ARTICLE 7

(29) "The subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical but also the speculative intellect, without any reference to the will. Thus the Philosopher holds, in VI Ethics, c. 3, that science, wisdom, and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. The reason for this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as was said above (q. 9, a. 1; q. 17, aa. 1, 5; I, 82, 4). Therefore, if a man actually do well, this is because he has a good will; and so the virtue which makes a man actually do well, and not merely be able to do so, must be either in the will itself or in some power moved by the will."--I-II, 56, 3.

             (30) "No habit has the ratio of virtue except one whose act is always good; for otherwise it would not be the perfection of a power. Therefore, since the act of the intellect is good in that it considers the truth, it follows that a habit residing in the intellect cannot be a virtue unless it be such that by it the truth is infallibly perceived. For this reason, opinion is not an intellectual virtue, but science and understanding are, as we read in VI Ethics (c. 3, 6 and 7)."--De Veritate, q. 14, a. 8.

             "Now the good of the intellect is knowledge of the truth; and therefore, those habits whereby the intellect is perfected in knowing the truth, are called virtues, as it says in VI Ethics (c. 5 and 6), as rendering the act of the intellect good.

             "But falsity is not only a lack of truth, but also the corruption thereof. For one who completely lacks knowledge of the truth, in whom there is a lack of truth, although he does not hold as an opinion the contrary of truth, is not in the same state as regards truth, as one who holds a false opinion, whose judgment is corrupted by falsehood. Wherefore, just as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsity is its evil, for which reason the habit of opinion is not an intellectual virtue, because it can happen that by it falsehood is approved, as we learn from VI Ethics, c. 3. Now no virtuous act can be evil, as though false opinion itself could be a kind of bad intellectual act."--Ibid., q. 18, a. 6.

             (31) As we pointed out above, note (2), the good of virtue is measured by its convenience to reason. St. Thomas repeats and employs this truth throughout his tracts on the virtues, in general and in particular, thus emphasizing the eminently significant role of the intellect in the acquisition and exercise of all the virtues. Thus, he argues that one virtue cannot be opposed to another, because the good of virtue depends on due relation to a single rule, namely, that of reason (I-II, 31, 8 ad 1). The gravity of sin is measured, in one instance, according as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason; because the good of virtue, which is effaced by sin, consists in a certain commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of right reason (I-II, 73, 3). So too, any kind of desire is said to be inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue lies (II-II, 148, 1). Temperance is far greater than continence, because the good of a virtue lies in its accord with reason, which rules more completely in the temperate than in the continent man. Further, the good of reason, on account of which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscible power, as in the case of the temperate man, is shown to be greater than if it reached only to the will, as in the case of the continent man (II-II, 155, 4, c. and ad 3). Since the cause and root of human good is reason (cf. I-II, 18, 5; 61, 2), prudence, which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive powers, insofar as these participate in reason. Even among the moral virtues, one is better than another according as it approaches nearer to reason (I-II, 66, 1). The good in human acts is proportionate to their regulation by reason. Hence those acts which proceed more immediately from the rational part, are, precisely as such, more excellent than those of inferior powers (Contra Gentiles, III, 139). It remains, however, that to be more properly and perfectly a virtue, is not to be nobler in an absolute sense, but to have a more intrinsic and necessary ordination to an appetite, which alone moves one effectively to do good.

             (32) "Virtue is a habit perfecting a human power for a good act. Now an act may be called good in two ways: first, formally and per se, and secondly, materially and accidentally.

             "Since an act takes its form from its proper object, an act is said to be good formally whose object is a good under the aspect of good. And since good is the object of the will, it follows that no act can be called good in this sense except an act of the will or of the appetitive part.

             "However, an act is said to be good materially when it is convenient with an operating power, even though its object is not the good under the aspect of good: as when a man understands right or the eye sees clearly . . .

             ". . . Therefore, we may speak of virtue in two senses. In the first sense, virtue is a habit perfective of a good act of a human power, whether the act be good materially or formally; and thus intellectual and speculative habits can be called virtues, for by them the intellect and reason are determined to the truth, the consideration of which constitutes their good act. This is the sense in which the Philosopher speaks of virtue in the Ethics.

             "In another sense, we may speak of virtue more strictly, according to the common usage of this word, as a habit perfective of an act which is good not only materially but formally: and in this sense only those habits which pertain to the appetitive part can be called virtues, and not the intellectual habits, especially not those which reside in the speculative intellect." In III Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, qla. 3 sol. 1.