ARTICLE 12

(51) This is an especially rich and decisive Article. It is concerned in large measure with introducing and emphasizing the pre-eminence of the theological virtues, and in showing the ordination and subordination of all the other virtues to these three.

             Keeping in mind what is laid down at the beginning of the Prima Pars concerning the two-fold order of truths knowable about God, it will be seen that the order of naturally known truths is subordinate to the order of those which exceed natural reason. Consequently, God Himself, as the End of the supernatural order, is truly the complete and unique ultimate End of the whole created order; and for this reason, in I-II, 62, 2, St. Thomas tells us that God as He exceeds our natural knowledge, is the Ultimate End of all things. It becomes evident from this that the entire universe, including everything in it of the natural and the supernatural order, is a kind of unit, of which God, as the End of the latter order, is the End, absolutely and completely, and thus He is the object of our beatitude, for we have been raised to the supernatural order through grace, by the merits of Christ.

             We believe by Divine faith that we are ordered to supernatural happiness. However, as Cajetan points out, it is then a matter of rational deduction that there must be supernatural principles in us, that we might elicit proportionately supernatural acts towards the attainment of this end. That this capability perdure throughout life, these principles should likewise endure, that is to say, should reside in us as habits. Thus the theological virtues regard God as their proper and immediate object, and by them man is duly ordered to his ultimate end, which is supernatural beatitude.

             Theologians, following St. Thomas, remark that God is the object of the theological virtues, which are ordered to Him as to their end and object; whereas the other virtues are ordered to God only as their end--they each have their own proper and immediate objects. The virtue of religion is ordered to God as object, in a certain sense, but not properly and immediately, as Aquinas observes in II-II, 81, 5. Also, acquired faith and hope are excluded as true theological virtues, because they do not duly order man to supernatural beatitude. Hence theological virtue in general may be defined as that which, by its own interior act, immediately attains God as He is supernaturally known formally and explicitly. St. Thomas distinguishes the three theological virtues in several places: I-II, 62, 3, II-II, 17, 6; III Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 5; d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, qla. 1; In I Cor. c. 13, lect. 2 and 4. The text in I-II is precise and its doctrine complete:

             "The theological virtues direct man to supernatural beatitude in the same way as man is directed to an end connatural to him by a natural inclination. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are the principle of rational operation, both in speculative as well as in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will, which tends naturally to the good of reason.

             "But both of these are defective as regards the order of supernatural beatitude, according to 1 Cor. 2/9: 'The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God had prepared for them that love Him.' Hence in respect of both the above things, man needed to receive in addition something supernatural, to order him to a supernatural end. First, as regards his intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are grasped by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, with which faith is concerned.--Secondly, the will is ordered to this end, both as to the movement of intention, which tends to that end as something attainable, and this pertains to hope; and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is in some way transformed into that end, and this pertains to charity. For the appetite of each thing is moved and tends naturally to an end connatural to it; and this movement arises from a certain conformity of the thing with its end."--I-II, 62, 3.

             (52) Father Carpenter explains why, in the supernatural order, virtue is necessary not only to bring about an habitual orientation of both intellect and will towards God, but even to make contact with God in this order at all possible: "Hence we find a peculiar necessity for certain new virtues, having no counterparts in the natural order of virtue, which will make that contact both possible and constant. They are three: Faith, which gives certitude to the intellect about the reality of the supernatural ultimate end, and makes it possible for the intellect to accept, though not to comprehend, ultimate truths which it could not otherwise even make contact with, Hope, which gives to the will confidence in the ultimate attainment of a beatitude far above natural needs and capacities; Charity, which effects through the will a direct contact of desire and love between man in a state of grace and God, his ultimate end and beatitude, and maintains a constant orientation of the will towards that ultimate end. They are called 'theological' virtues because they bring man into direct contact with God, and further because, unlike the other supernatural virtues, they have no counterparts in the order of natural morality." Carpenter, op. cit. pp. 136-137.

             (53) "In all things which act for an end, there must be an inclination to the end, and as it were a beginning of the end (already had--inchoationem finis): otherwise they would never (begin to) act for the end.

             "Now the end to which the Divine Bounty has ordered or predestined man, namely, the fruition of Himself, is completely elevated above the faculties of created nature; for 'eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him,' as we read in I Cor. 2/9.

             "Hence man does not have, by his natural powers, a sufficient inclination to this end; and so something must be added to man, whereby he might have an inclination to this end, just as by his natural faculties he has an inclination to an end connatural to himself: and these superadded qualities are called theological virtues, on three counts.

             "First, as to their object; because, since the end to which we are ordered is God himself, the inclination which is required beforehand consists in an operation which is concerned with God Himself.

             "Secondly, as to their cause; because, just as this end is ordered to (be attained by) us by God, not through our natural power, so God alone produces in us the inclination to this end, and thus these are called theological virtues, since they are formed in us by God alone.

