organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produces locomotion, but plants do not move as they do not have organs suitable for movement; therefore, the vegetative power is in vain for plants. But if it is not in vain, why did it not give them organs as well? Simply put, the irrational soul is not a cause of motion; for zoophytes do not move. Nor is sensation a cause of motion, since we move both when seeing and not, and when [not] hearing or not perceiving something. Nor is imagination; for it would be necessary to move by impulse at night when we have imaginings. Nor is the intellect, neither the theoretical, as it is not occupied with practical matters (and motion is a practical matter), nor the practical; for even if this {indeed} has choice, through which locomotion occurs, 71 nevertheless it does not cause motion. For this one first acts, in that "I should go and do this," and after <it> has ceased, the motion occurs. The stronger point: irrational creatures, having none of the threefold intellect, are moved. The continent motion comes from the intellect, the incontinent from appetite. Simply, therefore, they [say] the appetitive faculty is the [cause] of [such] motion. Irrational creatures do not have a consciousness of time; for time is incorporeal, the consciousness of time comes to us [with] reason. Time is spoken of in two ways, the definite and the indefinite; definite is that which is measured by night and day and hour, indefinite is summer, winter, and the rest. And irrational creatures also perceive these simply. But some say that irrational creatures also have knowledge of the future; for a lion, having been beaten in one flock, having gone to another is frightened. It does not infer the future from the past, but by imagination it perceives what it sees. Plato says the rational soul is the cause of motion, being bewitched by desire, and for irrational creatures, the irrational soul. He does not disagree with Aristotle; for Plato speaks of the efficient cause, this one of the final cause. The physicians say the organs are the causes of motion, the philosophers say the innate heat. We are moved with locomotion by a pushing and pulling of the feet, that is, an entrance and an exit. If motion is from appetite, why do zoophytes not also move? Of imagination, <the one> for us is deliberative, the other is coordinate with sensation; the deliberative belongs to humans, the coordinate is either confused as in worms or unconfused, and if unconfused, it is either teachable as in parrots or unteachable as in ants. Three things concern motion: that which moves, that <by which> it is moved, and that which is moved. Appetite without consciousness is as in plants and inanimate things; for a stone also desires downward motion. There is appetite with imagination, and another with the intellect. Of ensouled things, some are motionless like plants, and others are moved like animals. And of these, some universally, others partially. And some are under the moon, like zoophytes, and others are above the moon, like the celestial bodies. Zoophytes do not have the more perfect senses, but animals that can walk <have acquired these also>. For 72 the mole has sight, even if it is covered by a thin membrane. Worms, even 72 if they do not have sight, nevertheless nature has filled the need through their softness. Animals that can walk have both a vegetative and a sensitive soul, but the celestial bodies have only a sensitive soul. The Aristotelians say that the celestial bodies do not have sensation; for sensation is concerned with external things, but for celestial bodies, there is nothing external. The center is external. All the senses perceive only the form, but plants perceive the matter also, and they are affected by it and react against it. Among things that are moved in respect to place, some only move, like the hand the staff, the staff moves and is moved, the stone is only moved. Wax is impressed up to a certain point, water more so, air completely, a stone not at all. Touch contributes to being, but the others to well-being; touch is more necessary than the rest. Concerning principles and concerning the union of soul and body You asked whether we should call the genera of things principles and elements, principles as causes, and elements as

