Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to unintelligence. For such souls are neither divine, nor do they participate in a <divine> intellect; for the souls of gods participate through intellect, as was shown previously; nor are [they] receptive of change; for every intellect is participated by things that are always intellectual in substance and in activity (for this too is clear from what went before). 184 Every soul is either divine, or changes from intellect to unintelligence, or is between these, always thinking, but inferior to the divine souls. For if the divine intellect is participated by divine souls, and the merely intellectual intellect by those that are neither divine nor receptive of change from intellection to unintelligence, and there are also those that experience this, sometimes thinking and sometimes not, it is evident that there are three classes of souls: and first are the divine, second among the non-divine are those that always participate in intellect, and third are those that change sometimes to intellect, and sometimes to unintelligence. 185 All divine souls are gods psychically, and all those that participate in the intellectual intellect are always attendants of the gods, and all those receptive of change are at some time attendants of the gods. For if some have the divine light shining upon them from above, and others are always thinking, and others at some time partake of this perfection, then some, in the host of souls, stand in analogy to the gods; and others always accompany the gods, being always active according to intellect, and are dependent on the divine souls, having this relation to them that the intellectual has to the divine; and others, who think at some time, also follow the gods at some time, being able neither to participate in intellect always in the same way nor to revert always with the divine souls (for that which partakes of intellect only at some time can by no means be always united with the gods). 186 Every soul is an incorporeal substance and separable from body. For if it knows itself, and everything that knows itself reverts upon itself, and that which reverts upon itself is neither a body (for every body is unrevertible upon itself) nor inseparable from body (for that which is inseparable from body is not of a nature to revert upon itself; for in this way it would be separated from body), the soul, therefore, is neither a corporeal substance nor inseparable from body. But indeed that it knows itself is evident; for if it knows the things above itself, it is by nature able to know itself to a much greater degree, knowing itself from the causes prior to it. 187 Every soul is indestructible and incorruptible. For everything that is in any way capable of being dissolved and of perishing is either corporeal and composite or has its subsistence in a substrate; and that which is dissolved, since it exists out of many parts, is destroyed; while that whose nature is to be in another, being separated from its substrate, vanishes into not-being. But indeed the soul is both incorporeal and outside of every substrate, being in itself and reverting upon itself. Therefore it is indestructible and incorruptible. 188 Every soul is both life and living. For whatever a soul is present to, this lives of necessity; and that which is deprived of soul is immediately left without a share of life. Either, then, it lives through soul, or through something else and not through soul. But that it lives through something else alone is impossible. For everything that is participated gives either itself or something of itself to the participant, but if it furnishes neither, it would not be participated at all; but soul is participated by that to which it is present, and that which participates in soul is called ensouled. If, then, it bestows life on ensouled things, it is either life, or only living, or both together, at once life and living. But if it is only living, and no longer life, it will be composed of life and not-life; therefore it does not know itself nor revert upon itself; for knowledge is life, and the cognitive, as such, lives; if, then, there is something in it that is without life, this does not have in itself the power of knowing. And if it is only life, it will no longer participate in intellectual life. For that which participates in life is living and not only life; for only the first and unparticipated life is life alone, while that which is after it is at once living and life; but soul is not the unparticipated life. Therefore the soul is at once life and living. 189 Every soul is self-living. For if it is revertible upon itself, and everything revertible upon itself is self-subsistent, then the soul is also self-subsistent and constitutes itself. But indeed it is both life and living, and its existence is in accordance with the vital; for to those things to which it is present it imparts life to it

