,

and after those things and beyond, surpassing them, he will never cease from knowing, until he reaches that limit so as to know God as he is.

He who knows is knowable to himself and is knowledge and is an object of knowledge and is sci 239 ence. And I have said these things in general, because often the soul, when it is a plant being cultivated, itself has the principles of both. It cultivates itself, it cultivates nothing else; it does not cultivate things outside of itself, like one who cultivates perceptible plants; he does not take care of himself, but is a craftsman of plants. For he is not one who knows what will be, for as it will be, who will announce it to him? For this reason, "great is the knowledge upon man." No one knows what will be by perception; perception has a grasp of present things. But the things that will be do not yet exist. Therefore, there is no perceptual grasp of things that do not exist, but a gnostic contemplation; science is that which contemplates what will be. For instance, to grant that some people understand the things that happen from fate, they do not know the things that will be. For unless he again receives the sequence, that this star was in this zodiac sign, he again knows existing things, not things that will be. And even if, at some point, they speak prognostically about an eclipse of the sun or moon, he again understands that if this travels in this way and such a configuration of the stars occurs, this will be the result. Again, he gets the theory from existing things, from it having often happened thus. For as it will be, who will announce it to him? Some have observed concerning the difference between what is about to be and what will be. That which can come into being perceptibly is called 'about to be,' but they say 'will be' refers to things that are, as it were, intelligible and have their sequence in theory; "Behold, I am with you all the days until the end of this age." He did not say "I am coming later" for this. For "is" and "will be" are different. That which results according to the truth of nature is said to be what 'will be,' while 'to be about to be' refers to that which is not perceptibly present, but is able to come into being. Behold, I say: Is it not its nature for thunder to happen now? I do not say about it that it 'will be,' but that it 'is about to be'; for it is not yet. But what 'will be' is connected with the very thing that preceded it, if it has a cause and reason. In relation to the effect, I do not say 'to be about to be,' but 'to be.' For when there is a cause with which its existence is interwoven, this will certainly be. Therefore, no one any longer knew the things that will be in this way, unless God reveals it, unless the truth establishes the mind in knowledge. He spoke thus: "Behold, I will be with you," not "I am about to be." For from now on I am with you, from now on I exist with you and will be for all the days of the 240 age. And to speak more clearly, people use both knowledge and perception. When perceptible things are not present, there is about to be a grasp of them; nor from this moment does one grasp, when one perceives not what is not present but what already exists. But when one has a scientific contemplation, one applies it to each demonstrative problem; already having the knowledge, one also has it as something that will be. For it does not fly away like perceptual grasp. And so a certain argument is attempted, one that is sophistic rather than dialectical, that the sun is above the earth and its movement of this sort appears then, when it is day, when the underlying air is illuminated by it. But when, he says, it sets, we do not know if it is or if it is not. For even if we assume, but, he says, it sets, we do not know if it is or if it is not. For even if we assume that it is, we hold this by a certain supposition. But if it does not appear, we do not know if it exists or does not exist. -But I said that this argument is sophistic. Listen: things are interpreted according to their definitions. Some have defined the sun to be a star that appears by day. And "appearing by day" was taken as the differentia. But the differentiae must always belong to the things defined; if, therefore, it was taken as the differentia of the sun that it is a star appearing by day, if it is not day, it does not have the differentia in the definition. Whence it is unclear if it is or if it is not. But I said before that it is a sophism; it is neither a scientific theorem nor a dialectical problem. There is no man having authority in spirit to hinder with the

δὲ μετ' ἐκεῖνα καὶ πέρα ὑπερβάλλοντα, οὐδέποτε πεπαύσεται τοῦ γιγνώσκειν, ἕως εἰς ἐκεῖνο τ̣ο`̣ πέρας̣ φθάσῃ ὡς γνῶναι τὸν θεὸν καθώς ἐστιν.

