Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica

 After the judgment of the thoughts, an exact discernment of how the thoughts happen to be, whether they are good or otherwise but imagination is the

 to divide for us, by the established terms, the sesquitertian ratios into both the sesquioctave ratios and the leimmata, we would have stopped at thes

 having split it, he bent each one into a circle, bringing them together middle to middle with each other like a chi, having joined 7 them both to them

 left, or rather the one is an image of mind, the other of soul. And in the soul itself, the right is that which is turned toward the intelligible thin

 regarding the explanation of the Platonic psychogony, this we now discharge for you as a kind of debt. For Plato's statement that the division of thes

 and of exegesis. And there is a letter of mine placed among my books that has traced out and carefully examined the meaning in the sayings. But it is

 a ruler drives a team of two then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is oppo

 a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the extern

 through which it is not swept into material disorder, but is joined to the divine light, holds it in its own place and makes it unmixed with matter, l

 of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofo

 agrees, but among them the salty is more than the drinkable. They say, for example, that every soul is either divine or changing from intellect to min

 to be deemed worthy of pardon in repenting. If the soul is a body according to some of the ancients, what is it that contains it? every body is three-

 distinction. Two kinds of air according to Aristotle, the vaporous from the exhalation of water and the smoky from the extinguishing of fire. The latt

 Plato. Pleasure is not a coming-to-be for coming-to-be is of things that are not, while pleasure is of things that are. And coming-to-be is swift and

 is natural, while habit is acquired and taught. Providence is the care for existing things that comes from God. Epicurus says: the blessed and incorr

 but such powers are simply and imperceptibly desired. What then? Do we have three souls? Solution: just as the soul, when united to the body, seems to

 When this is dimmed they also are dimmed the soul flourishes when this 34 withers. Further, everything desires to preserve its own substrate. If the

 actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in th

 concerning form, matter and cause, for example the matter of the celestial bodies is not the four elements, but a certain fifth, spherical one, as be

 as knowledge (for knowledge is a transition from defined things to defined things for this reason it is also knowledge, as leading the mind to a stat

 this, for indeed the flesh also moves downwards and is none of the elements. Aporia: but matter, that is the element, is not soul, but the form that c

 definitions have as their beginning the most general things, as their end the most specific things. If, then, these are finite, so are the definitions

 and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be e

 the rest, but this is about hot and soft, heavy and light, rare and dense, and many opposites. In humans, the cause of local motion is intellect, in i

 is nourished {which} is twofold: either as Matter or as an instrument. And the instrument is twofold: either moving and being moved, like the innate h

 is equal in distance to the zodiac signs. Light is not a body. for if it were a body, how would it be possible for it to have instantaneous movement,

 we see the introduction of the forms of things seen entering the sight, but how do we see the interval of the air in between? Solution: It is not that

 with a violent collision. In soft things no sound is produced, because the air is broken up in their pores and dispersed as in sponges. In things that

 a buzzing which is conveyed back to the sense of hearing. Others say that the sound occurring in the ears after the blockage is of the external air th

 For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart.

 the sense organs of touch, it is clear for every sense organ is both separated and known. Aristotle speaks of the senses both as one each and as many

 Aristotle in On the Soul : if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-

 Some add also a sixth, the attentive [faculty], as when a man says, I perceived, I thought, I opined. To this part they also add the activities of t

 We can say ten, but not indeed opine it, so that opinion is not up to us. But neither do we imagine what we wish for we see at night what we do not w

 in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says

 theoretical versus the practical. The theoretical corresponds to a vision discerning of forms, while the practical corresponds to a vision not only kn

 organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produc

 simpler, or rather the things inherent in the matter, into which the matter is also divided, which are also prop[erly] called its elements. I say then

 he hints that it is not completed from both of the things mixed, but is produced in the union of the soul and the body, not by the soul itself giving

 closing the senses, so as to know unknowingly the transcendent substance of that which is. For according to their own opinions, the philosopher who ha

 he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philoso

 it grows and is naturally constituted to decay, must in every way grow along with and decay along with the other in a connate manner for that by whic

 a demonstration, so also the soul in an infant's body and a more imperfect one, if it were in another, perfect body, would immediately have shown its

 I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature,

 Porphyry has philosophized in harmony with this. For in discussing the soul, he says: “Just as insomniacs, by the very act of wanting to sleep and wat

 have they cast off? Perhaps those who hold the contrary opinion will vex us with these things. But their objection is like a spider's web, which will

 to have received watchwords from the first father, nor that they possess the fullness of many bosoms, nor would I accept that they stand before the bo

 both the Sibylline and the Orphic ones, and those according to which the Berytian Bulls came to be and Amous the Egyptian, and Socrates and Plato (for

 of the bonds by which they were bound, and after this, turning their minds upward, they will approach God. And if the account told about the Sibyl wer

 has the front part? What then do you think? a mind scattered in so great a size is from this cause for him both slack and weak, and the soul is simply

 would remember any of the things here. But as many of the souls as were allotted to more humble portions and their whole mind has not been snatched aw

