ARTICLE 10

(42) In his tract on the habits in general, before taking up the consideration of good habits or virtues, St. Thomas establishes the fact that the habits can be and, in fact, are infused into man by God:

             "Certain habits are infused by God into man, and this for two reasons:

             "The first reason is that there are some habits whereby man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, and this end is man's ultimate and perfect beatitude, as stated above (q. 5, a. 5). Since habits must be proportionate to that to which man is disposed by them, it follows of necessity that those habits which dispose to this end must exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore, such habits can never be in man, except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all the virtues which are freely given.

             "The second reason is, that God can produce the effects of secondary causes without these secondary causes, as we noted in the First Part (q. 105, a. 6). Hence, just as, in order to manifest His power, He sometimes causes health without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also for the manifestation of His Power, He sometimes infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by man's natural power. Thus to the Apostles He gave the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by habit, but not so perfectly." I-II, 51, 4.

             In the first place St. Thomas argues to the infusion of essentially supernatural virtues; and in the second, to those which are of their very nature proportionate to man's powers, but which derive their supernatural character from the mode in which they are received, viz., by Divine infusion.

             (43) Before giving any further notes on the theological doctrine of infused virtue, the declarations of the Church's magisterium must be carefully considered.

             As early as 1201, theological opinions concerning the infusion of grace and the virtues were officially recognized by the Church. In that year the great Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) enumerated three opinions in this regard: (1) Faith, Charity and the other virtues are not infused into infants at Baptism, because the babes do not exercise any consent (recall St. Thomas' own statement: "Infused virtue is caused in us by God, without any action on our part, not, however, without our consent."--Art. 2, ad 20, in the text, above); (2) Through baptism, sin is forgiven them, but no grace is conferred on the infants; (3) Both sin is forgiven and virtues are infused, so that the infants possess the latter as habits, but do not enjoy their use until they reach the age of discretion." Innocent does no more than state the three opinions which in his day enjoyed varying favor; he does not go on to declare his own mind in this particular matter.

             Pope Clement V (1305-1314), together with the Fifteenth Oecumenical Council of Vienne (1311-1312), took up this question and declared on it unequivocally. Condemning the errors of Peter John Olivi, concerning the effects of baptism in infants, Clement stated that, in virtue of the universal efficacy of the Death of Christ, which is applied equally to all who are baptized, the opinion which holds that in baptism informing grace and the virtues are conferred on both infants and adults is the more probable opinion, as being more in harmony with the teachings of the saints and of contemporary theologians. Clement adds that the Council also approves of this stand. Although this statement appears in a solemn declaration, it must be noted that it defends the doctrine of infused virtues only as "more probable."

             The Council of Trent, explaining the doctrine of justification and its cause, declares that by the merits of Christ's Passion "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us" (Rom. 5/5), and that this charity inheres in the just. Whence, in the actual justification, along with the remission of sins, faith, hope, and charity are all simultaneously infused into man through the merits of Jesus Christ. The Council goes on to explain why these virtues must accompany one another, in their perfect state.

             In the canons on justification, of the same Session, anathema is pronounced on anyone who denies that grace and charity are diffused in the hearts of the just by the Holy Spirit, and inhere therein.

             Pronouncing on the nature and cause of merit, the Tridentine Fathers declare that Jesus Christ Himself, as the head of the members (Eph. 4/15) and the vine in the branches (Jn. 15/5), continuously infuses virtue into those who are justified, which virtue always antecedes their good works, and accompanies and follows upon them as well, and without which these same works can in no manner whatever be rendered meritorious and pleasing to God.

             The statements given here are all those which have been formally pronounced concerning the existence of infused virtues in general. Declarations on the three theological virtues in particular are numerous, and may be traced in Denzinger, Index system, XIb, XIc, and XId.

             (44) Along with, and ever under the direction and authority of, the magisterium of the Church, all Catholic theologians, ancient, medieval, and modern, unanimously teach that there are infused theological virtues. The conclusion of the majority of theologians is that (1) it is proximate to the faith that the theological virtues are infused with grace, and that (2) it is the truer and more common opinion that all the moral virtues and the gifts are also infused with grace. The latter conclusion is denied by no theologian today: There are as many infused moral virtues as there are acquired moral virtues. Indeed, the many definitions of the Church, interpreted and dutifully explained by Catholic theologians, demand the affirmation or supposition, in the supernatural organism of the soul, of the existence of certain well-determined aptitudes, dependent on the grace of Christ and unacquirable by us, and dwelling in the soul as permanent faculties, by way of habit. The positive function of Sacred Doctrine will be to inquire into and establish, by theological reasoning, the existence of these infused virtues; while Theology will exercise its speculative and scientific office, to acquire some idea of their nature and mode of operation. Saint Thomas is concerned chiefly with the latter function--which is an indication that the existence of the infused virtues was a commonly accepted doctrine in his day. Moreover, we may presume that these supernatural habits are not without some relation or analogy to our natural habits: and it is on this score that St. Thomas broaches the question: "Natural reason cannot argue to a state of grace in man, for in origin, in essence, and in consequences, it is supernatural. But this, at any rate, we can know demonstratively, namely, that if grace is given to man it will be given to him as a perfection compatible with and based upon His God-given nature. Any other conclusion would militate against the wisdom of the Creator. It is this alone that makes possible an analysis of the virtuous operation of man constituted in grace; it is this that justifies our . . . approach to supernatural virtues through the medium of the natural. It may be, indeed must be, taken for granted therefore that the various human faculties and their respective functions are essentially the same in the supernatural as in the natural order. There is the same co-ordination of these faculties in view of the ultimate end and object of existence. It follows that there is the same need for a perfecting of these faculties by means of virtue, for there must be the same habitual orientation of the whole man towards his ultimate end."

