authority for lying can be alleged, neither from the ancient Books, be it because that is not a lie which is received to have been done o

 10. As concerning purity of body here indeed a very honorable regard seems to come in the way, and to demand a lie in its behalf to wit, that if the

 11. But if any man supposes that the reason why it is right for a person to tell a lie for another is, that he may live the while, or not be offended

 12. Thus has the question been on both sides considered and treated and still it is not easy to pass sentence: but we must further lend diligent hear

 13. In which proposition these points may well deserve to be questioned: whether such consent is to be accounted as a deed: or whether that is to be c

 14. “How,” sayest thou, “is it not his doing as well as theirs, when they would not do this, if he would do that?” Why, at this rate we go housebreaki

 15. The whole stress, then, of this question comes to this whether it be true universally that no sin of another, committed upon thee, is to be imput

 16. Or, are some lies, also, to be excepted, so that it were better to suffer this than to commit those? If so, then not every thing that is done in o

 17. But yet if the option were proposed to the man who chose to burn incense to idols rather than yield his body to abominable lust, that, if he wishe

 18. This being from the very first and most firmly established, touching other lies the question proceeds more securely. But by consequence we must al

 19. These sorts of lies having been without any hesitation condemned, next follows a sort, as it were by steps rising to something better, which is co

 20. But haply some may think that there is an exception to be added that there be some honest lies which not only hurt no man, but profit some man, e

 21. If this be absurd, what shall we say? Is it so, that there is no “false witness,” but when one tells a lie either to invent a crime against some m

 22. What then, if a homicide seek refuge with a Christian, or if he see where the homicide have taken refuge, and be questioned of this matter by him

 23. This did a former Bishop of the Church of Thagasta, Firmus by name, and even more firm in will. For, when he was asked by command of the emperor,

 24. But one sometimes comes to a case of this kind, that we are not interrogated where the person is who is sought, nor forced to betray him, if he is

 25. For first to be eschewed is that capital lie and far to be fled from, which is done in doctrine of religion to which lie a man ought by no consid

 26. Touching which matter, there will be some place open for consideration, if first the divine authorities which forbid a lie be diligently discussed

 27. As, when we read in the Gospel, “Thou hast received a blow in the face, make ready the other cheek.” Now as an example of patience can none be fou

 28. It is also written, “But I say unto you, Swear not at all.” But the Apostle himself has used oaths in his Epistles. And so he shows how that is to

 29. As that, “Take no thought for the morrow,” and, “Take therefore no thought what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or what ye shall put on.” No

 30. Moreover, it was said to the Apostles that they should take nothing with them for their journey, but should live by the Gospel. And in a certain p

 31. Thus then what is written, “The mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul ” of what mouth it speaketh, is the question. For in general when the Scripture

 32. Manifestly also in the Gospel we find the mouth of the heart: so that in one place the Lord is found to have mentioned the mouth both of the body

 33. But, like as it is asked of what mouth the Scripture saith, “The mouth that lieth, slayeth the soul,” so it may be asked, of what lie. For it seem

 34. For what is written in another place, “Wish not to use every lie ” they say is not of force for this, that a person is not to use any lie. Therefo

 35. Moreover what is written “Thou wilt destroy all that speak leasing:” one saith that no lie is here excepted, but all condemned. Another saith: Yea

 36. For, concerning false witness, which is set down in the ten commands of the Law, it can indeed in no wise be contended that love of truth may at h

 37. Likewise, touching that which is written, “A son which receiveth the word shall be far from destruction: but receiving, he receiveth it for himsel

 38. Certain it is, albeit all this disputation go from side to side, some asserting that it is never right to lie, and to this effect reciting divine

 39. And all these sins, truly, whether such whereby an injury is done to men in the comforts of this life, or whereby men corrupt themselves and hurt

 40. Now the things which are to be kept safe for sanctity’s sake are these: pudicity of body, and chastity of soul, and verity of doctrine. Pudicity o

