41

The reason in the whole is unmoved, which is the divine art, which we called nature, being form, but not from matter and form; for what need has it of matter, hot or cold? For the created matter bears this in itself; for fire need not be added for matter to become fire, but reason; which is also no small sign that in animals and plants, the productive reasons are according to nature an abiding reason; and that the reasons according to the forms of the visible things of nature are offspring, that is, of the unmoved and abiding reason according to it. How then is evil in universal nature, when the reasons in creatures are natural, and in no way opposed to the whole nature which is from the good? If, therefore, it has been demonstrated that universal nature is from the good, and that the individual reasons in creatures are not opposed to universal nature, it is manifest that evil is not in nature either; but this is contrary to the beautiful; therefore evil is not, not even in the universal. But the contraries in the species of creation, whether in mixtures, or in animals and the rest, are not contrary to nature for themselves, but for others; and in what they are defectively borne contrary to nature, it is a weakness of that which is according to nature, but this is not evil; it is rather a defect of order.

Of universal nature: He calls the divine nature universal nature. ζ. For if all. All, he says, the reasons of nature, that is the causes according to

which they have come to be and exist, derive from the divine nature, which, as has been said, he calls universal, since from it all things have sprung; and he has called all the things created by God (14S_190> the whole nature. Therefore there is nothing in nature which is wholly opposed to wholes; for what is contrary to the nature of one of the beings is nature for another; and this is good. For every nature, therefore, not to abide in the state in which it was made, is evil; for he said this is a privation of the things of nature, not to fulfill for any cause whatsoever the things for which it was brought forth to generation.

η. § 27. But not in body either: Just as beauty is a symmetry of limbs and parts with a good complexion, so ugliness is an asymmetry of the same.

θ. Cause for the soul: Since some of the philosophers say, that from the irrational part of the soul, mixed with matter and body, the soul, inclining to it, does evil things, as he discussed above, the divine Dionysius excellently resolves the difficulty from the other incorporeal beings and those entirely unmixed with body, who also without a body, through a lack of the good, err.

For evil to subsist alongside: That it is possible for evil to subsist alongside even without a body, as in the case of demons.

And evil for bodies: What is evil. § 28. Or that it is not able to suffer anything in itself: It is reasonable to set out cursorily

the opinions of those who call matter non-being, and how they call it non-being, so that the syllogisms of the divine Dionysius may be understood. They call matter non-being, then, for the following reason; for they say that being, which is in the intelligible worlds, came to be from the first which is under being. Since, therefore, that one is above being, the being from it was called being, another being than being by descent; for the being they speak of, they name the matter of intelligible things, contemplated by reason alone, which they also say is itself form and life, as it were the substrate for the intelligible substances; (14S_192> but the matter in sensible things, as lacking all the things in intelligible things; for it is neither form, nor life itself. And this came to be, as they say, by being, which they said came to be from the first and super-essential; so that, since it is other than being, they do not say that it is being, but non-being; for they say that the descent must go even to the last things, and for this reason they say that matter is other than being and the beautiful, so as not even to be beautiful. Therefore they say that it is nothing in actuality, but is deprived of all the things that happen upon it, such as form and quality; for neither does it form itself into a form, such as

41

ἀκίνητός ἐστι λόγος ὁ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, ὅς ἐστιν ἡ θεία τέχνη, ἥν ἔφημεν φύσιν, εἶδος οὖσα, οὐ μήν ἐξ ὕλης καί εἴδους· τί γάρ αὐτή ὕλης δεῖ, θερμῆς ἤ ψυχρᾶς; ἡ γάρ δεδημιουργημένη ὕλη τοῦτο φέρει ἐν ἑαυτῇ· οὐ γάρ δεῖ πῦρ προσελθεῖν, ἵνα πῦρ ἡ ὕλη γένηται, ἀλλά λόγον· ὅ καί σημεῖόν ἐστι οὐ μικρόν τοῦ καί ἐν τοῖς ζώοις καί τοῖς φυτοῖς, τούς λόγους εἶναι τούς ποιητικούς κατά τήν φύσιν εἶναι λόγον τόν μένοντα· λόγους δέ τούς κατά τάς μορφάς τῶν ὁρωμένων τῆς φύσεως εἶναι γεννήματα, ἤτοι τοῦ κατ' αὐτήν ἀκινήτου καί μένοντος λόγου. Πῶς οὖν ἐν τῇ καθόλου φύσει τό κακόν, τῶν ἐν τοῖς δημιουργήμασι λόγων φυσικῶν ὄντων, καί ἐν οὐδενί ἐναντιουμένων τῇ ὅλῃ φύσει ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ οὔσῃ; Εἰ τοίνυν ἀποδέδεικται τήν καθόλου φύσιν ἐκ τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τούς δέ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν τοῖς δημιουργήμασι λόγους μή ἐναντιοῦσθαι τῇ καθόλου φύσει, πρόδηλον ὡς οὐδέ ἐν φύσει τό κακόν· τοῦτο δέ τῷ καλῷ ἐναντίον· οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἔστι τό κακόν, οὐδέ ἐν τῷ καθόλου. Τά δέ ἐν τοῖς κατ' εἶδος τῆς δημιουργίας ἐναντία, εἴτε ἐν κράσεσιν, εἴτε ἐν ζώοις καί λοιποῖς, οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς εἰσι παρά φύσιν, ἀλλά τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐν οἷς δέ παρά φύσιν πλημμελῶς φέρονται, τοῦ κατά φύσιν ἐστίν ἀσθένεια, οὐ μήν τοῦτο κακόν· κακία δέ τάξεως μᾶλλόν ἐστι.

