§26. It will not do to apply this conception, as drawn out above, of the Father and Son to the Creation, as they insist on doing: but we must contemplate the Son apart with the Father, and believe that the Creation had its origin from a definite point.

But perhaps some of the opponents of this will say, ‘The Creation also has an acknowledged beginning; and yet the things in it are not connected in thought with the everlastingness of the Father, and it does not check, by having a beginning of its own, the infinitude of the divine life, which is the monstrous conclusion this discussion has pointed out in the case of the Father and the Son. One therefore of two things must follow. Either the Creation is everlasting; or, it must be boldly admitted, the Son is later in time (than the Father). The conception of an interval in time will lead to monstrous conclusions, even when measured from the Creation up to the Creator.’

One who demurs so, perhaps from not attending closely to the meaning of our belief, fights against it with alien comparisons which have nothing to do with the matter in hand. If he could point to anything above Creation which has its origin marked by any interval of time, and it were acknowledged possible by all to think of any time-interval as existing before Creation, he might have occasion for endeavouring to destroy by such attacks that everlastingness of the Son which we have proved above. But seeing that by all the suffrages of the faithful it is agreed that, of all things that are, part is by creation, and part before creation, and that the divine nature is to be believed uncreate (although within it, as our faith teaches, there is a cause, and there is a subsistence produced, but without separation, from the cause), while the creation is to be viewed in an extension of distances,—all order and sequence of time in events can be perceived only in the ages (of this creation), but the nature pre-existent to those ages escapes all distinctions of before and after, because reason cannot see in that divine and blessed life the things which it observes, and that exclusively, in creation. The creation, as we have said, comes into existence according to a sequence of order, and is commensurate with the duration of the ages, so that if one ascends along the line of things created to their beginning, one will bound the search with the foundation of those ages. But the world above creation, being removed from all conception of distance, eludes all sequence of time: it has no commencement of that sort: it has no end in which to cease its advance, according to any discoverable method of order. Having traversed the ages and all that has been produced therein, our thought catches a glimpse of the divine nature, as of some immense ocean, but when the imagination stretches onward to grasp it, it gives no sign in its own case of any beginning; so that one who after inquiring with curiosity into the ‘priority’ of the ages tries to mount to the source of all things will never be able to make a single calculation on which he may stand; that which he seeks will always be moving on before, and no basis will be offered him for the curiosity of thought.

It is clear, even with a moderate insight into the nature of things, that there is nothing by which we can measure the divine and blessed Life. It is not in time, but time flows from it; whereas the creation, starting from a manifest beginning, journeys onward to its proper end through spaces of time; so that it is possible, as Solomon somewhere93    Compare Eccles. iii. 1–11; and viii. 5, “and a wise man’s heart discerneth both time and judgment.” says, to detect in it a beginning, an end, and a middle; and mark the sequence of its history by divisions of time. But the supreme and blessed life has no time-extension accompanying its course, and therefore no span nor measure. Created things are confined within the fitting measures, as within a boundary, with due regard to the good adjustment of the whole by the pleasure of a wise Creator; and so, though human reason in its weakness cannot reach the whole way to the contents of creation, yet still we do not doubt that the creative power has assigned to all of them their limits and that they do not stretch beyond creation. But this creative power itself, while circumscribing by itself the growth of things, has itself no circumscribing bounds; it buries in itself every effort of thought to mount up to the source of God’s life, and it eludes the busy and ambitious strivings to get to the end of the Infinite. Every discursive effort of thought to go back beyond the ages will ascend only so far as to see that that which it seeks can never be passed through: time and its contents seem the measure and the limit of the movement and the working of human thought, but that which lies beyond remains outside its reach; it is a world where it may not tread, unsullied by any object that can be comprehended by man. No form, no place, no size, no reckoning of time, or anything else knowable, is there: and so it is inevitable that our apprehensive faculty, seeking as it does always some object to grasp, must fall back from any side of this incomprehensible existence, and seek in the ages and in the creation which they hold its kindred and congenial sphere.

