Against Lying.

 1. A great deal for me to read hast thou sent, my dearest brother Consentius: a great deal for me to read: to the which while I am preparing an answer

 2. Perceivest thou not how much this reasoning aideth the very persons whom as great game we make ado to catch by our lies? For, as thyself hast shown

 3. Which sentence dishonoreth the holy Martyrs, nay rather taketh away holy martyrdoms altogether. For they would do more justly and wisely, according

 4. Of lies are many sorts, which indeed all, universally, we ought to hate. For there is no lie that is not contrary to truth. For, as light and darkn

 5. Well then, let us set before our eyes a cunning spy as he makes up to the person whom he has already perceived to be a Priscillianist he begins wi

 6. It remains, then, that what the Priscillianists think, according to the nefarious falsity of their heresy, of God, of the soul, of the body, and th

 7. And, what is more miserable, even they, already made as it were our own, cannot find how they may believe us. For if they suspect that even in the

 8. But now observe how more tolerable in comparison with us is the lying of the Priscillianists, when they know that they speak deceitfully: whom by o

 9. When therefore we teach ours to blaspheme God that the Priscillianists may believe them theirs, let us see what evil themselves say when they there

 10. Ever, my brother, in such cases, it behoves with fear to recollect, “Whoso shall deny Me before men, I will deny him before My Father which is in

 11. “But, hidden wolves,” thou wilt say, “clad in sheep’s clothing, and privily and grievously wasting the Lord’s flock, can we no otherwise find out.

 12. “But,” thou wilt say, “we more easily penetrate their concealment if we pretend to be ourselves what they are.” If this were lawful or expedient,

 13. Or haply is it so, that he who plots in this way to find out Priscillianists, denies not Christ, forasmuch as with his mouth he utters what with h

 14. Wherefore, that which is written, “Who speaketh the truth in his heart,” is not so to be taken, as if, truth being retained in the heart, in the m

 &gt 15. And as for that saying of the Apostle, “Putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbor, for we are members one of another,” far b

 16. For there were even in the Apostles’ times some who preached the truth not in truth, that is, not with truthful mind: of whom the Apostle saith th

 17. Wherefore, though there be indeed many ways in which latent heretics may be sought out, without vituperating the catholic faith or praising hereti

 18. It does indeed make very much difference, for what cause, with what end, with what intention a thing be done: but those things which are clearly s

 19. Some man will say, “So then any thief whatever is to be accounted equal with that thief who steals with will of mercy?” Who would say this? But of

 20. But, what must be confessed, to human minds certain compensative sins do cause such embarrassment, that they are even thought meet to be praised,

 21. If then to sin, that others may not commit a worse sin, either against us or against any, without doubt we ought not it is to be considered in th

 22. And to holy David indeed it might more justly be said, that he ought not to have been angry no, not with one however ungrateful and rendering evi

 23. But in all our doings, even good men are very greatly embarrassed in the matter of compensative sins so that these are not esteemed to be sins, i

 24. Touching Jacob, however, that which he did at his mother’s bidding, so as to seem to deceive his father, if with diligence and in faith it be atte

 25. Nor have I undertaken that in the present discourse, as it more pertains to thee, who hast laid open the hiding-places of the Priscillianists, so

 26. To show then that some things in the Scriptures which are thought to be lies are not what they are thought, if they be rightly understood, let it

 27. There are some things of this sort even of our Saviour in the Gospel, because the Lord of the Prophets deigned to be Himself also a Prophet. Such

 28. Hence is also that which thou hast mentioned that they speak of, that the Lord Jesus, after He was risen, walked in the way with two disciples an

 29. Because, therefore, lying heretics find not in the books of the New Testament any precedents of lying which are meet to be imitated, they esteem t

 30. But why do these persons think they may imitate Tamar telling a lie, and not think they may imitate Judah committing fornication? For there they h

 31. But he who says that some lies are just, must be judged to say no other than that some sins are just, and therefore some things are just which are

 32. But, as for that which is written, that God did good to the Hebrew midwives, and to Rahab the harlot of Jericho, this was not because they lied, b

 33. It remains then that we understand as concerning those women, whether in Egypt or in Jericho, that for their humanity and mercy they received a re

 34. But some man will say, Would then those midwives and Rahab have done better if they had shown no mercy, by refusing to lie? Nay verily, those Hebr

 35. Since these things are so, because it were too long to treat thoroughly of all that in that “Pound” of Dictinius are set down as precedents of lyi

 36. But for that we are men and among men do live, and I confess that I am not yet in the number of them whom compensative sins embarrass not, it oft

 37. Add to this, (and here is cause to cry out more piteously,) that, if once we grant it to have been right for the saving of that sick man’s life to

 38. But infirmity pleadeth its part, and with favor of the crowds proclaims itself to have a cause invincible. Where it contradicts, and says, “What w

 39. But, some man will say, “Strong meat is for them that are perfect.” For in many things a relaxation by way of indulgence is allowed to infirmity,

 40. But sometimes a peril to eternal salvation itself is put forth against us which peril, they cry out, we by telling a lie, if otherwise it cannot

 41. Either then we are to eschew lies by right doing, or to confess them by repenting: but not, while they unhappily abound in our living, to make the

38. But infirmity pleadeth its part, and with favor of the crowds proclaims itself to have a cause invincible. Where it contradicts, and says, “What way is there among men, who without doubt by being deceived are turned aside from a deadly harm to others or themselves, to succor men in peril, if our affection as men may not incline us to lie?” If it will hear me patiently, this crowd of mortality, crowd of infirmity, I will say somewhat in answer on the behalf of truth. Surely at the least pious, true, holy chastity is not otherwise than of the truth: and whoso acts against it, acts against truth. Why then, if otherwise it be not possible to succor men in peril, do I not also commit whoredom, which is therefore contrary to truth, for that it is contrary to chastity, and yet, to succor men in peril, do speak a lie which most openly is contrary to truth itself? Wherein hath chastity so highly deserved at our hands, and truth offended us? When all chastity is of the truth, and not the body’s but the mind’s chastity is truth, yea, in the mind dwelleth even the body’s chastity. Lastly, as I shortly before said, and say again, whoever for the recommending and defending of any lie speaks against me, what speaks he, if he speaks not truth? Now if he is therefore to be heard because he speaks truth, how wishes he to make me, by speaking truth, a liar? How does lying take unto itself truth as its patroness? Or, is it for her own adversary that she conquers, that by herself she may be conquered? Who can bear this absurdity? In no wise therefore may we say, that they who assert that it is sometimes right to lie, in asserting that are truthful; lest, what is most absurd and foolish to believe, truth should teach us to be liars. For what sort of thing is it, that no man learns of chastity that we may commit adultery; that we may offend God none learns of piety; that we may do any man harm, none learns of kindness; and that we may tell lies, we are to learn of truth! But then if this thing truth teaches not, it is not true; if not true, it is not meet to be learned; if not meet to be learned, never therefore is it meet to tell a lie.

CAPUT XIX.

38. Ut periclitanti subveniatur si non committendum stuprum, ita nec loquendum mendacium. Si aliquo modo permittuntur mendacia, metuendum ne usque ad perjuria et blasphemias progrediantur. Pejerare et blasphemare qua ratione differant. Sed agit partes suas infirmitas et causam invincibilem faventibus turbis se habere proclamat. Ubi contradicit, et dicit: Quomoda apud homines, qui procul dubio si 0545 falluntur, avertuntur a pernicie vel aliena vel sua, periclitantibus subvenitur hominibus, si nos humanus ad mentiendum non inclinet affectus? Si patienter me audiat turba mortalitatis, turba infirmitatis, respondebo aliquid pro negotio veritatis. Certe pia, vera, sancta castitas non nisi ex veritate est: et quisquis adversus eam facit, profecto adversus veritatem facit. Cur ergo et si non possit aliter periclitantibus subveniri, non committo stuprum, quod ideo est contrarium veritati, quia contrarium est castitati; et ut periclitantibus subveniatur, loquor mendacium, quod ipsi apertissime est contrarium veritati? Quid nos tantum promeruit castitas, et offendit veritas? cum omnis ex veritate sit castitas, et sit non corporis, sed mentis castitas veritas, atque in mente habitet etiam corporis castitas . Postremo, quod et paulo ante dixi et iterum dico, quisquis mihi pro persuadendo et defendendo ullo mendacio contradicit, quid dicit, si verum non dicit? Si autem propterea est audiendus quoniam verum dicit, quomodo me vult facere verum dicendo mendacem? Quomodo mendacium patronam sibi adhibet veritatem? An adversario suo vincit, ut a se ipsa vincatur ? Quis hanc absurditatem ferat? Nullo ergo modo dixerimus, eos qui asserunt aliquando esse mentiendum, id asserendo esse veraces; ne, quod est absurdissimum et stultissimum credere, veritas nos doceat esse mendaces. Quale est enim, ut esse adulterandum nemo discat a castitate, Deum offendendum nemo discat a pietate, cuiquam nocendum nemo discat a benignitate, et esse mentiendum discamus a veritate? Porro si hoc non docet veritas, non est verum: si non est verum, non est discendum: si non est discendum, nunquam est igitur mentiendum.