41
The involuntary is that of which the principle is external, with the one who is forced contributing nothing according to his own impulse. And "principle" here means the efficient cause. But it is questioned whether these things are also involuntary, such as the jettisoning of cargo which sailors do when they encounter a storm, or when someone accepts to suffer or do a shameful thing in order to save friends or country. But they seem to be rather voluntary. For this reason the phrase "with the one who is forced contributing nothing according to his own impulse" is added to the definition, for in such cases they themselves voluntarily through their own agency move their instrumental parts and thus throw the cargo into the sea. And similarly also those who endure something shameful or terrible for the sake of a greater good, like Zeno who bit off his own tongue and spat it out at Dionysius the tyrant in order not to reveal the secrets to him at all, and similarly Anaxarchus the philosopher who endured being pounded in a mortar by Nicocreon the tyrant in order not to betray his friends. Therefore, in general, whenever someone chooses the lesser evil either for fear of greater evils, or accepts a lesser evil in hope of a greater good, which cannot otherwise be achieved, he does not undergo an involuntary action or passion; for he acts according to choice and selection, and they are choice-worthy at the time when they are done, though not being choice-worthy in themselves. They are, therefore, mixed, of the involuntary and the voluntary; involuntary in themselves, but voluntary at the time on account of the circumstance. For without the circumstance no one would choose to do these things. And the praise or blame that arises for such actions also makes it clear that they are voluntary. For of involuntary deeds there will be no praise or blame. But it is not easy to distinguish which thing should be chosen instead of which. But for the most part one must choose painful things before shameful ones, as Susanna and Joseph did, but not always; Origen, for instance, in order not to fall into the shame of the Ethiopians, by offering incense, fell from the whole; thus the discernment of such things is not easy. And even more difficult than this is to abide by what has been decided. For the terrible things do not strike in the same way when expected and when brought upon us, but sometimes having made a decision we abandon our decision when we are in terrible circumstances, as has happened with some in the act of martyrdom; for having persevered at the beginning, they gave in toward the end, having become soft in the trial of difficult things. But let no one think that the desire of intemperance or anger are among the involuntary sins, since these too have an external efficient principle; for the beauty of the prostitute drove the one who saw her to intemperance, and the one who provoked stirred the anger. For even if they have an external principle, they themselves act by their own agency and through their instrumental parts, and they do not fall under the definition of the involuntary, since they also provide the cause of the principle for themselves through a bad upbringing, being easily captured by the passions. At any rate, those who do these things are blamed as enduring a voluntary evil. And that it is voluntary is clear, for they take pleasure in the act; but the involuntary was shown to be painful. So much, then, concerning the involuntary by force, but it remains to speak concerning that through ignorance. 30 Concerning the involuntary through ignorance We do many things through ignorance at which we rejoice after the act, as when someone unwillingly kills an enemy, but rejoices at the killing. These things, therefore, and such things they call not-voluntary, but not, however, involuntary either. And again, we do some things through ignorance and we are pained at what has been done. These they called involuntary, all those things which, when done, are followed by pain. Therefore, of things done through ignorance there are two kinds, one the not-voluntary and the other the involuntary. But it is now proposed to speak only about the involuntary, for the not-voluntary is classified rather with voluntary things, being mixed; for it has an involuntary beginning, but a voluntary end, for from the outcome the involuntary has become voluntary. For which reason they also define the involuntary thus: involuntary is that which, besides not being voluntary, is painful and involves regret. Again, it is one thing to do something through ignorance, and another while being ignorant. For if the cause of the ignorance is up to us, we act while being ignorant, but not through ignorance. For the one who is drunk and angry
41
