OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, AN OVERTHROW OF CERTAIN ARISTOTELIAN DOGMAS.

 And concerning these things, all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same things, and there was no disagreement among them b

 posited, must necessarily come to be by composition but if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it has been superfluously dis

 is another thing besides the destruction of all that is, but if matter has this, how is its being matter not also destroyed? Further, if when the form

 by its presence and absence, then the principles will be both generated and destroyed by each other, and not eternal for the eternal does not need th

 ·having been said concerning the philosophers among the Greeks, how they did not make their arguments concerning beings according to demonstrative sci

 animal, but in the generation of the animal simply the substrate was not seed, how is the animal coming to be from not-animal not contrary to nature?

 and matter is deprived of being the matter of something, but it is not deprived of being matter itself, therefore matter will be being and not-being,

 Saying If, when the form is present, then the privation does not remain, it is clear that when the form is not present, the privation remains. How th

 The eternally uncreated has this same [quality] with respect to something coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then was God able to make som

 and of change, but in another way the form and the shape according to reason. For just as art is said to be that which is according to art and the art

 he subjected to generation not only to the spontaneous one, but also to that through intellect and nature which is manifestly absurd, that the one wh

 sible, but it is among the impossible things for that which is going to be to be ungenerated, both without beginning and without end, both having and

 And that, if the infinite in no way exists, many impossibilities occur, is clear: for time will have a beginning and an end, and magnitudes will not b

 is in potentiality, but not in actuality but the amount taken always exceeds any definite quantity. But this number is not definite, nor does infinit

 second to providence but if place is ungeneratedly and without beginning what it is and has what it has, then place is ungenerated and first of all t

 Where is that which is in a place? And if not every being is in a place, how will some beings not be the same as non-being, if indeed not being in a p

 to have come into being. For those things to which belong the generable and having come into being, from these of necessity the eternal and the unorig

 38. From the same discourse. Whatever neither moves nor is at rest, is not in time for to be in time is to be measured by time, and time is the measu

 time to be, so also has the past been. But the future time, just as it has a future coming-into-being, so also it has a beginning and just as there i

 to be straight. The principles of things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For if they transmit the nature they have to th

 And this is the case for any single one of the things that come to be, but it is necessary for something else to be moved previously among the things

 according to which some things have come to be above nature, and others according to nature. If before and after is ungenerated, then there will b

 we say, of which there is no demonstration. But God and nature do nothing in vain. If there were contrary motions in the locomotion of bodies, either

 worlds to come into being from it, but having been used up for the genesis of one world, did it stop the unwilling god from making more worlds? 51. Fr

 and an enmattered principle in matter, through which 'for heaven to be' is different from 'for this particular heaven to be'? If heaven cannot do by w

 each other. But now this much is clear, for what reason there are more circular bodies: that it is necessary for there to be generation, and generatio

 and the outcome in things that happen by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it exist in eternal things that this particular thing is because

 chance can exist in eternal things, but the heaven is eternal and its circular motion, for what reason then does it move in one direction, and not in

 to suffer it. These things, therefore, are heated because they are carried through the air, which through the striking by the motion becomes fire but

 it was moved by nature the motion by which it is now moved, how was it not bound to the sphere in vain? But if it was not moved this way according to

 always? If to things that are always in motion the spherical shape was given as suitable, how is it that of the things having a spherical shape, one i

 and have what they have? If the stars ought not to move, why do they move at all by means of others? But if they ought to move, why do they not move b

 of an element besides the things here, but at other times from the same elements, how is he not speaking falsely in one of the two ways? 63. From the

 and the bricks. Therefore, since matter is not substance, who is it that has made from it the things that have come from it, since both nature and art