All, I say, with any insight, however moderate, into the nature of things, know that the world’s Creator laid time and space as a background to receive what was to be; on this foundation He builds the universe. It is not possible that anything which has come or is now coming into being by way of creation can be independent of space or time. But the existence which is all-sufficient, everlasting, world-enveloping, is not in space, nor in time: it is before these, and above these in an ineffable way; self-contained, knowable by faith alone; immeasurable by ages; without the accompaniment of time; seated and resting in itself, with no associations of past or future, there being nothing beside and beyond itself, whose passing can make something past and something future. Such accidents are confined to the creation, whose life is divided with time’s divisions into memory and hope. But within that transcendent and blessed Power all things are equally present as in an instant: past and future are within its all-encircling grasp and its comprehensive view.

This is the Being in which, to use the words of the Apostle, all things are formed; and we, with our individual share in existence, live and move, and have our being94    Acts xvii. 28; Col. i. 17.. It is above beginning, and presents no marks of its inmost nature: it is to be known of only in the impossibility of perceiving it. That indeed is its most special characteristic, that its nature is too high for any distinctive attribute. A very different account to the Uncreate must be given of Creation: it is this very thing that takes it out of all comparison and connexion with its Maker; this difference, I mean, of essence, and this admitting a special account explanatory of its nature which has nothing in common with that of Him who made it. The Divine nature is a stranger to these special marks in the creation: It leaves beneath itself the sections of time, the ‘before’ and the ‘after,’ and the ideas of space: in fact ‘higher’ cannot properly be said of it at all. Every conception about that uncreate Power is a sublime principle, and involves the idea of what is proper in the highest degree95    καὶ τὸν τοῦ κυριωτάτου λόγον ἐπέχει·.

We have shewn, then, by what we have said that the Only-begotten and the Holy Spirit are not to be looked for in the creation but are to be believed above it; and that while the creation may perhaps by the persevering efforts of ambitious seekers be seized in its own beginning, whatever that may be, the supernatural will not the more for that come within the realm of knowledge, for no mark before the ages indicative of its nature can be found. Well, then, if in this uncreate existence those wondrous realities, with their wondrous names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are to be in our thoughts, how can we imagine, of that pre-temporal world, that which our busy, restless minds perceive in things here below by comparing one of them with another and giving it precedence by an interval of time? For there, with the Father, unoriginate, ungenerate, always Father, the idea of the Son as coming from Him yet side by side with Him is inseparably joined; and through the Son and yet with Him, before any vague and unsubstantial conception comes in between, the Holy Spirit is found at once in closest union; not subsequent in existence to the Son, as if the Son could be thought of as ever having been without the Spirit; but Himself also owning the same cause of His being, i.e. the God over all, as the Only-begotten Light, and having shone forth in that very Light, being divisible neither by duration nor by an alien nature from the Father or from the Only-begotten. There are no intervals in that pre-temporal world: and difference on the score of being there is none. It is not even possible, comparing the uncreate with the uncreated, to see differences; and the Holy Ghost is uncreate, as we have before shewn.

This being the view held by all who accept in its simplicity the undiluted Gospel, what occasion was there for endeavouring to dissolve this fast union of the Son with the Father by means of the creation, as if it were necessary to suppose either that the Son was from everlasting along with the creation, or that He too, equally with it, was later? For the generation of the Son does not fall within time96    The generation of the Son does not fall within time. On this “eternal generation” Denys (De la Philosophie d’Origéne, p. 452) has the following remarks, illustrating the probable way that Athanasians would have dealt with Eunomius: “If we do not see how God’s indivisibility remains in the co-existence of the three Persons, we can throw the blame of this difficulty upon the feebleness of our reason: while it is a manifest contradiction to admit at one and the same time the simplicity of the Uncreated, and some change or inequality within His Being. I know that the defenders of the orthodox belief might be troubled with their adversaries’ argument. (Eunom. Apol. 22.) ‘If we admit that the Son, the energy creative of the world, is equal to the Father, it amounts to admitting that He is the actual energy of the Father in Creation, and that this energy is equal to His essence. But that is to return to the mistake of the Greeks who identified His essence and His energy, and consequently made the world coexist with God.’ A serious difficulty, certainly, and one that has never yet been solved, nor will be; as all the questions likewise which refer to the Uncreated and Created, to eternity and time. It is true we cannot explain how God’s eternally active energy does prolong itself eternally. But what is this difficulty compared with those which, with the hypothesis of Eunomius, must be swallowed? We must suppose, so, that the ᾽Αγέννητος, since His energy is not eternal, became in a given place and moment, and that He was at that point the Γεννητός. We must suppose that this activity communicated to a creature that privilege of the Uncreated which is most incommunicable, viz. the power of creating other creatures. We must suppose that these creatures, unconnected as they are with the ᾽Αγέννητος (since He has not made them), nevertheless conceive of and see beyond their own creator a Being, who cannot be anything to them. [This direct intuition on our part of the Deity was a special tenet of Eunomius.] Finally we must suppose that these creatures, seeing that Eunomius agrees with orthodox believers that the end of this world will be but a commencement, will enter into new relations with this ᾽Αγέννητος, when the Son shall have submitted all things to the Father.”, any more than the creation was before time: so that it can in no kind of way be right to partition the indivisible, and to insert, by declaring that there was a time when the Author of all existence was not, this false idea of time into the creative Source of the Universe.