ἀκουσίου ἐστὶν οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου κατ' οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν τοῦ βιασθέντος. ἀρχὴ δὲ εἴρηται ἐνταῦθα ἡ ποιητικὴ αἰτία. ζητεῖται δὲ εἰ καὶ ταῦτα ἀκούσιά ἐστιν, οἷον αἱ ἀποβολαὶ τῶν φορτίων ἃς ποιοῦνται οἱ ναῦται χειμῶνι περιπεσόντες, ἢ ὅταν τις αἰσχρὸν πρᾶγμα καταδέξηται παθεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ σῶσαι φίλους ἢ πατρίδα. ἐοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἑκού σιοι. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ πρόσκειται τῷ ὅρῳ τὸ μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου κατ' οἰκείαν ὁρμὴν τοῦ βιασθέντος, ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἑκόντες αὐτοὶ δι' ἑαυτῶν κινοῦσι τὰ ὀργανικὰ μόρια καὶ οὕτω ῥίπτουσιν εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν τὰ φορτία. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ αἰσχρὸν ἢ δεινόν τι ὑπομένοντες διὰ μεῖζον καλόν, ὡς Ζήνων ὁ ἀποφαγὼν ἑαυτοῦ τὴν γλῶτταν καὶ ἀποπτύσας ∆ιονυσίῳ τῷ τυράννῳ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδ' ὅλως αὐτῷ ἐξειπεῖν τὰ ἀπόρρητα, ὁμοίως καὶ Ἀνάξαρχος ὁ φιλόσοφος ὑπομείνας πτίσσεσθαι ὑπὸ Νικοκρέοντος τοῦ τυράννου ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ προδοῦναι τοὺς φίλους. καθόλου οὖν ὅταν ἢ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν ἕληταί τις τὸ ἔλαττον κακόν, ἢ δι' ἐλπίδα μείζονος καλοῦ καταδέξηταί τις ἔλαττον κακόν, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως κατορθῶσαι, οὐκ ἀκούσιον ὑπομένει πρᾶξιν ἢ πάθος· ποιεῖ γὰρ κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ κατ' ἐκλογήν, καὶ τότε εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ ὅταν πράττωνται, καθ' ἑαυτὰς οὐκ οὖσαι αἱρεταί. εἰσὶν οὖν μικταὶ ἐξ ἀκουσίου καὶ ἑκουσίου· ἀκουσίου μὲν καθ' ἑαυτάς, ἑκουσίου δὲ τότε διὰ περίστασιν. ἄνευ γὰρ περιστάσεως οὐδεὶς ἂν ἕλοιτο ταῦτα πρᾶξαι. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσι γινόμενος ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος ὅτι ἑκούσιαί εἰσιν. ἀκουσίων γὰρ ἔργων οὐδεὶς ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος ἔσται. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ῥᾴδιον διακρῖναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρετέον. δεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πρὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν αἱρεῖσθαι τὰ λυπηρά, ὡς Σωσάννα καὶ Ἰωσὴφ ἐποίησαν, οὐκ ἀεὶ μέντοι· Ὡριγένης γοῦν διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπεσεῖν τῇ αἰσχύνῃ τῇ τῶν Αἰθιόπων ἐπιθύσας τοῦ παντὸς ἐξέπεσεν· οὕτως οὐκ ἔστιν εὔκολος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων διάγνωσις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστι τὸ ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς δόξασιν. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐκπλήσσει τὰ δεινὰ προσδοκώμενα καὶ ἐπαγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε κρίναντες ἐξιστάμεθα τῆς κρίσεως ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς γενόμενοι, ὡς ἐπί τινων συμβέβηκεν ἐν τῷ μαρτυρεῖν· τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ καρτερήσαντες περὶ τὸ τέλος ἐνέδωκαν ἐν τῇ πείρᾳ τῶν χαλεπῶν ἀπομαλακισθέντες. μηδεὶς δὲ νομίσῃ τῆς ἀκολασίας τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τὸν θυμὸν τῶν ἀκουσίων εἶναι πλημμελημάτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔξωθεν ἔχει τὴν ποιητικήν· τό τε γὰρ κάλλος τῆς πόρνης ἐξοίστρησεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκολασίαν τὸν ἑωρακότα, καὶ ὁ παροξύνας ἐκίνησε τὸν θυμόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔξωθεν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ δι' ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῶν ὀργανικῶν μορίων ἐνεργοῦσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσι τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ὁπότε καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἑαυτοῖς παρέχονται διὰ φαύλην ἀγωγὴν ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν ῥᾳδίως αἰχμαλωτιζόμενοι. ψέγονται γοῦν οἱ ταῦτα πράττοντες ὡς ἑκούσιον κακὸν ὑπομένοντες. ὅτι δὲ ἑκούσιόν ἐστι, δῆλον, ἥδονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει· τὸ δὲ ἀκούσιον λυπηρὸν ἐδείχθη. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ ταῦτα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δι' ἄγνοιαν εἰπεῖν ὑπολέλειπται. 30 περὶ τοῦ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου Πολλὰ πράττομεν δι' ἄγνοιαν ἐφ' οἷς μετὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν χαίρομεν, ὡς ὅταν τις ἄκων μὲν ἐχθρὸν φονεύσῃ, χαίρῃ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ φόνῳ. ταῦτ' οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καλοῦσιν οὐχ ἑκούσια, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἀκούσια. καὶ πάλιν πράττομέν τινα δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς γενομένοις λυπούμεθα. ταῦτα ἐκάλεσαν ἀκούσια, ὅσοις πραχθεῖσιν ἐπακολουθεῖ λύπη. τῶν οὖν δι' ἄγνοιαν δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη, ἓν μὲν τὸ οὐχ ἑκούσιον ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀκούσιον. πρόκειται δὲ νῦν εἰπεῖν περὶ μόνου τοῦ ἀκουσίου, τὸ γὰρ οὐχ ἑκούσιον τοῖς ἑκουσίοις μᾶλλον ὑπάγεται, μικτὸν ὑπάρχον· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἀκούσιον ἔχει, τὸ δὲ τέλος ἑκούσιον, ἐξ ἀποβάσεως γὰρ ἑκούσιον γέγονε τὸ ἀκούσιον. διὸ καὶ οὕτως ὁρίζονται τὸ ἀκούσιον· ἀκούσιόν ἐστι τὸ πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἑκούσιον εἶναι ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ. πάλιν ἄλλο μέν ἐστι δι' ἄγνοιάν τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο δὲ ἀγνοοῦντα. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ᾖ τῆς ἀγνοίας τὸ αἴτιον, ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν ποιοῦμεν, οὐ δι' ἄγνοιαν δέ. ὁ γὰρ μεθύων καὶ θυμούμενος