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for which they philosophize, they turn to mocking. On account of such men, therefore, let us select some suitable place for being by ourselves. And a certain rich man among them, who always possessed a place about him with foliage of every kind, said: Since a very great heat is burning, let us withdraw a short distance from the city into my gardens. And so, going forward, they sat down, where there were clear streams of cool waters and the green shade of all sorts of trees. There I gladly sat down, and the rest around me, and being quiet, instead of using a voice to ask me, by gazing at me they were clearly demanding the fulfillment of the promise. And so then I began to speak thus: There is a great difference, O men of Greece, between truth and custom. For truth, when genuinely sought, is found; but custom, of whatever sort it has been received, whether true or false, is established by itself without examination, and the one who has received it is neither pleased with it for being true nor displeased with it for being false. For such a person has believed not by judgment, but by prejudice, having committed his own hope to an uncertain chance by the opinion of those before him. and it is not easy to put off the ancestral garment, even if it is shown to him very clearly to be foolish and ridiculous. For instance, I say that the entire culture of the Greeks is a most grievous invention of an evil demon. For some of them introduced many gods, and these evil and subject to every passion, so that the one wanting to do similar things may not even feel shame (which is proper to man), having as an example the evil and shameful lives of the mythological gods. And by not even feeling shame, such a one displays not even a hope of repentance. Others introduced fate, the so-called nativity, contrary to which no one is able to suffer or to do anything. Therefore, in like manner, this is the same as the first. For one, believing that contrary to nativity no one can either suffer or act, easily comes to sinning—and having sinned, he does not repent of the impious things he has done, bringing forward the excuse that he was compelled to do them by nativity—and as one unable to set his nativity right, for the sins he commits he does not even have shame. And others introduce an unprovidential motion, as if all things move about automatically, with no master presiding over them. And to believe these things in this way, as we have said, happens to be the most grievous of all opinions. For since there is no one who presides and provides, and who allots to each according to their deserts, they easily do everything they are able to on account of their fearlessness. Whence not easily (or perhaps not at all) do those who think such things become temperate; for they do not foresee the returning danger. But the doctrine of the Jews, barbarians (as you say), is most pious, introducing one Father and Creator of this universe, by nature good and just; good, on the one hand, as forgiving the sins of those who repent, and just, on the other hand, as proceeding against each one who does not repent according to the deserts of their deeds. This doctrine, even if it happens to be a myth, being at least pious, would not be unprofitable for life. For each person, in expectation of being judged by the all-seeing God, receives a greater impulse toward being temperate. But if the doctrine should also be true, it has delivered the temperate