 Let us not altogether reject the analogy of the eye in the case of the soul, let it be and be called a more precise substance of the soul but if some

 The manner of the entry of souls, and likewise of their release or separation from hence, both are most difficult or hard to explain for of the first

 but by such powers the soul is led like some kind of thing moved by another, being drawn towards whatever the leaders happen to lead it, but then rath

 For that which is according to reason, knowledge is readily at hand, but that which is contrary to reason, is so because it has received such a nature

 of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent

 fitting and gluing it to that by means of a suitable analogy, not placing the rational and intellectual substance into any of the animals for this is

 are generated from these powers alone, for this reason, having abandoned the others, they divided the substance of the soul into these alone. But if y

 it is in fourths, when one might contemplate these both in the third order of the intellectual virtues and in the fourth of the paradigmatic virtues,

 and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for y

 and with nothing separating them, it is necessary for the one to be ordered, and the other to order and the one which is ordered has its form divided

 what is hard and resistant in them has been smoothed out by me. But what follows from this must be attributed to them alone for, proposing to speak a

 proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause

 in our sacred writings, neither a whole soul nor any whole nature, apart from the partial ones, has been dogmatically established1. I for my part reje

 by the energy, then also the substance is perfected according to it, and these things stand in each other according to one energy. For he who does not

 having a life activated according to intellect and reason the psychic is defined according to reason 124 and takes care of divisible souls the physi

 tormenting them. But there are, they say, both on earth divine daimons and in the air, guardians of the animals there, and <in> the water, extending t

 make it superior to the confusion of life, but, if possible, may you not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the very body which you have put o

 cast under your mind: for there is no plant of truth on earth» that is: do not busy your mind with the great measures of the earth, as the geographer

 Gregory by reason and contemplation leads the soul up to the more divine things by reason that is according to us, the more intellectual and better,

 such a lion-bearing fount of heaven and the stars, but the ruling part of its own existence conceals the vision of them. Chaldaean Oracle. From all si

 often appearing, they feign the semblance of some goodness towards the one being initiated. Chaldean Oracle. The soul of mortals will draw God into it

 they can. Whence everything they say and show is false and insubstantial for they know existing things through forms but that which knows future thi

 and fear is the holding back of his goodness towards us for the sake of the economy. Chaldean Oracle. The Father snatched himself away, not even enclo

 they are possessed by passions. Therefore, it is necessary for these also to receive their part of the whole judgment and, having been filled up with

 for it is higher than being venerated, than being uttered, and than being conceived. A Chaldean Oracle. The Iynges, being conceived by the Father, the

 an unknown password, spoken and unspoken. And they often bring the soul down 148 into the world for many reasons, either through the shedding of its w

 of truth and of love. After which are the demiurgic fountains, such as that of the ideas, according to which the cosmos and the things in it have shap

 enclosing the triad towards itself and they call these also intelligible. After these, another order of the intelligible and at the same time intelle

 to the setting [sun], and the pit to the one just at mid-heaven. And thus, gently separating the membrane of the liver, [which is placed] upon the org

 parts of philosophy is necessary. For according to moral philosophy it is necessary to assume that not all things are and come to be by necessity, but

 knowledge and sees not only the essences themselves, but also their powers and their activities, both those according to nature and those contrary to

 he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad and this knowledge is an unchan

 from the one who knows, and it revolves around the thing known and is made like the one who knows. I mean something like this: the knowledge of the so

 they fabricate. For I too had a certain little man, ignoble in soul, but by no means the least of storytellers to him, at any rate, such phantoms pre