ὁ ἐπιστάνων ἑαυτῷ γνωστόν ἐστιν καὶ γνῶσις καὶ ἐπιστητόν ἐστιν καὶ ἐπι 239 στήμη. καὶ εἶπον καθόλου ταῦτα, ὅτι πολλάκις ἡ ψυχή, ὅτε φυτόν ἐστιν γεωρ- γούμενον, αὐτὴ ἔχει ἀμφοτέρων τοὺς λόγους. ἑαυτὴν γεωργεῖ, οὐκ ἄλλο τι γεωργεῖ· οὐ τὰ ἔξω ἑαυτῆς γεωργεῖ ὡς ὁ τὰ φυτὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ γεωργῶν· οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμέλεται, ἀλλὰ φυτῶν ἐστιν τεχνίτης. ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν γιγνώσκων τί τὸ ἐσόμενον, ὅτι καθὼς ἔσται, τίς ἀναγγελεῖ αὐτῷ; διὰ τοῦτο "πολλή ἐστιν ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γνῶσις." οὐδεὶς αἰσθήσει τὸ ἐσόμενον οἶδεν· τῶν παρόντων ἀντίλημψιν ἔχει ἡ αἴσθησις. τὰ δὲ ἐσό-μενα οὔπω ὑφέστηκεν. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ ἀντίλημψις τῶν μὴ ὑφεστη-κότων, ἀλλὰ γνωστικὴ θεωρία· ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ θεωροῦσα τὸ ἐσόμενον. αὐτίκα γοῦν ἵνα δῶμεν, ὅτι ἐπίστανταί τινες τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς εἱμαρμένης, τὰ ἐσόμενα οὐκ ἴσασιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ λάβῃ πάλι̣ν̣ ἀκολουθίαν, ὅτι ὅσδε ὁ ἀστὴρ κατὰ τόδε τὸ ζώδιον γέγονεν, τὰ ὄντα πάλιν γιγνώσκει, οὐ τὰ ἐσόμενα. κἄν ποτε γοῦν προγνωστικῶς περὶ ἐκλείψεως ἡλίου ἢ σελή-νης λέγουσιν, λαμβάνει πάλιν, ὅτι ἐὰν τόδε ὁδεύηται καὶ τοιάδε γένη-ται κατάστα̣σις τῶν ἀστέρων, τόδε ἀποτελεῖται. ἐξ ὄντων πάλιν λαμβάνει τὴν θεωρίαν, ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις οὕτω γεγονέναι. ὅτι καθὼς ἔσται, τίς ἀναγγελεῖ αὐτῷ; παρετηρήσαντό τινες περὶ διαφορᾶς μέλλοντος καὶ ἐσομένου. μέλλον λέγετ̣α̣ι̣ τ̣ο`̣ α̣ι᾿̣σ̣θη̣τικ̣ῶς̣ δυν̣άμεν̣ο̣ν̣ ὑπάρξα̣ι, ἔσεσθαι δὲ λέγο̣υ̣σ̣ιν τὰ ὥσπερ ἐννοητά τινα ὄντα καὶ ἐν θεωρίᾳ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἔχοντα· "ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ μεθ' ὑμῶν πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας ἕως τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου." οὐκ̣ εἶπεν ὅτι "ὑστερίζω" τοῦτο. ἄλλο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ ἔστ̣ιν̣ κ̣α̣ὶ τὸ ἔσεται. τὸ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν φύσεως ἀποβαῖνον τοῦτο λέγεται ἔσεσθαι, μέλλει̣ν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικῶς μὴ παρόν, δ̣υνα´̣μ̣ενον̣ δὲ ὑπαρχθῆναι. ἰδού, λέγω· οὐ πέφυκ̣εν ἄρτι γενέσθαι βροντή; οὐ λέγω περ̣ὶ αὐτῆς ὅτι ἔσε-ται, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέλλει τὸ μέλλον· οὔπω γ̣ὰρ ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ ἐσόμενον σ̣υ̣ν̣-άπτεται τῷ αυ᾿̣τ̣ῷ προλαβόντι, ἐὰν αἴτιον καὶ αἰτίαν ἐ´̣χ̣ῃ. π̣ρ̣ο`̣ς̣ τὸ αἰτιατὸν οὐ λέγω μέλλειν, ἀλλὰ ἔσεσθαι. οὗ γὰρ αἰτίου τυγχάνοντος, ᾧ συνπε´̣πλεκται ἡ ὕπαρξις ἐκείνου, πάντως ἔσετ̣αι τοῦτο. τὰ οὕτως οὖν ἐσό-μενα οὐκέτι τις ἦν ἐπιστάμενος, εἰ μὴ θεὸς φανερῶτ̣αι, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀλή-θεια ἐπιστήσῃ τὸν νοῦν εἰς γ̣νῶσι̣ν. εἶπεν̣ οὕτω· "ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ἔσομαι μεθ' ὑμῶν", οὐ "μέλλω ἔσεσθαι". καὶ γὰρ ἀπεντεῦθέν̣ ε̣ἰμι π̣α̣ρ̣' υ῾̣μῖν, ἀπεντεῦθεν μεθ' ὑμῶν ὑπάρχω καὶ ἔσομαι ἐπὶ πασῶν τῶν ἡμερῶν τοῦ 240 αἰῶνος. καὶ ἵνα σαφέστερον εἴπω, χρῶνται οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ γνώσει καὶ αἰσθή-σει. ὅταν μὴ παρῇ τὰ αἰσθητά, μέλλει τούτων ἔσεσθαι ἀντίλημψις· οὐδὲ ἀπεντεῦθεν ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ὅταν τὸ μὴ παρὸν οὐκ αἰσθάνεται ἀλλὰ τὸ ἤδη ὑφεστηκός. ὅταν δὲ ἐπιστημονικὴν ἔχῃ θεωρίαν, καὶ ἑκάστῳ προβλήματι ἀπο-δεικτικῷ ἐπιβάλλει· ἤδη ἔχων τὴν γνῶσιν καὶ ἔχει αὐτὴν ἐσομένην. οὐ γὰρ ἀφίπταται ὡς ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἀντίλημψις. καὶ τόπος γοῦν τις ἐπιχειρεῖται τοιοῦτος σοφιςτικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ διαλεκ- τικός, ὅτι ὑπὲρ γῆν ἐστιν ὁ ἥλιος καὶ φαίνεται τότε ἡ τοιαύτη αὐτοῦ κίνη-σις, ὅταν ἡμέρᾳ ᾖν, ὅταν ὁ ὑποκείμενος ἀὴρ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ φωτίζηται. ὅταν δέ, φησίν, δύνῃ, οὐκ ἴσμεν, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. κἂν γὰρ τιθώμεθα, δέ, φησίν, δύνῃ, οὐκ ἴσμεν, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. κἂν γὰρ τιθώμεθα, ὅτι ἔστιν, ὑπολήμψει τινὶ τοῦτο ἔχομεν. εἰ δὲ οὐ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἴσμεν, εἰ ὑπάρχει ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει. -εἶπον δέ, ὅτι σοφιστικόν ἐστιν τὸ ἐπιχείρημα τοῦ-το. ἄκουσον· πρὸς τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἐκδέχονται τὰ πράγματα. τινὲς ὡρίσαν-το τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι ἄστρον ἡμεροφανές. καὶ ὡς διαφορὰν ἔλαβεν τὸ ἡμερο- φανές. δεῖ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς ὑπάρχειν ἀεὶ τοῖς ὁριστοῖς· εἰ τοίνυν ὡς διαφορὰ τοῦ η῾̣λ̣ίου̣ ε᾿̣λ̣η´̣φ̣θ̣η̣, ὁ´̣τι ἡμεροφανὲς ἄστρον ἐστίν, ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ ἡμέρα, ου᾿̣κ̣ ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τὴν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ. ὅθεν ἄδηλον, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. προλαβὼν δὲ ε̣ἶπ̣ον ὅτι σόφισμά ἐστιν· οὐδὲ ἐπιστημο̣ν̣ι̣-κ̣ὸν θεώρημά ἐστιν οὐδὲ διαλεκ̣τι̣κὸν προ´̣βλημα. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ἐξουσιάζων ἐν πνεύματι τοῦ κωλῦ-σαι σ̣ὺν τὸ