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σιν δι' ὃ φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τὸ χλευάζειν τρέπονται. διὰ δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους ἐπι- τήδειόν τινα πρὸς τὸ ἰδιάζειν τόπον ἐπιλεξώμεθα. Καί τις ἐν αὐτοῖς πλούσιος ἀνὴρ καὶ διὰ παντὸς χῶρόν τινα περὶ ἑαυτὸν κεκτημένος πανμούσων φύλλων ἔφη· Ἐπειδὴ σφόδρα καῦμα ἐπιφλέγει, βραχὺ τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἐμοὺς κήπους ὑποχωρήσωμεν. καὶ δὴ προϊόν- τες ἐκαθέζοντο, ἔνθα ἦν καθαρὰ ψυχρῶν ναμάτων ·εύματα καὶ δένδρων παντοίων χλοερὰ σκέπη. ἔνθα ἐγὼ ἀσμένως ἐκαθεζόμην καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ περὶ ἐμέ, καὶ ἡσυχάζοντες ἀντὶ τῆς μελλούσης ἀξιοῦν με φωνῆς διὰ τοῦ ἀτενίζειν εἰς ἐμὲ δῆλοι ἦσαν τῆς ὑποσχέσεως τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀπαιτοῦντες. καὶ δὴ οὕτως λέγειν ἠρξάμην· Πολλή τις, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, ἡ διαφορὰ τυγχάνει ἀλη- θείας τε καὶ συνηθείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀλήθεια γνησίως ζητουμένη εὑρίσκεται, τὸ δὲ ἔθος, ὁποῖον ἂν παραληφθῇ, εἴτε ἀληθὲς εἴτε ψευδές, ἀκρίτως ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κρατύνεται, καὶ οὔτε ἀληθεῖ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἥδεται ὁ παραλαβὼν οὔτε ψευδεῖ ἄχθεται. οὐ γὰρ κρίσει, ἀλλὰ προλήψει ὁ τοιοῦτος πεπίστευκεν, γνώμῃ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἀδήλῳ τύχῃ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπιδεδωκὼς ἐλπίδα. καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ῥᾳδίως ἀποδύσασθαι τὴν πάτριον περιβολήν, κἂν πάνυ αὐτῷ δεικνύηται μωρὰ καὶ καταγέλαστος οὖσα. αὐτίκα γοῦν ἐγὼ τὴν πᾶσαν Ἑλλήνων παιδείαν κακοῦ δαίμονος χαλεπωτάτην ὑπόθεσιν εἶναι λέγω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν πολλοὺς θεοὺς εἰσηγήσαντο, καὶ τούτους κα- κοὺς καὶ παντοπαθεῖς, ἵνα ὁ τὰ ὅμοια πράττειν θέλων μηδὲ αἰδῆται (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον), παράδειγμα ἔχων τῶν μυθολογουμένων θεῶν τοὺς κακοὺς καὶ ἀσέμνους βίους. τῷ δὲ μηδὲ αἰδεῖσθαι οὐδὲ ἐλ- πίδα μετανοίας ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐμφαίνει. ἄλλοι δὲ εἱμαρμένην εἰσηγήσαντο, τὴν λεγομένην γένεσιν, παρ' ἣν μηδένα πάσχειν τι ἢ ποιεῖν δύνασθαι. ὁμοίως οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τῷ πρώτῳ ταὐτόν ἐστιν· νομίσας γάρ τις ὅτι παρὰ γένεσιν οὐδεὶς οὔτε πάσχειν οὔτε ποιεῖν ἔχει, ·ᾳδίως ἐπὶ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν ἔρχεται-καὶ ἁμαρτὼν οὐ μεταμελεῖται ἐφ' οἷς ἠσέβηκεν, ἀπολογίαν φέρων ὅτι ὑπὸ γενέσεως αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ἐξηναγκάζετο-καὶ ὡς τὴν γένε- σιν κατορθῶσαι μὴ δυνάμενος, ἐφ' οἷς ἐξαμαρτάνει οὐδὲ τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι ἔχει. ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπρονόητον φορὰν εἰσηγοῦνται, ὡς αὐτομάτως τῶν πάντων περιφερομένων, οὐδενὸς ἐφεστηκότος δεσπότου. ταῦτα δὲ οὕτω νομίζειν, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν, πασῶν δοξῶν τυγχάνει οὖσα χαλεπωτάτη. ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἐφεστῶτος καὶ προνοουμένου καὶ ἑκάστῳ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονέμοντος, πᾶν ὅτι δύνανται διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν εὐκόλως δρῶσιν. ὅθεν οὐ ·ᾳδίως (ἢ τάχα οὐδὲ ὅλως) οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα φρονοῦντες σωφρο- νίζονται· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιστρέφοντα κίνδυνον οὐ προορῶνται. ὁ δὲ τῶν (ὡς ὑμεῖς φατε) βαρβάρων Ἰουδαίων λόγος εὐσεβέστατός ἐστιν, ἕνα πα- τέρα καὶ δημιουργὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εἰσηγούμενος, τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ δίκαιον· ἀγαθὸν μὲν ὡς μεταμελομένοις χαριζόμενον τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, δίκαιον δὲ ὡς ἑκάστῳ μὴ μετανοοῦντι κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν πεπραγμένων ἐπεξιόντα. οὗτος ὁ λόγος, εἰ καὶ μῦθος ὢν τυγχάνει, εὐσεβής γε ὢν οὐκ ἀσύμφορος ἂν εἴη τῷ βίῳ. ἕκαστος γὰρ προσδοκίᾳ τοῦ κριθή- σεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ παντεπόπτου θεοῦ πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον τὴν ὁρ- μὴν λαμβάνει. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀληθὴς εἴη ὁ λόγος, ἀπήλλαξε μὲν τὸν σωφρό-