Our previous contention, therefore, is true, that the everlastingness of the Son is included, along with the idea of His birth, in the Father’s ungeneracy; and that, if any interval were to be imagined dividing the two, that same interval would fix a beginning for the life of the Almighty;—a monstrous supposition. But there is nothing to prevent the creation, being, as it is, in its own nature something other than its Creator and in no point trenching on that pure pre-temporal world, from having, in our belief, a beginning of its own, as we have said. To say that the heavens and the earth and other contents of creation were out of things which are not, or, as the Apostle says, out of “things not seen,97    Heb. xi. 1; 2 Cor. iv. 18.” inflicts no dishonour upon the Maker of this universe; for we know from Scripture that all these things are not from everlasting nor will remain for ever. If on the other hand it could be believed that there is something in the Holy Trinity which does not coexist with the Father, if following out this heresy any thought could be entertained of stripping the Almighty of the glory of the Son and Holy Ghost, it would end in nothing else than in a God manifestly removed from every deed and thought that was good and godlike. But if the Father, existing before the ages, is always in glory, and the pre-temporal Son is His glory, and if in like manner the Spirit of Christ is the Son’s glory, always to be contemplated along with the Father and the Son, what training could have led this man of learning to declare that there is a ‘before’ in what is timeless, and a ‘more honourable’ in what is all essentially honourable, and preferring, by comparisons, the one to the other, to dishonour the latter by this partiality? The term in opposition98    ἀντιδιαστολὴ to the more honourable makes it clearer still whither he is tending.

Ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐρεῖ τις τῶν ἐνισταμένων τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι καὶ ἡ κτίσις ὁμολογουμένην ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἔχει, καὶ οὔτε συνεπινοεῖται τῇ ἀϊδιότητι τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τὰ γενόμενα οὔτε ἵστησι διὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἀρχῆς τὸ ἀόριστον τῆς θείας ζωῆς, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐξεταζόμενος ὁ λόγος τὴν ἀτοπίαν ὑπέδειξεν: ὡς ἀκόλουθον εἶναι διὰ τούτου ἢ καὶ τὴν κτίσιν συναΐδιον τῷ θεῷ ἢ καὶ τὸν υἱὸν μεταγενέστερον ἀφόβως λέγειν. ὁ γὰρ τοῦ διαστήματος λόγος ὁμοίως ὑποδείξει τὸ ἄτοπον καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως ἐπὶ τὸν πεποιηκότα διαμετρούμενος. ὁ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνθυποφέρων οὐκ ἀκριβῶς τάχα τῇ διανοίᾳ τοῦ δόγματος ἐπιστὰς διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ παντάπασιν ἀκοινωνήτων τοῦ προκειμένου τὴν πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα ποιεῖται μάχην. εἰ μὲν γάρ τι τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν κτίσιν δεικνύειν εἶχεν ἔν τινι διαστηματικῷ σημείῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχον τῆς ὑποστάσεως, καὶ τοῦτο παρὰ πάντων ὡμολογεῖτο δυνατὸν εἶναι, τὴν τοῦ διαστήματος ἔννοιαν καὶ πρὸ τῆς κτίσεως ἐννοεῖν, εἶχεν ἂν ἴσως καιρὸν τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἀποδειχθεῖσαν διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀϊδιότητα τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἀναλύειν πειρᾶσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάσαις ταῖς τῶν εὐσεβούντων ψήφοις ὁμολογεῖται, ὅτι πάντων τῶν ὄντων τὸ μὲν διὰ τῆς κτίσεώς ἐστι, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῆς κτίσεως, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν θεία φύσις ἄκτιστος εἶναι πεπίστευται, ἐν ᾗ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ ἐξ αἰτίου τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἀδιαστάτως ἔχειν ὁ τῆς εὐσεβείας διδάσκει λόγος, τῆς δὲ κτίσεως ἐν παρατάσει τινὶ διαστηματικῇ θεωρουμένης, πᾶσα χρονικὴ τάξις καὶ ἀκολουθία τῶν γεγονότων διὰ τῶν αἰώνων καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ προαιώνιος φύσις ἐκπέφευγε τὰς κατὰ τὸ « πρεσβύτερόν » τε καὶ νεώτερον διαφορὰς τῷ μὴ συνθεωρεῖσθαι τῇ θείᾳ τε καὶ μακαρίᾳ ζωῇ, ὅσα περὶ τὴν κτίσιν ἰδίως ὁ λόγος βλέπει. ἡ μὲν γὰρ κτίσις πᾶσα, καθὼς εἴρηται, κατά τινα τάξεως ἀκολουθίαν γεγενημένη τῷ τῶν αἰώνων διαστήματι παραμετρεῖται, καὶ εἴ τις ἀνίοι τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τῆς τῶν κτισθέντων ἀκολουθίας ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν γεγονότων ἀρχήν, τῇ τῶν αἰώνων καταβολῇ περιορίσει τὴν ζήτησιν. ἡ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν κτίσιν οὐσία ἅτε παντὸς διαστηματικοῦ νοήματος κεχωρισμένη πᾶσαν χρονικὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐκπέφευγεν, ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς εἰς οὐδὲν πέρας δι' οὐδενὸς τρόπου τοῦ κατά τινα τάξιν εὑρισκομένου προϊοῦσα καὶ καταλήγουσα. τῷ γὰρ διαβάντι τοὺς αἰῶνας καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς γεγονότα καθάπερ τι πέλαγος ἀχανὲς ἡ τῆς θείας φύσεως θεωρία τοῖς λογισμοῖς προφανεῖσα οὐδὲν δώσει σημεῖον ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς γνωριστικὸν ἀρχῆς τινος τῷ εἰς τὰ ἐπέκεινα διατείνοντι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν: ὥστε τὸν πολυπραγμονοῦντα τὸ τῶν αἰώνων πρεσβύτερον καὶ ἀνιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὴν ἐν μηδενὶ στῆναι τῷ λογισμῷ δυνηθῆναι, ἀεὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου ὑπεκπροθέοντος καὶ μηδεμίαν στάσιν τῇ πολυπραγμοσύνῃ τῆς διανοίας ὑποδεικνύοντος.
