The Five Books Against Marcion.
Book I. Wherein is described the god of Marcion. …
Chapter III.—The Unity of God. He is the Supreme Being, and There Cannot Be a Second Supreme.
Chapter XXVII.—Dangerous Effects to Religion and Morality of the Doctrine of So Weak a God.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Tables Turned Upon Marcion, by Contrasts, in Favour of the True God.
Chapter II.—Why Christ’s Coming Should Be Previously Announced.
Chapter III.—Miracles Alone, Without Prophecy, an Insufficient Evidence of Christ’s Mission.
Chapter V.—Sundry Features of the Prophetic Style: Principles of Its Interpretation.
Chapter VIII.—Absurdity of Marcion’s Docetic Opinions Reality of Christ’s Incarnation.
Chapter X.—The Truly Incarnate State More Worthy of God Than Marcion’s Fantastic Flesh.
Chapter XI.—Christ Was Truly Born Marcion’s Absurd Cavil in Defence of a Putative Nativity.
Chapter XII.—Isaiah’s Prophecy of Emmanuel. Christ Entitled to that Name.
Chapter XVI.—The Sacred Name Jesus Most Suited to the Christ of the Creator. Joshua a Type of Him.
Chapter XVII.—Prophecies in Isaiah and the Psalms Respecting Christ’s Humiliation.
Chapter XIX.—Prophecies of the Death of Christ.
Chapter XXI.—The Call of the Gentiles Under the Influence of the Gospel Foretold.
Chapter XXIV.—Christ’s Millennial and Heavenly Glory in Company with His Saints.
Book IV. In Which Tertullian Pursues His…
In the scheme of Marcion, on the contrary, the mystery edition the
Chapter VII.—If God Had Anyhow Checked Man’s Liberty, Marcion Would Have Been Ready with Another and Opposite Cavil. Man’s Fall Foreseen by God. Provision Made for It Remedially and Consistently with His Truth and Goodness.
By such a conclusion all is reserved480 Salva. unimpaired to God; both His natural goodness, and the purposes of His governance and foreknowledge, and the abundance of His power. You ought, however, to deduct from God’s attributes both His supreme earnestness of purpose481 Gravitatem. and most excellent truth in His whole creation, if you would cease to inquire whether anything could have happened against the will of God. For, while holding this earnestness and truth of the good God, which are indeed482 Sed, for scilicet, not unfrequent with our author. capable of proof from the rational creation, you will not wonder at the fact that God did not interfere to prevent the occurrence of what He wished not to happen, in order that He might keep from harm what He wished. For, since He had once for all allowed (and, as we have shown, worthily allowed) to man freedom of will and mastery of himself, surely He from His very authority in creation permitted these gifts to be enjoyed: to be enjoyed, too, so far as lay in Himself, according to His own character as God, that is, for good (for who would permit anything hostile to himself?); and, so far as lay in man, according to the impulses of his liberty (for who does not, when giving anything to any one to enjoy, accompany the gift with a permission to enjoy it with all his heart and will?). The necessary consequence,483 That is, from the Marcionite position referred to in the second sentence of this chapter, in opposition to that of Tertullian which follows. therefore, was, that God must separate from the liberty which He had once for all bestowed upon man (in other words, keep within Himself), both His foreknowledge and power, through which He might have prevented man’s falling into danger when attempting wrongly to enjoy his liberty. Now, if He had interposed, He would have rescinded the liberty of man’s will, which He had permitted with set purpose, and in goodness. But, suppose God had interposed; suppose Him to have abrogated man’s liberty, by warning him from the tree, and keeping off the subtle serpent from his interview with the woman; would not Marcion then exclaim, What a frivolous, unstable, and faithless Lord, cancelling the gifts He had bestowed! Why did He allow any liberty of will, if He afterwards withdrew it? Why withdraw it after allowing it? Let Him choose where to brand Himself with error, either in His original constitution of man, or in His subsequent abrogation thereof! If He had checked (man’s freedom), would He not then seem to have been rather deceived, through want of foresight into the future? But in giving it full scope, who would not say that He did so in ignorance of the issue of things? God, however, did foreknow that man would make a bad use of his created constitution; and yet what can be so worthy of God as His earnestness of purpose, and the truth of His created works, be they what they may? Man must see, if he failed to make the most of484 Si non bene dispunxisset. the good gift he had received, how that he was himself guilty in respect of the law which he did not choose to keep, and not that the Lawgiver was committing a fraud against His own law, by not permitting its injunctions to be fulfilled. Whenever you are inclined to indulge in such censure485 Peroraturus. (and it is the most becoming for you) against the Creator, recall gently to your mind in His behalf486 Tibi insusurra pro Creatore. His earnestness, and endurance, and truth, in having given completeness487 Functo. to His creatures both as rational and good.
CAPUT VII.
Hac definitione omnia Deo salva sunt; et natura bonitatis, et ratio dispositionis, et praescientiae et potentiae 0293A copia. Exigere tamen a Deo debes et gravitatem summam et fidem praecipuam in omni institutione ejus, ut desinas quaerere an Deo nolente potuerit quid evenire. Tenens enim gravitatem et fidem Dei boni, sed rationalibus institutionibus ejus vindicandas, nec illud miraberis, quod Deus non intercesserit adversus ea quae noluit evenire, ut conservaret ea quae voluit . Si enim semel homini permiserat arbitrii libertatem et potestatem, et digne permiserat, sicut ostendimus, utique fruendas eas ex ipsa institutionis auctoritate permiserat; fruendas autem quantum in ipso, secundum ipsum, id est secundum Deum, id est in bonum: quis enim adversus se permittet aliquid? quantum vero in homine, secundum motus libertatis ipsius Quis enim non hoc 0293B praestat ei, cui quid semel frui praestat, ut pro animo et arbitrio suo fruatur? Igitur consequens erat uti Deus secederet a libertate semel concessa homini, id est contineret in semetipso et praescientiam et praepotentiam suam, per quas intercessisse potuisset, quo minus homo male libertate sua frui adgressus, in periculum laberetur. Si enim intercessisset, rescidisset arbitrii libertatem, quam ratione et bonitate permiserat. Denique, puta intercessisse, puta rescidisse illum arbitrii libertatem dum revocat ab arbore, dum ipsum circumscriptorem colubrum a congressu foeminae arcet, nonne exclamaret Marcion: O dominum futilem, instabilem, infidelem, rescindentem quae instituit! Cur permiserat liberum arbitrium, si intercedit? cur intercedit, si permisit? 0293C Eligat ubi semetipsum erroris notet, in institutione, an in rescissione. Nonne tunc magis deceptus ex impraescientia futuri videretur, cum obstitisset? et quod quasi ignorans quomodo evasurum esset indulserat, quis non diceret? Sed etsi praescierat male hominem institutione sua usurum, quid tam dignum Deo, quam gravitas, quam fides institutionum qualiumcumque? Vidisset homo si non bene dispunxisset quod bene acceperat; ut ipse legi reus fuisset cui obsequi noluisset, non ut legislator ipse fraudem legi suae faceret, non sinendo praescriptum ejus impleri. Haec dignissime peroraturus in Creatorem, si libero arbitrio hominis ex providentia et potentia, quas exigis, 0294A obstitisset, nunc tibi insusurra pro Creatore et gravitatem, et patientiam, et fidem, institutionibus suis functo, ut et rationalibus et bonis.