             "Thirdly, as to the knowledge of their nature; for since the end is above our natural knowledge, the inclination to the end cannot be known by natural reason, but only by Divine revelation; and thus they are called theological virtues, because they have been revealed to us by the Divine word. And hence the Philosophers knew nothing about them." In III Sent. d. 23; q. 1, a. 4, gla. 3, Sol. 3.

             "Habits are distinguished, not only by their subjects but also by their objects. Therefore, the moral and intellectual virtues are distinguished from each other from the part of their subject, as we have said. But the theological virtues are distinguished from both of these from the part of their object, which is above the natural power of both the intellectual and the moral virtues. Hence, of the theological virtues, one has to do with knowledge, and this is faith, which communicates in this respect with the intellectual virtues; while the others regard the affective part, as does charity, and so it has something in common with the moral virtues."--Ibid., ad 4.

             (54) St. Thomas insists frequently on the pre-eminence of the end in all moral matters--theological as well as philosophical. Thus: "A due end is the chief consideration in virtue (Id quod potissimum est in virtute, est debitus finis): for it is from the end that the notion of the good principally derives. If, therefore, the end were more excellent, even if one should in a given case act quite remissly, his act would still be more virtuous . . . by reason of the greater good aimed at or intended, even though another man might seem more fervent in actual execution."--III C. G. 138.

             "It is apparent that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in acts of the moral virtues.

             "For human happiness is not ordainable to a further end, if it be truly ultimate. But all moral actions are ordered to something else, as is evident from those which are outstanding among them. For acts of fortitude, which are concerned with affairs of war, are ordered to victory and to peace: indeed it would be stupid to go to war merely for its own sake (X Ethics, c. 6, 1177 b)! Similarly, acts of justice are ordered to preserving peace among men, by seeing to it that each man possess his own property in tranquility. And the same is clearly true of all the others. Therefore, the ultimate happiness of man does not consist in moral operations.

             "Further, the moral virtues aim at conserving the mean in interior passions and exterior affairs. But it is impossible that the moderation of passions or of external things be the ultimate end of human life: since these passions and external things are themselves ordained to something else. Hence it cannot be that man's final happiness consists in acts of the moral virtues . . ."--Ibid., ch. 34.

             Now the ends which are proximate and proper to each of the virtues are all ordered and subordinated to beatitude as to their one, universal, ultimate end: "The proper ends of the virtues are ordained to happiness as to their last end."--I-II, 13, 3, ad 1; and: "Even virtue itself, which consists essentially in noble good (bonum honestum) is ordered to something else as its end, namely, to happiness."--II-II, 145, 3. The superiority of the theological virtues is thereby further manifested, because of their close proximity to the end.

             (55) It is important to remember that the division of the virtues is analogous: "When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic concept; although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other animals. But when an analogous term is divided, which may be applied to several things, but to no one before another, there is nothing to prevent one from ranking before another, even as regards the point of the generic concept. Thus the notion of being is applied to substance more principally, in relation to accident. And such is the division of virtue into the various kinds of virtue: since the good of reason is not found in the same way in all things."--I-II, 61, 1 ad 1. In his Comment in I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 1, St. Thomas indicates that the analogy here is secundum esse et non secundum intentionem, or what is called "analogy of inequality," a most powerful analogy, persistent throughout the whole of created being; although it cannot exist between God and creatures, because there is no such agreement between them secundum intentionem: cf. In I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 4 c. Nevertheless, the scale of the virtues, explained by St. Thomas in I-II, 61, 5, is based to some extent on a sort of exemplarism which agrees in some part with this type of analogy, although formally and properly it pertains to what is called "analogy of attribution." This point was not fully developed in the doctrine of St. Thomas; but the principles for its solution are contained in Thomistic metaphysics and theology. It is a difficult, technical problem which need not distract the student or beginner.

             (56) The intimate and immediate relation between sanctifying grace and the theological virtues is at once apparent. "So close is it, indeed, that the great Master of the Sentences, Peter the Lombard, would admit no difference between them. It was in view of this that he formulated his famous Augustinian definition of virtue previously referred to, which might almost equally well serve as a definition of grace in that grace implies, fundamentally, a power of supernatural operation as do all initiative habits. This close relation is especially marked in the case of Charity, for grace must almost inevitably be expressed in terms of love. It presupposes God's love for man; it causes a man to be pleasing, i.e., lovable in the sight of God; and it implies an active recognition of the gift by way of a return love. But this quality of lovableness implied in grace must belong primarily and directly to the essence of the soul and only indirectly to the faculties, for one is loved for oneself primarily, not for one's faculties. It is not immediately productive of operation, but is related to operation through the medium of faculties (Cf. Comm. Sent. II, 26, 1, 4). At the same time this close alliance of grace and charity indicates the fundamental importance of Charity itself, for if grace connotes a supernatural ultimate end and can only be expressed in terms of love, it is clear that charity is the essential means of attaining that end which grace makes, so to speak, connatural to man. Therefore all virtues even Faith and Hope somehow depend for their efficacy on Charity." Carpenter, op. cit. pp. 137-38 The primacy of charity and its role in the formation and ordering of all the virtues is treated at length in the second Disputed Question of the series on the virtues, entitled On Charity. Cf. briefly, I-II, 62, 2 ad 3.