Σαφὴς δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ τῷ μετρίως ἐπεσκεμμένῳ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, ὅτι τῇ μὲν θείᾳ τε καὶ μακαρίᾳ ζωῇ τὸ παραμετρούμενόν ἐστιν οὐδέν. οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνης ὁ χρόνος: ἡ δὲ κτίσις ἀπό τινος ὁμολογουμένης πάντως ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὸν ἴδιον σκοπὸν διὰ τῶν χρονικῶν διαστημάτων ὁδεύουσα φέρεται, ὡς ταύτης μὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι, καθώς φησί που ὁ Σολομών, ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος καὶ μεσότητα διασκοπῆσαι, διὰ τῶν χρονικῶν τμημάτων τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν κατ' αὐτὴν σημειούμενον. ἡ δὲ ὑπερκειμένη τε καὶ μακαρία ζωὴ ἅτε μηδενὸς συμπαροδεύοντος αὐτῇ διαστήματος τὸ διαμετροῦν καὶ διαλαμβάνον οὐκ ἔχει. τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγονότα πάντα τοῖς ἰδίοις μέτροις ἐμπεριγεγραμμένα κατὰ τὸ ἀρέσαν τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ κτίσαντος οἷόν τινι ὅρῳ τῷ προσήκοντι μέτρῳ ὡς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς εὐαρμοστίαν ἐμπεριείληπται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κἂν τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν ἀνέφικτος « ᾖ » ἡ τῶν ἐν τῇ κτίσει θεωρουμένων ἔφοδος, ἀλλ' οὖν τὸ πεπερατῶσθαι τὰ πάντα τῇ τοῦ πεποιηκότος δυνάμει καὶ ἐντὸς εἶναι τῶν τῆς κτίσεως ὅρων οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλεται: ἡ δὲ ποιητικὴ τῶν ὄντων δύναμις τὴν τῶν γεγονότων ἐν ἑαυτῇ περιγράφουσα φύσιν αὐτὴ τὸ περιέχον οὐκ ἔχει, πᾶν νόημα τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θείας ζωῆς ἀνελθεῖν ἐπειγόμενον ἐντὸς ἑαυτῆς κατακλείουσα καὶ πάσης περιεργίας καὶ φιλοπραγμοσύνης τῆς πρὸς τὸ πέρας τοῦ ἀορίστου φθάσαι φιλονεικούσης ὑπερεκπίπτουσα. ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ μετὰ τοὺς αἰῶνας ἄνοδος καὶ διάστασις τοῦ νοῦ τοσοῦτον ὑψωθήσεται μόνον, ὅσον κατιδεῖν τὸ τοῦ ζητουμένου ἀδιεξίτητον, καὶ ἔοικεν οἷόν τι μέτρον καὶ ὅρος τῆς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν κινήσεως καὶ ἐνεργείας ὁ αἰὼν καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς τούτων εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ὑπερκείμενα τούτων ἄληπτα καὶ ἀνεπίβατα λογισμοῖς μένει, παντὸς τοῦ δυναμένου ὑπὸ κατάληψιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐλθεῖν καθαρεύοντα. ἐν οἷς γὰρ οὐκ εἶδος, οὐ τόπος, οὐ μέγεθος, οὐ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ χρόνου μέτρον οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν καταληπτῶν ἐπινοεῖται, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἡ καταληπτικὴ τοῦ νοῦ δύναμις, ζητοῦσά τινος περιδράξασθαι « τῶν » περὶ τοὺς αἰῶνας καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις κτίσιν, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς ἑαυτῇ καὶ ὁμόφυλον συνιζήσει, τῆς ἀλήπτου φύσεως πανταχόθεν ἀπολισθαίνουσα.
Παντὶ γὰρ οἶμαι τοῦτο γνώριμον εἶναι τῷ καὶ μετρίως ἐπεσκεμμένῳ τὰ ὄντα, ὅτι τοὺς αἰῶνας καὶ τὸν ἐν τούτοις τόπον οἷόν τι χώρημα δεκτικὸν τῶν γινομένων προκαταβαλλόμενος ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς ἐν τούτοις κτίζει τὰ πάντα. οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεταί τι τῶν διὰ κτίσεως γεγονότων ἢ γινομένων μὴ πάντως ἢ ἐν τόπῳ ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν. ἡ δὲ ἀπροσδεὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐμπεριεκτικὴ φύσις οὔτ' ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τούτων καὶ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κατὰ τὸν ἄφραστον λόγον αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς διὰ μόνης τῆς πίστεως θεωρεῖται, οὔτε αἰῶσι παραμετρουμένη οὔτε χρόνοις συμπαρατρέχουσα, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἑστῶσα καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ καθιδρυμένη, οὔτε τῷ παρῳχηκότι οὔτε τῷ μέλλοντι συνδιαιρουμένη: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι τι παρ' αὐτὴν ἔξω αὐτῆς, οὗ παροδεύοντος τὸ μέν τι παρέρχεται τὸ δὲ μέλλει. ταῦτα γὰρ ἴδια τῶν ἐν τῇ κτίσει τὰ πάθη, πρὸς ἐλπίδα καὶ μνήμην κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου διαίρεσιν τῆς ζωῆς σχιζομένης: ἐκείνῃ δὲ τῇ ὑψηλῇ καὶ μακαρίᾳ δυνάμει, ᾗ πάντα κατὰ τὸ ἐνεστὸς ἀεὶ πάρεστιν ἐπίσης, καὶ τὸ παρῳχηκὸς καὶ τὸ προσδοκώμενον ὑπὸ τῆς περιεκτικῆς τῶν πάντων δυνάμεως ἐγκρατούμενα καθορᾶται.
