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the goat-part grew onto half, or the reverse happened in the mixture of the animals, so that the deer-part grew onto a whole goat, for this reason the myth named it in the aforesaid manner, but the composition of the names 3,1.216 explains the sharing in some way in each nature. So that according to the prose-writer, if the same is man and God, having the connection in some way, whether the whole nature ran together or was deficient, he will not escape that absurd composition of the name. And if the Greeks, having learned these things from him, were to ridicule our mystery, surely he who provided the occasion for the blasphemy will be under the prophetic curse, which says, Woe to him through whom my name is blasphemed among the nations! Let us consider what things he adds again to what has been said.

If from two perfects, he says, neither in that in which he is God, in this is he man, nor in that in which he is man, in this is he God. But if the composite were granted to be from a deficient and a perfect, according to his argument, will not the same thing be said by those who dare such things, that in that in which he is God he is not man, and in that in which he is man he is not God? For the account of both the divinity and the humanity is different in every way, and no one would suppose the diminution of the humanity to be a definition of the divine nature; for he is not that in this not being or being imperfectly, but each, being understood by itself, is considered in its own terms. For both he who hears 'God' has, through this name, also accepted all that is proper to think about God, and he who accepts the name of 'man' has through this word formed an impression of the whole nature, and the meaning of what is said suffers no confusion in the names, so as to understand the one in the other of the names. For neither is that signified in this, nor this in that, but each of the names remains with its natural meaning, and in no way will their significations be interchanged with one another. But 'the imperfect' and 'the perfect' become for the hearer a basis for other concepts. For we say 'perfect' is that which is completed 3,1.217 in the proper principle of its nature; but 'imperfect' is the opposite. But neither of these, when spoken of itself, signifies either man or God, but to whatever thing or name it might be joined, it suggests that what is signified is to be understood as either full or deficient. How then, if the man were imperfect, is the imperfect established by Apollinarius to be God, as if the mutilation of our nature corresponds to the divinity in the Word?

Again, bringing his argument to what follows, he says: Man cannot save the world, remaining man and being subject to the common corruption of men. I say this too: for if human nature were sufficient to acquire the good for itself, the mystery would be superfluous. But since it was impossible to be beyond death unless God provided salvation, for this reason the light shines in the darkness through the flesh, that it might cast out from the flesh the destruction that comes from darkness. But neither by God, he says, are we saved, unless he is mingled with us. The prose-writer seems to be of sound mind in what he says and brings his soul back to sensible reasonings; for he who speaks of a 'mixture' of things naturally distinct signifies the union. He is mingled, he says, by becoming flesh, that is, man, as the gospel says, that when he became flesh, then he tabernacled among us. And these things do not disagree with sound doctrine, unless some of the weedy seed should be sown in it after this. For this is our argument, or rather, that of the truth, that he tabernacled in us then, when he became flesh, and conversely, he became flesh then, when he tabernacled in us. If, therefore, the flesh is from that from which the tabernacling in us is, then before the virgin was evangelized by Gabriel 3,1.218 the Word was not yet flesh; and he is false who says that the human has descended to us from above and that he was the one before the human nature

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ἡμίσεως προσεφύη τὸ τράγειον ἢ τὸ ἔμπαλιν περὶ τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἐγένετο μίξιν, ὥστε ἀκε ραίῳ τράγῳ προσφυῆναι τὸ ἐλάφιον μέρος, διὰ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὁ μῦθος ὠνόμασεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μετασχεῖν ἑκατέρας τῆς φύσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσις 3,1.216 διερμηνεύει. ὥστε κατὰ τὸν λογογράφον, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεὸς ὁπωσοῦν τὴν συνάφειαν ἔχων, εἴτε πάσης συνδραμούσης τῆς φύσεως εἴτε καὶ ἐλλιπῶς ἐχούσης, τὴν ἄτοπον ἐκείνην τοῦ ὀνόματος συνθήκην οὐ διαφεύξεται. καὶ εἰ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτοῦ μαθόντες οἱ Ἕλληνες κωμῳδοῖεν ἡμῶν τὸ μυστήριον, πάντως ὁ τὴν ἀφορμὴν παρασχὼν τῆς βλασφημίας ἐν τῇ προφητικῇ κατάρᾳ γενήσεται, ἥ φησιν Οὐαὶ δι' οὗ τὸ ὄνομά μου βλασφημεῖται ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν! Οἷα δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις προστίθησι πάλιν, κατανοήσωμεν.