μέν, νοερὸς δὲ μόνον ὤν, μετ έχεται ὑπὸ ψυχῶν οὔτε θείων οὔτε νοῦ καὶ ἀνοίας ἐν μεταβολῇ γινομένων. οὔτε γὰρ θεῖαι ψυχαί εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται, οὐδὲ νοῦ μετέχουσαι <θείου>· θεῶν γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ νοῦ μετέχουσιν, ὡς δέδεικται πρότερον· οὔτε [αἱ] μεταβολῆς δεκτικαί· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν ἀεὶ καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοερῶν μετέχεται (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν). 184 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἢ θεία ἐστίν, ἢ μεταβάλλουσα ἀπὸ νοῦ εἰς ἄνοιαν, ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀεὶ μὲν νοοῦσα, καταδεεστέρα δὲ τῶν θείων ψυχῶν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θεῖος νοῦς ὑπὸ θείων μετέχεται ψυχῶν, ὁ δὲ νοερὸς μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν μήτε θείων μήτε μεταβολῆς δεκτικῶν ἀπὸ νοήσεως εἰς ἄνοιαν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ τοῦτο πάσχουσαι καὶ ποτὲ μὲν νοοῦσαι, ποτὲ δὲ μή, φανερὸν ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν ψυχῶν εἰσιν· καὶ πρῶται μὲν αἱ θεῖαι, δεύτεραι δὲ τῶν μὴ θείων αἱ ἀεὶ νοῦ μετέχουσαι, τρίται δὲ αἱ ποτὲ μὲν εἰς νοῦν, ποτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄνοιαν μεταβάλλουσαι. 185 Πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ θεῖαι ψυχαὶ θεοί εἰσι ψυχικῶς, πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ τοῦ νοεροῦ μετέχουσαι νοῦ θεῶν ὁπαδοὶ ἀεί, πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ μεταβολῆς δεκτικαὶ θεῶν ὁπαδοὶ ποτέ. εἰ γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἔχουσι τὸ θεῖον φῶς ἄνωθεν ἐπιλάμπον, αἱ δὲ ἀεὶ νοοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ ποτὲ ταύτης μεταλαγχάνουσι τῆς τελειότητος, αἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν ψυχῶν ἀνάλογον ἵστανται θεοῖς· αἱ δὲ ἀεὶ συνέπονται θεοῖς, κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργοῦσαι ἀεί, καὶ τῶν θείων ἐξήρτηνται ψυχῶν, τοῦτον ἔχουσαι πρὸς αὐτὰς λόγον, ὃν τὸ νοερὸν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον· αἱ δὲ ποτὲ νοοῦσαι καὶ ἕπονται ποτὲ θεοῖς, οὔτε νοῦ μετέχειν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως οὔτε ταῖς θείαις συνεπιστρέφεσθαι ψυχαῖς ἀεὶ δυνάμεναι (τὸ γὰρ ποτὲ νοῦ μεταλαγχάνον οὐδεμία μηχανὴ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀεὶ συνάπτεσθαι). 186 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀσώματός ἐστιν οὐσία καὶ χωριστὴ σώματος. εἰ γὰρ γινώσκει ἑαυτήν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἑαυτὸ γινῶσκον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφεται, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφον οὔτε σῶμά ἐστι (πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἀνεπίστροφον) οὔτε σώματος ἀχώριστον (καὶ γὰρ τὸ σώματος ἀχώριστον οὐ πέφυκε πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφειν· χωρίζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ταύτῃ σώματος), ἡ ἄρα ψυχὴ οὔτε σωματική ἐστιν οὐσία οὔτε σώματος ἀχώριστος. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γινώσκει ἑαυτήν, φανερόν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν γινώσκει, καὶ ἑαυτὴν πέφυκε γινώσκειν πολλῷ μειζόνως, ἀπ' αἰτίων τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς γινώσκουσα ἑαυτήν. 187 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀνώλεθρός ἐστι καὶ ἄφθαρτος. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν διαλύεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι δυνάμενον ἢ σωματικόν ἐστι καὶ σύνθετον ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλαχε· καὶ τὸ μὲν διαλυόμενον, ὡς ἐκ πολλῶν ὑπάρχον, φθεί ρεται· τὸ δὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἶναι πεφυκὸς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χωριζό μενον ἀφανίζεται εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἀσώ ματός ἐστι καὶ ἔξω παντὸς ὑποκειμένου, ἐν ἑαυτῇ οὖσα καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστρέφουσα. ἀνώλεθρος ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ ἄφθαρτος. 188 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ καὶ ζωή ἐστι καὶ ζῶν. ᾧ γὰρ ἂν παραγένηται ψυχή, τοῦτο ζῇ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· καὶ τὸ ψυχῆς ἐστερημένον ζωῆς εὐθὺς ἄμοιρον ἀπολείπεται. ἢ οὖν διὰ ψυχὴν ζῇ, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι καὶ οὐ διὰ ψυχήν. ἀλλὰ δι' ἄλλο τι μόνον, ἀδύνατον. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μετεχόμενον ἢ ἑαυτὸ ἢ ἑαυτοῦ τι τῷ μετέχοντι δίδωσι, μηδέτερον δὲ παρέχον, οὐδ' ἂν μετέχοιτο· ψυχὴ δὲ μετέχεται ὑπ' ἐκείνου, ᾧ ἂν παρῇ, καὶ ἔμψυχον ἐκεῖνο λέγεται τὸ ψυχῆς μετέχον. εἰ οὖν ζωὴν ἐπιφέρει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις, ἢ ζωή ἐστιν ἢ ζῶν μόνον ἢ τὸ συνάμφω, ζωὴ ἅμα καὶ ζῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ζῶν μόνον, οὐκέτι δὲ ζωή, ἔσται ἐκ ζωῆς καὶ μὴ ζωῆς· οὐκ ἄρα γινώσκει ἑαυτὴν οὐδὲ ἐπιστρέφεται πρὸς ἑαυτήν· ζωὴ γὰρ ἡ γνῶσις, καὶ τὸ γνωστικόν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, ζῇ· εἰ οὖν τι ἐν αὐτῇ ἄζων ἐστί, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχει καθ' αὑτὸ τὴν τοῦ γινώσκειν δύναμιν. εἰ δὲ ζωὴ μόνον ἐστίν, οὐκέτι μεθέξει τῆς νοερᾶς ζωῆς. τὸ γὰρ ζωῆς μετέχον ζῶν ἐστι καὶ οὐ ζωὴ μόνον· ζωὴ γὰρ μόνον ἡ πρώτη καὶ ἀμέθεκτος, ἡ δὲ μετ' ἐκείνην ζῶν ἅμα καὶ ζωή· ψυχὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ζωή. ἅμα ἄρα ζωή ἐστι καὶ ζῶν ἡ ψυχή. 189 Πᾶσα ψυχὴ αὐτόζως ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ ἐπιστρεπτικὴ πρὸς ἑαυτήν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπι στρεπτικὸν πᾶν αὐθυπόστατον, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα αὐθυπόστατος καὶ ἑαυτὴν ὑφίστησιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ζωή ἐστι καὶ ζῶν, καὶ ἡ ὕπαρξις αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ ζωτικόν· καὶ γὰρ οἷς ἂν παρῇ ζωῆς μεταδίδωσιν αὐτῷ