Αὕτη τοίνυν ἡ οὐσία ἐστίν, ἐν ᾗ πάντα, καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, συνέστηκε, καὶ οἱ καθ' ἕκαστον τοῦ εἶναι μετέχοντες ζῶμέν τε καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν, ἡ ἀνωτέρα μὲν πάσης ἀρχῆς, σημεῖα δὲ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως οὐ παρεχομένη, ἀλλ' ἐν μόνῳ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι καταληφθῆναι γινωσκομένη. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτῆς ἰδιαίτατον γνώρισμα, τὸ παντὸς χαρακτηριστικοῦ νοήματος ὑψηλοτέραν αὐτῆς εἶναι τὴν φύσιν. ἡ τοίνυν κτίσις διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ ἀκτίστῳ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῆς πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα συγκρίσεώς τε καὶ κοινωνίας χωρίζεται, τῇ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν λέγω διαφορᾷ καὶ τῷ ἴδιον ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ τὸν παραστατικὸν τῆς φύσεως ἐπιδέχεσθαι λόγον οὐδὲν ἐπικοινωνοῦντα τῷ ἐξ οὗ γέγονεν. ἡ δὲ θεία φύσις πάντων τῶν ἰδιαζόντως ἐπιθεωρουμένων τῇ κτίσει σημείων ἀλλοτρίως ἔχουσα κάτω ἑαυτῆς καταλείπει τά τε χρονικὰ τμήματα, τὸ « πρεσβύτερον » λέγω καὶ τὸ νεώτερον καὶ τὰς τοπικὰς ἐπινοίας, ὡς μηδὲ « ἀνώτερον » ἐπ' αὐτῆς τι κυρίως λέγεσθαι. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ νοούμενον ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκτίστου δυνάμεως ἄνω ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τὸν τοῦ « κυριωτάτου » λόγον ἐπέχει.
Ἐπεὶ οὖν δέδεικται διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων μὴ ἐν τῇ κτίσει τὸν μονογενῆ υἱὸν καὶ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πνεῦμα « δεῖν » διερευνᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἄνω τῆς κτίσεως πιστεύειν εἶναι, ἡ μὲν κτίσις ἐπί τινος ἰδιαζούσης ἀρχῆς διὰ τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα ζητεῖν φιλονεικούντων ἴσως καταληφθήσεται, τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ ταύτην οὐδὲν ἂν διὰ τούτων μᾶλλον εἰς γνῶσιν ἔλθοι, οὐδενὸς ἐν αὐτῷ σημείου δεικτικοῦ πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων εὑρισκομένου. εἰ οὖν ἐν τῇ ἀκτίστῳ φύσει νοεῖται τὰ θαυμαστὰ πράγματά τε καὶ ὀνόματα, ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, πῶς ἔσται δυνατόν, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν κάτω περιεργαζομένη καὶ πολυπραγμονοῦσα καταλαμβάνει ἡ ἔννοια, ἕτερον ἑτέρου συγκριτικῶς ὑπερτιθεῖσα διά τινος χρονικοῦ διαστήματος, τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκτίστου καὶ προαιωνίου νομίζειν οὐσίας εἶναι; ἐν ᾗ πατὴρ μὲν ἄναρχος καὶ ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀεὶ πατὴρ νοεῖται, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὸ προσεχὲς ἀδιαστάτως ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ συνεπινοεῖται, δι' αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ, πρίν τι κενόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόστατον διὰ μέσου παρεμπεσεῖν νόημα, εὐθὺς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον συνημμένως καταλαμβάνεται, οὐχ ὑστερίζον κατὰ τὴν ὕπαρξιν μετὰ τὸν υἱόν, ὥστε ποτὲ τὸν μονογενῆ δίχα τοῦ πνεύματος νοηθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχον τοῦ εἶναι, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ μονογενές ἐστι φῶς, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ φωτὸς ἐκλάμψαν, οὔτε διαστήματι οὔτε φύσεως ἑτερότητι τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἀποτεμνόμενον. διάστημα μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς προαιωνίου φύσεως οὐκ ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν διαφορὰ οὐδεμία. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι δυνατὸν ἀκτίστου πρὸς ἄκτιστον διαφορὰν ἐννοῆσαι, ἄκτιστον δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, καθὼς ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν ἀποδέδεικται λόγοις.
