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to be false. Since, therefore, there are also such thoughts, we will call them words. 237 The divine apostle, therefore, knowing this says "to have heard unspeakable words." And it seems to be a contradiction, unless we take "spoken" and "unspoken" according to one and another meaning. They are unspoken, inasmuch as they are spoken in the mind alone and God sends them into the intellect. And they possess truth and falsehood, so that in this respect they are also words. They are unspoken as not being spoken by means of syllables, not being of a nature to be written and inscribed. In not being uttered through syllables, they are unspoken. But if each of the things I say is spoken—for I utter it by means of an articulate voice—the thought, however, which the voice does not suggest, is an unspoken word. For it has either truth or falsehood. They are unspoken on account of not being uttered through syllables and articulate words, but they are words on account of having truth or falsehood. a wise man’s heart to know a time of judgment; for to every matter there is a time and a judgment, for the knowledge of the wise man is great upon him. This is what it says: the mind and the heart of the wise man knows "the time of judgment," not only the one spoken of in scripture. The divine words call "a time of judgment" that time in which all stand before the judgment seat of God. And it calls this time "the day of judgment." Here, however, the wise man knows every time and judgment of every matter. He applies himself to matters with discernment, he utters words with discernment. For he knows when he must give an answer and when not, and when to hold back his speech and when to let it loose upon his hearers. He knows, therefore, the judgment of this time, so that you might not take "time" as some specified duration, such as of a day or of a night, but as the opportune moment for saying certain things to one who is in a certain state. "The heart of the wise man, therefore, knows the time of judgment"; he knows the judgment according to which he must use the opportune moments. For to every matter there is a time and a judgment. Every matter clearly has a time and a judgment. He, therefore, who is able to handle matters in such a way as to speak about them opportunely and with discernment, this man is wise and does the work of a wise man. For the knowledge of man is great upon him. 238 But we take "knowledge of man" in two ways: either that which he knows or that by which he is known. For example, wise men who are knowers of themselves possess the principle itself, of both the one who knows and the one who is known. If they are knowers of themselves and others do not know them, they themselves are the ones who know and the ones who are known. "Great, therefore, is the knowledge of man that is upon him," both that which he himself knows and that by which he himself is known. At any rate, men have set in motion countless things towards that maxim which says, "know thyself." It is one, the saying is brief, but its meaning is great. He who has known himself knows that he is created, and knows that he is naturally disposed towards the attainment of virtue. He knows that in him the soul rules and the body is ruled, and again in the soul that the rational part rules, while the appetitive and spirited parts are ruled. If these things happen in reverse, it is most evil. If that soul is ruled by the body and the body rules, it is destruction for that man; and if the rational part is ruled by spirit or by appetite, this rule is unlawful. The wise man, therefore, must know himself and understand that "the knowledge upon him is great," even the knowledge upon him which he ought to know. For if he knows that "the knowledge upon him is great"—since he must know himself—he will not, upon knowing a few things, cease, thinking he has been perfected. And even if he should receive all the understanding and knowledge that it is possible to possess here, he knows that "he knows in part" and will not cease as some already do, but still strives to receive other knowledge, even if he should know all visible things. And, as Solomon says, you should receive "unerring knowledge" of all "things that are," turning his own mind to invisible things, he knows that in many things he has knowledge. For he has a grasp of perceptible things only. And even if one should ascend to invisible things, since these are nearer and first, other things