in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says every soul is a place of forms and in act, Aristotle an unwritten tablet. Our knowledge is twofold: the non-rational, which is of sensation, and the rational, of the intellect, which understands also enmattered things. How then does the intellect know the things of sensation, that is, the particulars? When this acts by itself it is like a straight line, but when bent towards sensation, like a broken one. If the intellect acts upon material things, it certainly also is affected among things of the same matter and same rank. This is investigated: does the intellect know itself insofar as it is intellect, or is it in one respect intellect, and in another intelligible? If in another respect, it is composite. But if insofar as it is intellect, then everything that is understood is intellect and the subjects of learning are intelligible. Then also everything that is properly intelligible is intellect, but the other things are not properly so, according to Aristotle. Providence is so called as pre-existing the intellect. Further, not everything intelligible is called intellect, but that which understands itself or is intelligible by itself is intellect. Further, insofar as it is understood it understands itself, and not insofar as it understands. How is it that we do not understand ourselves frequently? We seek worldly and super-worldly things, but not ourselves because of habit. Plotinus says: "There is the intellect that always understands itself, that is, the one in act, and the one that never understands, that is, the one in potentiality." Concerning the intellect in act, ten things are investigated: that it makes all things, and that it acts in its substance not in potentiality, to always understand and act, that it is of the soul, further that it is immortal, separable, analogous to light (and just as this does not make colors but makes forms manifest, so this does not make things but impresses forms), that the potential intellect differs from the intellect in act in time, and that it acts with imagination. Alexander opines that the intellect in act is from without, that is, the principle of all things, Marinus some demonic being, Plotinus the human one. Separable is that which is able to be separated, but separated is that which has been separated in act. The human intellect always understands, not the one in number, but the one in the whole world; for if I do not understand, another does. The intellect does not always act, because it acts with imagination and when this is destroyed it does not act. It must be known that whatever the intellect understands without sensation, it also understands without imagination, such as divine things and universals. The indivisible is fivefold: the term of propositions, continuous magnitude according to act, the enmattered form, the immaterial. Continuous magnitude is an enmattered form, that in an indivisible quantity is immaterial. Truth is twofold: the existential, and that which is contrasted with falsehood. Our intellect knows some things affirmatively, some negatively, as by the negation of number the m[on]a[d] and of magnitude the point; but the divine intellect knows [all things affirmatively], except for evil. The continuous is divisible in potentiality and not in act, such as magnitude; in act it is divisible, but in potentiality not, [as] water. The intellect therefore opines both in contrary ways. The intellect understands indivisibly, but discursive reason dividedly and each separately. And in time the intellect is an indivisible power of the [sou]l. The intellect in the proper sense is occupied with simple things, while imagination is an intellect occupied with composite things. And the difference is that the intellect is always true, while the imagination is also false. The intellect is like sensation occupied with its proper sensibles, but discursive reason incidentally. ** [First,] that the intellect in act is the things themselves, but the intellect in potentiality is not the things, unless it understands them; secondly, that the potential precedes the actual in a single time, but not in the whole; for there is always both actuality and potentiality. For the actual must always exist, in order to bring the potential to actuality. Further, the practical intellect is concerned with particulars, the theoretical with universals. The practical always uses imagination, the theoretical not always. In the theoretical there is truth and falsehood, in the practical good and evil. Just as the potential intellect is not other than the actual intellect in subject, but differs only in time, so also the