             (57) Note that there are two kinds of infused habits: (1) for all men: sanctifying grace and the virtues; (2) for certain men, according to their state of life, for the edification of others, or for a particular task: the gratuitously given graces, such as prophecy, the gift of tongues, etc. This division is in large part the basis of St. Thomas' division of the II-II.

             (58) The order among the theological virtues is discussed in I-II, 62, 4; and stated briefly in III Sent. d. 23, q. 2, a. 5: "A thing can be said to precede another thing in time and in nature.--In time all the virtues are simultaneous, because they are divinely infused at the same time;--but in nature, the order of the virtues must be established from their acts, as is the order of the powers of the soul, which are simultaneously concreated with it.

             "Now an act of faith consists in knowledge of the truth, which the love of God, which is demanded in all the other virtues, presupposes. And so faith, as regards what is proper to it as such, is prior to all the other virtues according to nature."

             "Just as the end is prior in intention and posterior in being; so, by as much as a thing is closer to the end, it is prior in intention, although it may be posterior in being, whether in time or in nature. And so hope, according as it approaches closer to the attainment of the end than faith, precedes faith in intention (in proposito), but not in being. And in this respect hope is said to lead to faith, not that which already is, but that which is proposed in the future; as when eternal goods are proposed to someone, first, he wills them; secondly he wills to cling to them through love; thirdly, he wills to hope for them; fourthly, he wills to believe them, so that believing he might already hope, love, and possess. Hence in being faith is prior."--Ibid., ad 4.

             "Although faith presupposes (the act of) will, still, it does not presuppose a will already loving, but intent on loving, and this in so far as it is faith; because the affection cannot be fixed through love on something on which the intellect has not fixed through assent: just as it cannot tend by desire to something which the intellect does not previously apprehend.

             "Hence the natural order of these acts is that God is first apprehended--which pertains to the knowledge preceding faith--then one wills to attain to Him, then one wills to love Him, and so on, as we said above."--Ibid, ad 5.

             (59) There are a great number of questions concerning the theological virtues which have not been touched in these notes, chiefly because they are not raised or alluded to in the text of our Disputed Question. However, it is interesting to consider the reasons given by Cajetan that theology is not a theological virtue: "Our theology falls short in two respects of the nature of a theological virtue. First, since theology differs from faith in this, that faith perfects the intellect with respect to the act of assent; while theology does so with respect to the act of knowing (sciendi), which imports assent and evidence. However, the act of assent is made perfect by faith, whereas the act of science is not made perfect by the science of theology: from which it follows that theology is not a virtue, but faith is: for a virtue should make its work good. Secondly, because of the, difference between them in the fact that the assent of faith terminates immediately in God, whereas the knowledge of theology is terminated in God mediately. For we believe God revealing not by believing in another: but, on the other hand, we know God by knowing vestiges of Him or Him in His vestiges. And so, although theology and faith agree in object, still they differ in their manner of attaining it, one mediately and the other immediately, according to the nature of each one's act."--In II-II, 17, 5 n. 2.

             (60) Aristotle enumerates, classifies, and describes a host of virtues in his Nichomachean Ethics. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that, after considering the end or goal of human life, the Aristotelian critique of the means to attain this end consists almost entirely in an inquiry into the existence, nature, and distinction of virtues. The Philosopher distinguishes virtues according to object and subject, thus:

A. Concerning operations

 (only one virtue) in the will    justice

B. Concerning passions

 1. fear and daring in the irascible appetite fortitude

 2. anger   in the irascible appetite meekness

 3. pleasures of

    touch   in the concupiscible appetite temperance

 4. honors

  (a) fair  in the concupiscible appetite modesty

  (b) great  in the irascible appetite  magnanimity

 5. wealth

  (a) moderate in the concupiscible appetite liberality

  (b) great  in the irascible appetite magnificence

 6. affability  in the concupiscible appetite friendship

 7. manifestation of

    one's thoughts in the concupiscible appetite veracity

 8. games   in the concupiscible appetite eutropelia

             There are many others for which, Aristotle says, no name has been found (cf. II Ethics c. 7). The British scholar, Prof. W. D. Ross, gives a complete tabulation of the moral virtues treated by Aristotle in his survey of the Peripatetic's thought, Aristotle, Methuen, London, 1930, p. 203. This table is reproduced in A History of Philosophy, Copleston, S. J., Vol. 1, Newman Press, Westminster, Md. 1948, p. 341, note 3.

             (61) Again, the cardinal virtues demand a specific study by themselves; hence Aquinas has devoted an entire question in the Summa to them, I-II, q. 61, and considers them as well as III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, and in a profound and splendidly ordered Disputed Question which bears the title On the Cardinal Virtues. We may note here that these virtues are called cardinal, not in respect to the theological, but as regards other human virtues, as St. Thomas indicates in the present Article, ad 24, in the text above.