ARTICLE 11

(49) St. Thomas' doctrine on the increase of infused virtue, in I-II, 66, 1, is an application, with due considerations and reservations, of his teaching on the increase of habits in general, to which he devotes an extraordinarily long and difficult article, q. 52, a. 1. The matter itself is intricate enough on the natural level, and becomes positively mysterious and elusive when it is a question of supernatural virtue. Two more articles in q. 52 discuss the mode in which habits may be increased; and the same doctrine is treated, more concisely, in Thomas' Comment. in X Ethics, lect. 3. The holy Doctor broaches the problem in q. 52, a. 1, by a consideration of the signification of the terms "increase" and "perfection," wherein he indicates the analogous usages of these concepts. This is followed by an account of four opinions among philosophers concerning the intensity and remissness of habits. The general positions of these four schools are alluded to in the present Article of The Virtues in General. They were as follows: (1) Habits themselves are susceptible of more and less, because they are material qualities: Plotinus and other (neo-) Platonists. (2) Habits are not of themselves susceptible of more and less, but their subjects are so affected, in respect of the degree to which they possess the habits: an opinion alluded to by Aristotle in the Categories, c. 6. (3) Some habits, such as the arts, are of themselves susceptible of more and less, and some, such as the virtues, are not: the Stoics. (4) Qualities are immaterial forms, and so are not susceptible of more and less, but material forms are. Having stated the positions maintained by his predecessors, St. Thomas examines the matter himself:

             "In order that the truth of this matter be made manifest, we must observe that that whereby a thing receives its species must be something fixed and stable and, as it were, indivisible: for whatever attains to these conditions are contained under a species, and whatever falls short of them, more or less, pertains to another species, more or less perfect. Hence in VIII Metaphys. (S. Thos. lect. 3), the Philosopher says that the species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction varies the species. If, therefore, a form or any other thing, either in respect of itself or in respect of something of itself, takes on the ratio of a species, it follows of necessity that, considered in itself, it must have a determined nature, which can neither further increase nor further diminish. Of this nature are heat and whiteness and other similar qualities, which are not denominated by a relation to something else: and, a fortiori, substance, which is being per se.--However, those things which receive their species from something to which they are ordered, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less, and nevertheless remain specifically the same, because of the unity of that to which they are ordered and from which they receive their species. Thus motion is more intense or more remiss in itself, and yet remains specifically the same, on account of the unity of the term, by which it is specified. The same may be observed of health: for a body attains the perfection of health according as its dispositions are agreeable to animal nature, to which diverse conditions can be convenient Hence the body's disposition can vary more or less, and yet the form of health will remain throughout. The Philosopher, therefore, says in X Ethics, c. 3, that 'health itself is susceptible of more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one and the same person; but it can decrease to a certain point, and yet remain health.' However, these diverse measures or dispositions of health are spoken of by way of excess and a point exceeded (excedens et excessum): wherefore, if the name of health were attributed only to the most perfect measure, then health itself would not be spoken of as greater or less.--Thus it is clear how a quality or form can, in itself, be increased or diminished, and how it cannot.

             "But if we were to consider quality or form according to the participation of their subject, then we should also find that certain qualities and forms are susceptible of more and less, while others are not. Simplicius assigns as the cause of this diversity the fact that substance cannot in itself be susceptible of more or less, because it is being per se. And so every form which is participated substantially by its subject lacks intenseness and remissness: hence in the genus of substance, nothing is predicated according to more or less. Because quantity is close to substance, and because figure likewise follows quantity, therefore, neither in these is anything spoken of as more or less. Hence the Philosopher says, in VII Physics, c. 3, that when anything receives form or figure, it is not said to be altered but rather to become (fieri).--But other qualities, which are further removed from substance, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more and less, as regards the participation of their subject.

             "However, the reason for this diversity can be even more fully explained. For, as we have said, that from which a thing has its species, must remain fixed, stationary, and indivisible. Therefore, it can happen in two ways that a form is not participated according to more and less. In one way, because the participant has its species according to that form. And thus no substantial form is participated according to more and less; for which reason the Philosopher says, in VIII Metaphys. (S. Thos. lect. 3) that: 'just as number cannot be more nor less, so neither can a substance (substantial form) which determines a species,' that is, as regards the participation of a specific form; 'but as regards its matter,' that is, according to material dispositions, more and less is found in substance.--It may happen in another way, from the fact that indivisibility itself is of the ratio of form: hence it must be that, if anything participates this form, it will participate of it according to the nature of indivisibility. Hence it is that the species of numbers are not spoken of according to more and less; because each species thereof is by an indivisible unit. The same may be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two cubits long, three cubits long; of (quantitative) relations, as double and triple; and of figures, as triagonal and tetragonal. Aristotle gives this explanation in the Predicaments, c. 6, where assigning the reason why figures are not susceptible of more and less, he says: 'Things which receive the nature of triangle and of circle, are all similarly triagonal or circular;' because indivisibility is of their very ratio, whence whatever participates in their ratio must participate in it indivisibily.

             "Thus it is clear that, since habits and dispositions are predicated according to their relation or order to something, as it says in VII Physics, c. 3, intenseness and remissness in habits and dispositions can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves: as we speak of greater or lesser health; or greater or lesser science, which embraces more or fewer truths.--Secondly, according to the participation of a subject: as the same (aequalis) science or health is received by one subject more than by another, according to the diverse aptitude resulting either from nature or from habit (custom). For habit and disposition do not give the subject its species: nor again do they include indivisibility in their concepts."--I-II, 52, 1. St. Thomas adds in closing: "We shall say later how this applies to the virtues." Note that in the Sed Contra of this article, St. Thomas cites the words spoken by the disciples to Our Lord: "Lord, increase our faith." (Luke 17/5) In q. 66, a. 1 S.c.: "Unless your justice abound more than the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter the kingdom of heaven." (Matt. 5/20); and "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." (Vulg: virtus) (Prov. 15/5).

             St. Thomas treats profusely of the increase of the virtue of charity, an important theological question, especially for the spiritual life. Cf. II-II, q. 24, aa. 4-10, In Ep. ad Hebr. 10/25. Father Garrigou-Lagrange presents a concise and beautiful exposition of St. Thomas' doctrine in The Three Ages, I, c. 7, pp. 129-140.

             (50) St. Thomas' teaching on the increase of virtue may be summed up in the following outline:

A virtue may be increased

 (1) Intensively: by a firmer radication in its subject, which it actuates more with respect to its perfection (thus: charity, cf. II-II, 24, 4 ad 3).

 (2) Extensively:

  (a) intrinsically: the virtue is perfected in itself by attaining the force to extend to new material objects, which it could not attain before (the intellectual virtues).

  (b) extrinsically: the virtue is extended merely by way of application to a new material object, without being perfected any further in itself (the moral virtues.)

 Note that extensive increase can be found along with intensive increase in virtue. For the basis of this schema, cf. I-II, 52, 2.