ὄργανα. ἔτι ἐν νυκτὶ μᾶλλ[ον ἐν]εργεῖ ἡ θρεπτική, οὐδόλως δὲ ἡ κινητική. ἀπορία· ἡ φυτικὴ ποιεῖ τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, τὰ φυτὰ οὐ κινοῦνται ὡς μὴ ἔχοντα ὄργανα ἐπιτήδεια πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν· λοιπὸν μάτην τοῖς φυτοῖς ἡ φυτικὴ δύναμις. εἰ δὲ μὴ μάτην, πῶς οὐκ ἔδωκε τούτοις καὶ ὄργανα; ἁπλῶς ἡ ἄλογος ψυχὴ οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτία κινήσεως· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ζῳόφυτα κινοῦνται. οὐδ' ἡ αἴσθησις αἰτία κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ βλέποντες καὶ μή, καὶ [μὴ] ἀκούοντες ἤ τινος μὴ αἰσθανόμενοι κινούμεθα. οὐδ' ἡ φαντασία· ἔδει γὰρ νυκτὸς ὅτε φανταζόμεθα κινεῖσθαι καθ' ὁρ[μήν]. οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ὁ μὲν θεωρητικὸς ὡς μὴ περὶ πρακτικὰ καταγινόμενος (ἡ κίνησις δὲ πρακτικόν), οὐδ' ὁ πρακτικός· εἰ {δὲ} γὰρ καὶ προαίρεσιν οὗτος ἔχει δι' ἧς γίνεται ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, 71 ὅμως οὐ κινεῖ. οὗτος γὰρ πρῶτον ἐνεργεῖ, ὅτι «ἀπέλθω καὶ ποιήσω τόδε», καὶ μετὰ <τὸ> παῦσαι γίνεται ἡ κίνησις. τὸ κρεῖττον· τὰ ἄλογα μηδέν τι ἔχοντα τοῦ τριττοῦ νοὸς κινεῖται. Ἡ ἐγκρατὴς κίνησις ἐκ τοῦ νοός, ἡ ἀκρατὴς ἐκ τῆς ὀρέξεως. ἁπλῶς οὖν τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν αἰτί[αν λέγ]ουσι [τ]ῆς [τ]οι[αύ]της κινήσεως. Τὰ ἄλογα οὐκ ἔχει συναίσθησιν χρόνου· ὁ γὰρ χρόνος ἀσώματος, ἡ συναίσθησις τοῦ χρόνου [μετὰ] τοῦ λόγου γίνεται ἡμῖν. ὁ χρόνος διττῶς λέγεται, ὁ ὡρισμένος καὶ ἀόριστος· ὡρισμένος ὁ νυκτὶ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ὥρᾳ μετρούμενος, ἀόριστος τὸ θέρος, ὁ χειμὼν καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τούτων δὲ αἰσθάνεται ἁπλῶς καὶ τὰ ἄλογα. λέγουσι δέ τινες ὡς ἔχουσι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος γνῶσιν τὰ ἄλογα· καὶ γὰρ λέων πληγεὶς ἐν ποίμνῃ ἀπελθὼν εἰς ἑτέραν δεδίττεται. οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρελθόντος συνάγει τὸ μέλλον, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας αἰσθάνεται οὗ βλέπει. Πλάτων τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν αἰτίαν λέγει κινήσεως γοητευθεῖσαν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, τοῖς δ' ἀλόγοις τὴν ἄλογον. οὐ διαφωνεῖ πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην· Πλάτων γὰρ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον λέγει, οὗτος τὸ τελικόν. Οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ ὄργανα λέγουσιν αἴτια κινήσεως, φιλόσοφοι τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμόν. κινούμεθα τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν κατὰ ὦσιν καὶ ἕλξιν τῶν ποδῶν, ἤγουν εἴσοδον καὶ ἔξοδον. Εἰ ἡ κίνησις ἐκ τῆς ὀρέξεως, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ ζῳόφυτα κινοῦνται; τῆς φαντασίας ἡμῖν <ἡ μὲν> βουλευτική, ἡ δὲ σύστοιχος τῇ αἰσθήσει· ἡ βουλευτικὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἡ σύστοιχος ἢ συγκεχυμένη ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν σκωλήκων ἢ ἀσύγχυτος, καὶ εἰ ἀσύγχυτος, ἢ διδακτὴ ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ψιττακῶν ἢ ἀδίδακτος ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν μυρμήκων. Τρία περὶ τὴν κίνησιν, τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ <ᾧ> κινεῖται καὶ τὸ κινούμενον. Ἡ ὄρεξις ἄνευ συναισθήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ φυτῶν καὶ ἀψύχων· ὀρέγεται γὰρ καὶ ὁ λίθος τῆς κάτω φορᾶς. ἔστιν ὄρεξις μετὰ τῆς φαντασίας, καὶ ἑτέρα μετὰ τοῦ νοῦ. Τῶν ἐμψύχων τὰ μὲν ἀκίνητα ὡς τὰ φυτά, τὰ δὲ κινεῖται ὡς τὰ ζῷα. καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν καθόλου, τὰ δὲ μερικῶς. καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ σελήνην ὡς τὰ ζῳόφυτα, τὰ δὲ ὑπὲρ σελήνην ὡς τὰ οὐράνια. τὰ ζῳόφυτα οὐκ ἔχει τὰς τελειοτέρας αἰσθήσεις, τὰ δὲ πορευτικὰ <καὶ ταύτας ἐκτήσατο>. καὶ γὰρ 72 ὁ ἀσπάλαξ ἔχει ὄψιν, εἰ καὶ λεπτῷ χιτῶνι καλύπτεται. οἱ σκώληκες, κἂν 72 καὶ μὴ ἔχωσιν ὄψιν, ἀλλ' οὖν διὰ τῆς μαλακότητος τὴν χρείαν ἡ φύσις ἀνεπλήρωσεν. τὰ πορευτικὰ καὶ φυτικὴν καὶ αἰσθητικὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει, τὰ δὲ οὐράνια μόνην αἰσθητικὴν ἔχει. Λέγουσιν οἱ Ἀριστοτελικοὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσιν αἴσθησιν τὰ οὐράνια· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις περὶ τὰ ἔξω, τῶν οὐρανίων οὐδὲν ἔξω. ἔστιν ἔξω τὸ κέντρον. Πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις τοῦ εἴδους μόνου ἀντιλαμβάνονται, τὰ δὲ φυτὰ καὶ τῆς ὕλης, καὶ πάσχουσιν ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ ἀντιδρῶσιν. Ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τόπον κινουμένοις τινὰ μὲν μόνον κινεῖ, οἷον ἡ χεὶρ τὴν ῥάβδον, ἡ ῥάβδος κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, ὁ λίθος μόνον κινεῖται. ὁ κηρὸς μέχρι τινὸς τυποῦται, τὸ ὕδωρ πλέον, ὁ ἀὴρ διόλου, ὁ λίθος οὐδόλως. Ἡ ἁφὴ εἰς τὸ εἶναι συντελεῖ, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι εἰς τὸ εὖ εἶναι· ἀναγκαιοτέρα λοιπῶν ἡ ἁφή. Περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ περὶ ἑνώσεως ψυχῆς καὶ σώματοσ Ἠρώτησας πότερον τὰ γένη τῶν πραγμάτων ἀρχὰς δεῖ λέγειν καὶ στοιχεῖα, ἀρχὰς μὲν ὡς αἴτια, στοιχεῖα δὲ ὡς