ARTICLE 9

(37) "Naturally speaking, the habit grows up and becomes more rooted in the faculty as the result of repeated individual acts of the same kind. These individual acts are performed as the result of rational deliberation and free choice, though the need of conscious deliberation or actual choice grows less in proportion as the passive indetermination of the faculty diminishes with the repetition of the act. The passive indetermination of the faculty becomes more and more an actual indetermination as it receives more and more deeply, and retains more and more firmly, the impress of the deliberate free-will which moves it."--Carpenter, op. cit. p. 117.

             (38) The question of whether a habit can be caused by a single act, which St. Thomas touches on here in the reply to obj. 11, is answered at length in the Summa: "Habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved (changed) by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive, the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Hence we see that fire does not kindle at once, because it cannot immediately overcome the combustible object; rather it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming the combustible element completely, it may impress its likeness on the object. Now it is manifest that the active principle which is reason cannot completely overcome the appetitive power in one act; because the appetitive power is inclined in various ways and to many things; while reason judges in a single act what should be willed as regards various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby overcome, so as to be inclined, as by nature, to the same thing in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore, a virtuous habit cannot be caused by a single act, but only by many acts.

             "In the apprehensive powers, however, it must be observed that there are two passive principles: one is the possible intellect itself, while the other is what Aristotle (De Anima III, text, 20) calls the passive intellect, which is the particular reason, or the cogitative power, together with the memory and the imagination (cf. I, 79, 2 c. and ad 2). With respect to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to overcome completely, by one act, the power of its passive principle: thus a single self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives firm assent to the conclusion, whereas a probable proposition cannot do this. Hence a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason--even on the part of the possible intellect; whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, as far as the possible intellect is concerned. But as regards the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts must be repeated many times for anything to be impressed firmly on the memory. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that 'meditation strengthens memory.' Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle be of great strength: for instance a strong dose of medicine will sometimes restore health at once."--I-II, 51, 3.

             (39) St. Thomas' position with regard to the possibility and existence of virtues acquired by our acts is commonly received among theologians, although Catholic doctors in general make it a point to emphasize the inferiority of these acquired virtues, as compared with those infused by God, and their absolute insufficiency for attaining a supernatural reward. That God can and sometimes does infuse virtues which, strictly speaking, we could attain to by our own actions (moved and sustained, of course, by God), is also maintained in the Thomistic doctrine on virtue:

             "Man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Since the notion of good consists in 'mode, species, and order,' as Augustine declares (De Natura Boni, iii), or in 'number, weight, and measure,' as we are told in Wisd. 11/21, man's good must be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as we said above (q. 19, aa. 3, 4), namely, human reason and Divine law. And since the Divine law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason is ruled by the Divine law as well; but the converse is not true.

             "It follows that human virtue ordered to a good which is laid down according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts; inasmuch as these acts proceed from reason, by whose power the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which orders man to a good defined by Divine law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, whose principle is reason, but is caused in us by the Divine action alone. Hence Augustine, in defining this latter type of virtue, inserts the phrase: 'which God works in us, without us' (Super Ps. CXVIII; Serm. xxvi)."--I-II, 63, 2.

             (40) "Certain philosophers, whom Avicenna follows, held that all forms are from a giver of forms, and that a natural agent does nothing except dispose for these forms.

             "Avicenna said, likewise, that science and virtue are from a giver, and that the soul is disposed by study and exercise for receiving the influx of these habits.

             "However, this position eliminates natural virtue, which is in every natural principle for the purpose of making something like to itself, according as the matter on which it acts is receptive of its likeness. This is necessarily true from the fact that every agent acts in so far as it is in act. Hence everything which is actually something must be capable of being in some way the active principle of what it actually is. And so every natural principle is naturally apt to induce its own likeness through its action.

             "Therefore, since the principles of the sciences and the virtues are naturally sown in us, as has been said, it necessarily follows that, by actions proceeding from these principles, the habits of the virtues and sciences are brought to perfection. Indeed, experience testifies to this; for by habitual (accustomed) action, what was previously difficult is made easy and delightful, and delight in an operation is a sign of an acquired habit."--In III Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, Sol. 2.

             (41) At first sight it may seem odd, yet the principles or "seeds" of the acquirable virtues, which pre-exist in us by nature, before any operation on our part, are really more important and more excellent than the virtues themselves, which are firmly established and brought to perfection by our repeated efforts. St. Thomas explains why this is so: "These principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them. Thus, the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which is the result of the participation by the appetite in reason, which is brought about by moral virtue." I-II, 63, 2 ad 3. Thomas adds that it is thanks to the inherent possession of these "seeds of virtue" that man is at all able to acquire further perfections. A little reflection recalls to mind the further truth that the innate inclinations to virtue are the immediate and exclusive handiwork of God, while the virtues which we acquire must be attributed to ourselves, as secondary causes, as well as to the First Cause and First Mover of all creatures. In this light, it is recognized as inevitable that the works of Almighty God should excel immeasurably those of His creatures.