 change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then do

change, but into the opposite in the same genus, for instance in quality a change does not occur from white to large but to black, in what way then does matter change in the generation of the substances that come into being from it, when it has nothing capable of being changed? 13. If, just as in animate things there is the animal and in colored things there is color, so also in material things there is matter, how is it that when animate things are destroyed, the animal is destroyed with them, and when colored things are destroyed, color is destroyed, yet when material things are destroyed, matter is not destroyed? But if matter is destroyed together with material things, how does matter pre-exist material things? 14. If to be devoid of and to partake of are properties of beings, it is clear that what is in every way non-being is neither devoid of anything nor partakes of it. How then does matter partake of privation, and yet is not among beings? 15. If it is impossible for the same thing at the same time to be moved with both motions, both that according to nature and that contrary to nature, how is the sun moved according to nature from east to west, but contrary to nature from west to east because of the sphere? For it is not possible for the same thing at the same time to be moved with naturally contrary motions. 16. If the sun did not exist, the eye would be superfluous, and if the eye did not exist, the sun would be superfluous. But since each is necessary for the other, then each is created; for the uncreated is not uncreated for the sake of anything, but for its own sake alone, or rather, not for its own sake; for the uncaused is without cause. 17. If, when time exists, it is impossible for that which has come into being to have come into being by cause but not in time, how do the Greeks say that the world came into being by cause and not in time? 18. If it is impossible for the world to exist without a year, how is the world eternal and uncreated, when the year is not eternal but has its existence from a cycle of many days? 19. If the year is created, how are the things within the year eternal and uncreated?

βολή, ἀλλὰ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, οἷον ἐν τῇ ποιότητι οὐ γίνεται μεταβολὴ ἐκ τοῦ λευκοῦ εἰς τὸ μέγα ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ μέλαν, κατὰ τί οὖν μεταβάλλεται ἡ ὕλη ἐν τῇ γενέσει τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς γινομένων οὐσιῶν, μηδὲν ἔχουσα δυ νάμενον μεταβάλλεσθαι; ιγ. Eἰ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ζωϊκοῖς τὸ ζῶον καὶ ἐν τοῖς χρωϊκοῖς τὸ χρῶμα, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑλικοῖς ἡ ὕλη, πῶς ἀναιρουμένων τῶν ζωϊκῶν συναναιρεῖται τὸ ζῶον καὶ ἀναι ρουμένων τῶν χρωϊκῶν ἀναιρεῖται τὸ χρῶμα, καὶ ἀναιρουμέ νων τῶν ὑλικῶν οὐκ ἀναιρεῖται ἡ ὕλη; Eἰ δὲ συναναιρεῖται τοῖς ὑλικοῖς ἡ ὕλη, πῶς προϋπάρχει τῶν ὑλικῶν ἡ ὕλη; ιδ. Eἰ τὸ ἀπέχειν καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ πάντη μὴ ὂν οὔτε ἀπέχει τινὸς οὔτε μετέχει. Πῶς οὖν μετέχει ἡ ὕλη τῆς στερήσεως, καὶ τῶν ὄντων οὐκ ἔστιν; ιε. Eἰ ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀμφοτέρας κινεῖ σθαι τὰς κινήσεις, τήν τε κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὴν παρὰ φύσιν, πῶς ὁ ἥλιος κατὰ φύσιν μὲν κινεῖται ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς εἰς δύσιν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς δύσεως εἰς ἀνατολὴν διὰ τὴν σφαῖραν; Oὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τὰς ἐναν τίας κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις. ι. Τοῦ ἡλίου μὴ ὄντος περιττὸς ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμός, καὶ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ μὴ ὄντος περιττὸς ἦν ὁ ἥλιος. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δι' ἑκάτερον ἀναγκαῖος ἑκάτερος, γενητὸς ἄρα ἑκάτερος· τὸ γὰρ ἀγένητον δι' οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀγένητον, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸ μό νον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ δι' αὐτό· ἀναίτιον γὰρ τὸ ἀναίτιον. ιζ. Eἰ ἀδύνατον χρόνου ὄντος τὸ γενόμενον γενέσθαι μὲν κατ' αἰτίαν, οὐ κατὰ χρόνον δέ, πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες τὸν κόσμον γεγενῆσθαι κατ' αἰτίαν καὶ οὐ κατὰ χρόνον; ιη. Eἰ ἀδύνατον τὸν κόσμον εἶναι χωρὶς ἐνιαυτοῦ, πῶς ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀγένητος ὁ κόσμος, τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ οὐκ ὄντος ἀϊδίου ἀλλ' ἐκ περιόδου πλειόνων ἡμερῶν τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντος; ιθ. Eἰ γενητὸς ὁ ἐνιαυτός, πῶς ἀΐδια καὶ ἀγένητα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ;