Chapter 61 [XXXV.]—Conclusion of the Work.

Let us at last bring our book to an end. I hardly know whether we have accomplished our purpose at all by our great prolixity. It is not in respect of you, [my Marcellinus,] that I have this misgiving, for I know your faith; but with reference to the minds of those for whose sake you wished me to write,—who so much in opposition to my opinion, but (to speak mildly, and not to mention Him who spoke in His apostles) certainly against not only the opinion of the great Apostle Paul, but also his strong, earnest, and vigilant conflict, prefer maintaining their own views with tenacity to listening to him, when he “beseeches them by the mercies of God,” and tells them, “through the grace of God which was given to him, not to think of themselves more highly than they ought to think, but to think soberly, according as God had dealt to every man the measure of faith.”362    Rom. xii. 1, 3.

Chapter 62.—He Returns to the Question Which Marcellinus Had Proposed to Him.

But I beg of you to advert to the question which you proposed to me, and to what we have made out of it in the lengthy process of this discussion. You were perplexed how I could have said that it was possible for a man to be without sin, if his will were not wanting, by the help of God’s aid, although no man in the present life had ever lived, was living, or would live, of such perfect righteousness. Now, in the books which I formerly addressed to you, I set forth this very question. I said: “If I were asked whether it be possible for a man to be without sin in this life, I should allow the possibility, by the grace of God, and his own free will; for I should have no doubt that the free will itself is of God’s grace,—that is, has its place among the gifts of God,—not only as to its existence, but also in respect of its goodness; that is, that it applies itself to doing the commandments of God. And so, God’s grace not only shows what ought to be done, but also helps to the possibility of doing what it shows.”363    See his work preceding this, De Peccat. Meritis, ii. 7. You seemed to think it absurd, that a thing which was possible should be unexampled. Hence arose the subject treated of in this book; and thus did it devolve on me to show that a thing was possible although no example of it could be found. We accordingly adduced certain cases out of the gospel and of the law, at the beginning of this work,—such as the passing of a camel through the eye of a needle;364    Matt. xix. 24. and the twelve thousand legions of angels, who could fight for Christ, if He pleased;365    Matt. xxvi. 53. and those nations which God said He could have exterminated at once from the face of His people,366    Deut. xxxi. 3; comp. Judg. ii. 3.—none of which possibilities were ever reduced to fact. To these instances may be added those which are referred to in the Book of Wisdom,367    Wisdom xvi. suggesting how many are the strange torments and troubles which God was able to employ against ungodly men, by using the creature which was obedient to His beck, which, however, He did not employ. One might also allude to that mountain, which faith could remove into the sea,368    Matt. xxi. 21. although, nevertheless, it was never done, so far as we have ever read369    Augustin, it would then seem had not met with the statement of Eusebius, as translated by Rufinus (Hist. vi. 24), to the effect that Gregory, bishop of Neocæsarea, in Pontus, once performed the miracle of removing a mountain or rock from its place; which Bede also mentions, Comment. on Mark xi., Book iii. or heard. Now you see how thoughtless and foolish would be the man who should say that any one of these things is impossible with God, and how opposed to the sense of Scripture would be his assertion. Many other cases of this kind may occur to anybody who reads or thinks, the possibility of which with God we cannot deny, although an example of them be lacking.

Chapter 63.—An Objection.

But inasmuch as it may be said that the instances which I have been quoting are divine works, whereas to live righteously is a work that belongs to ourselves, I undertook to show that even this too is a divine work. This I have done in the present book, with perhaps a fuller statement than is necessary, although I seem to myself to have said too little against the opponents of the grace of God. And I am never so much delighted in my treatment of a subject as when Scripture comes most copiously to my aid; and when the question to be discussed requires that “he that glorieth should glory in the Lord;”370    2 Cor. x. 17. and that we should in all things lift up our hearts and give thanks to the Lord our God, from whom, “as the Father of lights, every good and every perfect gift cometh down.”371    Jas. i. 17. Now if a gift is not God’s gift, because it is wrought by us, or because we act by His gift, then it is not a work of God that “a mountain should be removed into the sea,” inasmuch as, according to the Lord’s statement, it is by the faith of men that this is possible. Moreover, He attributes the deed to their actual operation: “If ye have faith in yourselves as a grain of mustard-seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, “Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; and it shall be done, and nothing shall be impossible to you.”372    Compare Matt. xvii. 20, Mark xi. 23, Luke xvii. 6. Observe how He said “to you,” not “to Me” or “to the Father;” and yet it is certain that no man does such a thing without God’s gift and operation. See how an instance of perfect righteousness is unexampled among men, and yet is not impossible. For it might be achieved if there were only applied so much of will as suffices for so great a thing. There would, however, be so much will, if there were hidden from us none of those conditions which pertain to righteousness; and at the same time these so delighted our mind, that whatever hindrance of pleasure or pain might else occur, this delight in holiness would prevail over every rival affection. And that this is not realized, is not owing to any intrinsic impossibility, but to God’s judicial act. For who can be ignorant, that what he should know is not in man’s power; nor does it follow that what he has discovered to be a desirable object is actually desired, unless he also feel a delight in that object, commensurate with its claims on his affection? For this belongs to health of soul.

CAPUT XXXV.

61. Conclusio operis. Concludamus igitur librum aliquando, cujus tanta prolixitate utrum aliquid egerimus, nescio: non apud te, cujus fidem scio; sed apud animos eorum propter quos me scribere voluisti: qui non contra nostram, sed (ut mitius loquar, et non dicam illius qui in suis Apostolis est locutus) certe contra tanti apostoli Pauli, non unam sententiam, sed tam vehementem, tam intentam vigilemque conflictationem malunt suam defensitare sententiam, quam eum audire obsecrantem per miserationem Dei, et dicentem, per gratiam Dei quae data est illi, non plus sapere praeter quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad temperantiam, unicuique sicut Deus partitus est mensuram fidei (Id. XII, 1, 3).

62. Tu autem quid mihi proposueris, et quid tam longo disputationis hujus opere effecerimus adverte. Movit te certe quemadmodum dictum fuerit, fieri posse ut sit homo sine peccato, si voluntas ejus non desit, ope adjuvante divina; quamvis nemo tam perfectae justitiae in hac vita fuerit, vel sit, vel futurus sit. Sic enim hoc ipsum in illis prius ad te conscriptis libris proposui: «Si a me quaeratur,» inquam, «utrum homo sine peccato possit esse in hac vita; confitebor posse per Dei gratiam et liberum ejus arbitrium: ipsum quoque liberum arbitrium ad Dei gratiam, hoc est, ad Dei dona pertinere non ambigens, nec tantum ut sit, verum etiam ut bonum sit, id est, ad facienda mandata Domini convertatur; atque ita Dei gratia, non solum ostendat quid faciendum sit, sed adjuvet etiam, ut fieri possit quod ostenderit» (De Peccatorum Meritis, lib. 2, n. 7). Tibi autem absurdum visum est, sine exemplo esse rem quae fieri potest. Hinc exorta est hujus libri quaestio, ac per hoc ad nos pertinebat ostendere, fieri posse aliquid quamvis desit exemplum. Hinc ex Evangelio et ex Lege quaedam posuimus in sermonis hujus exordio, sicut de cameli transitu per foramen acus (Matth. XIX, 24), et de duodecim millibus legionum Angelorum, qui potuerunt, si vellet, pugnare pro Christo (Id. XXVI, 53), et de illis gentibus quas Deus dicit potuisse se a facie populi sui semel exterminare (Deut. XXXI, 3, et Judicum II, 3): quae omnia facta non 0242 sunt. His addi possunt etiam illa quae leguntur in libro Sapientiae, quam multa posset nova tormenta Deus exercere in impios ad nutum sibi serviente creatura (Sap. XVI, 24), quae tamen non exercuit. Potest et de monte illo quem fides in mare transferret (Marc. XI, 23): quod tamen nusquam factum, vel legimus, vel audivimus . Quisquis enim horum aliquid Deo dixerit esse impossibile, vides quam desipiat, quamque adversus fidem Scripturae ejus loquatur. Multa alia hujusmodi possunt occurrere vel legenti vel cogitanti, quae possibilia Deo negare non possumus, quamvis eorum desit exemplum.

63. Sed quia dici potest, illa opera esse divina, juste autem vivere ad nostra opera pertinere; suscepi ostendere etiam hoc opus esse divinum, et hoc egi libro isto loquacius fortasse quam sat est: sed contra inimicos gratiae Dei etiam parum mihi dixisse videor; nihilque me tam multum dicere delectat, quam ubi mihi et Scriptura ejus plurimum suffragatur; et id agitur, ut qui gloriatur in Domino glorietur (II Cor. X, 17), et in omnibus gratias agamus Domino Deo nostro sursum cor habentes, unde a Patre luminum omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum est (Jacobi I, 17). Nam si propterea non est opus Dei, quia per nos agitur, vel quia illo donante nos agimus, nec illud est opus Dei, ut mons transferatur in mare; quia per fidem hominum fieri posse Dominus dixit, et hoc ipsorum operi attribuit, dicens, Si habueritis in vobis fidem tanquam granum sinapis, dicetis monti huic, Tollere et mittere in mare, et fiet, et nihil impossibile erit vobis (Marc. XI, 23, 24, et Luc. XVII, 6). Certe vobis dixit; non, Mihi aut Patri: et tamen hoc nullo modo facit homo, nisi illo donante et operante. Ecce quemadmodum sine exemplo est in hominibus perfecta justitia, et tamen impossibilis non est. Fieret enim, si tanta voluntas adhiberetur, quanta sufficit tantae rei. Esset autem tanta, si et nihil eorum quae pertinent ad justitiam nos lateret, et ea sic delectarent animum, ut quidquid aliud voluptatis dolorisve impedit, delectatio illa superaret: quod ut non sit, non ad impossibilitatem, sed ad judicium Dei pertinet. Quis enim nesciat, non esse in hominis potestate quid sciat, nec esse consequens ut quod appetendum cognitum fuerit appetatur, nisi tantum delectet, quantum diligendum est ? Hoc autem sanitatis est animae.