Chapter XXXVI.—Other Absurd Theories Respecting Matter and Its Incidents Exposed in an Ironical Strain. Motion in Matter. Hermogenes’ Conceits Respecting It.

But see what a contradiction he next advances382    Subicit. (or perhaps some other reason383    Other than “the right reason” above named. occurs to him), when he declares that Matter partly corporeal and partly incorporeal. Then must Matter be considered (to embrace) both conditions, in order that it may not have either? For it will be corporeal, and incorporeal in spite of384    Adversus. the declaration of that antithesis,385    The original, “Adversus renuntiationem reciprocationis illius,” is an obscure expression. Oehler, who gives this reading in his edition, after the editio princeps, renders the term “reciprocationis” by the phrase “negative conversion” of the proposition that Matter is corporeal and incorporeal (q.d. “Matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal”). Instead, however, of the reading “reciprocationis,” Oehler would gladly read “rectæ rationis,” after most of the editions.  He thinks that this allusion to “the right reason,” of which Hermogenes boasted, and of which the absurd conclusion is exposed in the context, very well suits the sarcastic style of Tertullian.  If this, the general reading, be adopted, we must render the whole clause this: “For it will be corporeal and incorporeal, in spite of the declaration of that right reason (of Hermogenes), which is plainly enough above giving any reason,” etc. etc. which is plainly above giving any reason for its opinion, just as that “other reason” also was. Now, by the corporeal part of Matter, he means that of which bodies are created; but by the incorporeal part of Matter, he means its uncreated386    Inconditum. See above ch. xviii., in the middle. Notwithstanding the absurdity of Hermogenes idea, it is impossible to translate this word irregular as it has been proposed to do by Genoude. motion. If, says he, Matter were simply a body, there would appear to be in it nothing incorporeal, that is, (no) motion; if, on the other hand, it had been wholly incorporeal no body could be formed out of it. What a peculiarly right387    Rectior. reason have we here! Only if you make your sketches as right as you make your reason, Hermogenes, no painter would be more stupid388    Bardior. than yourself. For who is going to allow you to reckon motion as a moiety of Matter, seeing that it is not a substantial thing, because it is not corporeal, but an accident (if indeed it be even that) of a substance and a body?  Just as action389    Actus: being driven. is, and impulsion, just as a slip is, or a fall, so is motion. When anything moves even of itself, its motion is the result of impulse;390    Actus ejus est motus. but certainly it is no part of its substance in your sense,391    Sicut tu. when you make motion the incorporeal part of matter. All things, indeed,392    Denique. have motion—either of themselves as animals, or of others as inanimate things; but yet we should not say that either a man or a stone was both corporeal and incorporeal because they had both a body and motion: we should say rather that all things have one form of simple393    Solius. corporeality, which is the essential quality394    Res. of substance. If any incorporeal incidents accrue to them, as actions, or passions, or functions,395    Officia. or desires, we do not reckon these parts as of the things. How then does he contrive to assign an integral portion of Matter to motion, which does not pertain to substance, but to a certain condition396    Habitum. of substance? Is not this incontrovertible?397    Quid enim? Suppose you had taken it into your head398    Si placuisset tibi. to represent matter as immoveable, would then the immobility seem to you to be a moiety of its form? Certainly not. Neither, in like manner, could motion. But I shall be at liberty to speak of motion elsewhere.399    See below, ch. xli., p. 500.

CAPUT XXXVI.

Sed ecce contrarium subjicit, aut alia fortasse ratio ei occurrit, ex parte corporalem renuntians materiam, et ex parte incorporalem. Jam ergo ne neutrum sit, utrumque materia censenda est? Erit enim 0230B corporalis et incorporalis adversus renuntiationem rectae rationis illius, plane rationem non reddentis sententiae suae, sicut nec alia reddit. Corporale enim materiae vult esse, de quo corpora edantur: incorporale vero, inconditum motum ejus. Si enim, ait, corpus tantummodo esset, nihil ei incorporale appareret, id est motus. Si vero in totum incorporalis fuisset, nullum corpus ex ea fieret. Quanto haec rectior ratio! nisi quod si tam rectas lineas ducis, Hermogenes, quam ratio ista , pictor te bardior non est. Quis enim tibi concedit motum in secundam partem substantiae deputare? cum substantiva res non sit, quia nec corporalis; sed accidens si forte, substantiae et corporis, ut actus, et pulsus, ut lapsus, ut casus, ita et motus. Nam sive a semetipso quid movetur, actus ejus est motus, certe pars substantiae non est 0230C sicut tu motum substantiam facis materiae incorporalem. Omnia denique moventur, aut a semetipsis, ut animalia; aut ab aliis, ut inanimalia : tamen nec hominem, nec lapidem et corporalem et incorporalem dicemus, quia et corpus habeat et motum, sed unam omnibus formam solius corporalitatis, quae substantiae res est: si qua incorporalia eis adsunt, 0231A aut actus, aut passiones, aut officia, aut libidines eorum, non portiones deputamus. Quo ergo facit, portionem materiae in motum disponere, qui non ad substantiam pertinet, sed ad substantiae habitum? Quid enim si immobilem placuisset tibi inducere materiam, numquid immobilitas secunda pars formae videretur? Sic itaque nec motus: sed de motu et alibi licebit .