             The argument, then, for the existence of infused, supernatural virtues will look to the dynamic needs of man, constituted in grace or justified, and ordered to a supernatural end. It is the universal Providence of God, which extends to all things "sweetly and strongly," which persuades the theologian, grounded on his Catholic faith, of the existence of the infused virtues: "It is unfitting that God should provide less for those whom His love has destined to the attainment of a supernatural good, than for those creatures for whom His love has prepared a natural good. Now He so provides for natural creatures, that He not only moves them to their natural operations, but He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are principles of acts, so that they might be inclined of themselves to this movement. And so the motion whereby they are moved by God is made connatural to and easy for creatures, according to Wisd. 8/1: 'she . . . ordereth all things sweetly.' Much more, therefore, does He infuse into those whom He moves to the attainment of an eternal, supernatural good, certain forms of supernatural qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly, to the attainment of an eternal good."--I-II, 110, 2.

             (45) The difference between the infused and the acquired moral virtues is a special problem in itself, and is taken up by St. Thomas in I-II, 63, 4. For a more lengthy and detailed account of this question, cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, The Three Ages of the Interior Life, Vol. I, pp. 58-66. Father Garrigou-Lagrange exposes the doctrine clearly and simply, and offers admirable comments on its ramifications on the spiritual life.--It may be noted that theologians distinguish between virtues which are infused per se and those which are infused per accidens. They classify under the former title those virtues which of their proper nature can be effectively produced in us only by God, namely, the theological virtues. Per accidens infused virtues are those which, by their nature, can be acquired by our acts, but which, by Divine dispensation, are actually infused. Thus, all those virtues which of themselves are acquirable were infused into our First Parent, and also into Our Lord. Cf. 1, 95, 3 and III, 7, 1 and 2.

             (46) St. Thomas treats briefly and pointedly the difference between acquired and infused virtue in his Commentary on the Sentences:

             "Acquired and infused virtues differ specifically, fortitude from fortitude and temperance from temperance, and so for the rest; because, as we have said, in actions, ends are as principles.

             "If there were a science which could not be reduced to those principles which are naturally known, it would not be of the same species as the other sciences, nor would science be understood univocally of all.

             "Wherefore, since the ends of the infused virtues do not pre-exist in the natural 'seed-beds' of virtues, but exceed human nature; it follows that the infused virtues must be specifically different from the acquired virtues which spring from those seeds. Hence also the former perfect man in another sort of life: the acquired virtues, in civic life, the infused, in the spiritual life which derives from grace and by which the virtuous man is a member of the Church."--In III Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2 Sol. 4.

             "Although the acts of the acquired and of the infused virtues may be materially the same, nevertheless, they are not the same acts formally. For by acquired virtue circumstances are ordered according to their proportion to the civil good; whereas by infused virtue they are ordered according to their proportion to the good of eternal glory. Hence also, what is excessive according to the norms of civic virtue may be truly moderate, according to infused virtue; for example, that a man fast or offer himself voluntarily to die in defense of the faith."--Ibid., ad 2.

             (47) The necessity of infused virtues for salvation is expressed in the three following propositions: (1) Infused virtues are absolutely necessary, that a man be formally just and holy. "But without faith it is impossible to please God." (Heb. 11/6); "And you, employing all care, minister in your faith, virtue" (2 Pet. 1/5). (2) Infused habits are absolutely necessary, that supernatural acts may be performed with due proportion and connaturality, i.e., that they may be elicited according to the conditions which their nature postulates, by a principle which is duly proportioned to them. (3) Infused habits are not absolutely necessary for performing supernatural acts, if it be a question of acts which, although good and salutary, nevertheless are not connaturally and duly proportioned to the nature of such habits; e.g., in unreconciled penitents, there may be true acts of faith and of hope, etc.

             (48) "The ultimate good which the philosopher considers is other than that considered by the theologian.

             "For the philosopher considers as the ultimate good what is proportionate to human powers, and consists in an act of man himself; hence he says that beatitude is a certain operation. And so, according to the philosopher, a good act, whose principles is called a virtue, is said to be such absolutely in so far as it is convenient to a power, as perfecting the latter. Wherefore, whatever habit the philosopher finds eliciting such an act, he calls a virtue; whether it be in the intellective part, as science and the intellectual virtues of this sort, whose act is the good of the power itself, which is the consideration of truth; or in the affective part, such as temperance and fortitude and the other moral virtues.

             "But the theologian considers as the ultimate good what exceeds the faculty of nature, namely, eternal life, as we said above. Hence he does not consider that good is to be found absolutely in human acts, because he does not place the end in these, but he considers the good of human acts as ordered to that good which he holds to be the end: asserting that an act is completely good only when it is proximately ordered to the ultimate good, that is, when it is meritorious of eternal life; every such act he calls a virtuous act; and whatever habit elicits such an act, is called by him a virtue.

             "However, an act cannot be said to be meritorious, except as it is constituted in the power of the agent: because one who merits must exhibit something; nor can he exhibit anything, save what is in some way his own, that is, from himself. Now an act is truly in our power when it is subject to our will; whether it belong to the will as elicited by it, as to love and to will; or whether it be imperated by the will, as walking and talking. Hence, with respect to any such act, a virtue can be assigned, eliciting the aforesaid acts in the class of acts mentioned above."--De Veritate, q. 3, a. 14.