Τούτων οὖν οὕτως ἔχειν ὑπειλημμένων παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς καταδεχομένοις τὸν ἰδιωτισμὸν τοῦ ἁπλουστέρου κηρύγματος, τίνα καιρὸν ἔχει τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα συνάφειαν διὰ τῆς κτίσεως ἀναλύειν πειρᾶσθαι, ὡς ἐπάναγκες εἶναί τι καὶ ταύτῃ συναΐδιον ἢ καὶ τὸν υἱὸν μεταγενέστερον οἴεσθαι; οὔτε γὰρ ἡ γέννησις τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἐντὸς τῶν αἰώνων οὔτε ἡ κτίσις πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων, ὥστε οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ προσήκει τὴν ἀδιάστατον φύσιν καταμερίζεσθαι, καὶ μεταξὺ τῆς πάντων ποιητικῆς αἰτίας διαστηματικήν τινα παρενείρειν ὑπόνοιαν ἐν τῷ λέγειν ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸν πᾶσι δεδωκότα τὸ εἶναι. οὐκοῦν ἀληθὴς ὁ προαποδεδομένος λόγος, ὅτι τῇ μὲν ἀγεννησίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς ἡ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἀϊδιότης γεννητῶς συνεπινοεῖται: εἰ δέ τι διάστημα μεταξὺ νομισθείη, ᾧ ἡ γέννησις τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ζωῆς διατέμνεται, τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ζωῆς τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων θεοῦ ὁρισθήσεται, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. τὴν δὲ κτίσιν κωλύει οὐδέν, ἄλλο τι οὖσαν κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, ἀπό τινος ἰδιαζούσης νοηθῆναι ἀρχῆς, καθὼς ἔφαμεν, κατ' οὐδὲν τῇ ἀκηράτῳ καὶ προαιωνίῳ φύσει συμβαίνουσαν. τὸ γὰρ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ἤ, ὥς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, ἐκ μὴ φαινομένων οὐρανὸν ἢ γῆν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐν τῇ κτίσει θεωρουμένων γεγενῆσθαι λέγειν οὐδεμίαν τῷ ποιητῇ τῶν ὅλων ἀδοξίαν προστρίβεται, ἐπεὶ καὶ μεμαθήκαμεν παρὰ τῆς θείας γραφῆς μήτε ἐξ ἀϊδίου ταῦτα εἶναι μήτε εἰσαεὶ διαμένειν. εἰ δέ τι τῶν ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ τριάδι πεπιστευμένων μὴ ἀεὶ συνυπάρχειν τῷ πατρὶ πιστευθείη, ἀλλά τις κατὰ τὸν τῆς αἱρέσεως λόγον ἐπινοηθείη διάνοια γυμνοῦσά ποτε τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸν τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος δόξης οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ θείου πράγματός τε καὶ νοήματος κατὰ τὸν τῆς αἱρέσεως λόγον ὁ θεὸς κεχωρισμένος ἐπιδειχθήσεται. εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἔνδοξος ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ὑπάρχων πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων, δόξα δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ προαιώνιος υἱός, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ δόξα τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀεὶ συνθεωρούμενον τῷ υἱῷ καὶ τῷ πατρί, πόθεν ὁ σοφὸς οὗτος καὶ ἐκ ποίας παιδεύσεως τὸ « πρεσβύτερον » ἐν τοῖς ἀχρόνοις καὶ τὸ « τιμιώτερον » ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τιμίοις ἀποφαίνεται, συγκριτικῶς ὑπερτιθεὶς τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον καὶ διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς προτιμήσεως τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἀτιμάζων; ἡ γὰρ ἀντιδιαστολὴ τοῦ « τιμιωτέρου » φανερωτέρα πάντως ἐστὶν εἰς ὅ τι φέρει.