 41. There resulteth then from all these this sentence, that a lie which doth not violate the doctrine of piety, nor piety itself, nor innocence, nor b

 42. It clearly appears then, all being discussed, that those testimonies of Scripture have none other meaning than that we must never at all tell a li

 43. So great blindness, moreover, hath occupied men’s minds, that to them it is too little if we pronounce some lies not to be sins but they must nee

34. For what is written in another place, “Wish not to use every lie;”56    Ecclus. vii. 13 μὴ θέλε ψεύδεσθαι πᾶν Ψεῦδος, noli velle mentiri omne mendacium. “Use not to make any manner of lie,” E.V. “Every” is used for “any.” they say is not of force for this, that a person is not to use any lie. Therefore, when one man shall say, that according to this testimony of Scripture we must to that degree hold every sort and kind of lie in detestation, that even if a man wish to lie, yea, though he lie not, the very wish is to be condemned; and to this sense interpreteth, that it is not said, Do not use every lie, but, “Do not wish to use every lie;” that one must not dare not only to tell, but not even to wish to tell, any lie whatever: saith another man, “Nay, in that it saith, Do not wish to use every lie, it willeth that from the mouth of the heart we exterminate and estrange lying: so that while from some lies we must abstain with the mouth of the body, as are those chiefly which pertain to doctrine of religion; from some, we are not to abstain with the mouth of the body, if reason of avoiding a greater evil require; but with the mouth of the heart we must abstain utterly from every lie.” Where it behoveth to be understood what is said, “Do not wish:” namely, the will itself is taken as it were the mouth of the heart, so that it concerneth not the mouth of the heart when in shunning a greater evil we lie unwillingly. There is also a third sense in which thou mayest so take this word, “not every,” that, except some lies, it giveth thee leave to lie. Like as if he should say, wish not to believe every man: he would not mean to advise that none should be believed; but that not all, some however, should be believed. And that which follows, “For assiduity thereof will not profit for good,” sounds as if, not lying, but assiduous lying, that is, the custom and love of lying, should seem to be that which he would prohibit. To which that person will assuredly slide down,57    Abutendum who either shall think that every lie may be boldly used (for so he will shun not that even which is committed in the doctrine of piety and religion; than which what more abominably wicked thing canst thou easily find, not among all lies, but among all sins?) or to some lie (no matter how easy, how harmless,) shall accommodate the inclination of the will; so as to lie, not unwillingly for the sake of escaping a greater evil, but willingly and with liking. So, seeing there be three things which may be understood in this sentence, either “Every lie, not only tell thou not, but do not even wish to tell:” or, “Do not wish, but even unwillingly tell a lie when aught worse is to be avoided:” or, “Not every,” to wit, that except some lies, the rest are admitted: one of these is found to make for those who hold that one is never to lie, two for those who think that sometimes one may tell a lie. But yet what follows, “For assiduity thereof will not profit to good,” I know not whether it can countenance the first sentence of these three; except haply so, that while it is a precept for the perfect not only not to lie, but not even to wish; assiduity of lying is not permitted even to beginners. As if, namely, on laying down the rule at no time whatever not merely to lie but so much as to have a wish to lie, and this being gainsaid by examples, in regard that there are some lies which have been even approved by great authority, it should be rejoined that those indeed are lies of beginners, which have, in regard of this life, some kind of duty of mercy; and yet to that degree is every lie evil, and by perfect and spiritual minds in every way to be eschewed, that not even beginners are permitted to have assiduous custom thereof. For we have already spoken concerning the Egyptian midwives, that it is in respect of the promise of growth and proficiency to better things that they while lying are spoken of with approval: because it is some step towards loving the true and eternal saving of the soul, when a person doth mercifully for the saving of any man’s albeit mortal life even tell a lie.

