Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth (De Veritate)

2. Matter is merely a being in potency. Now, if an idea has to correspond to its effect, if matter has an idea, the idea of matter will be merely in potency. There is, however, no potentiality in God. Therefore, first matter has no idea in Him.

3. As they exist in God, the ideas are of those things which are or can be. But first matter does not exist separately, that is, by itself, nor can it so exist. Therefore, it has no idea in God.

4. An idea is that according to which a thing is informed. But first matter can never be informed so that a form would belong to its essence. Therefore, if it did have an idea, that idea would be useless in God. This, however, is absurd.

To the Contrary:

1'. Whatever derives its act of existence from God has an idea in God. Matter belongs to this class of beings. Therefore, it has an idea in God.

2'. Every essence is derived from the divine essence. Therefore, whatever has an essence has an exemplar in God. Matter belongs to this class of beings. Therefore.

REPLY:

Plato, who was the first to speak about ideas, did not posit any idea for first matter, because he asserted that the ideas were the causes of the things modeled upon them, and first matter is not caused by an idea but, instead, is its co-cause. For he said that there are two principles to be found in matter, "the great" and "the small," but only one principle to be found in form, namely, the idea. We, however, assert that matter is caused by God. Hence, it is necessary to affirm that its exemplar in some way exists in God, since He possesses a likeness of whatever He causes.

On the other hand, if we take idea in its strict sense, we cannot say that first matter of itself has an idea in God that is distinct from the idea of the form or of the composite. For an idea, properly speaking, is related to a thing in so far as it can be brought into existence; and matter cannot come into existence without a form, nor can a form come into existence without matter. Hence, properly speaking, there is no idea corresponding merely to matter or merely to form; but one idea corresponds to the entire composite--an idea that causes the whole, both its form and its matter. On the other hand, if we take idea in its broader sense as meaning an intelligible character or likeness, then both matter and form of themselves can be said to have an idea by which they can be known distinctly, even though they cannot exist separately. In this sense, there is no reason why there cannot be an idea of first matter, even taken in itself.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although first matter has no form, there is in it an imitation of the first form; for, even though its act of existence may be very feeble, it is an imitation of the first being. For this reason, its likeness can be in God.

2. The idea and its copy need not be similar according to a conformity in nature. It is enough that one represent the other. For this reason, the idea of even composite things is simple, and, similarly, the idea of a potential being is actual.

3. Even though matter cannot exist by itself, it can be considered in itself. Thus, it can, in itself, have a likeness.

4. That argument refers to the idea inasmuch as it is actually or virtually practical, and is related to a thing in so far as it can be brought into being. First matter does not have an idea of this kind.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. Matter derives its act of existence from God only in so far as it is part of a composite. In this sense, it does not, properly speaking, have an idea in God.

2'. Similarly, matter does not properly have an essence. It is, rather, part of the essence of the whole.