ἐπὶ τῶν παίδων, ὁ καθ' ἕξιν, καὶ <ὁ> ἐνεργείᾳ ὡς ὁ κυβερνῶν τὰ πάντα ἢ ὁ θύραθεν εἰσιών. Πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ὁ Πλάτων λέγει τόπον εἰδῶν καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀγράφῳ γραμματείῳ. διττὴ ἡμῖν ἡ γνῶσις· ἡ ἄλογος ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἡ λογικὴ τοῦ νοῦ ἥτις νοεῖ καὶ τὰ ἔνυλα. πῶς οὖν ὁ νοῦς τὰ τῆς αἰσθή67 σεως οἶδεν, ἤγουν τὰ μερικά; οὗτος ὅτε καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐνεργεῖ εὐθείᾳ μὲν γραμμῇ ἔοικεν, ἐπικαμπτόμενος δὲ πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν κεκλασμένῃ. Εἰ ἐνεργεῖ ὁ νοῦς εἰς τὰ ὑλικά, πάντως καὶ πάσχει ἐν τοῖς ὁμοΰλοις καὶ ὁμοτίμοις. Ζητεῖται τοῦτο· ὁ νοῦς οἶδεν ἑαυτὸν καθὸ νοῦς, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο μὲν νοῦς, κατ' ἄλλο δὲ νοητός; εἰ κατ' ἄλλο, σύνθετος. εἰ δὲ καθὸ νοῦς, λοιπὸν πᾶν τὸ νοούμενον νοῦς καὶ τὰ μαθήματα νοητά. λοιπὸν καὶ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως νοητὸν νοῦς, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ κυρίως κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην. πρόνοια λέγεται ὡς προϋπάρχουσα τοῦ νοῦ. ἔτι οὐ λέγεται πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν νοῦς, ἀλλὰ τὸ νοοῦν ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ νοητὸν νοῦς ἐστιν. ἔτι καθὸ νοεῖται νοεῖ ἑαυτὸ καὶ οὐχὶ καθὸ νοεῖ. Πῶς οὐ νοοῦμεν ἑαυτοὺς συχνῶς; ζητοῦμεν τὰ ἐγκόσμια καὶ ὑπερκόσμια, οὐχ ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ τὴν συνήθειαν. ὁ Πλωτῖνος λέγει· «ἔστιν νοῦς ὁ ἀεὶ νοῶν ἑαυτόν, ἤγουν ὁ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ ὁ μηδέποτε νοῶν, ἤγουν ὁ ἐν δυνάμει.» Ἐπὶ τὸν ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦν δέκα τινὰ ζητεῖται· ὅτι πάντα ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅτι τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐνεργεῖ οὐ δυνάμει, τὸ ἀεὶ νοεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, ὅτι ψυχικός ἐστι, ἔτι ἀθάνατος, χωριστός, ἀναλογεῖ φωτί (καὶ ὥσπερ τοῦτο οὐ τὰ χρώματα ποιεῖ ἀλλὰ τὰ εἴδη φανεροῖ, καὶ οὗτος οὐ τὰ πράγματα ποιεῖ ἀλλὰ τὰ εἴδη ἐντυποῖ), ὅτι ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ χρόνῳ διαφέρει, καὶ ὅτι μετὰ φαντασίας ἐνεργεῖ. Ἀλέξανδρος ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦν τὸν θύραθεν δοξάζει, ἤγουν τὴν πάντων ἀρχήν, Μαρῖνος δαιμόνιόν τινα, Πλωτῖνος τὸν ἀνθρώπινον. Χωριστόν ἐστι τὸ δυνάμενον χωρισθῆναι, κεχωρισμένον δὲ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ χωρισθέν. Ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἀνθρώπινος ἀεὶ νοεῖ, οὐχ ὁ <εἷς> τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ· εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ μὴ νοῶ, ἄλλος νοεῖ. Ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ, ὅτι μετὰ φαντασίας ἐνεργεῖ καὶ φθαρείσης ταύτης οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. ἰστέον ὡς, ὅσα δίχα αἰσθήσεως νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ δίχα φαντασίας νοεῖ, ὡς τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὰ καθόλου. 68 Πενταχῶς τὸ ἀδιαίρετον· ὁ ὅρος τῶν προτάσεων, τὸ συνεχὲς μέγεθος κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, τὸ ἔνυλον εἶδος, τὸ ἄυλον. τὸ συνεχὲς μέγεθος ἔνυλον εἶδος, τὸ ἐν ποσῷ ἀδιαιρέτῳ ἄυλον. ∆ιττὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια· ἡ μὲν ὑπαρκτική, ἡ δὲ ἀντιδιῃρημένη τῷ ψεύδει. Ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς τινὰ οἶδε καταφατικῶς, τινὰ ἀποφατικῶς, ὡς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τὴν [μον]άδ[α] καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους τὴν στιγμήν· ὁ δὲ θεῖος νοῦς [πάντα καταφατικῶς] οἶδε, χωρὶς τοῦ κακοῦ. Τὸ συνεχὲς δυνάμει διαιρετὸν καὶ οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὡς τὸ μέγεθος, ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν διαιρετόν, δυνάμει δὲ οὔ, [ὡς] τὸ ὕδωρ. ὁ νοῦς τοίνυν καὶ ἄμφω ἐναντίως δοξάζει. Ὁ νοῦς ἀδιαιρέτως νοεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια διῃρημένως καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστον. καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἀδιαίρετος τῆς [ψυχ]ῆς δύναμις ὁ νοῦς. Ὁ κυρίως νοῦς περὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καταγίνεται, ἡ δὲ φαντασία νοῦς περὶ τὰ σύνθετα καταγινόμενος. καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ἀεὶ ἀληθεύει, ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ ψεύδεται. ὁ νοῦς ἔοικεν αἰσθήσει περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα αἰσθητὰ καταγινομένῃ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ** [πρῶτον] ὅτι ἐνεργείᾳ ὁ νοῦς αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, ὁ δὲ δυνάμει οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πράγματα, εἰ μὴ νοήσῃ αὐτά· δεύτερον ὅτι ὁ δυνάμει ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ χρόνῳ προτερεύει τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ οὔ· ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει. δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀεί, ἵνα ἄγῃ τὸ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔτι ὁ νοῦς ὁ πρακτικὸς περὶ τὰ μερικά, ὁ θεωρητικὸς περὶ τὰ καθόλου. ὁ πρακτικὸς ἀεὶ φαντασίᾳ κέχρηται, ὁ θεωρητικὸς οὐκ ἀεί. ἐν τῷ θεωρητικῷ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος, ἐν τῷ πρακτικῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ὥσπερ οὐχ ἕτερος ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἐνεργείᾳ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, ἀλλὰ μόνον τῷ χρόνῳ διαφέρει, οὕτω καὶ ὁ