Εἰ ἐκ δύο, φησί, τελείων, οὔτε ἐν ᾧ θεός ἐστιν, ἐν τούτῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ἄνθρωπος, ἐν τούτῳ θεός. εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀπολείποντος καὶ τελείου κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον εἶναι δοθείη τὸ σύγκριμα, ἆρ' οὐχὶ τὸ ἴσον παρὰ τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα τολμώντων ῥηθήσεται, ὅτι ἐν ᾧ θεός ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι θεὸς οὐκ ἔστιν; ἕτερος γὰρ παντὶ τρόπῳ ὅ τε τῆς θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις τὴν ἐλάττωσιν τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ὅρον εἶναι τῆς θείας ὑπονοήσειε φύσεως· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι ἢ ἀτελῶς εἶναι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἑκάτερον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ νοούμενον ἐν ἰδίοις θεωρεῖται ὀνόμασιν. ὅ τε γὰρ θεὸν ἀκούσας, ὅσα περὶ θεοῦ πρέπει νοεῖν, διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας ταύτης συμπαρεδέξατο καὶ ὁ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου προσηγορίαν παραδεξάμενος πᾶσαν τὴν φύσιν διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης ἀνετυπώσατο καὶ οὐδεμίαν ὀνόμασιν ἡ διάνοια τῶν λεγομένων πάσχει, ὥστε ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐννοῆσαι τὸ ἕτερον. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἐν ἐκείνῳ τοῦτο σημαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων τῇ κατὰ φύσιν παραμένει διανοίᾳ καὶ κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον αἱ ἐμφάσεις αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας ὑπαλλαγήσονται. τὸ δὲ ἀτελὲς καὶ τὸ τέλειον ἑτέρων νοημάτων ὑπόθεσις τῷ ἀκούοντι γίνεται. τέλειον μὲν γάρ φαμεν τὸ συμπεπληρω 3,1.217 μένον τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως· ἀτελὲς δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον. οὐθέτερον δὲ τούτων ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενον οὔτε ἄνθρωπον οὔτε θεὸν ἑρμηνεύει, ἀλλ' ᾧπερ ἂν συνονομασθῇ πράγματι ἢ ὀνόματι, ἢ πλῆρες ἢ ἐλλιπὲς τὸ δηλούμενον ἐννοεῖν ὑποτίθεται. πῶς οὖν, εἰ ἀτελὴς εἴη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, θεὸς εἶναι τὸ ἀτελὲς παρὰ τοῦ Ἀπολιναρίου κατασκευάζεται ὡς συμ βαινούσης τῷ λόγῳ τῆς θεότητος τῆς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν κολοβώσεως;

Πάλιν δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐφεξῆς προάγων τὸν λόγον φησίν· Οὐ δύναται σῴζειν τὸν κόσμον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος μένων καὶ τῇ κοινῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φθορᾷ ὑποκεί μενος. φημὶ τοῦτο κἀγώ· εἰ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἦν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις πρὸς τὸ ἑαυτῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν κατακτήσασθαι, περιττὸν τὸ μυστήριον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀμήχανον ἦν ἔξω θανάτου γενέσθαι μὴ θεοῦ τὴν σωτηρίαν πορίσαντος, διὰ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ λάμπει διὰ σαρκός, ἵν' ἐξορίσῃ τῆς σαρκὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ σκότους ἀπώλειαν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὑπὸ θεοῦ, φησί, μὴ ἐπιμιχθέντος ἡμῖν σῳζόμεθα. σωφρονεῖν ἔοικεν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὁ λογογράφος καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔμφρονας λογισμοὺς τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπανάγει· ὁ γὰρ μίξιν εἰπὼν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν διεστώτων σημαίνει τὴν ἕνωσιν. Μίγνυται δέ, φησί, σὰρξ γενόμενος, τουτέστιν ἄνθρωπος, καθὼς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον λέγει, ὅτε σὰρξ ἐγένετο, τότε αὐ τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐσκηνωκέναι. οὐδὲ ταῦτα τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος ἀπᾴδει λόγου, εἰ μή τι παρασπαρείη αὐτῷ μετὰ ταῦτα τῆς ζιζανιώδους σπορᾶς. οὗτος γὰρ ἡμέτερος, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ λόγος, ὅτι τότε ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτε σὰρξ ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, τότε σὰρξ ἐγένετο, ὅτε ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν. εἰ οὖν ἐξ ἐκείνου ἡ σάρξ, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν κατασκή νωσις, ἄρα πρὶν εὐαγγελισθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Γαβριὴλ τὴν παρ 3,1.218 θένον σὰρξ οὐδέπω ὁ λόγος ἦν· καὶ ψευδὴς ὁ λέγων ἐκ τῶν ἄνωθεν καταβεβηκέναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐκεῖνον εἶναι τὸν