S. AURELLII AUGUSTINI DE SPIRITU ET LITTERA Liber unus .

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 CAPUT XXV.

 CAPUT XXVI.

 CAPUT XXVII.

 CAPUT XXVIII.

 CAPUT XXIX.

 CAPUT XXX.

 CAPUT XXXI.

 CAPUT XXXII.

 CAPUT XXXIII.

 CAPUT XXXIV.

 CAPUT XXXV.

 CAPUT XXXVI.

Chapter 60 [XXXIV.]—The Will to Believe is from God.

Let this discussion suffice, if it satisfactorily meets the question we had to solve. It may be, however, objected in reply, that we must take heed lest some one should suppose that the sin would have to be imputed to God which is committed by free will, if in the passage where it is asked, “What hast thou which thou didst not receive?”358    1 Cor. iv. 7. the very will by which we believe is reckoned as a gift of God, because it arises out of the free will which we received at our creation. Let the objector, however, attentively observe that this will is to be ascribed to the divine gift, not merely because it arises from our free will, which was created naturally with us; but also because God acts upon us by the incentives of our perceptions, to will and to believe, either externally by evangelical exhortations, where even the commands of the law also do something, if they so far admonish a man of his infirmity that he betakes himself to the grace that justifies by believing; or internally, where no man has in his own control what shall enter into his thoughts, although it appertains to his own will to consent or to dissent. Since God, therefore, in such ways acts upon the reasonable soul in order that it may believe in Him (and certainly there is no ability whatever in free will to believe, unless there be persuasion or summons towards some one in whom to believe), it surely follows that it is God who both works in man the willing to believe, and in all things prevents us with His mercy. To yield our consent, indeed, to God’s summons, or to withhold it, is (as I have said) the function of our own will. And this not only does not invalidate what is said, “For what hast thou that thou didst not receive?”359    1 Cor. iv. 7. but it really confirms it. For the soul cannot receive and possess these gifts, which are here referred to, except by yielding its consent. And thus whatever it possesses, and whatever it receives, is from God; and yet the act of receiving and having belongs, of course, to the receiver and possessor. Now, should any man be for constraining us to examine into this profound mystery, why this person is so persuaded as to yield, and that person is not, there are only two things occurring to me, which I should like to advance as my answer: “O the depth of the riches!”360    Rom. xi. 33. and “Is there unrighteousness with God?”361    Rom. ix. 14. If the man is displeased with such an answer, he must seek more learned disputants; but let him beware lest he find presumptuous ones.

CAPUT XXXIV.

60. Voluntas credendi a Deo. Haec disputatio, si quaestioni illi solvendae sufficit, sufficiat. Si autem respondetur, cavendum esse ne quisquam Deo tribuendum putet peccatum, quod admittitur per liberum arbitrium, si in eo quod dicitur, Quid habes quod non accepisti? propterea etiam voluntas qua credimus, dono Dei tribuitur, quia de libero existit arbitrio, quod cum crearemur accepimus: attendat, et videat, non ideo tantum istam voluntatem divino muneri tribuendam, quia ex libero arbitrio est, quod nobis naturaliter concreatum est; verum etiam quod visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut velimus, et ut credamus, sive extrinsecus per evangelicas exhortationes, ubi et mandata legis aliquid agunt, si ad hoc admonent hominem infirmitatis suae, ut ad gratiam justificantem credendo confugiat; sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in potestate quid ei veniat in mentem, sed consentire vel dissentire propriae voluntatis est. His ergo modis quando Deus agit cum anima rationali, ut ei credat; neque enim credere potest quodlibet libero arbitrio , si nulla sit suasio vel vocatio cui credat; profecto et ipsum velle credere Deus operatur in homine, et in omnibus misericordia ejus praevenit nos: consentire autem vocationi Dei, vel ab ea dissentire, sicut dixi, propriae voluntatis est. Quae res non solum non infirmat 0241 quod dictum est, Quid enim habes quod non accepisti? verum etiam confirmat. Accipere quippe et habere anima non potest dona, de quibus hoc audit, nisi consentiendo: ac per hoc quid habeat, et quid accipiat, Dei est: accipere autem et habere utique accipientis et habentis est. Jam si ad illam profunditatem scrutandam quisquam nos coarctet, cur illi ita suadeatur ut persuadeatur , illi autem non ita; duo sola occurrunt interim quae respondere mihi placeat: O altitudo divitiarum (Rom. XI, 33)! et, Numquid iniquitas apud Deum (Id. IX, 14)? Cui responsio ista displicet quaerat doctiores, sed caveat ne inveniat praesumptores .