Τῆς καθόλου φύσεως: Καθόλου φύσιν τήν θείαν φύσιν καλεῖ. ζ. Εἰ γάρ οἱ πάντες. Πάντες, φησίν, οἱ τῆς φύσεως λόγοι, ἤγουν αἱ αἰτίαι καθ'

ἅς γεγόνασι καί εἰσί, παρά τῆς θείας φύσεως ὑπάρχουσιν, ἥν, ὡς εἴρηται, καθόλου καλεῖ, ἐπειδή ἐξ αὐτῆς ἔφυ τά ὅλα· ὅλην δέ φύσιν πάντα τά ὑπό τοῦ Θεοῦ κτισθέντα (14S_190> ἐκάλεσεν. Οὐδέν οὖν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει, ὅπερ ὅλον ὅλοις ἀντίκειται· τό γάρ τινι τῶν ὄντων παρά τήν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἑτέρῳ φύσις ἐστί· τοῦτο δέ ἀγαθόν. Πάσῃ οὖν φύσει τό μή μένειν ἐφ' οἷς γέγονε, κακόν· τοῦτο γάρ ἔφη στέρησιν τῶν τῆς φύσεως, τό μή ἐκτελεῖν καθ' ὁποιανοῦν αἰτίαν τά ἐφ' οἷς παρήχθη πρός γέννησιν.

η. § 27. Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν σώματι: Ὥσπερ τό κάλλος συμμετρία ἐστί μελῶν καί μερῶν μετά εὐχροίας, οὕτως αἶσχος ἀσυμμετρία ἐστί τῶν αὐτῶν.

θ. Αἴτιον τῇ ψυχῇ: Ἐπειδή τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων φασίν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς μέρους, ὕλῃ καί σώματι μεμιγμένου, ρεπούσης ἐπ' αὐτό τῆς ψυχῆς τά κακά πράττειν, ὡς ἀνωτέρω διῆλθεν, παγκάλως ὁ θεῖος ∆ιονύσιος λύει τό ἐπαπόρημα ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἀσωμάτων καί ἀμιγῶν σώματος πάντῃ, οἵ καί δίχα σώματος, ἐλλείψει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλημμελοῦσι.

Παρυφίστασθαι κακίαν: Ὅτι δυνατόν καί ἄνευ σώματος παρυφίστασθαι κακίαν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς δαίμοσι.

Καί σώμασι κακόν: Τί ἐστι κακόν. § 28. Ἥ μηδέ τό πάσχειν δύνασθαι καθ' ἑαυτήν: Εὔλογον ἐπιδρομάδην

ἐκθέσθαι τάς δόξας τῶν λεγόντων τήν ὕλην μή ὄν, καί πῶς καλοῦσιν αὐτήν μή ὄν, ἵνα καί οἱ συλλογισμοί τοῦ θειου ∆ιονυσίου νοηθῶσι. Καλοῦσιν οὖν τήν ὕλην μή ὄν ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου· φασί γάρ, ὅτι τό ὄν, ὅ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς διακόσμοις, ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τοῦ ὑπό τό ὄν ὄντος ἐγένετο. Ἐπεί οὖν ἐκεῖνος ὑπέρ τό ὄν ἐστι, τό ὄν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄν ἐκλήθη, ἕτερον ὄν τοῦ ὄντος καθ' ὑπόβασιν· τό γάρ ὄν, ὅ λέγουσι, τήν τῶν νοητῶν ὕλην ὀνομάζουσι, λόγῳ μόνῳ θεωρητήν, ἥν καἱ αὐτήν εἶδος καί ζωήν φασιν, οἱονεί τό ὑποκείμενον ταῖς νοηταῖς οὐσίαις· (14S_192> τήν δέ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὕλην, ὡς ἐνδεῆ πάντων τῶν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς· οὔτε γάρ εἶδος, οὔτε ζωή αὐτή. Ἐγένετο δέ αὕτη, ὥς φασιν, ὑπό τοῦ ὄντος, ὅν ἔφησαν γενέσθαι ἀπό τοῦ πρώτου καί ὑπερόντος· ὥστε ἕτερον αὐτήν οὖσαν τοῦ ὄντος οὐ λέγουσιν αὐτήν εἶναι ὄν, ἀλλά μή ὄν· φασί γάρ χρῆναι τήν ὑπόβασιν καί μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων ἱέναι, καί διά τοῦτο ἕτερόν φασι τήν ὕλην τοῦ ὄντος καί τοῦ καλοῦ, ὡς μηδέ καλόν εἶναι. Οὐδέν οὖν φασιν αὐτήν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, ἀλλά πάντων ἐστερῆσθαι τῶν ἐπ' αὐτῆς συμβαινόντων, οἷον εἴδους καί ποιότητος· οὔτε γάρ ἑαυτήν μορφοῖ εἰς εἶδος, οἷον