34. Nam quod alio loco scriptum est, Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium; non ad hoc volunt valere, ut nullo mendacio quisquam mentiatur. Itaque cum alius dixerit, ex isto Scripturae testimonio usque adeo generaliter omne mendacium esse detestandum, ut etiam si quis mentiri velit, etiamsi non mentiatur, jam voluntas ipsa damnanda sit; atque ad hoc interpretetur, 0510 quod non dictum est, Noli mentiri omne mendacium; sed, Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium; ut non solum mentiri, sed nec velle mentiri quisque audeat ullo mendacio.

CAPUT XVII.

Psalmi 5 versiculus 7 tripliciter quoque intellectus. Praeceptum vetans falsum testimonium dici, quomodo intelligendum. Dicit alius, Imo quod ait, Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium; de ore cordis exterminandum atque alienandum esse mendacium voluit: ut a quibusdam mendaciis ore corporis abstinendum sit, sicut illa sunt maxime, quae pertinent ad doctrinam religionis; a quibusdam vero non sit ore corporis abstinendum, si majoris mali evitandi causa exigit; ore autem cordis ab omni mendacio penitus abstinere debeamus. Ubi oportet intelligi quod dictum est, Noli velle: voluntas quippe ipsa quasi os cordis accipitur, ut non pertineat ad os cordis, cum majus malum caventes mentimur inviti. Est et tertius intellectus, quo sic accipias, Noli omne, ut exceptis aliquibus mendaciis mentiri te sinat. Tanquam si diceret, Noli velle credere omni homini: non utique ut nulli crederetur moneret; sed ut non omnibus, aliquibus autem crederetur. Et id quod sequitur, Assiduitas enim ejus non proficiet ad bonum (Eccli. VII, 14), ita sonat, quasi non a mendacio, sed ab assiduo mendacio, id est, a consuetudine atque amore mentiendi prohibere videatur. Quo profecto delabetur, quisquis vel omni mendacio putaverit abutendum, (ita enim nec illud cavebit, quod fit in doctrina pietatis et religionis; quo sceleratius quid facile invenias, non inter omnia mendacia, sed inter omnia peccata?) vel alicui mendacio, quamvis facili, quamvis innoxio, nutum voluntatis accommodaverit; ut non invitus evadendi majoris mali causa, sed volens libensque mentiatur. Ita cum tria sint quae in hac sententia intelligi possint: aut, Omne mendacium non solum mentiri noli, sed nec velle mentiri ; aut, noli velle, sed vel invitus mentire, cum fugiendum est aliquid gravius; aut, noli omne, ut exceptis aliquibus mendaciis caetera permittantur: unum hic pro his quibus mentiri nunquam placet, duo pro illis qui aliquando putant esse mentiendum, inveniuntur. Sed tamen quod sequitur, Assiduitas enim ejus non proficiet ad bonum, nescio utrum possit primae harum trium sententiae suffragari: nisi forte ita ut perfectorum praeceptum sit, omnino nunquam non solum mentiri, sed vel velle mentiri; assiduitas vero mentiendi nec proficientibus permittatur. Tanquam si cum praeciperetur, nunquam prorsus non solum mentiendum, sed nec voluntatem habendam esse mentiendi, contradiceretur exemplis, quod aliqua sunt etiam magna auctoritate approbata mendacia: responderetur autem, illa quidem esse proficientium, quae habent secundum hanc vitam qualecumque officium misericordiae; sed usque adeo esse omne mendacium malum, et perfectis atque spiritualibus animis omni modo fugiendum, ut nec ipsis proficientibus assiduitas ejus permittenda sit. Dictum est enim jam de obstetricibus Aegyptiis, quod de indole ad melius proficiendi 0511 mentientes approbatae sunt: quia nonnullus gradus est ad diligendam veram ac sempiternam salutem, cum quisque misericorditer etiam pro alicujus quamvis mortali salute mentitur (Supra, cap. 5, n. 5-7).