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ψεύσασθαι. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ νοήματά εἰσιν τοιαῦτα, ῥήματα αὐτὰ ἐροῦμεν. 237 τοῦτο οὖν ὁ θεῖος ἀπόστολος ἐπιστάμενος λέγει "ἀκηκοέναι ἄρρητα ῥήματα." καὶ δοκεῖ ἀντίφασις εἶναι, εἰ μὴ κατὰ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο σημαινό μενον λάβωμεν τὸ ῥητὸν καὶ ἄρρητον. ἄρρητά ἐστιν, παρ' ὅσον ἐν νῷ μόνῳ ὁμι λοῦνται καὶ θεὸς ἐνίησιν αὐτὰ τῇ διανοίᾳ. καὶ ἔχουσιν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεύδεσθαι, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτό εἰσι̣ν καὶ ῥήματα. ἄρρητά εἰσιν οὐ λεγό μενα διὰ συλλαβῶν, οὐχ οἷά τε ὄντα γραφῆναι καὶ χαραχθῆναι. τῷ δὲ μὴ προφέρεσθαι διὰ συλλαβῶν ἄρρητά ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον, ὧν λέγω, ῥητόν ἐστιν-προφέρομαι γὰρ αὐτὸ διὰ ἐνάρθρου φωνῆς-, τὸ μέντοι νόημα, ὃ οὐχ ὑποβάλλει ἡ φωνή, ἄρρητον ῥῆμά ἐστιν. ἔχει γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ ψεῦδος. ἄρρητά εἰσιν παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν διὰ συλλαβῶν καὶ λέξεων ἐνάρθρων προφέρεσ̣θαι, τῷ δὲ ἔχειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ῥήματά εἰσιν. καὶ καιρὸν κρίσεως γιγνώσκειν καρδία σοφοῦ· ὅτι παντὶ πράγματι ἔστιν καιρὸς καὶ κρίσις, ὅτι γνῶσις τοῦ σο φοῦ πολλὴ ἐπ' αὐτόν. τοῦτο λέγει· ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ καρδία τοῦ σοφοῦ οἶδεν "τὸν τῆς κρίσεως καιρόν", οὐ μόνον τὸν κατωμιλημένον ἐν τῇ γραφῇ. "καιρὸν κρίσεως" λέγουσιν οἱ θεῖοι λόγοι τὸν καιρὸν ἐκεῖνον, καθ' ὃν πάντες τῷ κριτη ρίῳ τοῦ θεοῦ παρίστανται. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν καλεῖ "ἡμέραν κρίσεως." ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὁ σοφὸς πάντα καιρὸν καὶ κρίσιν παντὸς πράγματος οἶδεν. κε κριμένως τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλλει, τοὺς λόγους κεκριμένως πρ̣οφέρει. οἶδεν γάρ, πότε δεῖ δοῦναι ἀπόκρισιν καὶ πότε οὔ, καὶ πότε ἀντισχεῖν τ̣ο`̣ν λόγον καὶ πότε ἐξαφεῖναι αὐτὸν̣ κατὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν. τὴν κρίσιν οὖν τούτου τοῦ καιροῦ ἐπίσταται, ἵνα καιρὸν μὴ χρόνον λάβῃς τινὰ ῥητόν, οἷον ἡμερινὸν ἢ νυκτερινόν, ἀλλὰ καιρὸν τῷ εἰπεῖν τοιάδε τινὰ τῷ τοιάν δε ἕξιν ἔχοντι. "ἡ καρδία οὖν τοῦ σοφοῦ οἶδεν τὸν καιρὸν τῆς κρίσεως", οἶδεν τὴν κρίσιν, καθ' ἣν̣ δ̣εῖ τ̣ο̣ῖς καιροῖς χρήσασθαι. ὅτι παντὶ πράγματι ἔστιν καιρὸς καὶ κρίσις. πᾶν πρᾶγμα ἔχει καιρὸν καὶ κρίσιν δηλονότι. ὁ δυνάμενος οὖν τὰ πράγματα οὕτω με̣ταχειρίζεσθαι, ὡς καιρίως λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ κεκρι μένως, οὗτος σοφός ἐστιν καὶ σοφοῦ ἔργον ποιεῖ. ὅτι γνῶσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλὴ ἐπ' αὐτόν. 238 γνῶσιν δὲ ἀνθρώπου δίττως λαμβάνομεν, ἢ ἣν γιγνώσκει ἢ ἣν γιγνώσκε ται. οἷον οἱ ἑαυτῶν ἐπιγνώμονες σοφοὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἔχουσιν, τοῦ τε γιγνώσκοντος καὶ τοῦ γιγνωσκομένου. εἰ ἑαυτῶν ἐπιγνώμονές εἰσιν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοι αὐτοὺς ἐπιγιγνώσκουσιν, αὐτοί εἰσιν οἱ γιγνώσκοντες καὶ οἱ γιγ νωσκόμενοι. "πολλὴ οὖν ἐστιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἡ γνῶσις ἡ ἐπ' αὐτόν", καὶ ἣν αὐτὸς γιγνώσκει καὶ ἣν αὐτὸς γιγνώσκεται. ἀμέλει γοῦν μύρια ὅσα κεκινήκασιν ἄνθρωποι εἰς τὴν γνώμην ἐκείνην τὴν λέγουσαν "σεαυτὸν γνῶθι". μία ἐστίν, βραχεῖά ἐστιν ἡ φωνή, πολλὴ δέ ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια. ὁ γνοὺς ε῾̣αυτὸν οἶδεν, ὅτι γενητός ἐστιν, καὶ οἶδεν, ὅτι πέφυκεν πρὸς ἀνάλημψιν ἀρετῆς. οἶδεν, ὅτι ἄρχει ἐν αὑτῷ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἄρχεται τὸ σῶμα, καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὅτι ἄρχει μὲν τὸ λογιςτικόν, ἄρ χεται δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικόν. ἐὰν ἔνπαλιν ταῦτα γίνεται, κάκι στόν ἐστιν. ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη ἐὰν ἄρχηται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἄρχῃ τὸ σῶμα, ὄλεθρος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ· καὶ ἐὰν τὸ λογιστικὸν ἄρχηται ὑπὸ θυμοῦ ἢ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας, ἡ ἀρχὴ αὕτη παράνομός ἐστιν. δεῖ οὖν τὸν σοφὸν εἰδέναι ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ὅτι "ἡ ἐπ' αὐτῷ γνῶσις πολλή ἐστιν", καὶ ἡ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἣν γιγνώσκειν ὀφείλει. ἐὰν γὰρ γνῷ, ὅτι "πολλή ἐστιν ἡ ἐπ' αὐτὸν γνῶσις"- ε᾿̣π̣ε̣ι`̣ δε̣ι῀̣ α̣υ῾̣τ̣ο`̣ν̣ γιγνώσκειν-, οὐκ ὀλίγα γνοὺς πεπαύσεται νομί ζων τετελειῶσθαι. κἂν πᾶσαν ο̣ὐ῀̣ν τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐνταῦθα ὑπαρχθῆναι σύν εσιν καὶ γνῶσιν λάβῃ, οἶδεν ὅτι "ἐκ μέρους γιγνώσκει" καὶ οὐ παύσε τα̣ι̣ ὥς τινες ἤδη, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ἄλλην γνῶσιν, κἂν γνῷ πάντα τὰ ὁρατά. καὶ, ὡς Σολομὼν λέγει, πάντων "τῶν ὄντων" λάβῃς "γνῶσιν ἀψευδῆ", ἀναφέρων τὸν νοῦν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀόρατα οἶδεν, ὅτι ἐν πολλοῖς ἔχει γνῶσιν. αἰσθητῶν γὰρ μόνων ἔχει ἀντίλημψιν. κἂν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀόρατά τις δὲ ἀνέλθῃ, ἐπ̣ε̣ι`̣ και`̣ τούτων εἰσὶν ἐγγυτέρω καὶ πρῶτα, ἄλλα